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My research is focused on investigating the socio-political processes taking place within 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Tanzania.  I draw on a political 
ecology approach in an investigation of the politics of struggles over natural resources, their 
management and the benefits that can be derived from this.  I bring together theories of policy 
processes, African politics and scale into an examination of power within two case studies of 
CBNRM from the wildlife and forestry sectors.  I carry out a comparative analysis of these case 
studies, employing a qualitative methodology based on semi-structured interviews, focus groups, 
participatory activities, participant observation and document analysis.   
 
My research is clustered around three core themes. Firstly, I trace the process of policy reform 
that introduced CBNRM in both the forest and wildlife sectors, and examine the differences 
between the governance systems prescribed in policy as a result of these processes.  The contrasts 
between the two sectors in Tanzanian CBNRM are important and multiple.  Different policy 
pathways were adopted, relating to the distinct political economies of forest and wildlife 
resources and their politicisation within the context of power devolution for CBNRM.  The 
prescribed governance systems in the two sectors contain important differences in the processes 
by which local communities can apply to participate in CBNRM, the mechanisms of revenue 
distribution, and the ways in which power is devolved to the local level.   
 
Secondly I examine the implementation of these prescribed governance systems and their 
performance in reality through an exploration of the configurations of power set out in CBNRM, 
and the struggles that take place around these in ‘politics of scales’ as actors attempt to benefit 
from CBNRM.   I examine the ways the governance systems have been adopted and adapted from 
those set out in CBNRM policy.  I argue that the distinctions between the prescribed governance 
systems in the two sectors produce separate contexts of re-configuration into the performed 
governance systems within the case studies.  However, I also argue that while the contexts are 
specific to each sector, both the case studies revealed the same underlying socio-political process 
of struggles over power to both manage and benefit from natural resources.  These struggles to 
control and benefit from CBNRM are closely linked to the unequal distribution of benefits that 
were witnessed in both case studies. 
 
Finally I examine the performance of CBNRM as an integration of systems of power set out in 
policy and hidden, often unacknowledged, local contours of power.  I address the themes of how 
the reality of CBNRM differs from that set out in policy, examine the processes ongoing within 
the projects that permit and maintain elite capture and unequal distribution of benefits, and 
investigate the socio-political processes of corruption taking place within devolved environmental 
management.  I argue that the struggles over power, combined with hidden aspects, especially 
neopatrimonialism, local moral economy and the cultural context of corruption, are central to 
these unequal outcomes and the capture of benefits by a small group of individuals. 
 
My research highlights that power, the politics of its devolution to the local level, the struggles 
that take place around it, and its subtle, hidden forms, lie at the heart of gaining further 
understanding of the ways in which policies develop, the unexpected outcomes they produce and 
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 “If community conservation is the answer in Africa, what is the question?” 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001a: 193) 
In this introduction, I present my research agenda.  I aim to justify this research focus and to 
show what it is that researchers should be asking about community conservation projects.   
My research, presented in this thesis, is concerned with the socio-political complexities of 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) as it is currently being 
implemented in rural Tanzania.  CBNRM is a form of community conservation which has 
been widespread across sub-Saharan African, and is particularly important in Tanzania, 
where it is one of two major national policies for community conservation, but remains 
relatively little studied.  Since the 1980s, the varied programmes and types of projects within 
community conservation, including CBNRM, have grown to become a new orthodoxy 
(Hulme and Murphree, 2001a), but it is not without its critics and the results of three decades 
of community conservation have left many disappointed (e.g. Brandon et al., 1998; Terborgh, 
1999).  In this thesis, I argue that research needs to focus on understanding the social, 
institutional and political dimensions of CBNRM to add depth of insight into the (often 
unexpected) outcomes.  I position my research in this field, as an in-depth study of two 
CBNRM case study projects, one in the wildlife sector and the other in forestry. 
I begin by discussing the paradigm shift to a community approach to conservation, its 
historical development, justifications and the foundational concepts on which all types of 
community conservation are based.  In 1.2, I then focus on the core characteristics of 
CBNRM within this broader paradigm of community conservation.  In 1.3, I review the 
literature discussing whether or not CBNRM ‘works’ and the assertion that CBNRM is in 
crisis.  Finally in 1.4 and 1.5 I outline a research agenda for CBNRM that introduces socio-
political processes and power as a lens for understanding the reality of CBNRM. 
1.1 People and Conservation: The Premise and Promise of Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management 
The term community conservation is applied to a broad spectrum of approaches that are 
centred around “ideas, policies, practices and behaviours that seek to give those who live in 
rural environments greater involvement in managing the natural resources...and/or greater 
access to benefits derived from those resources” (Hulme and Murphree, 2001a: 4).  Such 
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approaches, whilst varied, began to emerge in the 1980s, and by the 1990s had become a 
standard model of conservation programmes (Leach et al., 1997a; Fabricius, 2004; Hutton et 
al., 2005).  This represented a dramatic shift in conservation ideology and practice. 
Historically conservation had been dominated by a  protectionist model of conservation, 
which sought to remove the influence of people from wild spaces and safeguard natural 
resources under the management of the state (Leach et al., 1997a; Adams and Hulme, 2001a).  
The Protected Area (PA) model, in which areas of land are set aside for protection and 
conservation purposes, dominated conservation efforts.  Whilst PAs encompass multiple 
strategies to delimit land for conservation purposes, the national park, first introduced at 
Yellowstone in the USA in 1872, and the productive nature reserve, first introduced in 
colonial India, are the typical expressions of this model (Barton, 2001; Adams, 2004).  These 
ideas reflect the conceptual separation of people from nature, contrasting nature to the 
‘civilised’ spaces which people inhabit, and advocate protecting wilderness by creating wild, 
undisturbed spaces from which human impact has been removed (Marsh, 1865; Adams and 
Hulme, 2001a; Pretty, 2002; Neumann, 2004a).  People, and the ways in which they used 
such lands and natural resources, did not fit comfortably into this construction of wild nature; 
conservation narratives identified these people as deadly hunters and poachers, pitched 
against sentient, innocent and scared animals in a ‘war for biodiversity’ that threatened these 
wild spaces (Neumann, 2004a).  Colonial narratives of the ignorant ‘noble savage’, 
particularly with reference to hunting and forest management (MacKenzie, 1987; Barton, 
2001), alongside the reification of Western scientific knowledge for effective management, 
created powerful arguments and justifications for the removal of natural spaces into state-
managed PAs and the exclusion of local people who lacked the knowledge to manage these 
spaces effectively (Adams and Hulme, 2001a).  Conservation became dominated by 
narratives that pitched people against nature, therefore (Peluso, 1993).   
Whilst PAs still form the backbone of conservation efforts to this day, conservation 
developed a ‘human face’ (Bell, 1987) and, from the 1970s, new narratives of community 
conservation “stressed the need not to exclude local people, either physically from PAs or 
politically from the conservation policy process, but to ensure their participation” (Hutton et 
al., 2005: 342).  This paradigm shift to community conservation was based on several lines of 
argument. Firstly, in a context of increasing concern over human impacts on the biosphere, 
extinction rates, the global scale of environmental issues, and arguments that conservation 
must move beyond the borders of PAs, protectionist conservation came under criticism for its 
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high costs, inefficiency and poor results  (see Western et al., 1994; Adams, 2004; Fabricius et 
al., 2004; Adams, 2009).  Secondly, the rise of community conservation narratives drew on 
ideas of the economic impacts of PAs on local communities and the exacerbation of poverty 
resulting from biodiversity conservation (Western and Wright, 1994; Sunderlin et al., 2005).  
The impoverishing impacts of PAs were highlighted through the polarisation of costs and 
benefits at the local and national/international levels respectively (Ferraro, 2002), generating 
increased concerns over the human rights impacts of PAs, especially forced evictions and 
militaristic management (Neumann, 2004a), and drawing attention to the social impacts 
issues arising from these (Neumann, 1998; Brockington, 2002; Attfield et al., 2004).  
Accounts of conservation and PAs also highlighted the invalidity of arguments that removed 
people from PAs, highlighting the socially-constructed nature of concepts such as wilderness 
and pristine landscapes free from human influence, and the political motivations for state 
control of natural resources and the annexation of land for conservation purposes (Neumann, 
1998; Scott, 1998; Neumann, 2001).   
The rapid rise and adoption of community conservation was also a question of context and 
timing, however (Hutton et al., 2005).  By tying together conservation and poverty reduction 
objectives, community conservation narratives brought conservation in line with ideas about 
sustainable development in the 1980s (Roe, 1991; Adams and Hulme, 2001b).  The principle 
of integrated conservation and development and the ultimate objective of sustainable 
development was enshrined in the Brundtland Report (1987) and the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, held in Rio in 1992 (Western et al., 1994; Adams et al., 
2004; Hutton et al., 2005).  This integration of conservation and development objectives has 
often been termed a ‘win-win’ solution and ‘pro-poor’ conservation (Adams et al., 2004), that 
represents major changes in both conservation and development discourses that were taking 
shape during the 1970s and 1980s (Roe, 2008). 
The shift to the incorporation of people in nature conservation and the management of natural 
resources drew heavily upon the paradigm of community participation from within the field 
of development, which called for “rural people’s direct involvement in development activities 
while at the same time promoting both economic and social development” (Wainwright and 
Wehrmeyer, 1998: 933).  This shift in development thinking away from state-led, top down 
and technocentric development that dominated the development era post World War II was 
described as a shift from ‘things’ to ‘people’ (see Escobar, 1995; Leys, 1996).  The new 
paradigm was conceptualised as ‘bottom-up development’ (Chambers, 1983; Chambers, 
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1997; Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Parfitt, 2004; Williams, 2004a).  Participatory development 
emerged as a backlash against the failures of state-led development programmes (Pieterse, 
1998), but was also undoubtedly a consequence of the emerging interests in the capacity of 
local communities to manage natural resources, specifically the development of common-
pool resource theories (see 2.1.2; Ostrom, 1990), but also the new international policy agenda 
and the amalgamation of neo-classical economics and liberal democratic theory in 
neoliberalism (Virtanen, 2005).   
Neoliberalism “revolves around the restructuring of the world to facilitate the spread of free-
markets1” (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 433).  Neoliberalism is a broad term with multiple 
meanings, but which is synonymous with both deregulation and, in later forms, the 
emergence of hybrid forms of environmental governance (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brooks et 
al., 2006; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Tacconi, 2007; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; 
Brockington, 2008).  Under neoliberalism, businesses, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and communities, are seen to share responsibility for conservation with the state 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002; Igoe and Brockington, 2007).  Neoliberal forms of environmental 
governance presented an opportunity for the state to save financial resources through 
devolution, and was also supported by populist justifications for community participation 
which argued that local communities are best-placed to conserve natural resources (with 
external support) because they already use and rely upon them (Dressler et al., 2010).  
Through market mechanisms and new forms of environmental governance, neoliberalism 
promised “a world in which it is possible to eat one’s conservation cake and have 
development dessert too” (Grandia, 2007 in Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 434).  Community 
conservation was supported by neoliberal arguments that ‘win-win’ scenarios for 
conservation and development are possible; for example it was argued that the development 
of ecotourism would open up conservation spaces to tourism markets and generate revenue 
for investment in conservation and development, creating a sustainable system of continuous 
benefits (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). 
The confluence of these factors during the 1980s set the scene for the emergence of a new 
paradigm of community conservation which drew on the ascendance of neoliberalism, the 
inclusion and participation of local communities in bottom-up development and the 
                                                 
1 The ‘New Policy Agenda’ for foreign aid emphasised the role of market mechanisms, rather than state 
planning, to correctly set the economic incentives necessary to achieve policy aims, including conservation 
(Hutton et al., 2005). 
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integration of conservation and development objectives.  Following the institutionalisation of 
community approaches to conservation at the international level, for example in the World 
Congresses on National Parks and Protected Areas in 1982 and 1992, a plethora of large-
scale attempts at community conservation emerged, including the Man and Biosphere 
Programme,  Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (see Brandon and Wells, 
1992; Wells, 1998), and ‘conservation with development’ projects (Hutton et al., 2005). 
Community conservation, however, is a term that covers a wide spectrum of approaches that 
vary from PA outreach to devolved natural resource management, and can be distinguished 
by the values they place on nature and the powers devolved to communities (see Adams and 
Hulme, 2001b; Barrow and Murphree, 2001; Hulme and Murphree, 2001b; Adams and 
Hutton, 2007).  Within this spectrum of community conservation, CBNRM is an approach 
that focuses on conservation for use values, alongside the devolution of power to manage 
natural resources to the level of the participating community, as discussed in the next section 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001b).   
1.2 People, Benefits and Power: Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management 
The core principles of CBNRM emerged “out of a desire to rectify the human costs 
associated with coercive conservation...to return the stewardship of biodiversity and natural 
resources to local communities through participation, empowerment and decentralization” 
Dressler et al.  (2010: 5).  My focus is therefore upon approaches that involve power sharing, 
not just benefit sharing (Charnley and Poe, 2007) and I use the following three characteristics 
to define a CBNRM approach: (1) the inclusion of local communities in conservation 
practice, specifically through the devolution of management rights and responsibilities to the 
local level; (2) the central aim of sustainable use of resources in such projects (i.e. 
anthropocentric and utilisation values of nature); (3) the incorporation of economic benefits at 
the local level to compensate for the costs of conservation and further incentivise it (Adams 
and Hulme, 2001a; Hulme and Murphree, 2001b).  CBNRM was the most widely 
implemented form of community conservation across southern Africa in the 1990s, and it 
focused almost exclusively on the management of wildlife resources and the generation of 
revenue through hunting (Fabricius et al., 2004).  CBNRM later broadened to incorporate the 
management of other natural resources, and has become a widely implemented approach in 
the forestry and non-timber forest products sectors (Hutton et al., 2005).  In this thesis I 
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employ the term CBNRM in an investigation both the wildlife and forestry sectors in 
Tanzania.   
The term CBNRM remains most commonly associated with wildlife programmes, such as 
Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE; Murphree, 1996), but is entirely appropriate to the study of community 
forestry, which Charnley & Poe  (2007) define according to the same three characteristics.  
There is a clear issue of terminology surrounding CBNRM, including a variety of approaches 
claiming to be CBNRM and an equally large variety of approaches that can be classified as 
CBNRM but are not labelled as such (Roe et al., 2009).  I follow a definition of CBNRM that 
alongside these three key components, “inherently means local groups of people 
(‘communities’) managing resources in an active manner and with some degree of formal (de 
jure) or informal (de facto) control or tenure over those resources (see 2.1.3; Roe et al., 
2009).  The term is uncommon in West and Central Africa, where ‘gestion de terroir’ or 
sustainable resource management approaches have been more widely implemented (Roe et 
al., 2009).  In East Africa the defining characteristics of CBNRM are more commonly 
practiced, but often fall under sectored policies of ‘community-based conservation’ in 
wildlife and ‘participatory forest management’ in forestry (Roe et al., 2009). 
Both community conservation and CBNRM in the developing world vary widely in their 
characteristics (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Shackleton et al., 2010).  
For example, whilst East Africa’s programmes have focused very much around the existing 
PA network, in Southern Africa there has been a larger focus on private land in community 
conservation (Barrow et al., 2001).  Within the forestry sector, distinct policies have 
developed in several examples of national policy reform to incorporate CBNRM, including 
Nepal’s high profile Community Forest User Groups, Community-Based Forest Management 
in Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi and Uganda (Charnley and Poe, 2007).  In the 
wildlife sector, Namibia is heralded as one of the most successful examples of CBNRM 
through its Communal Conservancy Programme, which devolves broad and secure 
management rights for natural resources to local communities, who retain full revenue from 
diverse income sources, including hunting, tourism and non-timber forest products (Roe et 
al., 2009).  In 1999 a report by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
reported the devolution of authority to manage forest natural resources to the local level had 
begun in over 50 countries (cited in Agrawal, 2001).   
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CAMPFIRE is an excellent example of a model CBNRM approach, which has been highly 
praised for its innovativeness and for its commitment to decentralised authority (Jones, 2006).  
This praise has been accompanied by equal measures of criticisms however (see 1.3).  
CAMPFIRE provides a good example of the governance systems and management structures 
typical of CBNRM projects; Village and Ward Development Committees are set up, which, 
in theory, empower the local community and enable them to derive benefits from natural 
resources by entering into contracts with private investors (most commonly hunting and 
photoraphic tourism operators; Murombedzi, 2003). 
CAMPFIRE follows the market-based approach of the CBNRM model by focusing 
particularly upon the management of high-value wildlife resources (Songorwa et al., 2000), 
which are integrated into markets as consumptive and non-consumptive resources, to provide 
economic benefits and incentives for sustainable use to the local communities (Jones, 2006).  
Market-based approaches within community conservation and CBNRM became much more 
common in the 1990s, leading to what Hulme & Murphree (1999) termed a ‘new 
conservation’ that has been popular in both the wildlife and forestry sectors due to the high 
value of these resources.  Such a relationship between CBNRM and markets is an important 
development, described by Dressler et al. (2010: 6) as a process of “perverse hybridiz[ation] 
with wider neoliberal structuring”.  Multiple strategies have been employed in community 
conservation to channel benefits from conservation to local communities, including 
compensation and the initiation of alternative livelihood strategies (Turner et al., 2004), but 
within those that emphasise sustainable use and the devolution of power over natural resource 
management to the local level, this market-based approach has been key (Magome and 
Fabricius, 2004).  This type of CBNRM has placed a lot of emphasis on creating 
sustainability through nature ‘paying its way’, and ensuring that the full costs of conservation 
can be covered, including the social costs  (Smith and Scherr, 2003).  CBNRM became an 
excellent example of neoliberal conservation therefore, through its fostering of close 
relationships with the private sector and especially natural resources and tourism markets, 
and through producing a hybrid form of environmental governance that focuses upon 
merging neoliberal ideas of private markets with populisms arguments for devolved 
governance (Peck and Tickell, 2002).    
In the United Republic of Tanzania, CBNRM has followed this market-based approach and 
implemented twin policies in the wildlife and forestry sectors (see 3.4).  These are called 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) 
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respectively, and it is these policies and the implementation that are under consideration in 
this thesis. 
1.3 From Theory to Practice: Mixed Results, Disenchantment and the Crises 
of CBNRM 
 “For all the idealism inherent in CBNRM, it is never actually ideal in practice.” 
(Dressler et al., 2010:6) 
As CBNRM became increasingly popular and present around the world, debates over how to 
balance the objectives and needs of conservation and development within CBNRM, and 
community conservation approaches more widely, developed rapidly over the 1990s 
(Büscher and Dressler, 2007).  Criticisms of the community conservation paradigm have been 
aimed at its ideology, the assumptions made and its implementation, and have often been 
focused on the incompatibility of people and nature (see Barrett and Arcese, 1995; Songorwa 
et al., 2000), the need for rigidly protected conservation areas, the moral imperative of 
biodiversity conservation, the crisis of biodiversity decline and the myth of eco-friendly local 
communities (Büscher and Dressler, 2007).  Such critiques and criticisms have led many to 
identify a trend of going ‘back to the barriers’ (Hutton et al., 2005), a return to fortress 
conservation, which Büscher & Dressler (2007) refer to as the neoprotectionist turn.  
Criticisms of CBNRM have been part of this neoprotectionist turn.  Whilst the promises of 
CBNRM made it the “darling of funding agencies” (Shackleton et al., 2010: 2), reports from 
studies of CBNRM in practice often showed that its twin objectives have not been met and/or 
not balanced, producing a crisis of CBNRM. 
Evidence from CBNRM projects implemented around the world since the 1980s is mixed and 
many have expressed disappointment with the outcomes and disillusionment with the 
ideology (Hutton et al., 2005; Jones, 2006; Roe, 2008).  Case studies have highlighted the 
diversity in objectives regarding conservation and development within such approaches and 
identify failures to deliver the expected outcomes for either conservation or development 
(Hackel, 1999; Sundar, 2001; Francis and James, 2003; Berkes, 2004; Hutton et al., 2005; 
Selfa and Endter-Wada, 2008).  It has become accepted that win-win scenarios in reality 
usually consist of a set of trade-offs between conservation and development (McShane et al., 
2011).   
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Whilst some individual projects remain celebrated examples, others never get off the ground, 
some fall into obscurity and some are seen as catastrophic failures.  CAMPFIRE has 
produced several extremely successful examples of local benefits in terms of both revenues 
generated and resulting development (e.g. the Masoka example in Murombedzi, 2001).  
However, the complex nature of interpreting the results from CBNRM is clear from 
CAMPFIRE: Frost & Bond (2008) found that between 1989 and 2001, across Zimbabwe the 
revenue generated amounted to over $20 million transferred to participating communities.  
However, this impressive figure hides large inequalities between the amounts generated in 
different projects, wherein just 12 of the participating 37 districts generated an overwhelming 
97% of these revenues (Frost and Bond, 2008). CAMPFIRE has not generated significant 
benefits everywhere it is implemented, but success was identified as concentrated in specific 
areas with small, homogenous communities combined with high value, desirable game 
hunting opportunities (Bond, 2001; Jones, 2006).  Furthermore the CAMPFIRE example and 
other studies of CBNRM have shown that the predicted win-win outcomes are often not 
apparent, or disappointingly small, especially at the level of the individual household 
(Magome and Fabricius, 2004; Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009).  Asking 
questions about how much revenue is generated from CBNRM is clearly not enough to try to 
understand the complexities of its implementation or its outcomes. 
Generating revenue from CBNRM is one side of the battle for development objectives and 
many investigations into CBNRM have argued that getting this revenue to the community 
level is another.  The CAMPFIRE projects often had their revenue taxed at the regional level 
at a rate of 50% (Bond, 2001).  Beyond this, local people’s participation and the devolution 
of power in such projects has been repeatedly questioned (Gibson and Marks, 1995; 
Gillingham, 1998; Murombedzi, 1999; Goldman, 2003).  The outcomes of CBNRM for 
conservation objectives are no clearer.  Whilst many hail the increase in the area of land 
under some form of protected status through CBNRM as a major success of the approach, 
others argue that the influence upon people’s attitudes towards hunting or other illegal uses of 
natural resources, and wider conservation have not necessarily been changed by the 
introduction of community benefit schemes through CBNRM (e.g. Gillingham and Lee, 
1999).  Gibson & Marks’ (1995) study of CBNRM in Zambia concluded that the tactics of 
hunting had changed, shifting to alternative areas and alternative species in response to the 
introduction of CBNRM, but the incentives that led people to hunt remained unchanged.  It is 
clear that assumptions about how CBNRM works in practice often ignore the politics of 
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power devolution and of the costs, benefits and balance between conservation and 
development for the people participating in CBNRM.  There are ongoing debates about the 
ways communities have been portrayed within CBNRM ideology and strategy.  This topic is 
discussed in further detail in 2.1.2, but it is important to note that a key area of research has 
begun to identify problems and look at how CBNRM takes place at the local level.  The 
issues of elite capture by wealthy groups and individuals, and unequal distribution of costs 
and benefits within a community has been widely identified (e.g. Songorwa et al., 2000; 
Goldman, 2003; Hadiz, 2004; Meshack et al., 2006).   
CBNRM remains a leading strategy in the conservation of natural resources around the 
world, is aligned with the global paradigm of sustainable development and has received 
countless amounts of funding and effort over its history, yet its results are generally mixed, 
often disappointing and little-understood (Dressler et al., 2010).  In section 1.4, I outline a 
research agenda for CBNRM that focuses specifically upon understanding the complex 
nature of implementation of such an approach.  Research must focus on investigating the 
politics of natural resource management because natural resources, their management, the 
communities that undertake this and the changes in state-society relations that this involves 
are all political in their nature (Campbell and Vainio-Matila, 2003; Blaikie and Springate-
Baginski, 2007).  Sikor & Nguyen (2007) provide a clear example of this kind of research 
agenda in their study of the unequal distribution of benefits within CBNRM in Vietnam’s 
forestry sector.  They highlight two critical areas for further research: (1) the political-social-
economic context in which the devolution of rights to local communities to manage natural 
resources takes place; and (2) to investigate the clear patterns of costs and benefits at the local 
level resulting from locally-specific contexts of rights and access to natural resources.  My 
research responds to these priorities, and I further argue that to develop our understanding of 
the complex outcomes that continue to result from CBNRM, research must address questions 
of the socio-political processes taking place within CBNRM projects. 
1.4 The Socio-Politics of Natural Resource Management: A Research Agenda 
My research agenda is anchored in a belief that natural resource management is intrinsically 
and inescapably political.  This political nature is often left unrecognised and de-politicised 
by focusing instead on technical aspects of policy or project implementation, or what 
Ferguson  (1990) refers to as the ‘anti-politics machine’.  Anti-politics serves to simplify 
complex socio-political issues and simultaneously legitimise the work of conservation and 
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development as outside of politics through ‘mobilizing metaphors’ such as participation, 
good governance and ownership (Büscher, 2010).  Issues such as elite capture, the 
exacerbation of poverty through CBNRM and undesirable outcomes for conservation are 
often explained away as poor technocratic policy design, improper implementation or a lack 
of political will to devolve power to local communities (Hadiz, 2004).  I argue that a better 
understanding must focus on the workings of CBNRM, move beyond naive assumptions as to 
how it works in practice and apply an explicitly socio-political lens to investigate the 
processes at work around natural resource management that lead to these outcomes.  
There is a large focus within CBNRM studies on the economic benefits being channelled to 
the local community, and is often used as a benchmark of success and failure within these 
projects (Murphree, 2000; Songorwa et al., 2000; Murombedzi, 2001; Brockington, 2002; 
Murombedzi, 2003; Murphree, 2005).  However, there has been little focus upon 
relationships between different stakeholders involved in CBNRM, power relations, rights, 
equity and justice (Ribot, 1999; Shackleton et al., 2010).  Questions need to be asked about 
the socio-political processes that govern how money is distributed and used, how decisions 
are made and how inequalities remain unchanged.  The crisis of CBNRM lies in the need to 
understand the ‘how’ of governance processes across multiple levels (Büscher and Dressler, 
2007).  It is clear that in order to understand the successes and failures and the unexpected 
outcomes of CBNRM, attention must be paid to several socio-political factors including the 
nature of policies for management of natural resources, the governance systems and rules of 
natural resource use that they impose on communities for their management, and the socio-
political nature of that management within the communities.  This research agenda must also 
incorporate an investigation of the micro-politics in CBNRM and situate such practices 
within political economy and local context, therefore (Büscher and Dressler, 2007; Büscher, 
2010; Dressler et al., 2010).   
CBNRM is a process of policy reform that necessarily involves the devolution of power from 
the state to the local level, mandating communities with the authority to manage natural 
resources and to derive benefits from this.  Power is a central theme in the socio-politics of 
natural resource management, therefore.  There are two clear areas relating to power that 
require further investigation: the first relates to power devolution, and the complex reality of 
how this is being implemented.  If CBNRM begins with the devolution of power, we must 
investigate how this power is devolved, the politics involved in this process and what it 
means for the communities that take on the responsibility of managing such natural resources 
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(see 2.1.1); the second revolves around communities that participate in CBNRM, and 
explores questions relating to who such communities are and how they manage natural 
resources.  If the management of natural resources is intrinsically political, there is no reason 
why their management at the local, rather than the state level is any less political (see 2.1.2).   
In this thesis I aim to investigate the ways in which CBNRM is driving socio-political 
struggles at the local level for access to and benefits from natural resources.  Here again 
power is a core theme, based on the idea that the devolution of power over natural resource 
management takes place within existing and complex local systems of power.  Kumar’s 
(2002) study of Joint Forest Management in India and Gillingham’s (1998) study of 
Community-Based Wildlife Management in Tanzania both argue that power structures lie at 
the heart of facilitating and maintaining elite capture (of both income and influence) within 
communities.   Whilst the reporting of socio-political factors as important has become 
common-place, marking an important shift towards the research agenda presented in this 
thesis, investigations into the processes at work are rare.  It is to this gap in research that the 
research project is orientated.  
CBNRM is a mixture of the policy that sets it out, creating a framework for implementation 
and the structures and systems of management, alongside its implementation, by people and 
in reality.  I refer to these as the prescription of policy and its performance.  CBNRM 
highlights that there are differences between the two, and it is important to ask what these are, 
why they occur and how, or through what processes.  One of the central goals of my research 
is to identify the differences between prescribed and performed governance systems in 
Tanzanian CBNRM, and to uncover the socio-political processes by which the former is re-
shaped into the latter.  I employ the term governance, defining it as  “the activity of every 
individual or collective that both through formal and informal means tries to create steering 
mechanisms, set goals, frame demands and develop policy with the intent of bringing these 
into practice” (Rosenau, 2001 in Büscher and Dressler, 2007: 593).  This definition is a broad 
view of governance that draws on the political nature of resource management, its policies 
and the communities engaged in it.  This definition highlights the fact that governance takes 
place between states, policies and communities, in processes of both policy prescription and 
performance, none of which are neutral, harmonious or altruistic, but are engaged in 
processes of socio-political struggle.  This view acknowledges that the politics of natural 
resource management are not static, but are under constant re-negotiation, and that power 
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struggles and socio-political processes also take place within an informal setting (see 2.1.3 
and 2.4). 
There are three over-arching questions that formed the basis of my research interest at the 
outset of this research project: 
• How and why have the wildlife and forestry sectors implemented CBNRM differently 
in Tanzania? 
• How and why do the same small group of individuals benefit disproportionately from 
CBNRM? 
• How is the reality of governance in CBNRM different from that set out in policy? 
I have approached these questions through an investigation of the prescribed and performed 
governance systems within Tanzanian CBNRM, comparing and contrasting the wildlife and 
forestry sectors.  My specific research questions are detailed in Table 1.1.  These questions 
are split into three categories that correspond with the empirical chapters presented in the 
thesis.  In chapter 5, I address the first of the questions listed above through a discussion of 
the processes of policy reform that introduced CBNRM in Tanzania.  In this chapter I 
compare the formal, prescribed governance systems for CBNRM in the forestry and wildlife 
sectors and discuss the forces that shaped policy processes in these two sectors in different 
ways.  My investigation of the second and third questions shown above is split between 
chapters 6 and 7.  In chapter 6, I begin to examine the performance of policy through an 
analysis of power systems within CBNRM and the struggles and transformations taking place 
around these.  I utilise the power structures in place within CBNRM and the struggles taking 
place around it to investigate who benefits from CBNRM and what inequalities are witnessed 
in the distribution of benefits within both case studies.  I also outline the configurations of 
power that were witnessed in the case studies, and the differences between these and the 
arrangement of power set out in the prescribed governance system.  Chapter 7 continues this 
examination of the performance of policy by addressing the informal aspects of power that 
form part of the governance system in reality, but are hidden from view.  In this final 
empirical chapter I discuss the integration of CBNRM into local systems of power, and 
outline the deviations from policy and the prescribed governance system that took place in 
the case studies.  In this chapter I ask what processes of corruption and rule-breaking are 
taking place in the case studies, and what processes underlie them.  I focus on understanding 
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the socio-political processes that permit and maintain both differences between the prescribed 




Chapter Research Topic and Questions to be Addressed 
5 
Policy Processes in Tanzanian CBNRM 
• How have the conservation policies underlying WMAs and CBFM 
developed in Tanzania? 
• Why have the policies developed in different ways? 
• What discursive processes did this development entail? 
• How have wildlife and forest resources become politicised, and in what 
different ways?  
• What are the formal governance structures set out by the policies and how 
do these differ between the wildlife and forestry projects? 
• How are accountability, participation and democratic processes prescribed 
within these systems of governance? 
6 
The Performance of Policy I: Power Systems in Governance and Politics of Scale 
• How is power devolved within WMAs and CBFM? 
• How do the configurations of power differ between the WMA and VLFR 
•  Which actors become powerful and how is power re-spatialised from 
previous arrangements? 
• Who is identified as benefiting the most/least from the WMA/VLFR 
project? 
• How and why is power being contested and struggled over within the case 
studies? 
• What power structures can be indentified in the performance of policy and 
how do these differ from those prescribed in policy? 
7 
The Performance of Policy II: Hidden Aspects of Governance and Participatory 
Spaces 
• How are the governance structures being shaped by existing power 
relationships within the case studies? 
• How do actors create and use influence and power within the projects and 
adjust power systems? 
• How do the informal aspects of the performed governance system differ 
from that prescribed in policy? 
• What opportunities exist to challenge the formal and informal systems of 
power? 
• How is corruption taking place within the case studies? 
• How are such processes maintained? 
 
Table 1.1: Research Questions Addressed in this Thesis by Chapter 
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I have approached these questions through a study of power in Tanzanian CBNRM, 
positioning this as a central and linking theme that runs throughout these questions and the 
empirical chapters that follow.  In the following chapter I set out a theoretical framework to 
address this research agenda within this thesis.  This framework is necessarily broad, drawing 
on areas of study that are rooted in sociology, human geography, policy studies, conservation 
and development.  I then draw from these further disparate strands of study and theory to 
consider the intersection of power with policy and its implementation in the Tanzanian 
context of CBNRM.   
I have framed my research as fundamentally a political ecology approach that investigates the 
politics of natural resource management within CBNRM.  Political ecology forms the 
umbrella that brings together these different areas of scholarship, therefore (see 2.5).  
Political ecology has always been focused upon “probing how the politics of access to and 
control over land and resources were related to environmental change” and argues that social 
and political factors, not technical or managerial issues, lie at the core of ecological problems 
(Neumann, 2005).  Political ecology has politics at its heart, therefore and has developed 
since the 1970s in response to the perceived apolitical nature of environmental research, 
driving a new research field that adopts the underlying assumption that “politics and 
environment are everywhere thoroughly interconnected” (Bryant, 1998: 82). 
 1.5 Thesis Structure 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is set out to introduce the theoretical 
framework applied in this study in chapter 2, followed by a discussion of the research context 
and specifics of forest and wildlife conservation in the United Republic of Tanzania in 
chapter 3.  The methodology applied in this study is outlined in chapter 4.  Chapters 5, 6 and 
7 are the empirical chapters presenting my own research findings and addressing the research 
questions shown in Table 1.1.  Finally, chapter 8 is a summary and discussion of the research 








Theoretical Context  
 





In this chapter I explore the theoretical framework that I use to investigate the research 
agenda and questions set out in chapter 1, drawing on a wide body of literature to investigate 
the socio-politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in 
Tanzania.  This study is framed around the emergence and experience of CBNRM, and the 
challenges that have surfaced as a result of these.  Whilst there is considerable interest in the 
promises of CBNRM and its integration of conservation and development, there has been 
widespread disappointment at the unexpected results that have not lived up to the predicted 
‘win-win’ scenarios, as discussed in section 1.3.  My theoretical approach places politics and 
power at the centre of devolved environmental management, and aims to add depth of 
understanding to the processes taking place within Tanzanian CBNRM, rather than a black 
and white perception of CBNRM in which it either works or does not.  This has been 
highlighted as an area for further research (Adams and Hulme, 2001a; Berkes, 2004), and it is 
to these calls for a deeper, more socio-politically orientated approach that this thesis is 
orientated. 
I have framed my research as a political ecology investigation, which is discussed in the final 
section of this chapter (2.5).  Within this approach, I draw on many different areas of 
literature and theory.  I trace the socio-political processes within CBNRM from the initiation 
of policy reform through to the implementation of policy and its outcomes and complexities.  
In section 2.2, I discuss the literature from policy processes, on which I draw in chapter 5, to 
gain insight into the discursive processes that shaped CBNRM in Tanzania, and the sectoral 
policies that underlie it.  I use this literature to address the question of how and why the 
governance systems prescribed in CBNRM policy differ between the forest and wildlife 
sectors, and the ways in which power is devolved in distinct ways.  In section 2.3 and 2.4 I 
discuss my theoretical framing of both power and scale.  These are critical features of a 
political ecology approach (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), and are closely linked to the discussion 
of policy processes, where power is an often under-theorised aspect of policy reform, and 
where the scalar configurations of power prescribed in policy form the basis of political 
struggles for power.  In chapter 6, I draw on the politics of scales literature in my 
investigation of the reality, or performance, of CBNRM in Tanzania and the ways in which 
people are engaged in struggles to benefit from CBNRM, producing patterns of unequal 




In chapter 1 I argued for a socio-political research agenda and, in section 2.1, I begin this 
chapter with a discussion of the acknowledged complexities and theoretical developments 
associated with devolved environmental management and CBNRM.  I outline a theoretical 
framework for devolved environmental management that firstly emphasises the politics and 
intricacies of power devolution from the state to the local level.  Secondly, I draw on 
literature from participation, institutions and common pool resource theory to propose a 
concept of community within CBNRM that avoids the ‘local trap’ (Born and Purcell, 2006) 
and addresses the micro-politics of community management, participation and decision-
making.  Finally, in section 2.1.3 I discuss the importance of incorporating theoretical 
insights from the literature of African politics, particularly with respect to the inclusion of the 
informal realm in studies of governance.  This is an important feature of the discussion in 
chapter 7, where I address unacknowledged aspects of power within Tanzanian CBNRM and 
further socio-political processes taking place around the governance system. 
2.1 Devolved Environmental Management 
2.1.1 Devolved Environmental Management: Power in CBNRM 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, a central tenet of CBNRM is the devolution of power2 
to the local level, and the initiation of community-level decision-making for natural resource 
management.  This form of power devolution generally involves the conferment by the state 
of authority3 to local organisations.  The local level becomes authorised in the management 
of natural resources and receipt of benefits from this therefore.   
My focus is specifically upon programmes of devolution, and specifically the transfer of 
powers to community organisations.  This is a component of the broader term 
decentralisation, which involves the transfer of powers to lower levels of political 
administrative and territorial hierarchy (Shackleton and Campbell, 2001; Larson and Soto, 
2008).  I use the term decentralisation as an umbrella under which several different processes 
occur, including democratic decentralisation4, deconcentration5 and devolution.  Devolution 
is distinct from decentralisation in the level and types of powers transferred, with devolution 
                                                 
2 Power is a complex term that is discussed further in section 2.3 
3 Authority refers to compliance based on the recognised legitimacy of the decision-maker (Lukes, 
2005). 
4 The transfer of powers to lower level governments, for example district or regional level 
administrations, or to regional autonomous governments (Larson & Soto, 2008). 
5 The transfer of powers from central ministries to branch offices outside of the capital or 
administrative centre (Larson & Soto, 2008). 
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representing the fullest and least restrictive type of power transfer to a community group 
(Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003). 
Alongside the arguments made for the paradigm shift to community conservation and the 
integration of conservation and development objectives discussed in chapter 1, the 
justifications for the devolution of power to the local level in the natural resources sector are 
similarly based on the perception of local people less as a problem, and more as a potential 
solution (Larson and Soto, 2008).  The handing over of authorisation to manage natural 
resources and channelling benefits from this to the local level was predicted to reduce costs 
for the state, whilst at the same time improving compliance with natural resource rules and 
creating incentives for long-term sustainable management of resources (Sundar, 2001; 
Andersson and Ostrom, 2004; Brockington, 2008).  There are two key assumptions within 
this conceptualisation of power devolution in natural resource management that have been 
crucial to the mixed results and disappointments with CBNRM discussed in chapter 1: the 
meaning and types of power in power devolution; and the assumption that local support can 
be fostered through providing incentives for conservation (Gibson and Marks, 1995).  
Addressing these assumptions focuses research on the nature and politics of power devolution 
within specific CBNRM policies 
Multiple examples across the community conservation spectrum have indicated that power 
devolution, even when central to objectives, can take many forms, incorporating different 
levels and types of power and associated management rights at the community level 
(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).  The restriction of community management and ownership 
rights to that of implementation of an externally-designed system is seen as one of the biggest 
barriers to successful CBNRM (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Charnley and Poe, 2007).  Such 
restrictions can result in communities receiving handouts from CBNRM activities, instead of 
achieving meaningful control and empowerment at the local level, and such handouts may 
result in the supplementation of livelihoods, rather than the instigation of long term 
development (Murphree, 1996; Murombedzi, 2003).   Reviews of CAMPFIRE have often 
been critical on exactly this point, claiming that a lack of proprietorship rights for 
communities, and the lack of devolution to institutions at the village level results in income 
handouts rather than local management (Murphree, 1996; Murombedzi, 2003).  Similarly, 
studies of community conservation projects in Tanzania have concluded that they fail to 
create empowered community managers and frequently result in handouts to local 
communities, who are passive recipients in a government project (Songorwa et al., 2000; 
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Brockington, 2002).  An assessment of CBNRM initiatives therefore needs to carefully 
consider the ways in which power is devolved to local communities, the management rights 
they hold and the decision-making processes that take place at the local level.  Such an 
analysis can usefully draw on the analysis of different ‘bundles of rights6’ associated with 
communally managed resources outlined by Agrawal & Ostrom (2001):  
• Withdrawal rights that provide right of entry and attainment of resources or products 
• Management rights that are characterised by the ability to regulate use of natural 
resources and to make decisions to transform the resources and make improvements 
• Exclusion rights that allow the rights-holders to decide and implement a system of 
rules and eligibility for access and use of natural resources 
• Alienation rights that refer to the rights to sell or lease resources or the rights to 
manage those resources (Campbell, 2007).  
Rights of exclusion, associated with proprietorship of land is advocated as the minimum 
requirement for successful community management (see also 1.3; Charnley and Poe, 2007). 
The transfer of authority to community organisations is clearly a sensitive matter.  Just as the 
annexation of land and natural resources by the state has been described as an essential part 
of state-making (Ferguson, 1990; Neumann, 2001; Crook, 2003; Neumann, 2004b), states are 
often reluctant to relinquish control over these resources, and may curb devolution wherever 
possible (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).  This reluctance is evident in Nepal, where two 
distinct types of community forestry have developed (Thoms, 2008).  In areas where the 
value of forestry resources is low, the devolution of power to local communities has been 
celebrated as full and meaningful, whereas more valuable timber resources in the highlands 
remain under state ownership and control with compensation and alternative livelihood 
provisions for communities instead of devolved management (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).  
The unwillingness of states to devolve power appears strongly linked to the political and 
economic value of the resources in question, therefore.  Several examples of devolved natural 
resource management have indicated that recentralisation can actually take place within a 
programme of decentralisation or devolution (e.g. Pulhin and Dressler, 2009).  
‘Recentralising whilst decentralising’ is a process of the extension of state control which 
occurs through the restriction of power that is devolved to the local level, or through the 
devolution of power to local level institutions that serve the interests of the central authorities 
                                                 
6 Categories of property rights and operational use rights.  See Appendix 1 
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(Olowu, 1999; Schafer and Bell, 2002; Ribot et al., 2006).  This may take place through the 
procedures that communities are required to complete in order to receive state approval of 
their rights to manage natural resources, for example through compulsory attendance of 
approved training schemes, and a lack of recognition of other forms of knowledge (Goldman, 
2003).  The resulting form of CBNRM is one where the local community is restricted to the 
role of beneficiaries within a discourse of empowerment (Goldman, 2003).    
The second assumption that I wish to address is that of local support.  This is often assumed 
to be both critical to the success of CBNRM, and to be created through the construction of 
appropriate incentive structures to prioritise sustainable management of natural resources.  
However, Gibson & Marks (1995) argue that local support, seen as crucial to successful 
community conservation, is not necessarily created in this way.  Instead they highlight the 
importance of different meanings of resources and conservation in different contexts and for 
communities, and point to community power issues as crucial to understanding local attitudes 
towards conservation, and the outcomes of projects.  Similarly, in Songorwa et al.’s (2000) 
study in Tanzania they argue that local support for community wildlife management 
initiatives cannot be assumed, and that the nature of wildlife resources and the way they are 
perceived within local communities may make them inherently incompatible with rural 
development strategies.   
CBNRM is being implemented in a reality in which the support of the state to devolve power, 
but also the willingness of the community to adopt the ideology of CBNRM and 
responsibilities it involves, must not be assumed.  Empowerment of local communities to 
manage resources as envisaged by advocates of CBNRM necessarily involves a large risk 
that such communities choose to manage those resources in a way that is not in line with state 
priorities and models, and potentially not in line with conservation objectives (Redford and 
Sanderson, 2000).  Murombedzi’s (2001) analysis of CAMPFIRE revenues showed 
disparities in the priorities of central authorities, conservation organisations and local 
communities, with communities preferring to use funds they accumulated for development 
opportunities, rather than investing in wildlife management.  Empowering the community to 
set their own agenda and make their own management decisions is seen as a crucial 
component of meaningful power devolution, and local autonomy is critical to the 
construction of natural resource management systems that are adapted and appropriate to the 
local context (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).  However, the risks involved with devolution has 
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led many states to recentralise and include limitations on the decision-making powers of the 
communities involved (Schlager and Ostrom, 1993; Behera and Engel, 2006).   
The uncertainties involved with community autonomy over conservation and development 
decisions discussed above may also de-incentivise power devolution within CBNRM.  Both 
the assumptions discussed in this section hide powerful incentives for the state to retain 
ownership and control of natural resource management.  CBNRM is shaped by these factors, 
which can account for the discrepancies between the CBNRM that is envisaged and that 
which emerges in practice, both in terms of the ways in which power is devolved to a local 
community to manage its natural resources, but also in the ways that a community chooses to 
do so.  The socio-politics of CBNRM must address these issues of the intricacies of power 
devolution.  Important questions for research include the nature of the powers that are 
devolved to local communities, the shifts in roles for both the state and the local level that 
occur within it, the restrictions that are placed upon devolution and community autonomy in 
decision-making, and the ways in which power may be recentralised through CBNRM.  The 
prescribed governance system needs to be analysed from a power devolution perspective, 
therefore, to consider these complexities and their impacts on the authorisation of 
communities to manage natural resources and benefit from this.  Secondly, it is clear that 
communities do not necessarily share the same priorities for CBNRM decision-making as 
other managers, and investigating the decision-making processes within communities 
practising CBNRM is vital to further understanding of how the prescribed governance system 
takes shape in reality, to create the performed governance system. 
2.1.2 Devolved Environmental Management: Communities in CBNRM 
The restriction of powers that are devolved to local communities, as discussed above, has a 
corresponding impact upon community-level participation and engagement with CBNRM.  
The same processes by which states may retain and recentralise power over natural resources 
through administrative and legislative structures (see Ribot, 1999), shapes the space that is 
available for community participation in such projects. Analysis of participation in 
community conservation projects, and even within devolution-focused CBNRM projects has 
commonly identified a lack of meaningful participation as a result of these processes 
(Zacharia and Kaihula, 2001; Nelson et al., 2007).  However, the dynamics of participation in 
CBNRM are not solely controlled by the powers that are devolved to the community.  As 
discussed above, it cannot be assumed that communities that participate in CBNRM will 
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prioritise conservation objectives or act in the same way as if a state, NGO or private 
enterprise were managing those resources.  Songorwa (1999) found that community priorities 
around the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania were centred on access to meat, which drove 
participation in community conservation projects.  He argues that rather than the incentive 
structure set out in the project, it was this access that determined people’s perception of 
success and benefits from the project, and was largely responsible for people’s engagement, 
trust in the project and their support for it (Songorwa, 1999).  
Within the paradigm of community conservation and development, participation and 
empowerment have been large areas of study (Cleaver, 2001; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; 
Mosse, 2001; Matta et al., 2005).  Whilst participation is seen as a medium for the 
articulation of social and political needs in a context of state hegemony7 (Nagothu, 2001; 
Kelsall and Mercer, 2003; Hargreaves et al., 2007), the theoretical underpinning to such 
arguments is one that considers participation through ‘conscientisation’8 (Midgley et al., 
1986; Rose, 1997; Mohan, 2001; Carr, 2003).  Similarly, participation is often assumed to 
take place within a context of ‘ideal free speech’ (Habermas, 1994 in Puri and Sahay, 2003: 
183) and deliberative democracy where “democratic will-formation draws its legitimating 
force…from the communicative presuppositions that allow better arguments to come into 
play in various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining 
processes” (Habermas 1996a in Kapoor, 2002: 105).  Opening up the opportunity for 
participation and empowerment through the implementation of CBNRM, for example, is 
assumed to allow for fair, democratic participation by all those within a community, resulting 
in efficient and beneficial management of natural resources.  In reality, participation does not 
appear to take place like this, varies both spatio-temporally and socio-politically, and 
involves costs for participants (Rose, 1997; Williams et al., 2003; Williams, 2004b; Williams, 
2004a; Kapoor, 2005). 
Cooke & Kothari (2001) famously wrote about participation as tyrannical, rather than 
emancipatory.  Their criticisms of participation emphasise that it is a socio-political process, 
not a neutral event, and participation holds the potential for negative as well as positive 
outcomes (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  The participatory role of communities in CBNRM 
                                                 
7 A concept discussed by Gramsci as ruling class domination that is both  intellectual as well as a 
material force in society, and whereby the working class adopt a psychological state of acceptance 
and internalisation of the socio-political order (Lukes, 2005).   
8 Describing empowerment achieved through self-reflection and the production of knowledge.  The 
concept was made famous by Freire (1970). 
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must acknowledge that participation and empowerment do not take place evenly across a 
community, but take place within an existing context of power relations (Nelson and Wright, 
1995; Mohan and Stokke, 2000).  Such power relations can govern those who are able to 
speak at meetings, those who are able to gain positions within the management system and 
those who are listened-to in decision-making processes (Cleaver, 1999; Cleaver, 2001).  The 
identification of elite capture across the spectrum of community conservation approaches 
illustrates how this process is taking place and having material consequences for the 
communities and individuals involved.  In their study of Joint Forest Management in India, 
Hildyard et al. (2001) concluded that the outcomes of elite capture, gender inequalities in 
participation, intra-community differential outcomes and the importance of socio-economic 
and cultural groups seen in the project reflect deep-seated, structural, and often unintentional 
flaws in participatory theory and implementation (Hildyard et al., 2001).   
Critics of the participation movement argue that its socio-political nature is hidden and it is 
riddled with localist discourse, (Hickey and Mohan, 2004b; Williams, 2004b).  Communities 
are often conceptualised according to Tonnie’s idea of gemeinschaft and ideas of a mythical 
community consisting of small spatial units, and homogenous social structures that are based 
upon shared norms (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Nunan, 2006).  Community has become a 
vague term that is used to describe a group of people who are thought to intrinsically possess 
high levels of social capital9, capacity to participate and ability to make decisions in the best 
interests of the group as a whole.  This essentialisation of the community has created a 
privileged solution within a wider trend of ‘localism’, ‘enchantment with community’, or the 
‘local trap’ (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Adams and Hulme, 2001a; Mercer et al., 2003; Purcell 
and Brown, 2005; Born and Purcell, 2006).  These views romanticise and simplify the 
community into a harmonious, organic and virtuous construct, wherein the nuances of reality 
are simplified and masked from view by rhetoric (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000; Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2006).  Such characteristics may be present in 
some cases (Jones, 2006), but cannot be conceived as intrinsic to local communities, which 
are generally complex and messy groups of people representing different axes of power and 
multiple understandings and agendas with regards to natural resources and their management 
(Cleaver, 1999; Kapoor, 2002; Kapoor, 2005). 
                                                 
9 This is a complex term that is widely debated, but Putnam’s (1993) famous discussion described 
social capital as a feature of civil society in which“networks of trust and shared norms in society 
facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit” (Adams, 2009: 380). 
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In an attempt to recognise the complexity of communities, the environment and the 
relationships between the two, Leach et al. (1997b) argued that politics must be at the very  
heart of the approach to understanding community conservation and its varied outcomes.  
They introduced an institutional perspective called ‘environmental entitlements’ (Leach et al., 
1997b; Leach et al., 1999), which instead of seeing communities as harmonious, started from 
a viewpoint that they are socially differentiated and highly diverse, imbued with power 
relations around boundaries of gender, age, wealth and social identity.  Instead of seeing 
community management of natural resources as consensual and based upon shared beliefs 
and priorities, their approach conceptualises such processes as taking place through 
negotiation and bargaining, usually involving conflict and struggle (Leach et al., 1997b).  The 
entitlements framework built upon the arguments of Amartya Sen (1981; Sen and Press, 
1982), who argued that institutions governing access to food were responsible for creating 
famine situations, rather than an actual shortage of food.  Human behaviour in these 
processes of decision-making, management and access to natural resources is governed by 
institutions, defined as “regularised patterns of behaviour between individuals and groups in 
society”, commonly referred to as the ‘rules of the game’ (see also North, 1990; Mearns 
1995a in Leach et al., 1999: 226).  Institutions matter because there is a cost (financial or 
social) involved with violating them, and individuals and groups must abide by these rules in 
order to be playing the game legitimately therefore (North, 1990; Leach et al., 1997b).  
Importantly, Leach et al. (1999: 12) recognised that institutions are both formal (enforced by 
an endogenous organisation, e.g. laws) and informal (“upheld by mutual agreement among 
the actors involved, or by relations of power and authority between them”, e.g. social norms).  
Institutions are also not fixed, but can shift over both space and time as actors engage in 
negotiation and struggle (Kepe and Cousins, 2001; Nunan, 2006).  Institutions reflect values 
and norms, but they are only fully understood in the context of existing power systems as 
they are simultaneously a reflection of and are upheld by power relations (North, 1990; Leach 
et al., 1999).  Here there is an important link to the theorisation of power discussed in 2.3; 
power, and hence institutions, are not static features within a structural system of domination, 
but are socially-constructed and negotiated through constant struggle.     
Closely linked to the concept of institutions, a large body of work has focused on 
investigating the capacity of community organisations to manage common-pool resources10.  
                                                 
10 Such resources are defined as subtractable natural or human-made resources that are available for 
use by more than one person, and where degradation may be caused by over-use (Ostrom, 2002).   
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Elinor Ostrom’s many works on this subject, including Governing the Commons and The 
Drama of the Commons (Ostrom, 1987; 1990; Ostrom, 1992; see also Ostrom et al., 1999; 
2002) set out a strong argument for the successful management of such resources under group 
property rights, and developed a set of design principles outlining the characteristics under 
which success was witnessed.  Ostrom, amongst many authors, has created a strong narrative 
in support of CBNRM, arguing against powerful narratives of the tragedy of the commons 
and the idea that rational actor theories can fully explain community management, to show 
that the paradigm shift to approaches such as CBNRM was well-founded, but they also 
highlighted the complexities of this kind of management, including the importance of the 
wider socio-economic context (Schlager and Ostrom, 1993), and the integration of 
community management into a supportive governance structure across multiple levels 
(Ostrom, 1992).   
There are close links between the common pool resource literature and studies of the 
complexities of power devolution discussed in 2.1.1 as both argue that the types of powers 
held by or devolved to a community group are a vital characteristic of the management of 
natural resources.  Ostrom (1990) and Agrawal & Ostrom (2001) argued that community 
authority and autonomy lies as the heart of many of the design principles identified, including 
locally-adapted rules of use, meaningful participation in decision-making (see also Hayes, 
2006), and acceptable mechanisms of conflict resolution and sanctions for violations of 
community rules (Ostrom, 1990).  Common-pool resource theorists have added to debates 
about CBNRM significantly by outlining the complexities and capacities of communal 
management of natural resources, but the literature on common pool resources does not deal 
sufficiently with power to provide a framework for investigation of the socio-political 
processes at work within such management (see Agrawal, 2005). I acknowledge the 
important contributions made by both the institutions and common pool resource literatures, 
and I draw on the broad themes that they highlight within my own study, which is centred 
around a more serious investigation of power within the socio-political processes taking place 
in both power devolution and community management of natural resources. 
In this thesis I focus on power, and I utilise institutions as a lens through which to study the 
power relations at work. To this end, I argue that it is critical to investigate both the formal 
institutions in place within CBNRM, as set out in the prescribed governance system, and how 
these combine with the informal institutions that are present to create the performed 
governance system.  The role of informal institutions is especially important in Africa, as 
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power is concentrated in these institutions (Hyden, 2008).  In particular, informal institutional 
arrangements may provide valuable insight into the processes underlying the outcomes of 
elite capture and unequal distribution of benefits from CBNRM (Songorwa, 1999; Songorwa 
et al., 2000; Igoe and Croucher, 2007).  However, an in-depth investigation of the informal 
institutions in place within a performed governance structure is a particular research gap in 
CBNRM and community conservation research (Nygren, 2005; Bawa et al., 2007; Nelson 
and Blomley, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2008).   
A key aspect of CBNRM that has been highlighted by the literatures on devolution, common-
pool resource and African politics is the role of the informal realm.  Power to manage natural 
resources is made up of both de jure rights and responsibilities (formal institutions and rules 
e.g. laws) and by informal rights and responsibilities, which may be referred to as customary 
rights, informal institutions, norms of access or de facto rules in use (Robbins, 2000).  Hyden 
(2008: 12) argues that “any study of politics in Africa ... involves by definition the role of 
informal institutions.  Together with formal ones, they shape the articulation of power”.  De 
facto rules in natural resource management are moulded around local contexts of power and 
may operate alongside de jure rules, but they may also contradict these rules.  Studies of the 
role of informal institutions in communal management of natural resources have also 
produced a large literature on the extra-legal aspects of governance and the ways in which 
rules are broken.  Ostrom (1990) maintains that the de jure and de facto rules of use or formal 
and informal institutions do not stand in isolation, but are combined to produce the 
‘operational rules of use’, which is an important component of the performed governance 
system which I investigate.  African politics literature in particular has looked in detail at the 
illegal aspects of governance being performed, including rampant corruption and the systems 
of neopatrimonialism operating within the continent (Olivier De Sardan, 1999; Robbins, 
2000).  In the next section, I address these concerns and ask how such issues should be 
considered with regard to CBNRM and its performance. 
2.1.3 Studying the Informal: Disorder, Corruption and Neopatrimonialism  
 
 “A focus on power is particularly relevant in countries like Tanzania where it is 
more inherent in informal than in formal institutions” 
(Hyden, 2005: 1) 
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Chabal & Daloz (1999: xix) propose a theory of African politics that functions through 
disorder, a “condition which offers opportunities for those who know how to play [the] 
system”.  This disorder does not represent irrationality; “it is merely to make explicit the 
observation that political action operates rationally, but largely in the realm of the informal, 
uncodified and unpoliced” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: xix).  They argue that this has developed 
in Africa through the informalisation of politics, whereby the state and civil society are not 
separate, but straddle each other (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  The informal economy remains 
central to both social and political life, and the basic unit of reference remains family and kin-
based (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  The importance of the informal realm and a moral economy 
has previously been discussed with reference to Tanzania as an ‘economy of affection’11 
(Hyden, 1980; 2005).  The premise of the concept is that the economic system is at least 
partly based on provision through non-economic institutions, for example kinship and 
reciprocity (Booth, 1994).   
The theorisation of the role of the informal realm by Chabal & Daloz (1999) provides a frame 
with which to integrate both informal institutions and unofficial forms of power into the 
socio-political processes of natural resource management.  I employ their theory of disorder 
and conceptualisation of power in African societies to frame my investigation of power and 
how this is connected to rule-breaking and corruption, which are a focus of the discussion of 
hidden aspects of the performed governance system in chapter 7.  I utilise Chabal & Daloz’s 
(1999) theory of the informal nature of African social and political systems, resting on a 
moral economy and neopatrimonial systems of power, to examine rule-breaking and 
corruption as socio-political processes, rather than poor implementation.  Here I discuss this 
view of corruption and rule breaking and the neopatrimonial types of power which support it.  
“Corruption is not the absence of state institutions, but the presence of differing 
institutions, which vie for legitimacy and trust amongst diverse players within 
both the state and civil society” 
(Robbins, 2000: 426)  
There is a large literature on corruption, but little consensus as to how to define it.  Most 
discussions employ a Western view of such processes and utilise definitions that are infused 
                                                 
11 The concept has strong links to the gemeinschaft perception of communities (Booth, 1994) and must 
be considered in light of the discussion of community dynamics in 2.1.2.  
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with morality (Theobald, 1990).  Salient characteristics of common definitions12 place it in 
the realms of politics and public affairs and rely on deviance from the rules that are set out by 
states and found in laws.  I adopt a definition of corruption that recognises it as a form of 
rule-breaking and illicit behaviour, but removes the label of illegitimacy from such practices 
and focuses on the social context of corruption.  Numerous authors have outlined typologies 
of corruption that attempt to address its characteristics across different scales, rather than a 
uniform definition.  Olivier de Sardan (1999) argues that it is both important to distinguish 
between the different types of corruption13 and the levels at which corruption is practised.  
Corruption literature tends to focus on political corruption (see Theobald, 1990; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999); however, my interest is in the lower levels of corruption, the petty forms of 
corruption that pervade normal life, rather than high level, more economically significant 
corruption usually associated with governments (Olivier De Sardan, 1999).      
Leaving behind the Western notions of corruption, such processes have more recently been 
viewed in a social context (Chabal and Daloz, 1999), with efforts to outline the social, 
cultural and psychological foundations of corruption or, as Olivier de Sardan (1999) phrases 
it, how these ‘communicate with corruption’. Secondly, efforts should focus on 
understanding the impacts of corrupt practice across levels of society (Chabal and Daloz, 
1999).  Corruption must, therefore, be seen as part of a moral economy of production, 
without falling into the trap of saying that it is a cultural inevitability (Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Olivier de Sardan, 2008).  There are important questions as to why corrupt practice is 
generally upheld within African societies.  It is simultaneously decried and banalised, anti-
corruption discourse is largely rhetoric and social acceptance is high (Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Olivier De Sardan, 1999).  Pepinsky (1992: 27) summarised such attitudes by arguing 
that “there is nothing wrong with being reasonably corrupt in a corrupt system”.  I consider 
corruption not as a driving force behind the failure of CBNRM, but as a hidden socio-
political process taking place within it that requires further understanding.  My aims 
concerning corruption are three-fold: Firstly, to investigate the socio-political processes of 
corruption and how it is taking place within Tanzanian CBNRM; secondly to consider the 
                                                 
12 Huntingdon (1968 in Theobald, 1990: 2) defines it as “behaviour of public officials which deviates 
from accepted norms in order to serve private ends”.  Nye’s famous definitions claims that corruption 
is “Behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise 
of certain types of private-regarding influence” (1967 in Olivier de Sardan, 1999: 27). 
13 For example the abuse of power, nepotism, embezzlement and misappropriation of funds, influence 
pedalling and insider trading. 
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ways in which corruption mechanisms and power systems are being altered by the 
implementation of CBNRM, as the scaling-down of corruption to local communities is often 
associated with devolved natural resource management (Harriss-White and White, 1996; 
Robbins, 2000; Véron et al., 2006).  Finally, I wish to further address the issue of power 
within corruption and to ask how corruption is facilitated and why it goes largely 
unchallenged and accepted.  Corruption is essentially a form of rule-breaking or departure 
from the prescribed governance system.  I intend to investigate such processes, drawing on 
the concepts of the role of informal institutions and the social norms and rules in use to 
identify additional aspects of the governance system and power relations that are in place 
within local communities undertaking CBNRM.  The pervasive forms of corruption that I 
focus on are closely tied to the nature of social power in African, and particularly to the 
concept of neopatrimonialism, which Kelsall (2011) agues dominates the political economies 
of Africa14.   
Neopatrimonialism can be defined as a “system...held together by the personal distribution of 
material resources and perks...distributed and consumed as if they were the private property 
of the ruler and/or his staff” (Kelsall, 2011: 77).  The term originates from patrimonialism, 
which Weber defined as an ideal type of rule where authority is constructed from loyal 
personal relations between a leader and his staff (Kelsall, 2011).  The term neopatrimonialism 
refers to “a political economy in which this basic authority system is combined with, or exists 
behind some formal, impersonal elements of governance” (Kelsall, 2011: 77).   Bayart (1993) 
famously described such a system of authority as ‘the politics of the belly’, arguing not only 
that neopatrimonial systems dominate in Africa, but also that they are a quest for hegemony 
by those in power, and that such processes are socially accepted and normalised by the wider 
population (see also 2.3). 
The dominance of the informal realm and relationship-based institutions in African socio-
political life facilitates the expansion of patron-client relations, especially as social and 
political power is constructed through the network of supporters surrounding an individual15 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  To maintain this support requires relationships that are based on 
reciprocity, however, and powerful individuals are required to use their power and the 
                                                 
14 Clientelism and rent-seeking can be thought of as components within a neopatrimonial system 
(Kelsall, 2011). 
15 This kind of social power is similar to the concept of the ‘big man’, characterised as a charismatic 
individual, generous and with significant personal power, which has been discussed particularly with 
reference to Melanesia (Sahlins, 1963).    
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resources generated by it to purchase people’s affection, thus maintaining and expanding 
their network of support (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  A system of patrons and followers is 
created wherein the power of the patron rests on his/her ability to redistribute resources to the 
satisfaction of his clients (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  This system of redistribution is an 
essential characteristic of neopatrimonialism.  
Authority over natural resources is a significant source of power, and the politics that 
surround the management of natural resources demonstrate the instrumental use of this 
authority to protect and expand social power (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  It is critical to 
examine CBNRM within a context of the political nature of natural resources, and their 
intrinsic relationship to power.  The relationship between neopatrimonialism and corruption 
is also important.  Neopatrimonialism allows powerful individuals to supplement their 
incomes through corruption (Kelsall, 2011), but these powerful individuals must also strive to 
maintain their positions of power through the redistribution of natural resources, the benefits 
derived from access to them, and their management.  Through these processes, the prescribed 
governance system will clearly be altered in performance, as the formal institutions of 
governance meet and are integrated with local systems of power and informal institutions 
surrounding this. 
These concepts have become so central to theories of African politics that current policy 
thinking within development has begun to re-evaluate the prevalent forms of governance in 
Africa in light of these differences in the basis of power and the informal institutional 
context, and to question the applicability of Western models of development and ‘good 
governance’ in such contexts.  The African Power and Politics Programme16, for example, 
has begun to research alternatives to the standard developmental governance in Africa, 
drawing on the distinctions discussed above to assess the potential of ‘good enough 
governance17’ (Grindle, 2004; 2007) in an approach termed ‘going with the grain’ (Booth, 
2011; Kelsall, 2011).  This approach includes the exploration of the potential “harnessing of 
neo-patrimonialism for development ends”, termed ‘developmental patrimonialism’ (Kelsall, 
2011: 76).  Here there is a close link to the argument made by Chabal & Daloz (1999) that 
disorder is not necessarily irrational; neopatrimonialism is a different system, and there are 
glaring issues of inequality that are associated with it (see Bayart, 1993), but it can also be 
                                                 
16 See www.institutions-africa.org, accessed 15/6/2012. 
17 “Good enough governance directs attention to considerations of the minimal conditions of 
governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur” (Grindle, 2004: 526). 
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conceptualised as a legitimate upholding of socially accepted norms (Hyden, 2008).  My 
argument is that, setting aside arguments about whether it is right or not, it is crucial to 
investigate the workings of informal institutions, the basis of power and the processes of 
neopatrimonialism at work within CBNRM, as they constitute a critical component of the 
performed governance system. 
The complexities of devolved natural resource management discussed in this section indicate 
four key areas for research, which are closely linked to the research questions and empirical 
chapters set out in Table 1.1.  The first is the nature of power devolution, and the politics 
surrounding this process that work to resist devolution, restricting it and recentralising power 
to the state where possible.  This is addressed in chapter 5 through an investigation of the 
policy processes leading to CBNRM and the different forms of power devolution this entails.  
The second refers to the ways in which communities manage natural resources under their 
own authority.  It is clear that the powers devolved to a community are one part of the 
equation.  However, a second part is taken up by the micro-politics of community 
management that must acknowledge that local communities are socially-differentiated groups 
of individuals, not a unanimous voice.  Community management of natural resources, 
decision-making and individual participation takes place within this political setting, not in a 
political vacuum.  Thirdly this political space of CBNRM is filled with institutions, both 
formal and informal, that represent the rules of the game which individuals are playing in 
CBNRM.  My exploration of the performed governance system in chapters 6 and 7 addresses 
these two areas of research, focusing specifically on the issues of unequal distribution of 
benefits within CBNRM, the capture of benefits by certain groups, the political struggles 
taking place around natural resources and CBNRM, and the integration of local contexts of 
power into CBNRM.  Finally, and closely linked to this, the fourth area for focus is an 
examination of the informal aspects of power operating within CBNRM.  These are not 
represented in the prescribed governance structure set out in policy, but represent an 
important part of the governance system that is being performed in implementation.  Chapter 
7 focuses specifically on these hidden and informal aspects of power, and their role in the 
socio-political processes of rule-breaking and corruption. 
In the next four sections I further outline the theoretical framework that I draw on in my 
investigation of the socio-politics of CBNRM.  I begin at the start of CBNRM in Tanzania 
with a discussion of the process of policy reform.  I argue that the nature of power 
devolution, decisive in the reality of CBNRM, is a product of these policy processes and that 
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an investigation of the characteristics of this power devolution must begin with an 
understanding of the policy pathways adopted.  Specifically I address the questions of how 
power is devolved within CBNRM in Tanzania, and identify the driving forces and power 
relations that shaped policy in to its current form.  Research must focus on the politics that 
take place within and around policy “or, more specifically, how power shapes policy.  The 
insertion of power as the missing variable in the link between institution and policy adds 
texture to the analysis” (Hyden, 2008: 11). 
2.2 Policy Processes 
 “Policy is the ghost in the machine – the force which breathes life and purpose 
into the machine of government and animates the otherwise dead hand of 
bureaucracy” 
Shore & Wright (1997: 5) 
Policy is an unclear concept.  Is policy the strategy of government, the document which sets 
this out, the language of politicians and party manifestos, or the institutional mechanisms of 
decision-making?  How does policy come about and what drives it in the directions it 
follows?  All of these questions have occupied the minds of policy scholars at different times.  
Here I discuss the conceptualisation of policy, how this has changed over time and the lens 
through which I examine policy processes in this study.  As a broad concept that is touched 
upon and claimed as its own by several disciplines and areas of study (John, 2003; Borzel, 
2011), a history of policy studies and processes is not feasible.  Instead, I aim to lay out some 
of the broad debates that have influenced the many changes in this field and to discuss the 
roots of the framework employed in this study.  I follow the aims of Grindle & Thomas 
(1991) and Keeley & Scoones (2003) in being concerned primarily with the issue of policy 
reform, conceptualising this as an “interrelated processes of agenda setting, policy making 
and implementation” (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 4), inherently tied to issues of power and 
the result of both “structural constraints but also opportunities for agency, action and change” 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 39; see also 2.3.1). 
2.2.1 Linear Policy and Elite Decision-Making 
Policy processes were traditionally envisaged as a top-down, elite-dominated system and 
controlled by rent-seeking and competition for control over resources (Thomas and Grindle, 
1990; Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004).  These instrumentalist views saw policy as a tool of the 
‘few’ to control the wider ‘many’ by imposing rewards and sanctions, and considered policy 
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to be a rational, action-orientated instrument that developed in linear stages (Shore and 
Wright, 1997).  These views were represented in the rational stages heuristic of policy by 
Hofferbert (1974), exemplifying the structural approaches that dominated the social sciences 
at this time.  This linear view conceptualised policy as a problem-solving process in which 
problems are identified, actions is discussed, a decision is made concerning the best course of 
action, which is then implemented through policy (Fig. 2.1).  Any problems or shortcomings 
with the resulting policy are seen as an issue of poor implementation, lack of resources or a 
lack of political will (Thomas and Grindle, 1990).  This model removes the role of politics in 
decision-making, and fails to address the questions of how and why change occurs (Thomas 
and Grindle, 1990).  Within this frame, as policy scholars began to address the issue of the 
factors that drive policy, several different theories of policy creation were suggested.  Whilst 
some argued that policy was created in response to crises (e.g. Hirschman, 1963; see also 
Grindle and Thomas, 1991), Lindblom (1959; 1979) argued that policy was incremental, 
involving small adjustments and not sweeping revisions, which he famously described as a 
process of ‘muddling through’.  Etzioni (1967; 1986) attempted to draw upon both these 
concepts and form a middle ground, in which he posited that policy was created through 
‘mixed scanning’ whereby, a wide range of potential courses of action are considered and 
narrowed down to a few for deeper consideration.  Within these views, policy studies began 
to make room for the role of actors, introducing the ideas of policy entrepreneurs (see 
2.2.2.4), and the unpredictable nature of policy through trigger events, but none of these 
approaches said anything about the role of power in policy (Keeley and Scoones, 2003), 
which has become a major focus of an approach which frames policy as discourse18, and is 
inextricably tied to power (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). 
 
                                                 
18 Discourse is defined according to Hajer (1995: 44) as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and 




Fig. 2.1: The Linear Model of Policy Reform (Thomas and Grindle, 1990: 1165) 
 
A significant shift away from this linear model of policy-making has taken place across 
political science, policy scholars and the wider social sciences.  Brock et al. (2001: 3) 
described the linear model as now widely perceived as a “dignified myth”, with attention 
focused much more upon policy as an interactive process, involving myriad actors and 
groups. The changes in how policy is perceived form part of wider changes within the social 
sciences, which have led to an ‘argumentative turn’ in policy studies (Brock et al., 2001), 
focused upon poststructuralist19 views of policy as discourse (Fischer and Forester, 1993).  
Mirroring shifts in theorisations of power to include the organisation of bias and discursive 
forms of power (see 2.3), the argumentative turn in policy studies has challenged the idea of 
science ‘speaking truth to power’ in policy making and re-framed debates about policy in 
terms of the discursive construction of issues and control over agenda setting, raising 
questions about how certain problems become politically important and the social 
construction and shaping of knowledge (Shore and Wright, 1997; Keeley and Scoones, 
2003).   
2.2.2 Policy Network and Policy Processes Views  
As part of the argumentative turn, policy is re-framed as co-constructed across space, through 
networks linking the global and the local, the study of which requires “understanding the 
interaction of networks and relationships, agency and practice, and knowledge and power 
                                                 
19 Poststucturalism is a reaction against deterministic structural interpretations within the social 
sciences which argues that “the relationship between society and culture is mediated through 
language” (Kitchin & Tate, 2000: 17). Postructuralism within political ecology has emphasised the 
roles of knowledge, power and discourse and the multiple interpretations of environmental issues that 
these create (Watts & Peet, 2004). 
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dynamics in particular contexts” (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 4-5).  Drawing on the work of 
Marsh & Rhodes (1992), the policy network is a meso-level concept which places emphasis 
on the relationships between actors, structures, decisions and  institutions for policy outcomes 
(Bulkeley, 2000).  Policy networks are comprised neither of all interested parties, nor of a 
privileged few, but “arise as interest groups gather around one or more government 
department in the hope of influencing policy, and are integrated into the policy-making 
process by the state” (Bulkeley, 2000: 728).  This network approach to the study of policy is 
closely linked to the shift towards policy process analysis, rather than policy analysis, which 
in itself is rooted in contemporary theories of governance (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  These 
theories involve the substitution of rationalist views with ones that place power as a primary 
driver of the social world and attempt to integrate structural and actor-based influences (Arts 
and Tatenhove, 2004).  These contemporary theories of governance have also focused on the 
roles of discourse and the social construction of knowledge over scientific truth (Arts and 
Tatenhove, 2004).  The growth of the networks paradigm in governance is also intrinsically 
tied to the sweeping changes in the relationships between state and society, exemplified in the 
growth of neoliberal models of economics, politics and development (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991).  For some in the political sciences, these changes heralded a new ontological era of 
‘governance without government’ (the Max-Planck School), whilst for others the change is 
methodological and signifies the beginning of a new way of conceptualising and analysing 
policy process; through networks (Borzel, 2011).  The focus in this study is in line with the 
Anglo-American school which follows the latter of these views (Borzel, 1998).   
The network paradigm in policy studies is part of an interactive model of policy evolution, 
which recognises that policies change as they move through the processes involved in their 
creation (Grindle and Thomas, 1991), and attempts to integrate the roles of structure and 
agency to the study of such phenomena.  This interactive model includes roles for wider 
groups and actors, beyond bureaucratic policy-makers, generating debate as to the role of 
‘interest groups’ in policy (Grindle and Thomas, 1991).  Marsh and Rhodes (1992) developed 
a typology of different networks, distinguished by the nature and pattern of interactions 
between actors to address these roles.  They suggested a continuum of network types that 
range from a ‘policy community’, a strongly-institutionalised, close knit group of actors 
centred around a specific government department where shared views, beliefs and policy 
objectives can be identified (Bulkeley, 2000; Marsh and Smith, 2000).  At the other end of 
the spectrum is the issue network, which constitutes a broader concept of multiple interest 
36 
 
groups and multiple views of issues, solutions and policy requirements (Bulkeley, 2000).  
Marsh & Rhodes (1992) argue that policy networks can involve both of these groups, but 
they are hierarchical, subject to power relations and the role of a wider issue network is often 
dependent upon the perceived threat posed to the dominant political and economic group 
represented in the policy community.  In the next section, I discuss an approach to the study 
of policy processes that draws on the network paradigm and integrates the conceptualisation 
of both power and policy as discursive.  
Below I consider four key features and approaches within the network paradigm and how 
they inform the approach adopted in my research; epistemic communities, policy narratives 
and discourse coalitions, the advocacy coalition framework and the concept of policy space.  
This is not an exhaustive list as the policy processes field is very broad (see also Marsh and 
Smith, 2000; Arts and Tatenhove, 2004; Shanahan et al., 2011), but it includes some of the 
key concepts and frameworks which I draw on in this thesis. 
2.2.2.1  Epistemic communities 
Haas (1992) builds on the idea that policy is created by an elite group who possess expert 
knowledge.  He defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (1992: 3).  Key characteristics 
of the community are that they share normative and causal beliefs, which shape social action 
in the community, define issues and potential action to address it for desired outcomes, they 
share notions of validity, which define their criteria for the reification of specific types and 
sources of knowledge, and they share a ‘common policy enterprise’, whereby they address 
the perceived problem, using their expertise with the aim of improving the human condition 
(Haas, 1992).  These epistemic communities are key in the discursive framing of issues in 
policy and in its nature as a political technology, through the privileged nature of their 
knowledge and information, and the power these communities hold to classify and define 
issues (Shore and Wright, 1997).  Their influence is derived from the uncertainty faced by 
policy-makers addressing complex issues, which can be used to create space to frame 
problems and suggest appropriate action (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  The members of an 
epistemic community are usually highly-educated and well-connected individuals, often with 
access to international networks and policy-making groups, or may occupy key bureaucratic 
roles themselves (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  In relation to the policy network concept, an 
epistemic community is similar to the policy community as set out by Marsh & Rhodes 
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(1992), but incorporates a role for a wider group of actors at different levels, whereas the 
policy community is closely focused on government officials (Bulkeley, 2000). 
2.2.2.2  Policy Narratives and Discourse coalitions 
Harriet Bulkeley (2000) reviews many theories and conceptualisations of policy network 
approaches, including those of policy narratives and discourse coalitions.  She draws on the 
ideas developed by Maarten Hajer (Hajer, 1995; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005) and outlines the 
concept of policy narratives and discourse coalitions, arguing that these incorporate the 
interaction between actors and groups (epistemic or policy communities and issue networks), 
but also puts discourse at the centre of the approach (Bulkeley, 2000).  She sets out a policy 
network (termed issue network in accordance with Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) which is made up 
of multiple groups of individuals connected through discourse coalitions (Bulkeley, 2000).  
These discourse coalitions exist alongside a policy community and actors compete to position 
the discourse to which they ascribe as the institutionalised discourse adopted by the policy 





Placing discourse at the centre of policy processes is in line with poststructural perspectives 
(Fischer and Forester, 1993) and brings together the theorisation of power discussed in 2.3, 
and the political ecology approach discussed in 2.5.  Poststructuralist and political ecology 
studies of policy as discourse have often focused on the social construction of environmental 
problems, the neutral, scientific and rational language utilised in policy and the powerful 
groups that surround these uses of language in policy (Feindt and Oels, 2005; Goldman et al., 
2011).  Studies of policy as discourse also need to depict it not only as a means by which the 
world is created by actors, but also as a means of communication and negotiation (Bulkeley, 
2000).  The interaction, debates and conflicts between groups and actors with respect to 




policy reform is a crucial discursive process which both constitutes and is constituted by 
institutions (Bulkeley, 2000).  Such an approach must also carefully consider the role of 
power to such interactions, the emergence of dominant discourses and the ways in which 
routinised use of discourse removes confrontation and uncertainty and reifies the power 
structure (Hajer, 1995).  The concepts of policy narratives and discourse coalitions attempt to 
fulfil these requirements. 
Policy narratives are ways in which ‘policy-speak’ presents simplified, normative and 
powerful descriptions of a situation (Brock et al., 2001).  Roe (1991) likened narrative 
structures to that of a folktale in which, Brock et al., (2001: 5) argue, “a crisis summons forth 
a hero, who battles against a series of obstacles, emerges triumphant, and everyone lives 
happily ever after”.  Policy narratives as simple and evocative messages present a clear 
problem with a clear solution to which policy is orientated.  These ideas have been taken up 
in a discussion of ‘story lines’, which act as the ‘discursive cement’ that facilitates and 
organises communication among actors (Hajer, 1995).  “The key function of story-lines is 
that they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a 
problem” (Hajer, 1995: 56).  Actors and structures are positioned around an issue according 
to such story-lines, on which they draw for their reasoning and understanding (rather than 
drawing on comprehensive discursive systems; Hajer, 1995).  Attention to these story lines 
and the discourses they are a part of assists in investigating the clustering of knowledge and 
positioning of actors, how this results in coalitions of actors and control of the issues on the 
policy table through particular framings which fix and legitimise certain elements, whilst 
problematising alternatives (Hajer, 1995).  Through discourse coalitions actors engage in 
politics, which is described as a struggle for discursive hegemony (Hajer, 1995).  The concept 
can be used to investigate how actors are involved in argumentative power struggles in which 
they not only try to align others with their own particular framings, but also try to position 
other actors in specific ways for the benefit of those framings (Hajer, 1995).  
2.2.2.3  The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
A major and competing contribution to the study of policy networks was Paul Sabatier and 
colleagues’ advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier, 1991; Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1994).  The framework claims that policy formation is driven by advocacy 
coalitions that compete within a policy subsystem, consisting of multiple actors and 
institutions interested in a particular policy area (Sabatier, 1988).  Crucially, they define 
advocacy coalitions according to a shared set of beliefs and values, which they claim is a key 
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element of coalition formation and coherence (Schlager, 1995; Weible and Sabatier, 2005).  
This has in itself triggered vast areas of literature that investigates the nature of these beliefs, 
the different types of networks they may produce and the role that narratives may play (see 
Henry, 2011; Lahat, 2011; Matti and Sandström, 2011; Shanahan et al., 2011).  Beliefs are 
theorised as being three-tiered: core-beliefs, similar to a worldview; policy core-beliefs, 
relating to the nature of problems and potential policy solutions; and secondary beliefs, which 
refers to the policy implementation strategy preferred (Bulkeley, 2000).  The coalitions 
compete against one another in an attempt to align policy with their a priori beliefs through 
co-ordinated activity within the coalition and policy subsystem and through the use of ‘policy 
brokers’, who attempt to facilitate policy reform through minimising conflict (Sabatier, 1988; 
Bulkeley, 2000).  There are clear similarities between this framework and the concept of 
competing discourse coalitions and whilst the advocacy coalition framework has been widely 
adopted, particularly in political and policy science studies (see Marsh and Smith, 2000), it 
has been criticised for its neglect of discursive aspects of policy formation, lack of 
consideration of policy learning and the maintenance of a view that is too structural 
(Bulkeley, 2000).  Both discourse coalition perspectives and the advocacy coalition 
framework do not assume a shared world view between actors, and are open to the possibility 
of actors being involved in several coalitions and utilising different policy narratives at 
different times (Bulkeley, 2000).  Discourse coalitions, however, conceptualise interests and 
beliefs as being shaped by and through the policy process and the actors engaged in this, 
rather than semi-static (Bulkeley, 2000).  These discursive processes are vital to the 
integration of theories of power into policy studies, particularly with reference to the 
negotiation and struggle that takes place through power relations in the processes of policy 
reform. 
2.2.2.4  Policy space 
Alongside the growing appreciation of the interactions between “complex constellations of 
actors” (Brock et al., 2001: 7) in the process of policy evolution, Grindle & Thomas (1991) 
introduced the idea of ‘policy space’ to describe the arenas in which actors and discourses 
interact around policy issues.  The interactive model of policy as a process set out by Grindle 
& Thomas (1991) uses the concept of policy space to describe the ability of a political regime 
and its leadership to pursue policy reform without causing significant conflict or threatening 
the power of the regime.  The extent of policy space is seen as a function of ‘room to 
manoeuvre’ which can be created and shaped by actors within the policy elite (or 
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community), but, in line with ideas of policy narratives and discourse coalitions, is also 
shaped by the narratives and discourses surrounding an issue and used by the policy elite 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991).  The concept argues against deterministic models of behaviour 
and allows for the integration of structural and agent-centred factors, recognises the 
importance of discourse to these, and incorporates aspects of change over time in policy 
learning alongside strategic action and struggle for power and control over policy space 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991).  I utilise policy space as a term to describe the room for 
manoeuvre around a political issue, but recognise that this is a product of power relations, 
resulting in distinct and shifting policy space surrounding different individuals and groups. 
There are clear similarities between the policy space concept and Kingdon’s (1984) theory of 
policy streams and windows, in which a stochastic or chance element of policy formation is 
proposed.  Policy windows appear when “in response to a recognized problem, the policy 
community develops a proposal that is financially and technically feasible, and politicians 
find it advantageous to approve it” (Sabatier, 1991: 151).  Crucially Kingdon’s approach 
recognises the role of key actors, or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to creating these windows, and is 
insightful in explaining how certain issues and policy solutions take centre stage, revealing 
some of the politics within the process.  However, the conceptual map that Kingdon provides, 
like Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework, is lacking a serious consideration of power to 
these issues (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  Whilst I do not employ Kingdon’s theory in my 
own research for this reason, I do integrate his idea concerning the role of individuals acting 
as entrepreneurs as key to policy processes and the shaping of policy pathways.  I employ the 
term policy entrepreneur as this incorporates actors from a wider group, and acknowledges 
that such key individuals may be part of the policy community, discourse coalition or policy 
network. 
2.2.3 Policy Processes: An Integrated Approach 
In my discussion of policy processes in chapter 5, I employ a conceptualisation of policy that 
integrates the discussion in the previous sections on network and process views of policy.  I 
utilise the concept of a policy network, consisting of a policy community and multiple 
discourse coalitions, made up of groups of actors linked by policy narratives and vying for 
policy space and discursive institutionalisation. I adopt a policy as discourse view that 
contends that “policy does not move neatly from stages of agenda-setting and decision-
making to implementation: policy is often contested, substantially re-shaped or even initiated 
from a range of places...it is this complexity and dynamism...that may allow for the assertion 
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of alternative story lines and practices, which, in turn, can gradually result in substantial 
challenges or shifts in knowledge and practices associated with previously dominant 
discourses” (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 22).  In chapter 5, I use this framing of policy to 
investigate the process of policy reform to introduce CBNRM, and the characteristics of the 
policy network, including the policy community, discourse coalitions and policy 
entrepreneurs in the shaping of policy.  In chapter 5 I also examine the role of the local level, 
and specifically pilot projects, in policy processes through the construction of policy space 
and position within the policy network.   
Incorporating theories of policy as discourse necessitates the “analysis of webs of power 
underlying the actions of different actors in policy processes, as well as practices invested in 
policy negotiation or contest” (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 24).  I draw on this positioning of 
power at the centre of policy processes, conceptualising them as a “reflection of structured 
political interests, the product of agency of actors engaged in a policy area, and also part of 
over-arching power-knowledge relations that discursively frame practice in different ways” 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 38).  It is to the theorisation of power, and its integration in to 
both the study of policy processes and the power struggles taking place within CBNRM that 
this chapter turns next. 
2.3 Power 
Issues of power have become central to the study of policy and, whilst policies are obviously 
political phenomena, the politics of policy processes, and the power relations involved, are 
often “disguised by the objective, neutral, legal-rational idioms in which they are portrayed” 
(Shore and Wright, 1997: 8).  This is what Ferguson (1990) referred to as the ‘anti-politics 
machine’.  Hidden beneath apolitical discourses of participation, empowerment and 
neoliberal win-win scenarios, the crisis surrounding CBNRM is one of socio-politics and 
governance issues which drive inequalities, re-shape CBNRM according to actors’ own 
interests and produce unexpected results.  Placing power at the centre of these politics and 
processes requires careful thought however. 
Power is a term that has occupied the minds of social scientists for many years and in many 
ways.  The debates surrounding power operate across the realms of political science 
(Haugaard, 2002), policy studies (Keeley and Scoones, 2003), anthropology (Shore and 
Wright, 1997) and sociology (Foucault, 1975; Foucault, 1982; Clegg, 1989).  Whilst concepts 
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and theories of social power abound, highlighting what Clegg & Haugaard (2009) refer to as 
the many ‘faces’ of power, it is important to acknowledge that there is not one single type of 
power, and no single explanatory mechanism for it.  It is social power, “based upon 
knowledge and membership of social systems” (Barnes, 1988; Haugaard, 2002: 113), rather 
than natural power (such as the power to move and object) that has interested social scientists 
(see Lukes, 2005).   
Scott (2001) argued that studies of social power form two distinct streams:  a mainstream 
view concerned with the exercise of power and an alternative stream which conceptualises 
power as a dispositional capacity, without necessarily exercising it.  Traditional concepts of 
power focused upon the first of these streams, describing it as ‘power over’ (Göhler, 2009).  
For example, this was famously discussed as sovereign power in Hobbes’ Leviathan and 
Machiavelli’s The Prince (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009).  This classical view conceptualises 
power as ‘zero-sum’, asymmetrical and hierarchical, leading to the concentration of power in 
the hands of an (individual or group) elite (Scott, 2001).  Whilst the classical views of power 
have been reinterpreted over time, generating different schools of thought and 
conceptualisations of power, the power debate that gripped the social sciences in the latter 
half of the 20th century took its starting point from the ideas of elite control of power within 
this first stream.  The debate is often traced back to the work of Mills who, in the 1950s, 
published two seminal works concerning the power elite and community power structures 
(Haugaard, 2002).  These were famously criticised in behaviouralist or pluralist views of 
power which argued that different actors and interests dominate over different issues (Dahl, 
1961).  In the 1970s, these ideas were further expanded, particularly by Bachrach & Baratz’s 
(1962)  study of a second face of power.  This key work introduced the idea that power was 
exercised not only in the outcomes of decision-making, but in the agenda setting created by 
the ‘organisation of bias’ that led to dominant groups “limit[ing] decision-making to non-
controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, 
notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power issues” (Lukes, 
2005: 5).  Schrattschneider referred to this process as the way “some issues are organised into 
politics, others are organised out” (in Lukes, 2005: 7).   These works opened up the study of 
power beyond sovereign power and to more subtle forms such as authority, coercion, 
manipulation and influence (see Lukes, 2005), and raised questions about whether conflict 
was a necessary condition for the exercise of power.   
43 
 
The power debate has developed into a second stream of theory identified by Scott (2001): an 
exploration of power not just as ‘power over’ but as ‘power to’.  Parsons (1963) contributed 
greatly to these theoretical developments with his argument that power is not present only in 
its exercise, but also as a capacity that is socially produced (Haugaard, 1997). In this thesis, I 
employ a view of power that draws on this second stream, defining it as “the ability to 
achieve a desired outcome in competition with other actors who lay claim to the same 
resources needed to produce that outcome” (Hyden, 2008: 11).  I argue that power is both 
exercised and is a dispositional capacity, therefore.  As sociologists and political scientists 
turned their attention to more subtle forms of power, Lukes (1974; 2005) published a ‘radical 
view’ that extended these debates into a third dimension; ‘false consciousness’ as a way in 
which power is working in unconscious ways, affecting people’s values through processes of 
internalisation (Scott, 2001; Lukes, 2005).  This third dimension of power was used by 
Gaventa (1982) in his study of mining communities in an Appalachian valley, where he 
argued that quiescence of the dominated community could be attributed to power relations 
and specifically the influence of consciousness created by information control and 
socialisation and indirect means, such as anticipated defeat.  These ideas linked debates back 
to Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony, and to the later work of Pierre Bourdieu, who described 
how “social agents are endowed with habitus, inscribed in their bodies by past experiences: 
social norms and conventions of the various fields20 are incorporated or inscribed into their 
bodies, thereby generating a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, 
walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1990 in Lukes, 2005: 141).  
Bourdieu’s idea of habitus is conceptualised as “below the level of consciousness [and, unlike 
hegemony]...resistant to articulation, critical reflection and conscious manipulation”, which 
he described as ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu, 2001 in Lukes, 2005: 140).  What both these 
major players in social theory point to is the movement of the consideration of power beyond 
that of the exercise of ‘power over’ to more complex forms of the internalisation of values 
that represent the dominant.  This raises questions (and has been the basis for myriad 
theories) as to how this is achieved, what this tells us about power and whether it is 
necessarily undesirable.   
The internalisation of socially-constructed power forms a key element of the research project, 
which attempts to understand the power systems within which CBNRM is operating and 
                                                 
20 “stratified social spaces within which individuals struggle for unequally distributed resources or 
capital” (Bourdieu, 1990 in Lukes, 2005: 141). 
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specifically, how powerful actors within this are able to negotiate the system, manipulating it 
for their own ends.  In this thesis, I explore the axes of power present within Tanzanian 
CBNRM therefore, and investigate the internalisation of values that legitimise and support 
the power systems.  I argue that a conceptualisation of power must address debates that have 
been taking place within power literatures, but also more broadly across the social scientists 
and address the issue of structure and agency.  In addressing the questions of both the 
internalisation of values and how actors seek to exert power and control over each other and 
the environment, it is crucial to address the issue of how this takes place, where and how this 
power is created, and whether it is structurally or socially derived.   
2.3.1 Structure and Agency 
“Theorizing the relationship between power, social knowledge and structure 
inevitably takes us into the debate on the autonomy of the individual in relation to 
social order” 
(Haugaard, 1997:1).   
Power debates take place amongst wider debates concerned with the respective roles of 
structure and agency in society, politics and power (Giddens, 1984; Hayward and Lukes, 
2008).  There is a long-standing tension between structural-functional and Marxist accounts 
of power and actor-orientated perspectives that emphasise inequalities in the distribution of 
resources and power, but also acknowledge opportunities for people to shape these 
relationships through agency (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005).  Whilst Gramsci sat firmly at the 
structural end of the spectrum, Bourdieu attempted to find a middle ground between structure 
and agency to explain how behaviour is a product of both. It is the relationship between 
structure and agency that interests me, in terms of how power systems function, how policy is 
created and how its implementation and the complexities of outcomes witnessed in CBNRM 
are a process of continual tension and renegotiation between structures of governance and the 
agency of individuals.  I argue that all of these are socio-political processes ongoing within 
CBNRM that have power at their core and that are all discursive processes (Feindt and Oels, 
2005).   
Several attempts to combine the prospective roles of structure and agency and structural and 
post-structural accounts of power have become prominent, most notably in the work of 
Giddens’s ‘structuration theory’.  Essentially, Giddens argued against a dualism of subject 
and object-centred social theories, proposing structuration as an alternative whereby “social 
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structures...exist in the moment that they are reproduced by agents while, simultaneously, 
social agents constitute themselves as such through structured action.  This moment of 
reproduction of agency and structure is structuration” (Giddens, 1984 in Haugaard, 2002: 
146). Such attempts aim to make it possible to investigate both how actors are constrained 
and shaped by the socio-political structures that they live amongst, whilst acknowledging that 
these structures are socially constructed and are continually being challenged and re-shaped 
by actors (2004).  I argue that this conceptualisation of power through a combination of 
structure and agency is critical to understanding the implementation of an externally-designed 
governance system that is inserted within the socio-political context of a community under 
CBNRM.  This perspective is important to the consideration of institutions within my 
research, which brings together structure and agency to see both formal and informal 
institutions as “constituted through social processes, which they in turn enable and constrain.  
They embody social relations and rules, such as norms, values and behaviour, to which they 
lend stability and coherence over space and time.  Institutions, therefore, encompass concrete 
and cognitive structures that are habitualised over time and attain a degree of permanence 
within society” (Bulkeley, 2000: 731).  Such arguments form the basis of a research agenda 
that emphasises the socio-political nature of CBNRM, in terms of both policy and 
performance of that policy and highlights the need to investigate this performance as 
continual socio-political processes of re-construction and re-shaping of the governance 
system. 
In line with the growth of poststructural theory and the debates surrounding structure and 
agency, more recent theories of power have focused upon concepts of power that are not 
zero-sum but see power as created (often attributed to the work of  Parsons, see 1963), the 
relationship between power and knowledge (see Barnes, 1988), and questions of whether and 
how compliance to a socio-political power regime is accomplished (Foucault, 1975; Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, 1982; Bourdieu, 1989).  Haugaard (1997) argues that in modern thinking on 
power, four paradigms all concerned with these issues of structure and agency and the nature 
of power as domination and ‘political technology’ through the social construction of subjects 
are identifiable in the respective works of Steven Lukes, Michel Foucault, Barry Barnes and 
Anthony Giddens (as previously discussed).  Within these four key thinkers’ work on power, 
Foucauldian theory has been widely adopted, both within the social sciences more broadly, 
but especially within poststructural political ecology studies (see 2.5.1).  Foucault did not 
describe his work as being specifically an exploration of power, but did acknowledge that it 
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played a major role in his work.  The critical departure for Foucault from Marxist theory and 
the theories of power that prevailed was that he could not accept that knowledge and power, 
whilst inter-related, could be separated in the form of an ideologically-free, domination-free 
form of knowledge; he saw all knowledge, all meanings and all social life as being subject to 
“petty and ignoble power relations” (Haugaard, 1997: 43).  He argued that “it is not possible 
for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender 
power” and “the formation of ‘truth’ does not simply happen.  Rather, the truth of any 
discourse formation is the consequence of the struggles and tactics of power” (Foucault 1980 
in Haugaard, 1997: 66 and 68).  He moved away from concepts of negative-only (sovereign) 
power, and embraced theories of the construction of power, labelling it essentially positive.  
He was interested in “the point where power reaches into the very grains of individuals, 
touches their bodies and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes, their discourses, 
learning processes and everyday lives (Foucault, 1980 in Lukes, 2005: 89).  Here there are 
clear similarities to Bourdieu’s (1989; 1992) concept of habitus, but whilst Bourdieu 
concentrated on where practice comes from, Foucault focused more on the interaction 
between ‘techniques of domination’ and ‘techniques of the self’ to understand what practice 
does (Threadgold, 2006).  Bourdieu also argued that knowledge is not discursive, but forms 
part of habitus, whereas Foucault focused on the discursive nature of power (Haugaard, 
1997). 
Foucault argued that the discursive nature and ‘regime’ of power is not necessarily 
oppressive, but is positive and productive because the subject (himself created by it) must 
submit to it, in order to be seen to liberate himself from it (Haugaard, 1997).  For example, a 
patient in a mental health hospital is deemed to be cured, and can be freed from the 
restrictions placed upon him, only once he has accepted his diagnosis and submitted himself 
to the treatment proposed by the institution, which inherently involves the reification of the 
power structure in place (Haugaard, 1997).  Taking this view of power as positive, Foucault 
discussed the concept of ‘subjectification’ extensively, and created what is perhaps the most 
widely-applied aspect of Foucauldian theory; governmentality.  Foucault considered the most 
pernicious form of power to be its normalised forms.  In his studies of the deep, intimate 
connections between power and knowledge, he introduced the concept governmentality to 
describe “the ways in which subjectivity is constituted within a constellation of powers and in 
which people continuously and permanently survey and govern themselves as an effect of 
those powers” (Kesby, 2005: 2042).  Governmentality describes the generation of “compliant 
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subjects who actively reproduce assemblages of power without being forced to do so” 
(Kesby, 2005: 2040).  Foucault described this process using the example of Bentham’s 
‘panopticon’, a prison in which all inmates are positioned to be continually visible to a central 
watchtower, where authority (itself unseen) presides (Foucault, 1975).  Each inmate has no 
way of knowing when he is being observed, but begins to modify his own behaviour and 
observe himself, a process upon the soul which Foucault described as the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982).  Whereas Gramsci argued that even under hegemony 
and the ideological subordination of the working class, resistance and political struggle would 
always be present, Foucault argued that governmentalised subjects cannot see the power 
relations at work, which have been normalised and accepted as legitimate, producing passive 
subjects even in contexts of extreme domination (Gaventa, 1982; Haugaard, 2002).   
Foucauldian theory has been employed by Arun Agrawal in his study Environmentality 
(2005), in which he explores the ways in which policy is a political technology.  He uses the 
evolution of community-based forest management in India as an example, focusing on the 
shifts in relations between state and localities that this involved, the creation of environmental 
knowledges and the formation of self-identity within devolved environmental management.  
He argues that in his case study changing relations between the state and society produced 
new ‘governmentalized localities’ through the construction of new centres of environmental 
decision-making or ‘regulatory spaces’, and new forms of relationships termed ‘regulatory 
communities’ (Agrawal, 2005).  Within these regulatory spaces and communities he 
describes the process of governmentality in the production of environmental subjects 
(Agrawal, 2005: 14).  He also focuses on the discursive construction of these 
environmentalities and governmentalised localities: “regulations and villagers’ practices and 
words seem to be part of a process that has reshaped people’s understandings of the forest 
and the basis of forest control itself” (Agrawal, 2005: 12).   
Foucauldian concepts of discourse focus less upon language and more upon knowledge, and 
are characterised by four features (Feindt and Oels, 2005): firstly a focus on the productive 
function of discourse and the ways in which discourse establishes truths about the world, the 
environment or policy options; secondly that power is present in all forms of social 
interaction and is both productive as well as repressive.  This supports a theorisation of power 
that is “understood as a web of force relations made up of local centres of power around 
which specific discourses, strategies of power and techniques for the appropriation of 
knowledge cluster (Feindt and Oels, 2005: 164); thirdly that discourse is a strategic situation 
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that both forms and is formed by actors, and are locations of conflict.  This is an important 
aspect in the integration of structure and agency; and finally that discourse is important to the 
construction of subjectivity and governmentality.  I employ such a perspective firstly through 
consideration of the discursive production of CBNRM through policy processes.  Secondly 
my research considers the discursive practices of negotiation and political struggle ongoing 
within Tanzanian CBNRM, and in 6.3.4 I focus specifically on conflicts taking place and the 
power struggles these represent.  Finally, I address the issue of power and resistance by 
considering evidence of governmentality within Tanzanian CBNRM, particularly with 
reference to the informal and hidden systems of power and issues such as corruption and 
neopatrimonialism. 
Foucauldian theory has raised many questions and critiques, principally the issue of 
resistance.  Is a governmentalised subject aware of his subjectification?  Can this ever be 
broken?  James Scott (1985; 1990) has become one of the most well-known writers on the 
subject, arguing that resistance is always present and often subtle, quiescence is tactical and 
hegemony can only ever be paper-thin (Lukes, 2005).  Haugaard (2003) recently attempted to 
reconcile some of these many debates, making room for a nuanced understanding of power 
that accommodated both negative and positive power, twin roles of structure and agency and 
room for compliance and resistance.  He describes this as the seven ways in which power can 
be produced (Table 2.1).  He attempts to weave a way for power to be considered in its 
coercive form and as a product of the creation of social order and to bring together the works 
of many of the influential writers about power, including the work of Barnes, Clegg, Giddens, 
Lukes, Foucault, Arendt, Bachrach & Baratz and Weber and Dahl, alongside his own earlier 











Form of Power Example Description 
(1) 
Power created 
by social order 
Causal predictability 
created through the 
reproduction of meaning: 
structuration and 
confirming structuration 
Structuration is the reproduction of social structure, but 
this requires recognition to be socially meaningful or 
powerful.  This act of recognition and imbibing of 
meaning is confirming structuration21 
(2) 
Power created 
by system bias 
Order precludes certain 
actions: de-structuration 
Similar to the organisation of bias (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962) in that he describes the capacity of such agents to 
‘de-structure’ or ‘non confirm-structure’ the practices of 




by systems of 
thought 





Structural practices are sustained by social consciousness.  
Systemic biases are based upon social meanings, which 
are created by social meanings and systems of thought 






‘Power over’ based upon 
social knowledge that is 
not discursive.  
Empowerment through 
the transfer of knowledge 
from practical to 
discursive consciousness 
Rejects the idea of false consciousness and argues that 
consciousness raising and empowerment (through de-
stabilisation of social order) are possible through the 
creation of discursive  practical consciousness that 
provides us with the ability to recognize patterns of 




Social power has to 
appear as non-arbitrary 
Drawing upon the work of Foucault and Clegg with 
respect to internalisation and subjectification, Haugaard 
argues that the destabilisation of social order described in 
(4) may not always occur.  The reification of structures 
can lead to confim-structuration because actors cannot 




Routine is used to make 
actors predictable through 
the inculcation of 
practical consciousness 
knowledge 
Practical consciousness knowledge cannot be converted 
because it is blocked through socialisation involving the 
routinisation of structuration eliciting automatic confirm-




Natural power as a base: 
violence and coercion as a 
substitute for the creation 
of social power 
The final form of power is violence and coercion, which, 
as Arendt argued, represents not the ultimate form of 
power, but the failure of social power23 
                                                 
21 To illustrate this argument, Haugaard uses the example of a ship that is to be named and launched.  
Instead of the designated person, a stranger walks up, smashes the bottle on the side of the ship, 
proclaims a name and launches the ship.  We would not consider the ship to have been named or 
launched, because the act would not be recognised, even though the procedure might have been 
correct; in Haugaard’s argument an act of structuration has occurred, but it has not been confirmed, 
and is therefore meaningless (Haugaard, 2003). 
22 So that upon leaving the panopticon, the criminal retains the self-governing practices he learnt 
inside (Haugaard, 2003). 
23 “Once the sovereign has to draw their sword it is because the Leviathan has failed to create social 
power”(Haugaard, 2003: 108). 




I utilise several of Haugaard’s classification of forms of power to investigate how the power 
systems in place within CBNRM are operating. I employ the concept of power created by 
social order (1) and by discipline (6) to investigate the internalisation and confirm-
structuration of informal aspects of power, particularly with reference to corruption and 
neopatrimonialism.  In chapter 6 I utilise the ideas of power created by systems of thought 
(3), tacit knowledge (4) and reification (5) in an examination of the relationship between 
power and knowledge and the control of information within power struggles.  Finally I 
address the question of resistance and the roots of empowerment through evidence of power 
created by tacit knowledge (4).   
My analysis of power is one that weaves throughout the empirical chapters, and I argue that 
power is simultaneously a missing element in the study of policy processes, unacknowledged 
in its more subtle and informal forms within studies of the local politics of natural resource 
management, and the basis for contestation within such management.  I adopt a Foucauldian 
perspective of power, arguing that discursive processes of persuasion, negotiation and 
contestation are central to the prescribed governance system set out in policy and to the 
reality (and differences therein) of its performance. 
2.4 Politics of Scales 
I have framed my approach in this thesis as political ecology (see 2.5).  Bryant & Bailey 
(1997) argue that political ecology is characterised by two central themes: the first is power, 
as discussed in the previous section; the second is scale, which is the subject of this section.  
Power and scale are very closely linked as the latter are the product of the 
compartmentalisation of socially-produced space according to power systems (Zulu, 2009).  
If we consider the complexities of community conservation to be socio-political, which need 
to be investigated through an examination of power, the socio-spatial aspects of power are 
critical to this.  Here I discuss some of the fundamental aspects of spatial concerns within 
human geography, and how these are of relevance to a political ecology study of CBNRM.  
My interest in the area is in the application of a ‘politics of scales’ approach to investigating 
the governance of CBNRM projects, and how this is constructed and manipulated by actors 
in conflicts over access and power.  Adopting a politics of scales approach facilitates further 
investigation of the processes of negotiations and struggle described in 2.3, therefore.  Below 
I trace the development of the term, its application and debates surrounding its usage. 
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2.4.1 Geography and Scale 
 
“What gives geographers their disciplinary identity is their explicit consideration 
for spatial relationships”  
(Gibson et al., 2000: 226). 
Geography, in its many guises, is fundamentally concerned with place and space.  
Geography’s history in exploration and tradition of regional study clearly show this, and 
contemporary geography retains these foci, particularly in the expanding fields of Geographic 
Information Systems and remote sensing. Since the early 1990s, human geographers 
interested in social theory, urban contexts and economic geography have paid increasing 
attention to its theorisation and study (Brenner, 2001).   
Scalar theories, whilst multiple, all come back to the essential argument that space is socially 
constructed.  Attempting to distance themselves from the 1960s geography as a spatial 
science, authors such as Massey (1978) began to discuss space as a social phenomenon, a 
theme that has been widely adopted in the social sciences, both within and beyond human 
geography.  Studies in the 1970s and 80s focused heavily upon the production of space, 
territory, locality and place (see Harvey, 1989).  The social construction of space and place 
was an idea famously discussed by Henri Lefebvre (1974), who argued that spatial 
configurations within society or ‘social superstructures’ are both the driver and product of the 
development of capitalism.  His work raised ‘the scale question’ (Brenner, 2001), by positing 
that the social compartmentalisation of space produces ‘scales’, which has been the 
inspiration for substantial literatures in human geography.  The centre of these areas of study 
has been studies of capitalism and particularly “the uneven development of capital and the 
geography of industrial location; ...the changing geographies of state power, political 
regulation and socio-political identity; and...the organizational structures and strategies of 
labour  unions, political parties and social movements” (Brenner, 2001: 592).  The study of 
scale, its rise to prominence in geographical enquiry in the 1980s, and the debates this 
entailed are a product of context, and particularly the issue of globalisation at the time (Sayre, 
2005).  This period in history is conceptualised as involving especially large scalar 
transformations of organisation, associated with the growth of neoliberal models (Brenner, 
2001).  Brenner (2001: 594) described this shift as an “aggressive attempt to forge new 
global, national, regional and local scalar hierarchies in which unrestricted capital mobility, 
unfettered market relations, intensified commodification and a logic of ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ competition are to be permanently institutionalized (sic)”. 
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According to Marston (2000: 221), this period of studies exploring social constructionist 
ideas of scale have provided three widely-agreed essential features; firstly that scale is not an 
external fact or ontological given, but “a way of framing conceptions of reality”; second that 
the construction of these scalar frames is not a rhetorical act, but is “tangible and have 
material consequence” in everyday life and social structures; finally it is widely agreed that 
these framings of reality are not accepted and stable, but actively contested, often 
contradictory and under constant re-organisation.  Employing the idea of scales as frames of 
reality, it is vital not to assume hierarchy or a top-down, nested view of scales (Bulkeley, 
2005; Marston et al., 2005; Purcell and Brown, 2005).  In such views, sometimes referred to 
as the Russian doll or ladder analogies, scales are seen to start with the local and move up 
through regional, national and international levels, in which the latter rules and the former 
accommodates (Leitner and Miller, 2007).  Scales are better conceptualised as networks or 
‘tangled hierarchies’, emphasising the  “the shifting organizational (sic), strategic, discursive 
and symbolic relationships between a range of intertwined geographical scales and on the 
ramifications of such interscalar transformations for the representations, meanings, functions 
and organizational structures of those scales” (Bulkeley, 2005: 884).  Instead of hierarchy, 
scalar theorists must focus upon verticality, the inter-relatedness between scales and the 
politics both within and between them (Rangan and Kull, 2009).   
The last of Marston’s (2000) three features is the basis for the second24 fundamental 
theoretical underpinning in the development of the concept of politics of scales: the 
differentiation of space is infused with power relations and a process of political struggle 
(Zulu, 2009).  Scales are not fixed, therefore, but are spaces of constant conflict and re-
shaping and power relations are central to the scalar topography, but also the fulcrum around 
which struggles emerge and take place.  This was a central theme in Lefebvre’s work (1974), 
in which he saw power relations as ‘sociospatial’ (Leitner and Miller, 2007: 199).  As scale 
debates began to focus on the processes of scalar transformation and struggle, Smith (1992: 
74) made a crucial contribution to the theorisation of scale when he argued that “the scale of 
struggle and the struggle over scale are two sides of the same coin”, calling for a structuration 
element to scalar theory in which structure and agency are mutually constitutive “with agents 
enacting and transforming structures through their actions and structures enabling and 
constraining human actions” (Leitner and Miller, 2007: 118).  The fluid nature of scales and 
their constant construction and reorganisation has become a major theme and point of critique 
                                                 
24 The first being that space is socially constructed and compartmentalised into scales through power. 
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of early studies (Marston et al., 2005).  These scalar struggles are conceptualised as “an 
integral part of social strategies to combat and defend control over limited resources and/or 
struggle for empowerment” (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003: 913).  Scales should be seen 
not as things in themselves with inherent qualities, but rather as strategies that are pursued by 
(and benefit) social groups with particular spatial and environmental agendas” (Purcell and 
Brown, 2005: 279).  Space and spatiality, therefore are intrinsically linked to understandings 
of poststructuralist power, as seen in the work of Foucault (Allen, 1999).   
Elaborating on his ideas about the transformation of scales, Smith (1993) discussed the idea 
of scale ‘jumping’.  The term refers to the transformation of scalar formations through actors 
being able to use their social power to jump into another scale, thus resisting hegemonic 
structures (Smith, 1993).  In a later publication (2004: 193), Smith extended his arguments 
further to differentiate between scale jumping and scale ‘bending’, where the latter refers to 
the upsetting of “entrenched assumptions about what kinds of social activities fit properly at 
which scales”.  Using the example of the Mayor of New York City25 Rudy Giuliani 
,addressing the United Nations on the topic of the city’s role in the world in the wake of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.  Smith argued that his speech to the United Nations was an 
example of scale bending in which an actor contravenes the cognitively-comfortable 
organisation of scales.  Smith (2004: 205) differentiated between scale jumping and bending 
as the latter involving a “fragmentation of pre-existing scales”, whereas scale jumping is less 
transformative. 
2.4.2 Politics of Scales: Transformations 
In the second edition of Uneven Development, Smith (1990) pulled together his work on the 
socially-constructed nature of scales and their essentially contested and fluid nature to coin 
the term ‘politics of scales26’. Politics of scales can be defined as “situations whereby actors, 
directly or indirectly, attempt to shift the levels of study, assessment, deliberation and 
decision-making authority to the level and scale which most suits them, that is, where they 
can exercise power more effectively” (Lebel et al., 2008: 129). The focus is, therefore, on 
processes among and between scales (Brenner, 2001).   
                                                 
25 Not a nation state, which is the scale usually associated with the construction of foreign policy. 
26This is distinguished from a politics of scale approach which denotes “the production, 
reconfiguration or contestation of some aspect of sociospatial organization within a relatively bounded 
geographical area – usually labelled the local, the urban, the regional, the national and so forth” 
(Brenner, 2001: 599, emphasis in original). 
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It incorporates the ideas, not only of transformation, but of a strategic re-organisation of 
scales, and as resistance to the distribution of power.  These two elements are discussed by 
Edwards et al., (2001: 291-2) in their study of partnerships as a new scale of rural governance 
in the UK, which they argue may be approached in two ways; “in terms of the extent to 
which power and responsibility have been shifted between the existing scales of governance; 
or ... in terms of creating entirely new scales of governance not concurrent with the territories 
of any existing institutions”.  In this study of the emergence of new forms of governance and 
its scalar implications they argue that new forms do not develop on a scalar blank canvas, 
“rather they are constructed across a landscape already imprinted with a scale and territorial 
division of the state” (Edwards et al., 2001: 291).  They make a forceful case for the adoption 
of what has become known as a process-based approach to scale (Swyngedouw, 1997), in 
which both construction and transformation of scales are key.  This approach to scale 
“focuses attention on the mechanisms of scale transformation through social conflict and 
political struggle” (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003: 913).  I employ this approach in chapter 
6 in an investigation of the scalar landscape surrounding CBNRM in Tanzania, the scales of 
power prescribed in policy and their integration with existing and newly constructed scales in 
the performance of policy.  In 6.3.4 I focus specifically on how these scalar processes are 
taking place through conflict within the case studies.  In my investigation of scalar 
transformations I focus specifically on two aspects; the discursive construction of scale and 
scalecraft. 
2.4.2.1  The Discursive Construction of Scale & Scalecraft 
A politics of scales approach, which plays close attention to the role of power in scalar 
struggles, allows for the integration of another stream within scalar studies, that of the 
discursive construction of scale (see Agnew, 1997).  As discussed above, Marston (2000) 
claimed that one of the greatest contributions of the attention paid to scale in the 1990s has 
been the conceptualisation of scales as frames of reality.  In combination with a process-
based approach, scale is seen as discursively produced through the employment of these 
framings, but also continually contested by alternative framings and discursive strategies in 
the battle for power over the scalar landscape.   
Discursive strategies for scalar organisation within natural resource management privilege a 
particular level as appropriate (Lebel et al., 2008).  For example, Lebel et al. (2005), in an 
earlier study of river basin management, argued that discursive strategies re-scaled 
management to the national level through arguing that this was both legitimate and in the 
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national interest, and through arguing that alternative levels such as the local or watershed 
were inappropriate due to reduced accountability. Lebel et al., (2005) also argued that these 
strategic relations of actors in space in the construction and utilisation of discourses for scalar 
purposes is present not only in the narratives and discourses employed in such processes, but 
also in the control and manipulation of information, which empowers some and disempowers 
others.  On this point, there is clearly a strong link to the discussion of power in 2.3.  The 
control of information and knowledge is a form of political technology by which power 
relations are exercised, and actors engage in such processes within the power struggles that 
represent politics of scales. 
Fraser (2010: 335) considers the strategies employed by actors in terms of ‘scalecraft’, which 
he defines as “the skills in negotiating spaces of engagement ... Scalecraft draws our attention 
to actors’ skills and agency amidst the structures of opportunity and constraint that constitute 
the politics of scale[s]”.   This concept provides an important link between the perspectives of 
structure and agency described in section 2.3.1, which is critical in the integration of the role 
of power in scalar processes.  This concept makes room for discursive strategies and scalar 
processes within and around the existing scalar structures and opens up debate about whether 
these structures form the backdrop around which agency is organised.  In turn, this raises 
further questions about power, and whether the politics of scales processes, whilst attempting 
to transform the scalar landscape, simultaneously strengthen and reify systems of power 
through resistance to a recognised power system, as described by Haugaard in the first form 
of power (1997; see also Lukes, 2005 and 2.3.1). 
Power, policy processes and politics of scales are inter-related in the socio-politics of 
CBNRM.  The process of policy formulation is a discursive process imbued with power 
relations which results in the construction of a scalar landscape, as represented in the 
prescribed governance structure.  This scalar topography of power is not static however, and 
actors are continually engaged in negotiations and reconfigurations to position themselves to 
benefit from the power system in place, and to alter it for their own benefit.  This they do 
through discursive strategies.  In line with the discussion of structure and agency in 2.3.1, the 
scalar topography and politics of scales taking place around CBNRM represent structural 
systems of governance as prescribed in policy and their adaptation through the agency of 
individuals.  Similarly, the performed governance structure is comprised of alternative power 
structures originating from the communities in which CBNRM is being implemented, and 
these are amalgamated with the prescribed governance structure and their adaptations in a 
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complex web of shifting power relations and political struggle.  I bring these literatures and 
theoretical insights from policy processes, power and politics of scales together in a study 
that I define as adopting a political ecology approach.  As I will discuss in the next section, 
power and scale have been central themes within such an approach, which has a long history 
of overlap with politics of scales literature in its consideration of questions concerning “the 
various ways and forms in which one actor seeks to exert control over the environment of 
other actors” (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 39). 
2.5 A Political Ecology of Nature Conservation 
In this thesis, I employ a political ecology approach to investigate the socio-politics of 
CBNRM projects in the Tanzanian wildlife and forestry sectors.  In this section, I explore the 
field of political ecology, its roots and development and ask what it can give to such a study, 
why it is appropriate and how it has framed my research questions and fieldwork.  
Problematically, it is not quite clear what political ecology is: some describe it as a research 
agenda (Bryant, 1998), some as an approach (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003), others as a 
perspective (see (Neumann, 2005) and others as a discipline (Blaikie, 2011).  In addition, 
authors may define their particular approach within political ecology as radical, critical, 
feminist, urban, poststructural, Marxist, third world and first world (Neumann, 2005), whilst 
others prefer the term ‘liberation ecology’ (Peet and Watts), and some have rejected it 
entirely in favour of ‘environmental politics’ (Vayda and Walters, 1999).  This diversity 
within political ecology stems partly from its interdisciplinary nature, and partly from its 
history of grounded studies rather than theoretically-focused research (Bryant and Bailey, 
1997).   
The approach taken within this study is one that focuses on the politics of environmental 
issues and I follow the definition provided by Jones (2006: 483) that political ecology is 
“centrally concerned with the politics of struggles over the control of, and access to natural 
resources”.  I use the phrase political ecology approach, as I feel this best describes its use as 
both a perspective and framing of an issue, and an agenda for how this can be studied.  To 
explore this exciting but contested approach, I discuss key aspects of its history and a 
political ecology of biodiversity conservation specifically.  I examine some of the key debates 
in political ecology and the multiple divisions within it, and outline the approach adopted in 
this study.  A more detailed history and discussion of the complex roots of political ecology 
can be found in Neumann (2005), Robbins (2004) and Peet et al. (2011).   
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If we accept natural resources, policy and management of such resources as intrinsically 
political, it is clear that action to conserve natural resources, whether through PAs or 
CBNRM cannot be other than political (Adams and Hutton, 2007).  This is a core concept of 
a political ecology of nature conservation, which aims to integrate politics into an analysis of 
conservation, both through recognition that the biophysical condition of nature is dependent 
upon socio-political processes, but also that the understanding of that biophysical state is a 
political process in itself (Adams and Hutton, 2007).  Much political ecology has considered, 
therefore, the politics of knowledge and science, how we understand the world we live in, our 
impacts upon it, and how certain ways of understanding these things, particularly Western 
scientific knowledge, become privileged over others (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Roe, 
1991; Adams and Hutton, 2007).   
Understanding these complex outcomes and the socio-politics driving them has become a 
focus of political ecology, drawing on an access model inspired by the work of Amartya Sen 
and the concepts of entitlements (see 2.1.2) and capabilities (Forsyth, 2008).  The ways in 
which political ecology has considered conservation and natural resources has shifted over 
time, however, starting with a perspective drawn from Marxist political economy and later 
being dominated by post-structural accounts.  In the following section I discuss the core 
characteristics of both of these phases within political ecology’s history, before outlining, in 
2.5.2 political ecology’s contribution to nature conservation debates and, in 2.5.3, the post-
structuralist perspective adopted in my own research that brings together power, scale and 
policy processes under the umbrella of a political ecology of community-based forest and 
wildlife management in Tanzania. 
2.5.1  Political Ecology Perspectives 
Natural resources and human-environment relations have long formed the core of 
geographical studies (Bryant, 1998).  Cultural ecology grew out of this long tradition and was 
a key precursor to political ecology, which attempted to integrate the former’s focus on the 
ways in which humans shape their environment, alongside the role of external systems, 
particularly the global capitalist economy, to the phenomena it studied (Neumann, 2005).   
Political ecology emerged as the study of the influence of external forces and systems upon 
human-environment relationships in the local context (Forsyth, 2003).  This is exemplified in 
Michael Watts (1983) famous study of drought and famine in a Hausa peasant community in 
Nigeria.  Watts (1983) argued that these phenomena must be recognised as rooted in a 
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process of the erosion of rural poor communities’ adaptive capabilities through the colonial 
implementation of capitalist modes of production, criticising the Cartesian dualism of humans 
and nature as separate and insisting on replacing it with a new dialectic of society and nature 
(Neumann, 2005).  Watts (1983) conceptualised this dialectic as giving “greater attention to 
the social and historical contingencies of knowledge and political economic structure”, 
setting out his case for the inclusion of social theory and engagement with Marxist political 
economy (Neumann, 2005: 22).  The relationship between political ecology and political 
economy is a crucial one, and one of the approach’s most famous definitions argues that 
political ecology combines “the concerns of ecology and broadly defined political economy” 
(Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 17).  This political economy focus dominated in the 1970s and 
80s, producing some of the most famous and foundational texts in political ecology. 
In (1985), Piers Blaikie published The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing 
Countries, in which he addressed the failure of policies and projects to address the issue.  He 
argued that environmental degradation is inherently and concurrently an ecological, 
economic, social and political problem whose investigation requires three essential features; 
place-based analysis to examine where degradation is taking place; non-place-based analysis 
to incorporate socio-economic factors such as state-society relations and mechanisms of 
production; and finally he opened up the issue to incorporate “an assessment of the 
perceptions and ‘rationality’ of not just the local land users, but also of the government 
officials, conservationists, and scientists” (Neumann, 2005: 31).  He therefore introduced 
some of the key characteristics of political ecology in multiple-scale enquiries and the 
integration of social and biophysical analyses (Rocheleau, 2008) and later questions of power 
and knowledge (Bryant, 1998).   
This first phase of political ecology is closely tied to both political economy and the 
examination of biophysical processes alongside social and economic factors (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997).  Numerous studies emerged under this new framework (see Bassett, 1988; 
Peluso, 1992; Bryant, 1998), “stressing the social relations of production influencing land 
users' choices and access to environmental resources” (Moore, 1993: 381).  Furthermore, this 
period saw the consolidation of historical analysis and multiple method investigations as 
characteristic of the approach (Rocheleau, 2008). Political ecology came under increasing 
criticism however, for its reification of structural forces, and a lack of serious attention to 
political factors (Walker, 2005).  Michael Watts (1990 in Walker, 2005: 75) described the 
need for political ecology to engage with the “rough and tumble” of environmental politics, 
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whilst Moore (1993: 381) called for political ecologists to turn their attention to the 
“micropolitics of peasant struggles over access to resources and...the symbolic contestations 
that constitute those struggles”.  In the 1990s political ecology made an important shift 
towards post-structural perspectives.    
Poststructural political ecology turned towards the politics of political ecology, and 
particularly the discursive dimension of power.  This was not simply a reaction to the 
deficiencies of structuralist explanations and alternative approaches in environmental 
research, but a theoretical framework that conceptualises the environment as inherently 
‘politicised’ (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).  The concept of the politicised environment draws 
upon three key assumptions (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 28): that environmental change creates 
unequal patterns of costs and benefits for society; that this inequality reinforces or reduces 
existing socio-economic inequalities; and finally, that these inequalities have political 
implications through altered power relations.  Peet & Watts’s (2004) book Liberation 
Ecologies is an example of these developments in the approach, positioning itself as a 
poststructuralist, discursive and social theory based study that is rooted in the social 
movements literature to examine nature-society relations and access and control over 
resources in new forms of global governance.  These foci within political ecology are very 
compatible with a study of the socio-politics of CBNRM.  Whilst the acknowledgement of 
differential outcomes, the imposition of a new form of governance upon existing power 
structures and the importance of socio-political factors are all important developments within 
CBNRM literature, political ecology provides an approach for the investigation of these 
factors and processes.  Drawing upon the access model, issues such as inequalities in the 
impacts of CBNRM, both positive and negative need to be explored through their 
relationships to local power relations alongside broader socio-economic processes 
(Birkenholtz, 2011).   
Fairhead & Leach’s (1996) text Misreading the African Landscape became another key 
publication that marks the changes in the approach during the 1990s.  In line with 
poststructuralist theory, they highlight the importance of seeing multiple readings and 
understandings of the landscape and environment in their study of vegetation change in 
Kissidougou, West Africa.  Their study focused on a pluralistic ecology approach that 
incorporated local knowledge to deconstruct crisis narratives of deforestation seen in forest 
islands in the area and argue that these narratives can be understood through attention to 
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politics and power as state technologies to justify nationalised control over land (Fairhead 
and Leach, 1996).  They also drew on literature on agrarian change to provide insights into 
how social arrangements condition resource use and management, the everyday struggles 
these involve, and their resolution (Fairhead and Leach, 1996).  Their study is an example of 
how political ecology began to challenge concepts of a universal truth in knowledge, and 
open up questions about different types of knowledge (Zimmerer, 2006).  The socially-
constructed nature of knowledge became a major theme, alongside the nature and power of 
narratives and discourse (Forsyth, 2003).  This has been described as political ecology’s ‘turn 
to discourse’ (Peet and Watts, 2004) and produced large volumes of work that consider the 
‘politics of knowledge’, including gendered bases of environmental knowledge (Shiva, 1991; 
1993), the dominance of Western scientific knowledge over other forms (see Bryant, 1998) 
and the discursive construction of environmental narratives, including degradation 
(Neumann, 2005).  This phase of political ecology studies is characterised by increased 
attention to “local level studies of environmental movements, discursive and symbolic 
politics and the institutional nexus of power, knowledge and practice” (Walker, 2005: 75).   
2.5.2 Nature Conservation in Political Ecology  
Nature conservation has been a large focus in political ecology, especially discussions of the 
development of PAs and the history of conservation, and political ecology perspectives have 
been active in many of the debates surrounding protectionist conservation, community 
conservation and the social justice movement (see 1.1; Adams and Hutton, 2007).  PAs have 
been particularly popular with political ecologists because of their clear spatial boundaries 
and the definite control of access to natural resources within and around them (Zimmerer and 
Bassett, 2003). The roots of this model for conservation and the underlying environmentalism 
it involves has been one of extensive discussion within political ecology (see Anderson and 
Grove, 1987; Grove, 1987; Hulme and Murphree, 2001b; Adams and Hutton, 2007).  Its 
development is inherently linked to processes of imperial trade and the desire to map, delimit 
and claim (for the nation-state) valuable natural resources, particularly timber (Grove, 1987).  
PAs act as enclosures which, Neumann (2004b) argued, are a political project and an 
important aspect of statecraft and colonial control, incorporating the twin motives of 
‘civilising’ the colonies and bringing land and resources under the authority of the state.  
Similarly Peluso (1993) argued that as states hold a vested interest in centralising control over 
natural resources (and in avoiding the devolution of power) and they may, therefore, use 
conservation discourses to retain authority over these resources.  She goes on to describe the 
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discursive construction of identities for the state as guardians of these resources through 
conservation, and, through  this, the legitimisation of violence to achieve conservation 
objectives (Peluso, 1993). 
Political ecology discussions of the politics of power devolution and state-society relations 
can usefully be incorporated with the discussion of the politics of power devolution in 2.1.1 
and the mixed results from CBNRM in 1.3.  In a clear link to the issue of recentralisation, 
Peluso (1993) also argued that the incentives for the state to retain control over valuable 
natural resources has been an important driver in the balance between conservation and 
development within community conservation, leading to a common criticism that it consists 
of tweaking coercive conservation to include a development component alongside militaristic 
management of PAs.   This kind of study, focused on the social impacts of PAs and the 
political economy of conservation benefits through, for example ecotourism and CBNRM, 
has been common amongst political ecologists.  These issues continue to attract attention as 
the conservation fashion has moved on to ‘ecosystem services’ and concepts such as Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation27.  The way that the relationships between 
conservation, biodiversity, communities and poverty have been conceptualised by political 
ecologists have been highly influenced by the tying together of conservation and 
development objectives and the recognition that outcomes from such attempts are often a set 
of trade-offs between two set of objectives, rather than the predicted win-win scenarios, and 
that the social costs of conservation are often not recognised and rarely addressed (Adams 
and Hutton, 2007).   
As discussed in 2.5.1, poststructural political ecology is characterised by increasing interest 
in multiple actors, and identities, situated knowledges and cultural politics with “complexity 
and contingency in social and ecological relations of power” (Rocheleau, 2008: 722).  This 
represents the addition of network theories to the conceptualisation of inter-related nature of 
structure and agency in poststructuralist theory (Peet et al., 2011; see also 2.3.1).  There are, 
therefore, important links between these areas of study in political ecology and views of the 
policy process with respect to policy network views and the argumentative turn (see 2.2.2), 
and to the politics of scales literature discussed in 2.4 with respect to the discursive 
construction of scale and the politics of scalar struggles. In the following section I address the 
                                                 
27 See Blom et al., (2010) and Harvey et al., (2009). 
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integration of policy, power and scale under the title of a political ecology approach within 
my study.  
2.5.3 Political Ecology, CBNRM, Power and Politics of Scales  
 
“The complexity of human-environment interactions demands an approach that 
encompasses the contribution of different geographical scales and hierarchies of 
socioeconomic organisations” 
 (Neumann, 2009: 398)  
 Human geography is centrally concerned with space, place and scale, and despite complex 
debates surrounding the role of scalar analysis in human geography, many of the themes that 
weave together a political ecology approach are essentially scalar in their nature (Neumann, 
2009).  This is especially clear in the inter-relatedness of the social and the natural that 
political ecology argues for (see Zimmerer, 2000), and also in the central role that political 
ecology places on the role of power relations in shaping access to and control over 
environmental resources and space (Neumann, 2009).  Political ecology has been criticised 
however for an under theorisation of scale and reification of the local level (Brown and 
Purcell, 2005; Purcell and Brown, 2005; Neumann, 2009).  Earlier structure-focused political 
ecology studies (see 2.5.1), whilst crucial to attempts to integrate politics into human 
ecology, have been particularly criticised for lacking appreciation of the sociospatial, 
presenting scales as hierarchical and ontologically given (Rangan and Kull, 2009).  Later 
political ecology and the adoption of poststructural perspectives have engaged with the scale 
literature more comprehensively, however; the developments in consideration of networks 
and scales and the ‘politics of scales’ in political ecology are key examples of this (Rangan 
and Kull, 2009; see also 2.5).  Political ecology is well-positioned to contribute to the scale 
literature, particularly through the emphasis such an approach places on deconstructing the 
local trap and investigating the socio-political complexities of the local level (Neumann, 
2009).  Lisa Campbell’s (2007) study of sea turtle conservation in Costa Rica is a good 
example of how political ecology and scalar perspectives can be combined whilst avoiding 
the pitfalls described above.  She argues that power, seen both in the use of natural resources 
(material practice) and power over ideas (discourse), is crucial to understanding the case 
studies, but also that these power practices can be investigated through a scalar perspective.  
She emphasises the discursive construction and manipulation of scales, and the multi-level 
nature of actors operating within the conservation system around sea turtles, exemplifying the 
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approach described above to conceptualise scales as dispersed interscalar networks and 
tangled hierarchies (Bulkeley, 2005). 
The crucial nexus between the approaches of politics of scales and political ecology, to create 
a political ecology of scales, is found in the theme of power.  In a politics of scales approach, 
especially a process-based approach, the socio-spatial processes of transformation and 
conflict between scales are conceptualised as strategic acts initiated for control over nature, 
and which benefit some, whilst disadvantaging others (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003).  
This argument forms the core of my discussion in chapter 6, which traces the scalar 
configurations of power within Tanzanian CBNRM, and the politics of scales taking place 
around these as actors and groups attempt to benefit from the management of natural 
resources and the revenue this generates.  I use this political ecology of scales perspective to 
address the research questions for chapter 6 (see Table 1.1) and the over-arching questions in 
my research concerning the transformation of the prescribed governance system into that 
which is performed, and the ways in which some people benefit disproportionately from 
CBNRM.  In his examination of CBFM in southern Malawi, Charles Zulu (2009) employed a 
similar approach and produced an excellent example of how a politics of scales approach can 
be combined with a political ecology focus on power relations to add insight into the socio-
political characteristics and struggles ongoing in such projects.  Zulu (2009: 697) focuses on 
“spatial and scalar configurations of CBFM, forest boundary demarcation and allocation, rule 
formation and scaling, and scalar dynamics of external facilitation”.  He uses explanations of 
how scalar arrangements are expressed and the struggles by individuals to gain from these, 
including scale jumping, to interrogate the mechanisms underlying corruption, elite capture, 
decreased project accountability and resistance to the project and its perceived structural 
inequalities (Zulu, 2009).  He concludes that a containerised vision of CBFM set out in policy 
that ignored these politics of scales created strong patterns of winners and losers, disrupted 
livelihoods and was responsible for creating tensions between modern and traditional 
institutions, which ultimately can be detrimental to the objectives of CBFM (Zulu, 2009) 
A political ecology of scales addresses three key themes that overlap with the diverse 
literatures discussed in this chapter; the interactions of power, agency and scale; 
socioecological processes and scaling; and scaled networks (Neumann, 2009).  The first of 
these themes is seen in studies of the state and its re-organisation of scales to consolidate, 
regain or retain power over natural resources (Swyngedouw, 2000; Keil and Debbané, 2005), 
and will be examined through a policy processes perspective of reform to introduce CBNRM 
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in Tanzania.  The second follows Swyngedouw’s discussion of how the production of nature 
is an essential part of the production of scale, and will be examined in the scalar topographies 
of power set out in the prescribed governance system, and their re-configuration into the 
performed governance system.  The third theme “highlights the way networks of actors 
(human and non-human) transcend single spatial scales to produce new relational 
socioenvironmental spatialities” (Neumann, 2009: 404).   This will be examined in the 
empirical chapters with respect to the politics of scales taking place within Tanzanian 
CBNRM and in the adaptation and integration of the prescribed governance system into the 
performed governance system. 
2.6 Synthesis 
A socio-political research agenda for CBNRM needs to acknowledge that natural resources 
and the environment are inherently political, as are their management, the policies that set out 
their management and the people that implement such policies.  The political ecology 
approach outlined in this chapter is centred around these ideas, and places power as the 
unifying theme for investigating these politics.  The study of power within Tanzanian 
CBNRM must focus on understanding how people negotiate access to and benefits from 
natural resources and their management within CBNRM.  Such a theorisation of power draws 
on poststructuralist perspectives and relationships between structure and agency outlined in 
this chapter to investigate the different types of power that are at work and being constructed 
within the implementation of CBNRM.  I argue that the theme of power runs throughout the 
literatures on policy processes, politics of scales and political ecology, and that a 
postructuralist perspective of power that emphasises its discursive nature, and how such 
tactics are employed within both policy processes and politics of scales, draws these 
literatures together to add depth and breadth to the investigation of the socio-political 
processes within CBNRM. 
In the following empirical chapters I examine these socio-political realities and complexities 
of Tanzanian CBNRM through an examination of what I have termed the prescribed and 
performed governance systems.  These terms draw upon the recognition of policy as being 
intrinsically political and process-based to address the issue of how CBNRM has been 
adopted within the Tanzanian policy context (chapter 5), the system that is set out in official 
policy discourse (the prescribed governance system), and how this has been taken on by 
people and put into practice (the performed governance system; chapters 6 and 7).  I draw on 
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scalar theory and specifically the politics of scales literature to consider how this performance 
reflects struggles over power and the re-configuration of scales as part of these struggles.  In 
the final empirical chapter I develop this idea of the performance of policy to address 
questions about the elements of the governance systems operational within Tanzanian 
CBNRM that are hidden from view, not prescribed in policy, and operate outside of the 
official discourse.  There are several different aspects of power under consideration within 
my research therefore, which are each informed by the different literatures discussed in this 
chapter and brought together through this unifying theme of power, which is at the core of a 
political ecology approach (Jones, 2006).  Before tackling these themes in the empirical 
chapters, I first outline the context of my research in Tanzania, and the methodology 






















The focus of this thesis is on Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in 
the forest and wildlife sectors of the United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania).  Tanzania is a 
large28, coastal country in sub-Saharan East Africa (see Fig. 3.1).  The research presented in 
this thesis was carried out in the region of Iringa, which is located in the southern highlands 
of Tanzania and forms part of the Great Rufiji river basin (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2007).  The locations of research are discussed further in 4.2.1. 
 
                                                 
28 Tanzania covers an area of 945,000km2 and the national census of 2002 recorded a mainland 
population of 33,667,659 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007). 
Fig. 3.1: Map of the United Republic of Tanzania showing the Administrative Region of Iringa.  





In this chapter I aim to introduce the context in which CBNRM emerged in Tanzania.  I focus 
specifically on the initiation of devolved environmental management within the political 
system and the changing relationships between the state and local levels over the country’s 
history.  In section 3.2, I discuss the wider political developments that took place in Tanzania 
during the colonial and post-independence socialist periods and later neoliberal reforms.  
Insight into the contemporary milieu of institutions involved in natural resource management 
and the political-economic and sociological factors at work are an expression of this 
historical context (Hurst, 2004).  I discuss these political changes with respect to the role of 
the local level in political administration and the development of state policies of 
decentralisation (see 2.1.1).  In section 3.3, I then discuss the historical context of the policies 
specific to the wildlife and forestry sectors, upon which my research is focused.  The 
development of CBNRM in Tanzania exemplifies changing relationships between the state, 
society and international actors through neoliberal reforms, policies of decentralisation and 
the devolution of responsibility for natural resources to the local level.  This was the outcome 
of multiple factors that contribute to the political culture in Tanzania, including the changing 
political context discussed in 3.2. 
3.2 Devolved Environmental Management  
The role of the village and local29 levels in both natural resource management and wider 
politics in Tanzania has been a topic of discussion for decades (see Ingle, 1972; Mushi, 
2001).  Hyden (1980) argues that the importance of the village level throughout Tanzania’s 
history is based upon its autonomy, supported by its control of the subsistence base, and the 
maintenance of an ‘economy of affection’ (see 2.1.3), despite the state administration of a 
market economy.  The role of the local level in political culture is more complex however, 
and I discuss changing state-society relations and the role of the local level in two sections 
below; the first relating to the colonial and socialist periods; and the second to the 
implementation of neoliberal reform and decentralisation.   
                                                 




3.2.1 Devolved Environmental Management: Colonial Appropriation of 
Resources, Socialism and Ujamaa 
The period of colonial rule in Tanzania played an important role in the shaping of Tanzania’s 
social and political systems (Iliffe, 1979; Hyden, 1980).  Tanzania’s colonial episode began 
in 1884 when Dr Carl Peters formed the Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation (Association 
for German Colonisation), under which he secured rights to over 140,000km2 of territory, 
which became a protectorate a year later (Lovett, 2003).  The period of German colonial rule 
introduced the first declaration of ‘crown land’, bringing all areas not under specific 
ownership under the control of the state (Lovett, 2003).  The transition to British colonial rule 
took place in the aftermath of the First World War.  Germany ceded its East African territory 
as part of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and a League of Nations Mandate in 1922 placed 
Tanganyika (now mainland Tanzania) under British administration (Iliffe, 1979).  In 1946 
this relationship was altered to that of Trusteeship, until independence in 1961 (Iliffe, 1979).  
Both the British administration and the newly-independent government retained the German 
colonial system of public lands (Lovett, 2003).  The colonial period in Tanzania is very 
strongly associated with the appropriation of land, therefore.  The annexation of  land was 
accompanied by specific forms of state-local relations in which the role of the local level was 
highly restricted.  The role of the local level in political administration was not completely 
removed, but was retained through the implementation of a policy of indirect rule during the 
British colonial period, in which the existing local structures of power and authority in chiefs 
and native authorities were used to legitimise local political systems and concurrently extend 
the power of the newly formed state into the local level (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001). 
As an African state, post-independence, political culture in Tanzania represents the blending 
and hybridisation of both social norms and bureaucratic forms from indigenous and Western 
sources (Hurst, 2004).  In relation to the conservation of natural resources, particularly in the 
inheritance and maintenance of colonial systems of Protected Areas (PAs; see 3.3), and the 
role of external organisations in policy processes, these hybrid cultures, structures and 
processes comprised important aspects of the relationship between the state and local people, 
and are relevant to the conflicts and power struggles that still take place over natural 
resources (see 3.3).   
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Tanganyika gained independence from the British Empire on the 9th December 1961, under 
its first president, Julius Nyerere30, and in 1964 joined with Zanzibar to form the nation of 
Tanzania (Coulson, 1982; Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  The newly independent nation retained 
many of the administrative systems put in place during the British colonial period, including 
and assembly of representatives overseeing the executive and responsibilities separated into 
sectors with corresponding line departments (Hurst, 2004).  On the 29th January 1967 
Tanzania passed the Arusha Declaration, which heralded the start of socialism in the country 
(Coulson, 1982).  Tanzania has often been studied as a key example of the role of the local 
level in politics, due to its commitment to a socialist ideology and the focus of the Nyerere 
government upon rural development to achieve social transformation (Hyden, 1980).  The 
Arusha Declaration was implemented under the slogan ‘socialism and self-reliance’, and led 
Tanzania to become the most committed socialist country in Africa (Coulson, 1982).  The 
socialist period is famous for its ‘villagisation’ policy, which began in 1967 and by 1975 had 
brought about the relocation of more than 75% of the population into ‘ujamaa’31 villages, 
with the intention of creating communal production units  (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  Whilst 
the policy began as voluntary, between 1973-5 it became compulsory (Coulson, 1982).  The 
colonial era marked a period of state appropriation of resources which continued through to 
the independent administration, but the socialist period marked further important transitions 
in state-society relations.  This is discussed below with respect to tenure arrangements at the 
local level and legislation aimed at increasing public participation in development. 
Alongside the resettlement schemes, the socialist period marked the streamlining of 
government administrative structures, and restriction of the role of the local level in politics 
through the replacement of locally-elected governments with centrally appointed civil 
servants (Coulson, 1982; Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  The socialist period’s focus upon rural 
development was also accompanied by the abolition of local authorities (District Councils) 
and creation of District and Regional Development Councils, through the Decentralisation of 
Government Administration Act 1972 (Hyden, 1980).  The aim of these changes was to 
increase public participation in development and thereby to accelerate it, but ultimately 
resulted in the deterioration of service delivery to rural areas and decline of urban 
                                                 
30 Nyerere ruled for 24 years, and in 1965 he declared the country to be a one-party state, which was 
recognized in law in a constitutional amendment of 1975, governed by the Tanganyika African 
National Union (Hurst, 2004).  This remained in place until the amendment of the constitution to form 
a multi-party democracy in 1995 (Boiesen & Lund, 2003). 
31 The concept of ‘ujamaa’, which translates from Kiswahili as ‘family ties’, is based on three 
assumptions: respect, common property and obligation to work (Hyden, 1980).   
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infrastructure (Ngwilizi, 2002).  Whilst heralded as decentralisation, this period in fact 
constituted the consolidation of central power at lower levels, and is better termed de-
concentration (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001; Ngwilizi, 2002).  However, through the ujamaa 
policy, the shifting role of the local level and restrictions described above were accompanied 
by the first recognition of legal rights of the village to be responsible for lands and natural 
resources not directly under the control of the central government32  (Nshala, 2002).  The 
colonial and newly independent eras in Tanzania both represent complex shifts in state-local 
relations, marked by state appropriation of land and natural resources, the prominence of the 
village level, but its restricted role in political administration.  In the following section I trace 
the shifts in the role of the local level that occurred later in Tanzania and the introduction of 
devolved environmental management that was facilitated by these shifts. 
3.2.2 Devolved Environmental Management: Neoliberalism, Decentralisation 
and Local Government Reform 
An important step in the political history or Tanzania and the eventual devolution of rights to 
manage natural resources at the local level emerged in the 1980s when large shifts in 
Tanzania’s economic and political policy took place and  policies of decentralisation and later 
local government reform were implemented (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001).  These changes 
formed part of the introduction of neoliberal reform in Tanzania, partly in response to the 
poor economic situation of the 1970s and 1980s33 (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001).  This 
economic situation drove a number of important changes, including a new emphasis on 
external investment through donor-government partnerships (Nelson, 2007), which doubled 
in real terms per capita between 1974 and 1980 (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993).  The 
economic situation also led to reduced funding in the natural resources sectors, where funding 
for wildlife, forests and fisheries received just 1.2% of the development budget between 1976 
and 1981 (Kideghesho, 2006).   
When Mwinyi succeeded Nyerere as President in 1985, he accepted the International 
Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programme for induced privatization (Neumann, 
1998).  The implementation of neoliberal reforms began reversing the changes made through 
the Arusha declaration and reducing the size and roles of the state (Hurst, 2004).  In 1983 the 
                                                 
32 The 1975 Villages Act underlies this shift (Hyden, 1980). 
33 Tanzania, alongside many African countries, experienced a deep economic recession during the 
1970s and 80s, contributed to by plummeting coffee prices, oil shocks and rising international interest 
rates creating a higher burden of debt (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993).  The domestic situation was 
heightened by the extremely costly war with Uganda 1978-9 (Nelson, 2007). 
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government began a policy of decentralisation, introduced in the Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act (LGA) 1982, and associated acts covering government administration, urban 
authorities, local government finances and services (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001).  The biggest 
change was marked by the amendment of the constitution in 1984 which sanctioned the 
existence of local government authorities (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001).  Mniwasa & Shauri 
(2001) argue that these changes must be seen in a wider context of the trends in political 
culture, both within the country and globally, towards increased space for human rights, rule 
of law, political transparency and good governance.  The increased role afforded to local 
authorities under decentralisation was part of the twin reforms of the civil service in central 
government (as desired by the World Bank in 1981) and local authorities, which involved the 
transfer of rights and responsibilities form the centre to the local arena (Seppälä, 1998; 
Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001). 
Under the LGA (District Authorities) 1982, legal rights to hold management responsibilities 
for natural resources were devolved from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
(MNRT) to the local  (district and village) level (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  Under the same 
act village authorities were established or registered as the institution responsible for matters 
within village boundaries (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  The institutional structure implemented 
in this case heralded the Village Assembly as the supreme authority, and the organisation 
through which the Village Council is elected to oversee the day-to-day management of the 
village (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  The act established two tiers of local government as both 
“democratically representative corporate bodies with mandates to provide services and enact 
and enforce by-laws” (Lund, 2007: 2).   
Crucially, Tanzania began a process of Local Government Reform in 1996, which became 
policy in 1998 (Lund, 2007).  This set out a government priority to improve the delivery of 
service to the public through decentralisation on the understanding that it would bring about 
greater efficiency and capacity for effecting change lies at the local level (Ngware and Chale, 
2002). The reforms covered political, administrative and financial decentralisation and the 
redefinition of the relationship between rural districts, urban council and lower level local 
authorities (Ngware and Chale, 2002).  Within the programme, the role of the central 
government was confined to one of facilitation and enabling of service provision, the 
development and management of the policy framework, monitoring of accountability of local 
authorities, financial and performance auditing and the provisions of adequate grants 
(Ngware and Chale, 2002).  Local authorities on the other hand took on new roles and 
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responsibilities of facilitating participation, planning and executing development programmes 
and fostering partnerships with civic groups (Ngware and Chale, 2002).   
The relationship between the centre and local arenas was thus changed with the central’s role 
restricted to a policy-making body with supportive duties, monitoring responsibilities 
(Ngware and Chale, 2002).  The regional administration was restructured within the 
programme so that the regional development directorate was replaced by regional 
secretariats, which were given a back-stopping role for local governments (Ngwilizi, 2002).  
The changing roles and reporting lines of the different levels within Tanzanian government 
are shown in Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 (Blomley, 2006).  The changes involved not only 
reporting lines, but also financial mechanisms, whereby the government was required to 
make conditional and unconditional block grants to local government authorities to provide 
increased autonomy in financial planning and budgeting, to be in tune with local needs 
(Walsh, 2012).  To effect these changes, amendments were made to the LGA in 1999 (Act 6) 
to give legal effect to the principles guiding local government reform focusing on good 
governance, enhanced transparency and accountability (Ngwilizi, 2002).  These changes have 
demonstrated political commitment to the policy of decentralisation and process of 
devolution through strengthening the authority and responsibilities of the local level and 
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The administrative rights and responsibilities of the local level under decentralisation and 
local government reform were supported by changes to land tenure arrangements in Tanzania 
as part of the Land Act 1999 and Village Land Act 1999, which came into effect in 2001 
(Nshala, 2002).  These established three categories of land (general, reserved and village34) in 
Tanzania.  Village authorities, through the policy changes discussed in this section now hold 
                                                 
34 Village lands are classified under four circumstances; land registration under section 22 of the LGA 
no 7 of 1982 as within the boundaries of a village; lands designated under the Land Tenure Village 
Settlements Act 1965; clearly demarcated village boundaries; and land that is not reserved land and 
has been used by the villagers for at least 12 years before the enactment of the Village Land Act 1999 
(Nshala, 2002).   
Fig. 3.2: Local Government Reporting Structures in Tanzania 
using Participatory Forest Management as an Example (Blomley, 
2006). 
Legend for Fig. 3.3 
 
   Impact and Output Reporting 
 
   Financial and Progress Reporting 
 
 
Ministry of Finance 
 
 
Ministry of Natural 




























the legal right to manage natural resources on such lands, which are classified (de jure) as the 
property of the village. 
Neoliberal reforms from the 1980s, therefore, resulted in broad shifts in the relations between 
state and society and marked a definite increase in the role of the village within political 
administration, the roll-back of the state with respect to responsibilities and financial 
arrangements and legal security of the rights of the Village Council to manage areas of 
village land.  In the next section I discuss this increasing role of the local level with respect to 
the policies for natural resource management and the eventual introduction of CBNRM in 
national policy from 1998. 
3.3 Nature Conservation Paradigms, Policy, and Protected Areas in Tanzania 
The history of forest protection and wildlife conservation in Tanzania is one that has been 
recorded since the annexation of Tanganyika by Germany in 1891.  Prior to this, little is 
written or known with certainty about natural resource use within the country (Ylhäisi, 2003).  
The long history of formal PAs began during the colonial period, which  marked their growth 
to cover 200,000km2 (around 20% of the land within the country; Neumann, 1998; Siege, 
2001).   
Whilst the history of forest and wildlife policies and PAs has been very separate in Tanzania, 
there are common themes of colonial appropriation of resources for utilisation and 
preservation through the creation of PAs, the exclusion of local people from natural resource 
management and tension between the local and state levels with regards to natural resource 
management (Nelson et al., 2007).  In this section I discuss the development of PAs in both 
sectors, using the terms wildlife conservation and forestry protection to distinguish between 
the different objectives in these sectors; forest PAs were introduced to secure the production 
of timber for the state, not initially for conservation (Ylhäisi, 2003; Sunseri, 2005), whereas 
the wildlife sector has included an interesting mix of both wildlife utilisation and strict 
protection under the banner of conservation. 
3.3.1 Colonial Protected Areas: Strict Protection, Wildlife Hunting & Forest 
Reserves 
The justifications for the creation of PAs in both sectors in Tanzania during the colonial era 
were often based on the morality of preserving these resources for the future, threats posed by 
disease epidemics and an increasing commercial ivory trade, the need to manage hunting 
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resources for their long-term use, and the inability of local populations to manage such 
resources (Neumann, 1998; Neumann, 2001; Nelson et al., 2007).  However, Neumann 
(2004b) argues that conservation enclosures also served the twin objectives of the colonial 
powers to ‘civilise’ the local population and gain control over natural resources.  He argues 
that these twin objectives were part of the larger process of ‘statecraft’ in which colonial state 
policies of social control and spatial segregation utilised PA enclosures as a way of 
‘enframing’, fixing the boundaries between nature and culture and ultimately society and the 
state (Neumann, 2004b).  The legitimacy of the nation-state relies upon clear boundaries and 
total sovereignty through the re-ordering of territory, driving the demarcation of land and 
natural resources, placing them and society into areas defined by different rules and 
relationships between man and nature (Neumann, 2004b).  Thus Tanzania’s colonial history 
played a key role in the context of the evolution of conservation practice and policy within 
the country, leading Nelson et al., (2009: 301) to conclude that “the history of wildlife 
conservation in Tanzania is a story of increasing central control over wildlife resources across 
the colonial, post-independence socialist, and post-structural adjustment periods”.  Like 
Neumann, Nelson et al. (2009) argue that the creation of PAs and the centralisation of control 
over natural resources, whilst arguably for conservation reasons, also served to bring rural 
people under state-managed systems for ‘development’. 
By 1896 wildlife PAs had emerged in colonial Tanzania in the form of Game Reserves 
(Siege, 2001), and laws were put in place requiring all hunting within the territory to be 
sanctioned by license.  By 1913 the German colonial administration had created fifteen PAs 
to address fears of over-hunting (Baldus, 2001b).  Similarly in the forestry sector, the advent 
of colonialism heralded the exclusion of local communities from resources, through the 1904 
gazettement of 0.75 million hectares of Forest Reserves, where all uses required state 
authority sanction (Ylhäisi, 2003).   
Wildlife hunting has a long history in Tanzania and was one of the driving forces behind the 
history of wildlife conservation throughout the twentieth century (Adams, 2004).  As PAs 
and regulations for the preservation of game were increasingly introduced, it was suggested 
that licences to hunt game would be a valuable way of funding conservation; nature could 
pay for its own conservation (Adams, 2004).  The British colonial administration introduced 
a Game Department in 1921 to manage the country’s Game Reserves, enforce the hunting 
regulations and deal with problems of human-wildlife conflict (Leader-Williams, 2000).  The 
concept of aristocratic hunting also developed rapidly at this time in East Africa, championed 
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by famous hunters such as Theodore Roosevelt and, by the 1920s, the concept of the hunting 
safari became very fashionable (Adams, 2004).   As one of Africa’s richest countries in terms 
of wildlife resources, tourist hunting became an important economic use of Tanzania’s Game 
Reserves, bringing in fees for the government through the wildlife authorities (Leader-
Williams, 2000).  In the 1950s the Game Department introduced a fee structure for different 
species rather than a licence covering all species (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004).  Tourist 
hunting generally took place within Game Control Areas, although just prior to 
independence, Tanzania introduced Africa’s first system of hunting blocks within its Game 
Reserves35, which were leased to safari outfitters (see 3.3.2; Leader-Williams et al., 2009).   
Prior to independence, the 1940s witnessed increasing legislation of natural resource use in 
the Game Ordinance 1940 and National parks Ordinance of 1948 (Nelson et al., 2009).  The 
mid 20th century saw the expansion of protected areas in Tanzania to include the gazettement 
of the Serengeti National Park in 1958, the expansion of the Selous and Rungwa Game 
Reserves, the latter of which was subsequently upgraded to a National Park (Ruaha) in 1964, 
and further expanded in recent years to incorporate the Usangu Game Reserve, making it the 
largest National Park in the country (see also 4.2.1; Nelson et al., 2009; Walsh, 2012).   
3.3.2 Post-independence Continuation: Commitment to Conservation 
In the natural resources sectors, this period marks the start of a sharp increase in external 
involvement through bilateral aid agreements centered around both conservation and 
development, especially the agreement between the Tanzanian and German governments to 
start the Selous Conservation Project in the late 1980s (Nelson, 2007).  This period also 
included large shifts in the hunting sector, where private investments increased massively 
between 1984 and 1985 (Majamba, 2001).  The role of the natural resources sector began to 
change through these processes, but at the local level, more visible changes resulted from the 
policies for decentralisation and the introduction of local government. 
The commitment of the Tanzanian state to the conservation of its natural fauna and flora and 
the PA model to achieve this was reinforced post-independence:  From 1960, the 
international community, through the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), focused global attention towards the need for conservation in Africa, arguing that 
the destruction of its flora, fauna and habitats was the most pressing conservation problem of 
the time, and launching the ‘African Special Project’ to ensure conservation success 
                                                 
35 Previously closed to all hunting. 
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(Neumann, 1998).  This led directly to the IUCN Symposium on the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources in Modern African States (1961), where 21 African nations were 
represented alongside 5 international organisations (Neumann, 1998). It was at the 
conference that Nyerere made his famous ‘Arusha Manifesto’ pledging Tanganyika’s 
commitment to conservation, and inviting international experts and NGOs to assist them with 
this project (Neumann, 1998). 
This commitment to protectionist conservation in the wildlife sector was demonstrated in the 
publication of the Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA) in 1974, which represented one of the 
most crucial developments in Tanzanian wildlife policy through setting out the different 
categories of wildlife PA in Tanzania and their management (Nshala, 1999).  The WCA 1974 
replaced the Fauna and Flora Conservation Ordinance Cap. 302 (1940) and, until 1998, 
served as the primary legislation for wildlife (Nshala, 2002).  Importantly the act vested the 
Director of Wildlife with the powers to oversee the management of the country’s wildlife, 
placed him/her in charge of all the PAs, and clearly defined nature as a ‘ward of the state’ 
(Nshala, 1999; Neumann, 2004a).   
The centralised control of forest resources was also apparent in the post-colonial period, 
where policy remained focused on production.  The Forestry Policy of Tanzania published in 
1963 aimed to ensure that Forest Reserves produced sufficient forestry products to meet 
domestic needs and be competitive in the global timber economy and to protect water 
catchments (Ylhäisi, 2003).  Similarly in 1989 a new Forestry Action Plan was published, 
which again focused upon the creation of Forest Reserves, and whilst the participation of 
local communities was mentioned, it is not compulsory or detailed, and cannot be considered 
as community conservation (Ylhäisi, 2003).   
The six classifications of PAs for wildlife and forestry within Tanzania vary considerably in 
terms of the levels of protection and permitted uses within their boundaries.  National Parks, 
Game Reserves and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area are the most strictly protected, whilst 
Game Control Areas (GCA), Partial Game Reserves and Forest Reserves are less restrictive 
in terms of settlement and consumptive use (Mkumbukwa, 2008).  National parks are used 
for non-consumptive uses only, specifically tourist-related activities such as photographic 
tourism and accommodation whilst, within its network of Game Reserves and GCAs, 
Tanzania has maintained a policy of wildlife utilisation, except for during the period 1973-78 
when by government notice 210 of 1973 all hunting was banned (Nshala, 1999).  When 
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hunting activities resumed, the parastatal Tanzania Wildlife Corporation (TAWICO) was 
granted monopoly over the industry, with all powers to grant bocks, licenses etc. (Nshala, 
1999).  This was revoked in 1984, as part of the liberalization of the Tanzanian economy and 
political system, and power was handed back to the Wildlife Division and its Director 
(Nshala, 1999), who remains in charge of hunting activities in Tanzania to this day (see 
Chapter 5).   
Hunting takes place within a system of over 140 hunting block concessions36 allocated by the 
Wildlife Division (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004), covering an area of over 250 000km2 
(Nelson et al., 2009).  Hunting is a multi-million dollar industry in Tanzania, which generated 
a gross income of $27.6 million from around 1,400 clients in 2001 (Sachedina, 2008).  
Tourist hunting generates the vast majority of revenue from hunting, with average income to 
the Wildlife Division per hunting client of approximately US $520 per day, totalling US 
$7,000, the majority of which is made up of a trophy fee (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004).  
Resident hunting operates through a system of permits issued by District Game Officers for 
each administrative district.  Over time the hunting safari has merged into safari tourism, with 
photographic tourism now accounting for a much larger number of visitors (Adams, 2004), 
although the large sums involved means that tourist hunting still generates larger revenues for 
the Wildlife Division (Sachedina, 2008).  Hunting has also taken on increased significance in 
conservation since the introduction of CBNRM in Tanzania, particularly with the potential to 
channel associated revenues to local communities (see 3.3.2; Adams, 2004). 
The centralised history of natural resource management through the colonial periods and up 
to the 1980s is summarised by Baldus (2001a) as ‘conservation against the people’. The 
development of ‘conservation by the people’, and eventually CBNRM, is discussed in the 
following section, and further in Chapter 5.  It is important to note that the history of both 
wildlife conservation and forest protection, and the restrictions placed on local communities 
through the enclosure of land and appropriation of natural resources at the state level had 
important implications for state-society relations.  
Within both the wildlife and forestry sectors, the colonial annexation of land and creation of 
PAs is associated with a prodigious number of displacements of local communities 
(Neumann, 1998; Ylhäisi, 2003).  Conservation-related displacements are comprised of two 
                                                 
36 To increase revenue, the number of hunting blocks was almost doubled when the Wildlife Division 
took over management of wildlife hunting in 1988 (Leader-Williams et al., 2009). 
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processes: the forced removal (eviction) of people from their homes; and economic 
displacement, relating to the prevention of access to areas vital to livelihood strategies, and 
thereby enforcing a shift in economic activity (Brockington and Igoe, 2006).  In many cases 
evictions and resettlements were the result of colonial efforts to control sleeping sickness 
incidence within the country, as well as to re-organise the population into ordered 
settlements, integrate them into the tax system and improve agricultural and labour systems 
(Nelson et al., 2009).  For example, the creation of the Selous Game Reserve in 1922, 
underpinned by all these processes, as well as conservation concerns (see Neumann, 2001), 
led to the eviction of more than 40,000 people (Nelson et al., 2007).  Similarly the history of 
Mkomazi National Park involved the eviction of thousands of pastoralists37, justified in the 
name of wildlife conservation, and which had long-term impacts upon their livelihood 
strategies and security (Brockington, 2002).  Sachedina (2008) details the impacts of the 
implementation of community-based conservation in the Tarangire ecosystem of Northern 
Tanzania on both poverty alleviation and wildlife conservation.  He argues that throughout 
Tanzania, the extension of state control over wildlife resources and the evictions of pastoral 
communities38 from the Serengeti, Amboseli and Mkomazi National Parks, together with the 
Maasai Mara National Reserve and Usangu Game Reserve have contributed to the 
deterioration of relations between local people and the state, creating wildlife wars and a 
“militant state of environmentalism” (Sachedina, 2008: 121). 
The introduction of CBNRM in Tanzania, as discussed in Chapter 5, followed many of the 
arguments concerning social justice and the social impacts of conservation set out in section 
1.1.  CBNRM also represents new forms of environmental governance in Tanzania supported 
by the neoliberal reforms discussed in 3.2.2.  Thus, in the 1980s, both Community-Based 
Forest and Wildlife Management appeared in Tanzania not as a result of legislative change, 
but through the implementation of pilot projects, often donor-funded (Gillingham, 1998).  In 
the wildlife sector, the Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS), funded by 
Norwegian bilateral aid from 1985 was the first example of these, followed by the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) funded Selous Conservation Programme 
                                                 
37 People whose livelihoods are based at least partly around the herding of cattle (Nelson et al., 2009). 
38 Attention has often been focused on the displacement of pastoral communities through PA and 
community conservation programme establishment.  This is especially well-documented in the North 
of Tanzania where pastoral groups and their uses of land for grazing have been continually 
marginalised and largely ignored in policy processes (Goldman, 2003; Nelson et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, their livelihoods are being significantly altered as they are placed in competition with 
both conservation and agricultural land uses (Nelson et al., 2009; Goldman, 2003; Goldman, 2011).  
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(SCP).  In the forestry sector, the first examples of community forestry began in Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) funded pilot projects in Babati and 
Singida districts, known as the Land Management Programme (LAMP) projects (see also 
chapter 5, Wily, 1997; Wily, 2000; Wily and Dewees, 2001b).  By the late 1980s, several 
attempts at community conservation were being piloted and implemented in Tanzania, 
drawing upon experiments ongoing in other parts of sub-saharan Africa and the favourable 
environmental for Transnational Conservation Organisations and development agencies to 
initiate projects in Tanzania (see 3.2.2; Nelson et al., 2007).  Currently, Tanzanian state-
implemented community conservation initiatives relating to forest and wildlife consist of two 
approaches, which have grown out of the developments discussed above, but vary 
considerably in their approach.  The first of these is the Community Conservation Service 
(CCS), which began in 1988 as part of the Tanzanian National Parks Authority (TANAPA) 
benefit-sharing programme (Walsh, 2000).  It is a park outreach programme that provides 
funds for community development projects with the intention of increasing local support for 
National Parks, and decreasing infringements upon their rules (Bergin and Dembe, 1996).  
Despite its name, the initiative clearly involves no power devolution to local communities, 
and cannot be considered CBNRM.  The second group represent Tanzanian CBNRM 
policies, consisting of Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), which forms part of a 
larger policy of Participatory Forest Management, and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs). 
3.4 The Introduction of CBNRM 
CBNRM has been integrated within this existing hierarchy of PAs.  Within the wildlife 
sector, the creation of WMAs has been facilitated through the conversion of GCAs on village 
land (Zacharia and Kaihula, 2001), whilst Forest Reserves have been delineated into those 
owned by the government and those located upon village land for the creation of forestry 
CBNRM projects (see Table 3.2).  Within both these sectors the state retains ownership of all 
land, although a village holds tenurial rights to manage natural resources on that land.  In 
terms of the extent of power devolution (see 2.1.1 and Appendix 1), CBNRM in Tanzania 
involves bundles of rights for participating communities that include withdrawal, 
management and exclusion (but see also 5.2), but communities do not hold full alienation 










Management System or Details 
National Forest 
Reserves 
Managed by central government for: 
• Protection (e.g. water catchments) 
• Production (e.g. mangroves, plantations) 
• Nature reserves 
• Forests of general lands managed by the government 
Local Authority Forest 
reserves 
Managed by Local Authority for: 
• Protection (e.g. water catchments) 
• Production (e.g. plantation and natural forests) 
Village Land Forest 
reserve 
• Areas of forest on village land where management is vested in 
the Village Council 
• Includes Community Forest Reserves and Village Land Forest 
Reserves 
Private Forests 
• Forests on village land held by one or more individuals or under 
customary right of occupancy 
• Forests on general land or village land for which the rights of 
occupancy or management have been leased or given to one or 
more individuals or a partnership for the purpose of managing 
the forest 
 
3.4.1 Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania 
Within the forestry sector, two approaches have been developed, as part of Participatory 
Forest Management; Community-Based Forest Management and Joint Forest Management 
(Meshack et al., 2006).  Both resulted from the National Forest Policy (NFP) 1998 and the 
Forest Act of 2002 (Blomley et al., 2008b).  The development of Participatory Forest 
Management in Tanzania follows several years of pilot activities since the mid-1990s 
(Blomley et al., 2008a).  The aims of CBFM are three-fold (Blomley et al., 2008a); to 
improve forest quality through sustainable management; to improve local livelihoods using 
increased forest revenues; and to improve forest governance through effective and 
accountable natural resource management institutions.  The NFP 1998, replaced the 1963 
version, and heralded substantial changes in the management of forest resources (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009).  The main policy instrument in the NFP is the 
creation of Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs; Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, 1998b; Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  The policy places clear emphasis on 
participation through the establishment of VLFRs, making communities both owners and 
Table 3.2: Forest Reserve Categories in Tanzania according to the Forest Act 2002 (adapted 
from Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009). 
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managers of these forests, alongside agreements for Joint Forest Management (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009).  The NFP 1998 also makes it clear that the changes 
made in forestry policy in this respect are due to the recognition of the large areas of forest 
that lie outside of reserved areas, on village land, over which the Forest and Beekeeping 
Division has no mandate for management, thus the revised strategy is a mechanism for 
expanding the principles of sustainable use to a much wider area (Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, 2009).  The Forest Act of 2002 is important in that it provided the 
legal basis for communities to own, manage or co-manage and collect their own revenue 
from forest uses within their VLFR on village lands, and the state holds no entitlement to this 
revenue (Lund, 2007).   The Forest Act and National Forest Policy were followed by the 
publication of Community-Based Forest Management Guidelines (2001a). 
3.4.2 Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania 
In 1998 the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania published the Wildlife Policy for 
Tanzania (WPT; Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a) 39, which set out a 
new category of Protected Area called a Wildlife Management Area (Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a).  A WMA is defined as “an area set aside by a village 
government for the purpose of biological and natural resource conservation” (Government of 
the United Republic of Tanzania, 2002a).  A WMA is therefore an area of devolved 
management responsibility where local communities are awarded user rights and 
management responsibilities for natural resources within the WMA area (Nelson, 2007).  In 
2003 a list of 16 pilot WMAs sanctioned by the MNRT was announced, which operated until 
2006 (Nelson et al., 2007).  
The viability of the WMA concept was premised upon the fact that through investment 
agreements for the consumptive and non-consumptive use of natural resources (most 
commonly through tourist and resident hunting and photographic tourism), local communities 
would receive economic benefits, making wildlife management a competitive form of land 
use, and thereby incentivising the sustainable management of resources (Nelson, 2007).  The 
stated objectives of the WPT (1998) provide the first legal mechanism “to allow rural 
communities and private land holders to manage wildlife on their land for their own benefit” 
(Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a: 14).   WMAs were created as a 
mechanism to achieve both conservation and poverty reduction targets therefore, and were 
                                                 
39 Since updated in the WPT 2007. 
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strategically located in buffer and corridor zones, usually on areas previously designated as 
GCAs (Nelson, 2007).   
Following the publication of the WPT (1998), the institutional and governance systems for 
WMAs, the applications and gazettement procedures, rights of different stakeholders within 
the WMA, and how the costs and benefits from the WMA are to be distributed amongst these 
stakeholders were first outlined in the WMA Regulations (Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2002a; Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2005), WMA 
Guidelines (Wildlife Division, 2001), and the WMA Reference Manual for Implementing 
Guidelines (Wildlife Division, 2003).   
Since the publication of these policies setting out the institutional and governance structures 
to implement WMAs on village land, a process of recentralisation in the wildlife sector has 
been widely reported (see Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012).  This trend began as early as 
2000 when the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2000b; and see 2002) published 
an amendment to tourist hunting regulations that outlawed any investments within PAs 
(including WMAs) without written permission from the Director of Wildlife, including pre-
existing arrangements.  In later years the publication of a new Wildlife Policy for Tanzania 
(URT, 2007) marked an important shift in the tone of community involvement in Tanzanian 
Wildlife PAs and conservation.  The new Wildlife Policy for Tanzania makes little reference 
to participation at the local level, and whilst it still endorses the gazettement of WMAs on 
village land, the role of the public in conservation is described as “to support the government 
efforts in the conservation, management, development and sustainable utilisation of wildlife 
resources...In addition, local communities living on village lands with viable populations of 
wildlife have a role in protecting and benefitting from wildlife ...by setting aside wildlife 
conservation areas on their land” (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2007: 
18).  This represents a definite shift in tone from the 1998 WPT which stated that 
communities participating in WMAs would have “full mandate of managing and benefitting 
from their conservation efforts” (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a, 
Statement 34).  Furthermore, in the discussion about the importance of Game Control Areas 
as wildlife corridors, the statement that WMAs should be established “in order to secure 
habitat for wildlife” (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2007: 24) strongly 
indicates that the emphasis in this new policy is not on the inclusion of local communities in 
wildlife conservation, but on securing wildlife populations (see also Benjaminsen & 
Bryceson, 2012).   
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A further major development in wildlife policy and example of recentralisation occurred 
when new regulations covering non-consumptive uses of wildlife resources were published in 
2008 (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2008), which altered revenue sharing 
arrangements concerning WMAs.  Not only do all investment contracts related to WMA and 
village lands require sanction by the Director, but the revenue sharing arrangements were 
altered so that the AA no longer receives all revenue generated, but retains just 65%, and the 
remaining 35% is retained by the Regional Authorities (Government of the United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2008).  Benjaminsen et al (in press) argue that this arrangement is further 
complicated by the fact that there is no clear way of knowing the total revenue generated, and 
members of the AA or the Village Government are unable to hold the district authorities to 
account with respect to this revenue sharing. 
Under these new revenue-sharing arrangements, communities no longer retain all revenues 
generated at the local level, as described above, but this process of recentralisation concerns 
not just revenue, but also the restriction of community autonomy in decision-making and 
interference of the state at the local level.  In 2009 the Wildlife Conservation Act was 
updated (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2009) and provides further 
evidence of this recentralisation taking place within the wildlife sector.  The new act 
strengthens state control of wildlife and increases the authority of the Wildlife Division to 
interfere in management of wildlife resources on village land (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 
2012). This occurs principally through prohibition of hunting and grazing within a GCA 
without permission from the Director of Wildlife, and the involvement of the Wildlife 
Division and District Authorities in the negotiation and signing of investment contracts for a 
WMA (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2009).   
The policy environment today for WMAs is evidently very different from that published in 
1998, and the recentralisation discussed above clearly has important implications of the way 
power is currently devolved in WMAs (see also 5.2.4).  Benjaminsen & Bryceson (2012) and 
Benjaminsen & Svarstad (2010) discuss this recentralisation as a result of the changing roles 
of external organisations and NGOs in the wildlife sector.  Whilst such organisations were 
critical to the development of WMAs and the policies that first set them out (see 5.3), their 
involvement in wildlife policy has reduced markedly in the intervening period, partly due to 
accusations of corruption within the wildlife sector (e.g. Sachedina, 2008, Nelson, 2009, 
Nelson, 2010) and the perceived failures in the implementation of the 1998 WPT 
(Benjaminsen et al., in press).  Without the pressure from these donors to maximise power 
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devolution, the state has sought opportunities to re-capture and expand its power and 
revenues sources associated with the management of wildlife resources, resulting in the 
policy amendments described above. 
3.5 Summary 
The political context in Tanzania with respect to the control and management of natural 
resources has undergone large shifts over the past 120 years.  Tanzania has undergone major 
political changes during this period, with corresponding impacts on the relationship between 
the state and the local levels and the role of external agents in both conservation and 
development areas.  With respect to natural resources Tanzania has gone through transitions 
of centralised control to devolved environmental management and in conservation there has 
been a shift from strict protection towards community conservation, and specifically 
CBNRM.  The emergence of CBNRM in Tanzania is a product of this political history, and 
specifically the pathway to devolved environmental management is a result of the adoption of 
neoliberal reforms in Tanzania, the roll-back of the state and political decentralisation that 
















4.1 Ontology, Epistemology & Methodology 
 
In this thesis I adopt a political ecology approach to the study of socio-political processes in 
the development of, and ongoing in the governance of two case study Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects in Tanzania (see 1.4 and 2.6). 
“If you can measure it, that ain’t it” 
Kaplan (1964) in Berg (2009: 2). 
 
 My empirical research is qualitative, an approach which can be typified as concerned with an 
“intersubjective understanding of knowledge, [an] in-depth approach, [a] focus on 
positionality and power relations, [and] contextual and interpretive understandings” (Dwyer 
and Limb, 2001: 6).  Qualitative approaches have risen to prominence in geographical 
studies, and political ecology specifically, as part of broader changes in the discipline.  This 
followed the critique of spatial science and the subsequent foci, firstly on Marxist enquiry 
and “the constraining effect of social, economic and political structures” and, secondly, on 
humanist approaches which study the “mediating influence (on spatial patterns and 
processes) of human agency” (Cloke et al., 1991: 15).  These different approaches have been 
part of wider epistemological, ontological and methodological debates concerning the inter-
twining of structure and agency (see 2.3.1), which in turn have been key factors in the 
development of political economy and, subsequently, political ecology (see 2.5; Kitchin and 
Tate, 2000; Neumann, 2005).  Since the 1990s poststructuralist approaches to political 
ecology have sought to “destabilise both the overarching structuralist explanation of Marxist 
geography and the fiction of the integrated humanist subject that denies multiple different 
subjectivities” (Dwyer and Limb, 2001: 5), and to focus upon “discursive and symbolic 
politics and the institutional nexus of power, knowledge and practice” (Walker, 2005: 75).  
Themes central to this thesis, especially the situated nature of knowledge, multiple 
perceptions of environmental issues and the primacy of power in understanding access and 
distribution to natural resources, and the discursive construction and reinforcement of these 
power structures have become central themes within research that describes itself as political 
ecology (Brockington, 2002; Watts and Peet, 2004).   
Qualitative procedures “provide a means of accessing unquantifiable facts about the actual 
people researchers observe and talk to...Researchers using qualitative techniques examine 
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how people learn about and make sense of themselves and others” (Berg, 2009: 8).  
Ontologically, qualitative research “does not start with the assumption that there is a pre-
existing world that can be known, or measured, but instead sees the social world...as 
intersections of cultural, social, political and economic processes” (Dwyer and Limb, 2001: 
6) and the researcher “seek[s] subjective understanding of social reality rather than statistical 
description or generalizable predictions” (Dwyer and Limb, 2001: 6).  The adoption of a 
qualitative methodology was deemed appropriate to my research as I aim to provide an in-
depth understanding of socio-political features and processes that are shaping the governance 
systems and outcomes of the case study projects; characteristics which I did not feel could, or 
should, be measured quantitatively.  I began fieldwork with a list of research questions and 
themes to explore, but no hypotheses to test.  As such, the research project has been designed 
to be inductive, aiming for abstractive theory generation and grounded research, rather than 
theory verification. Grounded theory argues for a research strategy that is “open to what the 
site has to tell us, and slowly evolving a coherent framework rather than imposing one from 
the start” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles, 1979: 117; see also Punch, 1998).   I began this 
research project with little knowledge of Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM) in Tanzania and no prior knowledge of the case study projects, and by the start of 
my fieldwork phases my knowledge of the policy framework and case study projects had 
developed through extensive reading and interviews conducted with conservation 
practitioners who had worked in Tanzania, and also on the case study projects.  My research 
questions, therefore, had been guided by the theoretical framework and contextual knowledge 
developed prior to fieldwork, but the emergence of new information and research themes 
whilst in the field was both a product of the ideological and methodological approaches 
adopted, and critical to the findings of the project. 
In this chapter I outline the approach taken in my research and the specific methods 
employed.  I begin, in 4.2, with an introduction to the research area and the case study 
CBNRM projects.  In 4.3 I then discuss the specific research techniques used and in the final 
section I discuss methodological issues and how these were addressed in my research. 
4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Case Study Selection 
The case study approach has become a common aspect of qualitative research and is valuable 
in the overlapping epistemology that is “orientated towards analysing concrete cases in their 
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temporal and local particularity, and starting from people’s expressions and activities in their 
local contexts” (Flick, 2002: 13).  The approach is often criticised for its ability to produce in-
depth information about a specific locality, but its lack of generalisable findings.  Whilst this 
is inevitably true, the value of the research undertaken in this project lies not in the 
development of a widely applicable theory or model of governance processes, but in the 
recognition of the critical role of the socio-political processes and struggles inherent to the 
governance of CBNRM projects.  I argue that it is the articulation of local context within the 
wider policy framework which holds the issues of interest for understanding these socio-
politics of governance, and this necessitates investigation of these issues at the case study 
level in order to access the day-to-day management of these projects within the villages that 
run and participate in them. 
I carried out research into the twin policies of Community-Based Forest Management 
(CBFM) and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Tanzania across multiple levels 
spanning the national, ministerial, policy-making level and its associated institutions at 
regional and district levels.  I then conducted in-depth research in two case studies; one 
CBFM project, and one WMA project. Both of these case studies are located in Iringa region, 
in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania (see Fig. 4.1).  Iringa region is the 7th largest region in 
the country (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007) and has long been recognised for ecological 
significance as a transition zone between the Sudanian Acacia-Commiphora vegetation 
community of East Africa and the Zambezian Brachystegia vegetation of Southern Africa40, 
and Ruaha National Park, which falls within the region also contains Tanzania’s second 
largest elephant population (Hartley, 1997).  The region is comprised of seven administrative 
districts (Iringa Rural, Kilolo, Makete, Mafindi, Njombe, Ludewa and Iringa Urban).  The 
research presented in this thesis was carried out within the district of Iringa Rural which is 
made up of six administrative divisions, 20 wards and 119 villages (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2007).  Iringa rural is the largest of these districts and, in 2002, had a recorded 
population of 245,033 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007).   
 
 
                                                 
40 The region falls within the tropical and sub-tropical grasslands, savannas, shrublands and 








Fig. 4.1: Map of Iringa Region, Tanzania.  The two case study areas are indicated in further 
detail in Figs 4.2, 4.3 & 6.4. 
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The region of Iringa was named from a Hehe word ‘lilinga’ meaning fortress, and refers to 
the past struggles between the people of the region and other powers, including the colonial 
administrations (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007).  At the regional level, Iringa has 
the second highest level of income per capita (after Dar es Salaam), and is primarily an 
agricultural region, with commercial production of tobacco, tea, coffee and dairy products, 
although the majority of production within the region consists of small-scale subsistence and 
local market farming  (HIMA, 2000). The Iringa Rural district economy is also 
predominantly agricultural, with 95% of the population estimated to be engaged in 
subsistence agriculture (Health and Development International Consultants (HDIC), 2010).  
The principal market crops are rice, maize and potatoes (Health and Development 
International Consultants (HDIC), 2010).  
In terms of natural resources, the region contains significant resources in both the wildlife 
and forestry sectors.  Almost half of the region is covered in woodland41 (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2007) and there are 20 catchment and local authority forest reserves, predominantly 
located in Kilolo and Mufindi districts and covering over 1,700km2 (Lovett and Pócs, 
1993)42.  The district of Iringa Rural is dominated by Ruaha National Park, now the largest in 
the country and originally created from the colonial Saba River Game Reserve (first 
designated in 1910) and gazetted as a National Park in 1951(Neumann, 1998).  Iringa Rural 
also hosts the Lunda Game Reserve and the MBOMIPA Wildlife Management Area (Institute 
of Resource Assessment, 2007; National Bureau of Statistics, 2007). 
Ethnically, the district is dominated by the indigenous Hehe and Gogo communities, with 
smaller numbers of Bena, Kinga, Wanji, Safwa, Kimbu, Nyamwezi and Ngoni present 
(Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2003).  The Kosisamba group is made up of 
communities that were removed from within Ruaha National Park and is distinct to the 
district (Walsh, 1995).  There are significant pastoral populations (predominantly Il-Parakuyu 
Maasai), particularly in the lowland zones surrounding the Little Ruaha River (in Pawaga 
division), who have been resident in the area from the 1950s, followed by smaller numbers of 
Barabaig and Sukuma  livestock herders (Walsh, 1995).  Many of these pastoral groups have 
adopted cultivation alongside livestock keeping (Walsh, 1995).   
                                                 
41 Miombo and acacia woodland with varying canopy cover, and including natural grasslands 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2007). 
42 Although the largest of these forest reserves (Udzungwa Scarp and West Kilombero Scarp) are 
shared with Kilombero district, which is in the region of Morogoro (Lovett & Pócs 1993). 
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The case studies used in my research were selected for the opportunity to work on two case 
studies within the same administrative district (Iringa Rural) and under the same district 
authorities’ office, similar timescales of project histories and development, and a scarcity of 
previous research in this geographical area.  Within Iringa region, there is currently one 
WMA project (MBOMIPA) that has reached a stage in the application process that permits a 
study of this kind.  At the initiation of the research project there were 15 villages in the 
district that had reached a feasible stage in the CBFM application process, although the first 
phase of fieldwork revealed that only five of these were active43.   
The research carried out in the case study projects developed and was refined throughout the 
course of the research project, drawing upon existing literature and policy documents to 
identify the institutions involved and socio-economic characteristics of the communities  A 
preliminary qualitative survey of all 21 WMA villages and 5 CBFM villages was completed 
and the potential villages for further in-depth research were reduced for logistical and safety 
reasons and final selection was made on the basis of socio-economic comparability, project 
revenue comparability and the reputation and status of the villages within the CBFM and 
WMA networks at the district, region and national levels.  The case studies and selected 
villages are introduced below. 
4.2.1.1  WMA Case Study 
The case study WMA project is located within the district of Iringa Rural within the site of 
the former Lunda-Mkwambi Game Control Area44 (GCA, see Fig. 4.2), which is located 
along the eastern border of Ruaha National Park around 130km from the town of Iringa 
(Health and Development International Consultants (HDIC), 2010).  The project began as a 
British Overseas Development Association bi-lateral aid programme named the Ruaha 
Ecosystem Wildlife Management Project (REWMP), which has been described as a “classic 
integrated conservation-development project” (Hartley, 1997: 2).  REWMP’s mission 
comprised two major foci; the first was to assist in the planning for the adjacent Ruaha 
National Park, for which the project villages provided a buffer in the previously designated 
Lunda-Mkwambi GCA (Hartley, 1997).  A smaller focus was the development of a 
sustainable wildlife utilization scheme aimed at providing benefits for communities 
                                                 
43 The remaining ten were not producing revenue at the time as they were closed for regeneration of 
the forest.   
44 The southern portion of this Game Control Area has been re-gazetted as a WMA.  The Northern 
section remains under government authority. 
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surrounding the park (Hartley, 1997).  REWMP was not the first project of this kind in 
Tanzania, but followed the models applied in both the Serengeti Regional Conservation 





Fig.4.2: REWMP/MBOMIPA Case Study Area.  This map does not show the final two villages to join the WMA (Kitisi and Magombwe), which 
were both formerly sub-villages of Idodi and Isele respectively. 
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REWMP ran from 1992 to 1996, and Hartley’s (1997) review of the project shows that 
whilst the project is widely considered as a success, there were several periods of tension 
and difficulty, relating to the new arrangements for hunting in the area, the exposure of 
corruption and institutional weaknesses and the setting and sale of hunting quotas 
(Hartley, 1997).  REWMP officially ended in mid-1996, and the project was transformed 
into MBOMIPA45 from October 1997, just six months before the Wildlife Policy for 
Tanzania (WPT) was published (Walsh, 1998).  MBOMIPA began as a collaboration with 
both the Wildlife Division and the Tanzanian National Parks Authority (TANAPA) with 
financial support continuing to come from the Overseas Development Association, now 
re-named as the Department for International Development (Walsh, 1998).   
International funding ceased in 2002, with the project operating as an unofficial pilot of 
the new WMA policy (Interview P74).  From 2003 the Worldwide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) became a facilitator for implementation of the WPT nationally, and began to 
assist MBOMIPA with the long procedure of securing final gazettement of the WMA 
(Walsh, 2003).  WWF acted as technical advisors to MBOMIPA and negotiators between 
the project and the government authorities, through their Tanzania Policy Implementation 
Programme Team (Walsh, 2003).  In January 2002 MBOMIPA was the first WMA pilot 
project to register its Authorised Association (AA; Walsh, 2003), although official 
completion of the application procedure took place in 2007, when the WMA was gazetted 
and the MBOMIPA AA received its user rights.  In a 2007 assessment of the WMA pilot 
projects (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007), MBOMIPA was listed as a gazetted 
WMA with no allocated user rights.  Fieldwork carried out in the WMA villages during 
2010 showed that these have since been granted by the Wildlife Division, and the project 
has now secured several investment agreements with both hunting and photographic 
tourism outfitters.  
In the last financial year (2009-2010) MBOMIPA accounts show that the project 
generated over Tz Sh. 160,000,000 (around $110,000), which provided approximately 
$1,590 for each of the 21 participating villages to use as they wish.  MBOMIPA is well-
known for its record of generating income, initially from the sale of a wildlife quota to 
resident hunters under REWMP and subsequently MBOMIPA (Hartley, 1997; Walsh, 
2003; Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007), and later greatly increased by the 
                                                 
45 ‘Matumizi Bora Maliasili Pawaga na Idodi’ meaning sustainable use of natural resources in 
Pawaga and Idodi. 
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incorporation of revenues from the Wildlife Division tourist hunting block within the 
previous GCA.   
MBOMIPA WMA is an association of 21 villages, which are split between the 




























MBOMIPA has been selected as the case study project due to its long history as a CBNRM 
project, its inclusion within the pioneer group of such projects (URT, 2007) and its presence 
during the critical period of policy formation in the late 1990s.  It has also been selected 
because it has stood the test of time, and remains a celebrated example of the WMA policy, 
due in part to the income the project is generating, the significant area covered by the WMA 
(776.65km2) and its proximity to what is now the country’s largest national park, the potential 
for managing wildlife for community benefits in the area (Taylor, 1995; Walsh, 1995) and the 
large number of villages involved (21).  The village selected for further research within 
MBOMIPA was Makifu.  This village was selected according to the findings of the 
Table 4.1: Villages Participating in MBOMIPA by Administrative Division. 
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preliminary qualitative survey, which highlighted Makifu’s strategic position within the 
political struggles taking place within the WMA at the time, its average population size 
amongst the participating villages, alongside logistical reasons for creating a base for 
research.  The preliminary qualitative survey also led to the decision to expand the fieldwork 
undertaken during the second phase to include further interviews, alongside the in-depth 
research undertaken in Makifu, in five other MBOMIPA villages.  These villages were 
Tungamalenga, Nyamahana, Luganga, Mbuyuni and Itunundu.  The justification for this 
decision and the selection of these particular villages was based on the findings of the 
preliminary qualitative survey, the supra-village nature of the governance system 
implemented in WMAs, as discussed in 5.2.3, and the power struggles taking place within the 
MBOMIPA WMA, as described in 6.3.3.2. 
4.2.1.2  CBFM Case Study 
Participatory Forest Management began in Iringa Rural under the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA)-funded MEMA (Matumizi Endelevu ya Misitu ya Asili46) 
project, which began officially in June 1999 (MEMA, 2001).  The overall project consisted of 
two jointly-managed projects; the Udzungwa Mountains Forest Management and 
Biodiversity Conservation Project and the Community-Based Natural Woodlands 
Management Project, both of which were located within Iringa Region (MEMA, 2001).  The 
objective of MEMA was to “develop community-based sustainable management of natural 
forest and woodland in Iringa district, and through this effort to conserve valuable biological 
diversity and improve the welfare of rural poor communities” (MEMA, 2003: iii).  This was 
to be carried out through two immediate objectives; to “develop, test and implement widely 
applicable Participatory Forest Management models for environmentally sustainable 
production, use, management and protection of natural forests and woodlands in the pilot 
areas”; and secondly to “support capacity development in natural forests, woodlands and 
biodiversity resource management in Iringa District” (MEMA, 2003: 1).  MEMA targeted the 
forests and forest users of 23 villages, and its strategy was to establish and utilize Village 
Natural Resources Committees (VNRCs) to prepare forest management plans, working 
alongside MEMAs five zonal planning teams (MEMA, 2003).  The project aimed to establish 
Joint Forest Management within central and local government forest reserves, and CBFM on 
village lands, which would then become declared Village Forest Reserves (MEMA, 2003).  
The Danish government has a long history of involvement in biodiversity conservation work 
                                                 
46 Meaning ‘sustainable use of natural forests’. 
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in the Iringa region, for example through academic research carried out between the 
University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Copenhagen (MEMA, 2001).  The funding 
was supplied by the government’s Environment, Peace and Sustainability Facility (MEMA, 
2003).  Implementation was carried out with the Forestry and Beekeeping Division and Lands 
and Natural Resources Office of Iringa District Council (MEMA, 2003).  A map of the case 
study area for CBFM, which is located within the former Natural Woodlands Management 
Project, is shown in Fig. 4.3.  
The process leading to MEMA began in 1992, when the Royal Danish Embassy fielded a 
project preparation mission to the area of the Udzungwas, thereby initiating support for the 
project (MEMA, 2001).  This was followed by a feasibility report in 1993 (MEMA, 2001).  
In 1997, a request to DANIDA was received from the Regional Commissioner’s Office in 
Iringa, with support from a previously ongoing project called HIMA (Hifadhi ya 
Mazingira47), which asked for a revised project (MEMA, 2001).  The following project 
identification mission in March 1998 recommended numerous forestry-related projects in the 
region, including foci on the Udzungwas and natural woodlands areas (MEMA, 2001).  The 
rationale for such projects was identified as the pressure being exerted on these forest areas 
by the neighbouring Iringa town, and the need for design and implementation of sustainable 
use models (MEMA, 2001). 
 
                                                 






Although both the Udzungwa Mountains Forest Project and the Natural Woodlands 
Managment Project were guided by the same principles, their specific aims differed.  The 
Udzungwa concentrated upon conservation, whilst the natural woodlands project worked in 
forests that were “meant for production”, and therefore included harvesting forest products 
(Massao, 2003: 3).  MEMA’s first phase ran from June 1999 to May 2002, and concentrated 
on the preparation of JFM and CBFM management plans, which were completed on the 19th 
June, 2002 (Massao, 2003).  The second phase ran from June 2002 to May 2003, and its 
focus was to test the management plans and make necessary revisions (Massao, 2003).  The 
project was then extended further to the end of 2003 to assist the transition from MEMA to 
Fig.4.3: CBFM Case study area.  The villages of Kiwere, Mfyome, Kitapilimwa, 
Kinywang’ang’a and Itagutwa and Ikengeza form part of the previous MEMA Natural Woodlands 
Management Project and are currently implementing CBFM on village lands. 
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national policy-aligned Participatory Forest Management projects, and the seven month 
extension activities included revision of the management plans, continued monitoring and 
evaluation and the hand-over of project assets to the Forestry and Beekeeping Division and 
Iringa District Council (Massao, 2003).   
The initiation of MEMA in 1999 took place in between the publication of the National Forest 
Policy of 1998, which promoted substantial change in forest management, introducing 
Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs), National Forest Reserves and Local Authority Forest 
Reserves (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009) and the Forest Act of 2002, 
which provided the legal basis for villages to own, manage or co-manage VLFRs and to 
create forest management by-laws through the village forest committee (known as the VNRC 
or Village Environmental Committee; Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009).   
The authority of these village-level institutions, and their responsibility to manage lands 
designated as belonging to the village, is laid down in the local government reforms of 1982 
and the subsequent land act of 1999 and village land act of 1999 (Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, 2009). 
The CBFM village selected for further research was Kiwere.  This village was selected based 
on the project income and its comparability to the revenues associated with MBOMIPA at the 
individual village level, and also due to the location of previous research within the five 
potential villages, in order to avoid research fatigue amongst the participants.  The village is 
located approximately 20km from Iringa town, within the division of Kalenga.  The forest has 
an area of 4904Ha, and the village completed the application procedure and its forest, called 
Kidundakiyave, was officially gazetted as a VLFR in 2002 (Village of Kiwere, 2002)  
Notable natural resources in the forest are wood for firewood and timber (plus other uses 
such as poles for house construction), stones and wild animals (Village of Kiwere, 2002).  
Discussions with the village authorities confirmed that the forest is divided into several zones 
within its management plan, including zones for harvesting, and those closed for protection 
of water catchments and sensitive areas on steep hills or near water sources (Focus Group 
P195).  The management plan for the forest sets out the rules for use of the forest, including a 
timetable for access for firewood collection and other activities (such as mushroom 
collecting), and prices for permits to carry out harvesting activities such as firewood 
collection for tobacco curing, charcoal making and timber felling (Village of Kiwere, 2002).  
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The management of the forest is overseen by the Village Natural Resources Committee48, 
which is part of the Village Council49 structure. 
4.2.2  Fieldwork Timetable 
The research project was split into two major periods of fieldwork.  The first began in March 
2010 for a period of six months, concentrating upon research at the national, regional and 
district levels and also included the preliminary qualitative survey of the villages involved in 
CBNRM in the region. The second period of fieldwork was five months long, beginning in 
January 2011, and focused particularly upon the village level and repeat and extended rounds 
of interviews at the district and national levels. 
4.2.3 Research Outside of Tanzania 
During the course of my research, data collection took place in the UK, Denmark and 
Tanzania.  In order to undertake research in Tanzania, I made contact with the Sokoine 
University of Agriculture in Morogoro, Tanzania and became a Research Associate in the 
Department of Wildlife Management for the duration of my fieldwork under the guidance of 
Professor Alex Songorwa.  Through this connection to the university, I used a snowball 
approach to identify and carry out further interviews with academics and conservation 
practitioners at the national and international levels.  I also travelled to Denmark and worked 
as a visiting scholar at the centre for Forest and Landscape at the University of Copenhagen. 
4.2.4 Areas of study 
The collection of data was split according to the levels of analysis and according to different 
areas of study.  Across the levels of analysis four main areas of study were investigated.  The 
first involved the history and development of the policies underlying the CBFM and WMA 
projects under study.  This theme also included the history and development of the case study 
projects themselves, and their roles in the formation of national policies in the forest and 
wildlife sectors.  The second theme addressed the institutional and power structures in place 
in these policies, as seen through policy documents and in the implementation of these 
policies in the case studies.  The third area of study focused on unofficial or ‘hidden’ 
characteristics of the governance structures.  These were studied through examination of the 
outcomes, problems and conflicts within the case study projects, as perceived across the 
                                                 
48 Kamati ya Maliasili 
49 Serikali ya Kijiji 
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multiple levels of analysis, alongside cultural aspects of power within the projects.  Focusing 
on issues of outcomes, problems and conflicts, within this area of study allowed me to 
address the areas set out in the objectives of the research, whilst also addressing the sensitive 
issues that came out of the research in a non-confrontational manner. Finally, to investigate 
the internalisation of power and the nature of power as a political technology, particular 
attention was paid to the discourses employed by participants across all levels.   
4.3 Methods employed  
Multiple methods were used within and across these areas of study and during the two 
periods of international fieldwork.  This began with a series of repeat semi-structured 
interviews with international conservation practitioners based both in the UK and Denmark, 
who had worked on the case study projects during their phases as donor-funded projects (see 
4.2.1.1. and 4.2.2.2).  These initial interviews also served as the sources for collation of 
project documents and reports for the case study projects, national policy documents and 
relevant literature (see 4.3.1).  I used a snowball approach to identify further respondents of 
relevance to the history of CBNRM policies in Tanzania and the case study projects. 
During the first phase of fieldwork a preliminary qualitative survey was carried out at the 
village level and semi-structured interviews were carried out across all institutional levels. 
During the second phase of fieldwork, further semi-structured interviews were carried out 
across all institutional levels, focus groups and participatory activities with different 
stakeholder groups and participant observation were carried out at the village level, and a 
series of local assistant reports were collected in the CBFM research village (see 4.3.7). 
Interviews at the national, regional and district levels and with NGOs were arranged in 
person or by telephone and confirmed the day before the scheduled meeting.  Interviews were 
usually conducted in the office of the participant, and lasted between 45 minutes and 90 
minutes.  Data collected at the village level were organised through initial introductions and 
explanations of the research at the village offices.  Interviews and focus groups with village 
officials were completed first, and used to identify the first groups and individuals within the 
community of interest to the study.  Subsequent interviews and focus groups were organised 
in advance in person.  The length of focus group discussions did not exceed 1 hour 45 
minutes and interviews at the village level ranged between 25 and 90 minutes in length. A 
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summary of the data that was collected is shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and a schedule of this 
data is included in Appendix 2. 
 
 
Level Semi-Structured Interviews 
Preliminary 
Qualitative Surveys Focus Groups 
International 8   
National 5   
NGO 7   
District 4   
MBOMIPA 5   
Village  
Makifu Village Authorities 












Authorities  2   
Tungamalenga Village 
Residents 2   
Nyamahana Village 
Authorities  2   
Luganga Village Authorities  2   
Mbuyuni Village Authorities 3   
Itunundu Village Authorities  3   








Table 4.2: Semi-Structured Interviews, Qualitative Surveys and Focus Groups Carried out in 





Level Semi-Structured Interviews 
Preliminary 
Qualitative Surveys Focus Groups 
International 4   
National 5   
NGO 2   
Regional 2   
District 3   
Village  
Kiwere Village Authorities 










Total 44 5 11 
4.3.1 Document Analysis 
Documents used to further understanding of the policies underlying CBNRM in Tanzania and 
their implementation across the country were collated from academics at the Sokoine 
University of Agriculture, Government of Tanzania (Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism), conservation practitioners, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the case 
study projects themselves.  The documents used in the research project are shown in 
Appendix 3.  These documents were used to further understanding and to facilitate the design 
of the research project, and where relevant they were analysed in Atlas.ti for textual data and 
discourse purposes.  REWMP/MBOMIPA and MEMA project documents that were written 
during the donor-funded periods of the projects were analysed to build up a picture of the 
history of the projects and the context from which the current project emerged.  Conference 
proceedings and policy documents were analysed for the evolution of policy over time and 
the discourses surrounding this.  Contemporary reports written by NGOs, government 
ministries and from the projects themselves (including accounts and investment agreements) 
were used for specific data they contained regarding the projects and the discourses employed 
within them. 
4.3.2 Village Preliminary Survey 
During the first phase of fieldwork, following the interviews carried out at the national, 
regional and district levels, a qualitative survey of 26 villages (21 WMA villages and 5 
Table 4.3: Semi-Structured Interviews, Qualitative Surveys and Focus Groups Carried out in 




CBFM villages) was carried out.  The purpose of this survey was to introduce the research 
project to all villages involved in these projects, assess the feasibility of further study in each 
of these villages and to collect data on village socio-economic characteristics, project 
management at the village level and project performance.  The format for the survey was a 
group interview, the participants in which varied between the villages but included 
representatives from the Village Council, Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC; for 
CBFM villages) and MBOMIPA village representatives (WMA villages).  The interview 
schedule included a list of topics of interest and specific questions relating to socio-economic 
characteristics of the village, but no pre-prepared question structures or topic order were used 
(Kitchin and Tate, 2000; Berg, 2009).   
4.3.3 Focus Groups 
Focus groups bring together a small group of people to discuss a topic, although their 
characteristics vary widely (Morgan and Krueger, 1993).  The focus group was chosen as an 
appropriate method in this study to explore the social meanings of these policies and to 
provide a source of information on the ways people construct and debate knowledge relating 
to these issues (Hoggart et al., 2002).  The group context is an important feature of social 
processes (Kitzinger, 1994), and focus groups provide a socially sanctioned space to examine 
and induce the articulation of generally assumed and unstated norms and values (Bloor et al., 
2002).  Focus groups were used in the two villages selected for in-depth study (Kiwere and 
Makifu).  This process began with a focus group with representatives from the village 
authorities, with the objective of collecting basic information about the project and to 
facilitate the identification of stakeholder groups within the projects.  These stakeholder 
groups were then used as break characteristics for focus group segments (Morgan, 1998).  
Inter-group heterogeneity and intra-group homogeneity were implemented in order to limit 
the impact of intra-group power relations as much as possible (Morgan and Spanish, 1984; 
Cameron, 2005), with the objective of facilitating discussion (Knodel, 1993).  The segments 
used for the focus groups were: 
CBFM research village: 
 
• Resource user groups (charcoal, tobacco, beekeepers) 
• Pastoral groups using the forest 
• Gender 
• Official role in the project (village natural resources committee leaders, village natural 




WMA research village: 
 
• Official role in the project (village natural resources committee leaders, village game 
scouts) 
• Pastoral groups using the forest 
• Gender 
• Sub-villages within the entire village 
 
Focus groups were repeated with these characteristics until data saturation was reached.  
Particular attention was paid to the participants involved in these groups, their socio-
economic status and the area of the village they came from to ensure geographic and social-
group coverage to as wide an extent as possible.  Focus groups were held within the village in 
a public yet quiet space that was deliberately chosen to be far from the village offices and 
homes of the leaders of the VNRC, as it was felt that these could influence the spatial aspects 
of participation, including participants’ perceptions of the study and the appropriateness of 
people’s responses (Kesby, 2007).  In order to encourage discussion in the focus groups I 
used an invitational approach to participant recruitment, whereby we identified one member 
of the target stakeholder group and asked them to find between five and seven further 
members of the same stakeholder group who would be willing to participate in the focus 
group discussion.  This was a particularly successful method of recruiting participants but had 
two implications that needed careful attention; firstly this meant that the respondents were 
highly likely to know each other, which is usually seen as an undesirable characteristic of the 
method, but in the context of the research villages it was clear that this could not realistically 
be avoided; secondly the invitational approach meant that the participants were more likely to 
have close links to the individual that we first contacted, and were more likely to come from 
similar socio-economic groups and to live in close proximity to one another.  To deal with 
this, we had to take careful notes of the participants’ socio-economic status and which sub-
village they came from, using a map of the village, and following up the discussions with 
visits to the participants’ houses to qualitatively assess their socio-economic status (according 
to the wealth-ranking activity that was carried out in the village) to ensure that a illustrative 
sample had been created (McClintock et al., 1979; Flowerdew and Martin, 1997).  Focus 
groups followed a semi-structured format using a list of topics of interest.  As with all other 
forms of discussion-based data collected, the format of the focus groups depended upon the 
participant group, and the planned topics to be discussed had to be altered according to 
different groups’ uses of the natural resources governed by the projects, and the level of 
understanding of different groups.  I assessed this level of knowledge using broad, ‘throw-
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away’ questions (Berg, 2009) at the beginning of the interview.  For example, during 
introductions and explanations of my research I would ask general questions about the 
objective of the CBNRM project and how they were involved in and affected by the project.  
The semi-structured approach was very effective for tailoring the discussion to the knowledge 
base of the participants and allowed new themes and topics to emerge from the data.  The one 
major obstacle I faced with using focus group discussions was that I had to alter their format 
in line with cultural norms in the villages that I worked in.  It became very clear early on in 
the research that a traditional style focus group where participants discuss amongst 
themselves was an inappropriate expectation in the context of my research and mine and my 
assistant’s roles had to be altered along the lines of more active facilitation in order to create 
socially-acceptable channels to express different opinions.  This was partly because cultural 
norms often prevented debate or disagreement (see 7.4).  I had to pay careful attention to the 
subtle ways in which disagreements were voiced during such discussions therefore, and to 
carefully select the break characteristics in order to facilitate discussion as much as possible 
within the groups.   
Where I felt that individuals were restrained within the group discussion, or where interesting 
comments had been made but could not be explored fully because of these social norms, 
individual interviews were arranged with respondents to discuss issues in further detail.  It 
also became clear that the respondents were happier with a group interview session, rather 
than a discussion, and a compromise had to be made between my own objectives and the 
wishes of the participants.  In forging this compromise, my assistants and I paid close 
attention to the ways in which we could build trust and facilitate discussion with respondents, 
particularly by not taking lots of notes during the focus groups and by spending time at the 
beginning and end of the discussion engaging in more general conversation with the group. 
4.3.4 Semi Structured Interviews 
Within the study, I used semi-structured interviews in three ways: firstly they were used 
across the village, district, regional, national and international levels as a primary method to 
collect data from key individuals involved with the case study projects and policies.  These 
interviews took places in several stages, organised according to levels within the governance 
structures of the policies, and were repeated whenever further information was required or 
new themes discovered of relevance to the participant.  Secondly, interviews were used at the 
village level to investigate themes of interest that arose from the focus group and interview 
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data in more detail.  In some cases this was carried out when a comment of interest was made 
in a focus group, but which was deemed inappropriate for further discussion within the group.  
Semi-structured interviews were also used when further individuals of interest to the study 
were revealed through the course of fieldwork.  The interviews followed both a purposive 
and snowball sampling strategy, therefore, to create an illustrative sample (Flowerdew and 
Martin, 1997).   
All interviews were semi-structured, using a topic-guide, as with the focus group and 
qualitative survey methods employed.  Through reflection and practice, attention was paid to 
reducing the instances of leading and complex questions, and to alter the phrasing of 
questions in line with discoveries of socio-cultural meanings and level of knowledge of the 
participants (Singer et al., 1983; Smith, 1987; Foddy, 1993; Smith, 1995; Parfitt, 2004).  I 
had to develop my skills as an interviewer to ensure that the interviews remained semi-
structured, allowing new ideas to be contributed to the project and new topics explored as 
they arose, but also to ensure that the discussion remained focused upon topics of relevance 
to the research (Kitchin and Tate, 2000).  I also had to pay careful attention to managing the 
discussion to achieve depth of insight, particularly through the use of prompting participants 
in a manner that encouraged elaboration and discussion without being leading or pressuring 
(Krueger, 1998; Berg, 2009). 
Finally, semi-structured interviews were carried out by a team of local assistants in the 
CBFM research village as a means to access further opinions in the village, particularly 
regarding sensitive issues (see 4.3.7).  I employed six local villagers who each completed 
assignments to talk to local villagers and write reports on a specific issue related to my 
research.  I employed this method to attempt to provide an extra level of depth to the data that 
I was collecting personally.  The reports that were generated provided a medium for local 
villagers to contribute to the project in a totally anonymous fashion and were especially 
valuable for providing a means of communication about topics that were sensitive, 
particularly corruption mechanisms within the committee structure of the projects and 
villagers’ complaints about the project leaders themselves. 
4.3.5 Participatory Activities 
In conjunction with the focus groups, several participatory activities were carried out by the 








These activities were implemented not for emancipatory objectives (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004a), but as a tool to facilitate discussion and group dynamics, 
and to provide a meaningful way for people to articulate knowledge.  In the case of semi-
structured interviews carried out with the MBOMIPA Representatives in Nyamahana for 
example, a village map was created during the interview as a tool to facilitate discussion.  
This interview had started off very hesitantly, and the map drawing exercise was carried out 
as a means to help the participants relax and begin talking more freely with myself and my 
research assistant. 
 
The use of these techniques, for example the participatory wealth ranking in the communities, 
was also a valuable source of information about the village which helped to set other 
information in context, and as described earlier, was also a vital source of validation of the 
range of participants that had been included in the project.  The participatory activities also 
assisted in the clarification of bureaucratic procedures through a diagrammatic representation 
of procedures and responsibilities.   
4.3.6 Participant Observation 
Within the research villages I carried out participant observation as a tool to situate data 
gathered in focus group and interview settings (Agar and MacDonald, 2003), and as a stand-
alone method for use during meetings and daily activities in the communities.  The value of 
this data came from both the things that were said in these situations, but also in the greater 
Forestry Sector Wildlife Sector 
Village Natural Resources Committee annual 
calendar of duties 
Community-Based Forest Management financial 
system 
Village natural resources map 




Scout and Patrol System 
Wealth Ranking Chart 
 
Village natural resources map (Makifu and 
Nyamahana) 
Farming calendar 
Scout and patrol system 
Wealth ranking 
Table 4.4: Participatory Activities Carried out During Fieldwork.  All activities were carried out 
within the villages selected for in-depth research, unless stated otherwise 
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insight it provided into the power relations within the communities, social norms and groups 
within the communities.  During the fieldwork periods I participated in 3 village meetings 
(one in Kiwere and two in Makifu), which are quarterly meetings at which all issues of 
importance to the village are discussed.  I also attended one meeting of the zonal committee 
for Participatory Forest Management, which is held to report on the activities (financial and 
protection) of all Participatory Forest Management projects in the zone (consisting of five 
villages, including Kiwere; see Fig. 4.3) and provides a forum for advice and discussion 
between the leaders of the project and district authority representatives. 
4.3.7 Local Assistant Reports 
Within the CBFM research village, in addition to working with a full-time research assistant, 
I employed ten local assistants to carry out further discussion-based research and to write 
reports on specific topics.  I employed this technique because it became clear that within the 
small village community, discussing sensitive issues and creating space for people to discuss 
their complaints about the forest and its management by the VNRC was a difficult task.  The 
local assistants were each given a topic to research by talking to people within the community 
in an informal way, and were asked to create a written report within a week.  This technique 
proved especially useful for providing a means for people to express their opinions on such 
sensitive topics in an anonymous way, as the local assistants were instructed not to record the 
identities of the individuals they talked with.  This technique proved very successful in 
gathering further information about sensitive issues and contextual information about the 
research village.  The local assistants lived across the sub-villages within the research village 
and were all young and male and had completed some degree of secondary schooling.  It was 
not possible to recruit female local assistants due to the lack of secondary education 
completed by most young girls within the village and the domestic responsibilities placed 
upon them.  Despite the gender issue, the positionality of the local assistants within the 
village was largely beneficial as they were able to speak to many different social groups 
within the community and held no positions of authority or close personal connections to 
those involved in the management of the VLFR. 
4.4 Triangulation 
Multiple methods were employed to investigate each of the areas of study and research 
themes.  Triangulation was not used principally for information verification and replication, 
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as I chose to rely upon reaching data saturation within each of the methods.  Triangulation 
was valuable, however in providing multiple ‘lines of sight’ upon the research questions 
(Campbell, 2001; Berg, 2009).  These ‘lines of sight’ are combined to provide the researcher 
with “a better, more substantive picture of reality; a richer, more complete array of symbols 
and theoretical concepts; and a means of verifying many of these elements” (Berg, 2009, p.5).  
Triangulation in this sense provides a “means of refining, broadening and strengthening 
conceptual linkages” (Berg, 2009: 7).  As discussed above, therefore, multiple methods were 
used to address each of the research questions. 
4.5 Language 
Although English is an official language of the United Republic of Tanzania, it was necessary 
to conduct research in Kiswahili in all cases except for when dealing with international 
conservation practitioners and researchers and a small number of national level respondents.  
I carried out three months of intensive language training in total for the purpose of fieldwork.  
I passed the final examination at the level of ‘advanced high’.  I carried out my language 
studies at the Riverside Language and Cross-cultural School, based just outside Iringa town.  
This location also allowed me to begin project setup and to initiate contact with the regional 
and district authorities and several conservation and development Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), many of which became important contacts within the CBNRM 
community and research participants.   
Whilst Tanzania is an ethnically diverse country, Kiswahili is a universally spoken language 
that unites different ethnic groups.  The villages in which I was carrying out in depth research 
included residents that spoke several different languages, including Kihehe, Kibena, Kigogo 
and Maa amongst many others.  Choosing to learn Kiswahili enabled me to conduct research 
with all of the different ethnic groups present within the villages without the need for a 
translator.  Learning to speak Kiswahili was a vital skill that facilitated my research in several 
ways; being able to carry out all of my interviews in one language not only reduced the time 
taken to cover issues (and thus facilitating wider coverage of issues in interviews), but also 
reduced the level of artificiality that would have been associated with translation through an 
interpreter (Frey and Fontana, 1991; Evans et al., 1994).  During the course of my research it 
became clear that the use if Kiswahili was beneficial to recruitment of participants, as they 
expressed relief at being able to conduct the interview in one language and not having to be 
concerned with how my research assistants would translate their responses.  To avoid 
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misunderstandings I was accompanied by a research assistant to all pre-arranged interviews 
and focus groups. In response to the concerns of participants over translation, I chose to also 
use Kiswahili for cases where I required clarification of meaning during interviews. 
4.5 Recording and Note-taking Strategies 
A field diary was kept throughout the fieldwork periods.  This was used to keep a written 
record of all research carried out and topics or themes that arose from these.  The diary also 
served as a tool for reflexivity by providing a medium to express thoughts concerning 
motivations, decision-making and positionality (Dwyer and Limb, 2001).  All interviews at 
the international, national, regional, district and village authority levels were recorded with 
the permission of the participants using an Olympus WS-331M Digital Voice Recorder and 
noise cancelling microphone (when required).  Interviews at the village level (non village 
authority) were not recorded, as it was clear that respondents found this intimidating and 
were suspicious of what the machine did and how the data would be used.  However, I did 
record focus group discussions that took place in the villages in order to facilitate revision of 
the discussion.  During all interviews notes were taken by myself and my research assistant 
and were written up in the fieldwork diaries within 24 hours. Discussing the day’s work and 
writing up notes from the activities carried out each day was a vital tool for reflexivity and 
also allowed freedom for myself and my research assistants to take minimal notes during 
discussions.   
4.5 Transcription and Analysis 
The data outputs entailed notes taken during interviews and focus groups, participant 
observation, participatory activities, local assistant reports and document sources.  The 
recordings of interviews and focus groups were transcribed in cases where this was deemed 
necessary for further understanding, or where the interview or focus group proved 
particularly rich in information or discourse (see Appendix 1).  This resulted in 22 cases of 
interviews and focus groups being transcribed in full, and partial transcripts being taken for 
nearly all of the interviews and focus groups.  Transcription was carried out by my research 
assistant and the data was transcribed into Kiswahili, not translated into English. These 
sources were put into the textual analysis software Atlas.ti for analysis.  Analysis involved 
the application of thematic codes to the text data.  These codes were used to draw out 
instances where participants discussed themes of previously identified importance and to 
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attribute meaning and theories (Crang, 1997).  Secondly the coding process enabled 
identification of emic codes, used by the informants themselves, to highlight participants’ 
understandings (Crang, 1997).  Coding enabled organisation of the data, the drawing out of 
important themes and the process of coding proved highly useful to beginning to analyse the 
data and order thoughts and theories that emerged from them.  The codes created in Atlas.ti 
were used to create a conceptual hierarchy and network of codes to assist with analysis. 
Coding also assisted with comparisons between the interviews within each sector and across 
the wildlife and forestry sectors. 
4.6 Constraints and Reflections 
4.6.1 Positionality 
 
“The version somebody presents in an interview does not necessarily correspond 
to the version he or she would have formulated at the moment when the reported 
event happened.  It does not necessarily correspond to the version he or she 
would have given to a different researcher with a different research question.  The 
researcher, who interprets this interview and presents it as part of his or her 
findings, produces a new version of the whole.  Different readers of the book, 
article or report interpret the researcher’s version differently, so that further 
versions of the event emerge.” 
Flick (2002: 9) 
Since the mid 1980s, when qualitative research endured a ‘crisis of representation’, the 
fallibility of these kinds of data has been thoroughly debated.  It has become clear that in the 
context of interviews and focus groups, Haberrmas’s concept of an ‘ideal speech situation’ is 
deeply flawed (Puri and Sahay, 2003).  Qualitative methodologies involve social encounters, 
or dramaturgical performance (Berg, 2009) that takes place within the influences if myriad 
social processes and relationships (Mishler, 1986).  The information presented in interviews 
should always be recognised as a performance of discourse, power relations, social norms, 
the expectations of the informant, and their understandings of the researcher’s intentions 
(Briggs, 1986).  This was particularly apparent in the focus group discussions and the 
modifications that had to be made to these (see 4.3.3). Considering these limitations, it is 
recognised that the value-neutrality assertions of research are false, research “cannot but be 
political” (Hammersley, 1995: viii) and through a post-structuralist lens, it must be accepted 
that the knowledge presented in data collection methods is situated.  The situation of 
knowledge occurs in terms of the context of the discussion, whereby both interviewer and 
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participant arrive with desires and agendas and unique understandings of the matter to be 
discussed, and the discussion itself (Kitchin and Tate, 2000).  Secondly, knowledge is 
situated in cultural ideologies, or “general, unwritten laws concerning what is permissible 
within society” (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 24).   
 “Play fool to catch wise” 
Jamaican Slave Proverb (Scott: 3)  
The knowledge presented in the data collection methods employed in this study is situated 
according to the positionality of myself as a researcher also.  Positionality refers to the social 
roles assigned within research.  These roles are an amalgamation of the researcher’s cultural 
background, socio-economic status, race, gender and age, and positionalities affect both the 
researcher’s approach to the research problem, and also drive the roles and positions assigned 
to the researcher by the people being researched, and in turn the relationships that can be built 
between researcher and participant (Howard, 1994; Madge, 1994).  This placed constraints on 
me in relation to my gender in a patriarchal culture, nationality in a country previously under 
colonial rule and status as an outsider and non-native speaker of the language (Skelton, 2001; 
Mercer et al., 2003), However, I discovered that these roles could be useful in terms of my 
research.  Robson & Willis (1994) argue that these kinds of positionalities can be 
manoeuvred to create opportunities for participants to feel as if they are educating the 
researcher.  This I found to be very true, and beneficial in several ways; accepting my status 
as an outsider allowed me to project an image as a student in search of knowledge, an un-
threatening persona, and opened up opportunities to address sensitive issues, such as 
corruption, in a less-threatening way.  I also accept that my positionality as a foreigner, 
particularly as a researcher from the University of Cambridge, but also through my links to 
the Sokoine University of Agriculture, were key factors in gaining access to documents and 
being granted permission to carry out interviews.  
4.6.2 Sensitive Issues 
In addressing sensitive issues, the methodological approach was cautious and iterative.  I 
found that the most effective way to discuss issues such as corruption mechanisms within the 
projects was to open opportunities for the participant(s) to contribute to these issues, but not 
press participants to take these opportunities.  In short, I tried to construct a space for people 
to reveal ‘hidden transcripts’, or “critique[s] of power spoken behind the back of the 
dominant”(Scott, 1990: xii). I had to be sensitive to other people involved in the discussion, 
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who may have been inhibited in making disclosures, and to remain perceptive of people who 
might wish to discuss issues privately.  However, I was also acutely aware that the 
motivations of different actors within the projects made separating truth from rumour and 
gossip extremely complicated.  Here I had to rely on my background knowledge of the 
projects and its governance systems to assess whether certain accusations were feasible, and 
through triangulation I was able to increasingly judge the validity of many, but not all, 
claims.  Instead of doggedly seeking the truth in the performance given to me by research 
participants, I adopted an approach of seeing rumour, jokes and gestures as an expression of 
the hidden transcript, “albeit in disguised form” (Scott, 1990: xiii). 
4.6.3 Ethics 
Research in the past has been heavily criticised for its extractive, exploitative nature on 
participants (Chambers, 1997; Kitchin and Tate, 2000).  I attempted to address this issue by 
building in aspects of reciprocity into my research design.  I compensated participants for 
their time, using food rather than cash, whenever possible, and made a conscious effort to 
assist in the community, particularly through the service of my car to help people transporting 
goods to market, people to the clinic or elderly people to the next village, for example 
(Robson, 1994).  I thanked people who had been particularly helpful in the logistics and 
management of my research using culturally appropriate gifts, such as traditional gifts at 
particular national holidays and religious celebrations. 
I always ensured that participants were informed of my research and consented to participate.  
Due to the invitational recruitment technique used for the focus groups, these specifically 
applied an ‘opt in’ basis.  I obtained permission to record the interviews where the dictaphone 
was used and where permission was not granted (in two instances), I did not use the 
dictaphone and relied upon the notes that were taken during the interview. 
Confidentiality and anonymity were assured in the project, data were stored securely and 
primary data were never shared.  For the purposes of anonymity, the names of research 
participants, or instances where they referred to individuals in the projects have been 





Embracing the political nature of my research, I found it important to be reflective during the 
research process.  This is defined as “self critical sympathetic introspection and the self 
conscious analytical scrutiny of self as researcher” (England, 1994: 82).  In accordance with 
Flick (2002), I found that reflection helped to highlight some of the intricacies of the research 
project, and became a significant analytical and interpretive tool and data in their own right.  
To help reflect on the research, the participants and the findings, I used field diaries and 
discussion with my research assistant.  Reflection was particularly useful in addressing issues 
of cross-cultural research and attempting to situate findings within a cultural context.  I was 
able to discuss with my research assistants instances that puzzled me from the discussions 
that we had participated in.  The field diaries were also useful for keeping a record of the 
discussions and I was able to return to these notes at a later date and to add extra insight into 
the discussions from the things that I had learnt and experienced over the course of the 
fieldwork periods.  
I found reflection also to be invaluable in considering the themes that I was drawing out of 
my research findings and how these were shaping my further research and my understandings 
within further data analysis.  I found it important to keep a record of these developments 
within my thinking and to discuss the general themes that I was drawing from the research 
with my research assistants, who would sometimes have different ideas and contradictory 
beliefs regarding the research findings.  I found these discussions incredibly useful in refining 
my research strategy, identifying my own beliefs, pre-conceptions and misunderstandings 
within the research.  I used the outcomes of my own reflection and the discussions with my 
research assistants to continually assess the trajectory of the research being undertaken and to 
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5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I investigate the policy context in which Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) 
and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), as outlined in chapter 3, are currently 
being implemented.  I aim to explore the evolution of these policies, and identify the factors 
that played key roles in the emergence of the Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) agenda in Tanzania as a whole, and those shaping the distinct policy 
pathways that were adopted in the forestry and wildlife sectors.  I will attempt to deconstruct 
the processes within policy reform and to highlight the role that pilot projects in Tanzania, 
both prior to and during national policy development, played in this.  Following the 
framework set out in 2.2.3, I focus on policy reform, conceptualising this as the 
amalgamation of agenda setting, policy development processes and policy implementation 
(see also 2.2.2).  Each of these represent complex interrelated aspects of structured interests, 
actors’ agency, and power-knowledge relationships.  In the first section of the chapter I 
outline the key features of the institutional governance systems prescribed in policy for both 
WMAs and CBFM.  I utilise these structures and the application procedures to create a WMA 
and Village Land Forest Reserve (VLFR), as set out in policy, to draw attention to the 
differences between these two approaches to CBNRM in Tanzania.  Next I address the 
discursive shift to CBNRM in Tanzania and the role of external influences upon this.  In 
section 5.4 I draw upon ideas of a political economy of natural resources to add depth of 
understanding to the policy pathways chosen in the forestry and wildlife sectors, and explain 
the differences these represent.  In this section I also address the discursive and political 
struggles that took place within the process of policy reform, and the ways in which this 
relates to the structured political-economic interests of actors driving policy options.  In 
section 5.5, I adopt a network view of policy processes to consider the policy communities 
and discourse coalitions involved in the development of CBNRM policy, with particular 
attention to the role that donor-funded pilot projects played in these processes.   
This chapter draws both upon previous research carried out, and upon primary research 
findings from my own fieldwork.  The development and emergence of CBNRM at the policy 
level, and the shift from protectionist, fortress conservation strategies to the inclusion of local 
communities in Tanzania has become a popular topic for research (Songorwa et al., 2000; 
Brockington, 2002; Songorwa, 2004; Nelson, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007; Nelson and Blomley, 
2010), and I draw upon this background to add extra depth to the area of study and address 
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questions that have been raised in previous research.  From my own research into these 
issues, I draw on policy documents, alongside project documents for both the Ruaha 
Ecosystem Wildlife Management (REWMP) and later MBOMIPA projects and the MEMA 
forestry project (see 4.2.1.1 & 4.2.1.2 and Appendix 3) and research findings from the semi-
structured interviews carried out. 
5.2 Prescribed Governance Systems 
In Tanzania, policy reform in the forestry and wildlife sectors has produced a discourse of 
CBNRM, but is implemented in policy through WMAs and CBFM projects in two starkly 
different governance systems.  As described in 3.4, the objectives of WMA and CBFM 
projects are essentially the same, and follow a discourse of CBNRM to achieve sustainable 
management of natural resources through the tying together of conservation and development 
goals implemented in the devolution of power to the local level.  This highly sectoral nature 
of CBNRM policy in Tanzania is identified by Blomley & Iddi (2009: 16) as a major 
weakness with the policies resulting in “divergent ideas about how to devolve management to 
the village level”.  In this section I utilise an analysis of the policy documents underlying 
both WMAs and CBFM, alongside records held by the Village Natural Resources Committee 
(VNRC) of Kiwere and Authorised Association of MBOMIPA to compare the institutional 
structures prescribed in policy, the revenue systems within both WMAs and CBFM and the 
application procedures involved in gazetting a WMA and a VLFR.  
5.2.1 Community-Based Forest Management Institutions 
As a result of the development of CBFM, the role of the government in natural resource 
management is being both restricted and redefined, resulting in an approach that was 
described by MEMA as “eyes on, hands off” (MEMA, 2001: 3).  The Forestry and 
Beekeeping Division of the Tanzanian Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism does not 
implement CBFM directly, but its role consists of policy guidance, quality control and to 
offer guidance, capacity-building and training (Blomley, 2006).  The principal institution in 
CBFM has become the Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC), which acts as the 
institution responsible for day to day management of the VLFR.  Table 5.1 outlines the main 




















National Sanctioning of land use plans and officially gazette the VLFR  
Policy guidance 
Advice 
Capacity-building and training provision 
District Council District Collect taxes from the VLFR (5%) 
Facilitate and approve the land use plan for the VLFR 
Declaration of a VLFR alongside the Village Council 
Monitor the VNRC bank account 
Village Council Village To prepare the management plan for the forest land as part of the 
gazettement process 
Control revenue collection and spending of the VNRC 
To decide with the VNRC on expenses for the committee 








Implement forest management plan for the VLFR 
To hold monthly meetings and prepare monthly reports on 
revenue, patrols and resource monitoring 
Carry out monthly perception interviews in the community 
To prepare quarterly accounts and reports to be read aloud at 
village assembly meetings 
Enforce rules of use and village bye-laws  
Resource monitoring 
Conflict resolution 
Enforcement of sanctions for illegal activities 




All Facilitate application and gazettement of the VLFR  
Private Sector All Enter into investment agreements with the VNRC (through 
purchase of permits) 
Assist in protection of natural resources 
Adhere to the terms and conditions of the VLFR land use plan 
and investment agreement 
Table 5.1: Principal Roles and Responsibilities of Institutions within Community-Based Forest 
Management Policy (adapted from Boiesen and Lund, 2003; MEMA, 2003; Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, 2009).  The roles set out in this table were also particularly informed by Semi 




The institution charged with the chief management role, the VNRC, is a unique component of 
the village government system in Tanzania, as it is the only sub-committee of the Village 
Council that cannot consist of Village Council members, but must be elected through the 
village assembly (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  Its members are elected every five years (Lund, 
2007).  Within the CBFM system, the VNRC is the executive authority, with power to arrest 
defenders and collect revenue (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  It is important to note that in 
VLFRs the VNRC, through the creation of a management plan, is able to set its own 
permission system, prices, quotas and fine levels and sanction systems (Koppers et al., 2004).  
No other body is able to issue permits for use within the VLFR (Koppers et al., 2004).  The 
VNRC constitutes a standard committee structure, which must represent all the sub-villages 
within the village and consider gender representation (Boiesen and Lund, 2003; MEMA, 
2003).  The Chairman distributes all reports to the district offices, Village Council and 
assembly, prepares all the VNRC meetings and chairs them.  The Secretary is responsible for 
keeping records of all VNRC meetings and other meetings that have discussed the VNRC and 
for filling in all monthly forms and keeping copies of them.  The Treasurer records all 
permits, receipts and payment vouchers, collects all revenue and prepares the financial report 
monthly for the VNRC meetings. There is also an Interview Chairman, who is responsible for 
carrying out interviews with the local community to record uses of the forest, perceptions of 
the state of natural resources and the governance of the project.  There are 5-7 ordinary 
members who assist in decision-making processes and monitor the performance of the VNRC 
and its members.  The Patrol Commander ensures that patrols are carried out and that patrol 
forms are delivered to the Secretary and finally, 3 patrol guards carry out the actual patrols 
and fill in the patrol forms (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  According to Boiesen & Lund (2003) 
this institutional system leaves the top members of the committee with responsibilities of 
linking with other organisations and for the collection and distribution of information and 
material.  They also argue that the patrol guards hold a special position on the VNRC, as they 
are not full members, having been “consciously removed from the VNRC, as it is believed 
that their role as ‘policemen’ will inflict on the possibility of the other VNRC members to 
build more friendly relations with the villagers” (Boiesen and Lund, 2003: 79).  The VNRC is 
responsible for monitoring the resources within the VLFR, which it does through three 
methods; revenue accounts, perception interviews and monitoring the patrolling of the forest 
(Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009).  The perception interviews carried out 
must number at least five per month from people in different sub-villages, and should ask 
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interviewees to describe changes and developments in the forest resource, and to what they 
attribute these developments (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).   
The VNRC must produce a monthly report, which includes a summary of the committee’s 
activities, including meetings, general assemblies, workshops, a summary of permits, fines, 
revenue and expenditure, a summary of patrol observations, and a summary of perception 
interviews carried out (MEMA, 2003).  This report is kept by the VNRC and copies are sent 
each month to the District Natural Resources Office, and to the Ward Executive Officer 
(MEMA, 2003). 
5.2.2 CBFM Revenue Systems 
VLFR harvesting is conducted according to the management plan created by the village 
government, and approved by the district authorities (Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2002b; Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009).  In the research 
villages, interviews with the committee members and villagers confirmed that harvesting 
centred around timber, firewood for charcoal and tobacco processing, building poles and 
stones, livestock grazing and fodder collection and medicinal plant collection (Interviews 
P34, P35, P38, P47-P56).  Revenue from these activities is collected through payments for 
permits purchased by investors from the VNRC (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 
2009).  According to the Forest Act Regulations (Part XII) “timber harvested, sold and 
transported from village forest reserves shall be marked with a “registered mark” (hammer) 
which shall be issued by Local Authority for that respective village, and registered and 
gazetted by the Director of Forestry”. 
Since the political reforms of 2006 (see 3.2.2), financing and reporting lines for CBFM have 
altered; previously financing from development partners went from the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism (MNRT) to district accountants, and District Forest Officers’ 
reported activities and expenditures, based on approved budgets, back to the MNRT 
(Blomley, 2006).  In the current system funding is channelled directly from the Ministry of 
Finance to the district level, without passing through the MNRT, and routine reporting is to 
the District Council, which is collected by the Prime Minister’s Office Regional 
Administration and Local Government, which compiles financial reports and activity 
summaries across district for the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (Blomley, 2006).  District 
governments still report to the Forestry and Beekeeping Division concerning impact and 
output monitoring, as its staff retain responsibility for monitoring policy implementation.   
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Under CBFM, communities are exempt from regulation governing the harvesting of ‘reserved 
tree’ species, and are not obliged to share royalties with the district or national government 
(Blomley, 2006).  The villages do pay a 5% cess (tax) to the District Council, however 
(Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  Cess is a tax which the District Council retains for discretionary 
spending, as it does not have to be shared with central government (Koppers et al., 2004).  
Having paid their fee to the VNRC to receive a permit, producers or wholesalers are then 
exempt from paying the regular district cess (Boiesen and Lund, 2003).  Revenue collected 
by the VNRC must be used to finance expenditures related to forest management, and all 
remaining funds must be used for public services (Lund, 2007). 
5.2.3 Wildlife Management Area Institutions 
In WMAs the prescribed governance structure places management responsibility at the level 
of the Authorised Association, which represents the villages participating in the WMA.  The 


























& Tourism     
(Wildlife Division) 
National Authorise Community-Based Organisations to become Authorised 
Associations and grant user rights  
Declare WMA officially 
Sanction investment agreements 
Allocate revenue to lower operating levels 
Allocate hunting block and set hunting quota 
Determine memorandum of understanding on relationship between the 
Authorised Association and Wildlife Division concerning management 




National Act as the agent of the Wildlife Division in the WMA 
Participate in the District Natural Resources Advisory Board 
Assist AAs with anti-poaching activities and assist in anti-poaching 
and problem animal control 
District Council District Facilitate application procedure for gazettement of the WMA 
Form link between the AA and the Wildlife Division 
Approve land use plans for the WMA 
Approve village bye-laws 
Monitor all potential and existing investment agreements between 
private sector and the AA 
Issue resident hunting licenses to the AA 
District Game 
Officer 
District Responsible for managing problem animal control 




District Arbitration and resolution of conflicts 
Provide technical and legal advice to the AA 
Co-ordinate with the Wildlife Division to set the hunting quota 
Verify AA investment agreements and advise Wildlife Division as to 
their suitability 
Board of Trustees District Approves annual plans, budgets and financial statements of the AA 
Advisory role concerning all aspects of the WMA and its management 
Authorised 
Association 
Inter-village Complete requirements for official gazettement of the WMA 
Implementation of the land use plan (including conflict resolution, 
sanction enforcement, problem animal control, resource protection) 
Resource monitoring 
Protect biodiversity and wildlife resources in the WMA 
Report and seek authorisation for investment agreements 
Recruit, train and oversee Game Scouts 
Carry out financial management of the AA, including paying fees to 
relevant authorities 
Issue permits for resource use within the WMA 
Report to village assembly 
Monitor wildlife resources in the WMA 
Village Council  Village Co-ordination of natural resource management activities at the village 
level 
Preparation of the land use plan 
Creation of village bye-laws for approval by the District Council 
Monitor the AA and report to the District Council 
Enter into agreement with AA on management of the WMA 
Table 5.2: Principal Roles and Responsibilities of Institutions within Wildlife Management 
Areas (adapted from Walsh, 1998; MNRT, 2000b; Zacharia and Kaihula, 2001; MEMA, 2003).  The 
roles set out in this table were also particularly informed by semi structured interviews P73, P74, P77, 







Village Strengthen relationship between the village and village government,  
surrounding villages, Ruaha National Park and the Natural Resources 
and Community Development institutions at the ward and district 
levels 
Prepare Natural Resource Use Plans and ensure these become village 
plans 
To oversee the implementation of natural resource use plans 
Advise village government on the formulation of village bye-laws for 
natural resource and environmental protection 
Oversee implementation of bye-laws 
Co-ordinate Village Game Scouts’ patrols and reporting systems 
Receive confiscated exhibits/trophies and hand them to the District 
Officers 
Monitor and evaluate natural resource use by identifying and reporting 
issues with VNRC and Village Game Scouts 
To keep records of all activities related to the environment 
To develop and oversee Income Generating Projects for honey, fishing 
and forest products 
Provide environmental education through public meetings, community 
groups and primary schools 
Prepare and submit monthly income and expenditure reports for 
natural resource use and submit them to the Village Council, District 
Natural Resources Office and MBOMIPA offices 
Ensure budget for natural resource use is properly implemented 
Village Assembly Village Approve formation of the WMA 
Elect village representatives for the AA 
Approve village land-use plan and bye-laws 
Approve uses of village revenue from WMA 






All Facilitate application and gazettement of the WMA 
Provide technical advice to the AA 
Participate in the District Natural Resources Advisory Board upon 
request  
Private Sector All Enter into investment agreements within the WMA 
Participate in District Natural Resources Advisory Body upon request 
Assist in protection of natural resources 




According to the constitution of MBOMIPA (2002), the institutional structure of the 
Authorised Association (AA), the principal managing institution, consists of the Secretariat, 
Executive Committee, Sub-committees of Finance, Security and Discipline.  The Secretariat 
is formed by the two elected members from each participating village, and from this the 
Chairperson, General Secretary and Treasurer, their three deputies or assistants and the 
members of the further committees are elected.  The sub-committees of discipline and 
planning have five members each, whilst the security sub-committee is made up of six 
members (MBOMIPA, 2002).  The chair and secretary of each sub-committee become 
members of the executive committee, alongside the AA’s chair, secretary and treasurer and 
their three assistants (MBOMIPA, 2002).  The executive committee meets monthly, and is 
responsible for preparing the expenditure and income reports, annual programme of activities 
and the AA budget (MBOMIPA, 2002).  Committee members hold their position for five 
years, and may re-apply for their post (MBOMIPA, 2002). 
The chairperson of the AA is responsible for overseeing all activities, chairs all AA meetings, 
and is the designated spokesperson for the AA (MBOMIPA, 2002).  The Secretary General of 
the AA is responsible for all AA documentation, is Chief Executive and coordinates all 
activities, programmes and plans, also reports to the village members of the organisation, and 
handles all applications for membership and reports them to the Executive Committee 
(MBOMIPA, 2002).  The Treasurer of the AA is the chief financial and accounting officer, 
who is responsible for all financial and accounting records, proposes the budget to the 
Executive Committee, is a signatory on the bank account of the AA, cheques and 
bills/promissory notes, and may sign agreements on behalf of the AA if the Chairman and 
Secretary are not present (MBOMIPA, 2002).   
The role of the Disciplinary Committee is to oversee all members of the organisation 
(MBOMIPA, 2002).  This is the institution responsible for ensuring accountability, 
transparency and identifying wrong-doing.  The Financial Committee’s main responsibility is 
to discuss the financial programmes and to make suggestions at the secretarial conference 
(MBOMIPA, 2002).  The Security Committee’s role appears vague in the constitution, 
described as carrying out all security duties and recruiting security guards (MBOMIPA, 
2002).   
The AA holds at least three meetings per year.  These are called by the Secretariat and are 
attended by its members and any invited guests (MBOMIPA, 2002).  In practice this is 
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usually at least the District Game Officer, and often the Board of Trustees also.  A special 
meeting can be called at any time, however (MBOMIPA, 2002).  The conference of the 
secretariat provides the opportunity for proposed changes to the constitution, provided 21 
days notice of the changes has been given, and the passing vote is made up of at least three 
quarters of the secretariat members (MBOMIPA, 2002).  The meetings also form the site of 
dissolution of the organisation, which can take place if two thirds of the secretariat agree, and 
causes all the organisation’s assets to be transferred to a humanitarian organisation with 
similar values to the AA (MBOMIPA, 2002).  De-gazettement of a village within the WMA 
can take place only through application to the Director of Wildlife, which must include the 
certification of authorization given to the Community-Based Organisation (prior to AA 
status), a letter of approval from the District Council, the minutes of the village assembly 
showing approval of removal from the WMA (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 
2000a).  Disbanding of the WMA entirely can take place with two thirds agreement by the 
participating villages (MBOMIPA, 2002). 
The role of the district remains important in the WMA governance system.  The District 
Council must endorse all investment agreements (Booth et al., 2002) which is designed to 
assist AAs, who are seen as not having the negotiation skills to ensure that agreements are 
fair, but Booth et al. (2002: 45) argue that it also “erodes the concept of freedom of contract 
of the AA”.  They also argue that it creates decreased transparency and accountability and 
provides the District Council with supervisory powers with no corresponding mechanism to 
check this power (Booth et al., 2002).   At the district level the District Natural Resources 
Advisory Board coordinates the administration of the WMA, and is made up of up to 12 
members, including the District Commissioner (as Chairman), District Executive Director, 
District Game Officer (as Secretary), District Land Officer, District Forestry Officer, District 
Community Development Officer, District Fisheries Officer, District Planning Officer, a 
representative from the AA, and a representative of the Game Reserve or National Park can 
also be included (Interview P88, Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). 
Interviewees from the district authorities, MBOMIPA investors and Board of Trustees 
reported that the Board of Trustees is made up of eight locally respected people, usually 
businessmen, and often with some experience in the tourist sector and interest in 
conservation.  Their role is principally to provide advice on any aspects of the WMA and its 
management, but also to review all financial plans and statements for the WMA (Interviews 
P88, P102, P105).   
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Since the publication of the legislation underpinning WMAs in Tanzania, a new institution 
has been created at the national level; the National Consortium of Authorised Associations is 
made up of representatives from across the country’s WMAs and is designed to represent a 
coherent voice to represent the WMAs to the central government (Interview P100, Interview 
P80).  MBOMIPA AA leaders described the consortium as being first suggested by 
MBOMIPA, and created through their actions with support from their Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) facilitator, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF; Interview P100).  
Two members of the MBOMIPA AA also held roles within the national consortium 
committee structure.  
5.2.4 WMA Investment Agreements and Revenue Arrangements 
The Wildlife Policy for Tanzania (WPT) 1998 outlines that WMAs are eligible to gain 
income through entering into investment agreements with private investors on WMA land 
(Booth et al., 2002).  These agreements can be in several forms, including a single fee for use 
of the area or a percentage of gross annual income (see Booth et al., 2002).  All investment 
agreements are limited to three-year terms, and must be endorsed by the District Council and 
the Wildlife Division (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2005).  The role of 
the Village Assembly in WMA investment agreements remains unclear.  In the 2005 
Regulations for WMAs (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2005), the role of 
the AA in statement 22 is described as seeking authorisation for investments from the Village 
Assembly and reporting investment activities to them.  However, in statement 63, regarding 
investment agreements, the regulations make no mention of the Village Assembly 
(Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2005).  Research in the case study WMA 
indicated that the village level played no role in approving investment contracts, and even 
members of the Village Council were unaware of the number of investment contracts that 
existed, or their nature. 
Revenue distribution surrounding WMAs has been a topic of debate for several years (see 
Nelson, 2007), both concerning the distribution between the Wildlife Division and AAs and 
within the AA itself.  The financial system operating in WMAs involves the payment for 
hunting block concessions to the Wildlife Division, which then provides a proportion of this 
revenue to the AA (25%).  The WMA regulations (Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2005 Statement 73) state that “(1) benefit sharing in a WMA shall comply with 
circulars issued by the government from time to time and shall adhere to mechanisms of 
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equitable distribution of costs and benefits targeted at economic development and poverty 
eradication. (2) AA shall ensure that from it’s (sic) annual gross revenue – (a) not less than 
15% shall be reinvested for resource development. (b) not less than 50% shall be directed to 
member villages forming the WMA: and (c) not less than 25% shall be used to strengthen the 
AA”.  Whilst the distribution of funds within the AA is clearly stated, the proportion of 
revenue from wildlife utilisation within WMAs with designated hunting blocks, which must 
be handed down from the Wildlife Division to the AA is not stipulated. 
As early as 2000, the MNRT published an amendment to the Wildlife Conservation (Tourist 
Hunting) Regulations which declared that all investment contracts within any wildlife 
Protected Area (PA; including hunting blocks and WMAs) require written approval by the 
Director of Wildlife (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2000b).  This change is 
significant because it declares previous investment agreements for non-consumptive uses of 
wildlife (e.g. photographic tourism) on village land inside a WMA to be illegal, without this 
ministerial sanction.  The amendment has caused much controversy and some have declared 
that it has no legal basis (see Nshala, 2002; Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007).  This 
policy change, along with alterations to the revenue sharing arrangements which see AAs 
keep just 65% of non-consumptive wildlife revenues, has been further sanctioned by the state 
in the publication of the Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilisation Regulations in 2008 
(Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2008; see also 3.4.2).  Nelson et al., (2009) 
and Nshala (2002) argue that these amendments indicate the Wildlife Division’s desire to 
expand state control within the WMA framework, and represent a decrease in community 
autonomy.  Several villages with pre-existing investment agreements now find themselves 
accused of illegal actions if they permit such investments and revenue generating activities to 
continue (Nelson et al., 2009).  This is argued to form part of a wider trend towards 
recentralisation and state control over natural resources in the wildlife sector that has been 
strengthened between 1998 and the recent policy updates.  This argument is supported by the 
updated Wildlife Conservation Act (2009), but also in other sectors including marine and 
fishery resources (see Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; see also 3.4.2 and 5.4.2).  The 
process of recentralisation that has taken place in the wildlife sector between the publication 
of the WPT (1998) and its update in 2007 marks drastic changes for the local level in terms of 
power devolution and the authority of the AA to manage wildlife resources on village land.  
This is particularly clearly exemplified in the wildlife regulations that have expanded state 
authority to intervene in investment arrangements, land management decisions and re-capture 
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revenues from wildlife resources (both consumptive and not; see also 3.4.2). The restricted 
devolution of power witnessed in the WMA governance structure has undergone successive 
restrictions and increased state interference and the AA now holds no authority to determine 
investments or to collect revenues autonomously. 
5.2.5 A Comparative View of the Governance Systems in Tanzanian CBNRM 
There are three major areas of disparity between the institutional governance systems (shown 
in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2) as prescribed in policy for WMAs and CBFM projects.  These 
differences were reported by a District Official as representing different cost-benefit systems 
and intrinsically linked to the politicisation of these resources and their values: “Wildlife are 
hotcakes; the money from tourist hunting activities is very large” (Interview P28).  As 
discussed above, both WMAs and CBFM, as set out in policy, involve an administrative 
system that uses a management committee to oversee the daily management of the project.  
The first area of divergence in the prescribed governance systems concerns this 
administrative structure and the devolution of power within both sectors.  Within the forestry 
sector management responsibility is invested in the existing village government system, with 
principal management responsibilities residing with the VNRC.  Within the wildlife sector, 
management of the WMA is much more hierarchical, with an increased role for national, 
regional and district authorities, and local level responsibilities held mainly by the supra-
village AA. The disparity in complexity between Tables 5.1 and 5.2 clearly indicate this.  The 
AA is an institution that has not previously existed in Tanzanian law and has no pre-existing 
equivalent for natural resource management or local government structures.  The effect of 
this new level in the governance structure of the wildlife sector is to devolve power to a level 
that sits above the village level, making village governments, and VNRCs particularly, 
upwardly accountable to the AA.  In effect the management of the WMA is scaled up to the 
level of the AA and there is little downward accountability to the local level (see also 6.1.1). 
Village Council members in participating MBOMIPA villages described how they were 
invited to some MBOMIPA meetings and were able to give suggestions to the AA, but they 
expressed frustration that the AA should be accountable to them, but in reality they feel their 
job is to report on the activities of the AA to the village, and they have no control over the 
AA or the WMA (Interviews P129, P133, P89, P91).  In contrast the retention of 
management within the VNRC for CBFM maintains accountability of its members down to 
the lowest level in the local government structure.  Nelson & Blomley (2010) describe these 
differences as representing different levels and rapidity of power devolution within the 
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policies;  CBFM has followed a more rapid route of devolution of power to the local level, 
with greater ownership rights vested in the local level than is produced by the WMA system.  
A comparison of the role of the district level between WMAs and CBFM indicates a much 
more intense role in the wildlife sector.  Whilst the district is seen as a crucial level in the 
governance system for both CBFM and WMAs, through creating a link between the local and 
national levels (Zacharia and Kaihula, 2001), the institutional structures shown in Fig 5.2 
shows that in the wildlife sector additional roles are created through the incorporation of a 
new institution: the District Natural Resources Advisory Board.  The role of the regional 
level is also increased in the wildlife sector through the creation of a Board of Trustees for 











Fig. 5.1: Institutional Governance Structure Prescribed in Policy for 
CBFM in Tanzania 




Both policies set out a system of communities producing management plans for the land they 
wish to gazette as a WMA or VLFR, which are then approved by the authorities at the district 
and national levels, prior to official declaration.  Once the application procedure is complete, 
the AA or VNRC are eligible to enter into investment agreements with private sector 
companies to gain income from the sale of their rights to use the resources within the WMA 
or VLFR.  These procedures set out the two further areas of disagreement between the 
forestry and wildlife sectors’ policies, however.  Firstly, the application procedure to gazette 
a WMA is comparatively lengthy and complicated, which Nelson (2007) describes as 
motivated by the will to retain maximum district and national scale influence at all stages.  
The gazettement of a WMA follows the following steps (Nelson, 2007): 
1. Village Assembly agrees to form a WMA based on the Village Council 
recommendation 
2. Villages form a Community-Based Organisation (by election) and register it at the 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
3. Community-Based Organisation prepares a strategic plan 
4. Villages prepare a Land Use Plan  
5. Environmental Impact Assessment of Land Use Plan 
6. Villages create by-laws to support Land Use Plan 
7. Community-Based Organisation prepares a Resource Management Zone Plan 
8. Community-Based Organisation applies for user rights to become an Authorised 
Association  
9. WMAs on Game Control Areas must be re-gazetted  
10. Authorised Association applies to the Director of Wildlife for hunting block 
allocation 
11. Authorised Association enters into investment agreements 
12. Investments subject to environmental impact assessment 
 
According to a national review of Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009), the formal procedure to gazette a VLFR is as 
follows50: 
1. A management plan for the forest is created by the Village Council51. 
2. Written intention to declare a VLFR to the district authorities 52 
                                                 
50 Prior to the creation of the management plan, the villages must establish that they have legal tenure 
over the land (classified as village land by the  Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement), although 
management of the land can take place before this procedure has been completed and the village has 
obtained a certificate of village land.  All internal and external boundaries of the forest to be included 
in the VLFR must also be demarcated. 
51 The plan must describe how the forest will be used, managed and protected.  If timber utilization is 
proposed, the plan must outline the areas of the forest where this will take place, and the amounts 
involved (in accordance with the Forest Act 2002 part III section 14).  The plan must contain a map. 
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3. The management plan is presented to the village assembly for approval 
4. The village elects a Forest Management Committee or VNRC 
5. The village (Village Council and VNRC) prepares bye-laws that support the 
management plan 
6. Bye-laws presented to the village assembly for approval 
7. Ratification and declaration of the VLFR by the District Council53 
8. Formal Gazettement by the Forestry and Beekeeping Division54 
 
The key differences between these procedures is the complexity of the steps that must be 
completed to gazette a WMA; as part of this process permission must be granted from the 
ministerial level on four separate occasions (steps 8, 9, 10 and 12), which follow a lengthy 
period of complicated planning requirements for both the WMA as a whole and for individual 
villages participating in the WMA (a strategic plan, a land use plan, and a resource zone 
management plan).  One academic researcher described the required process as “more 
complicated than what has to be done to gazette a National Park, and yet it is communities 
that are expected to do it” (Interview P75).  In contrast, the procedure for VLFRs involves 
just two applications: one to the district level to declare the VLFR; and one (optional) 
application to the Forestry and Beekeeping Division for formal gazettement.  A VLFR also 
only requires one management plan to be created.  A WMA does not formally exist until step 
9 and may not collect revenue from investment contracts until step 12 is completed for each 
and every investment contract.  However, a VLFR becomes operational at step 7, and 
revenue can begin even before the final gazettement by the Forestry and Beekeeping 
Division, which is seen as a formality after a period of time.  In CBFM projects, the village 
must produce a management plan and by-laws to implement this plan, but no environmental 
impact assessments are required, and investments do not require sanction beyond the level of 
the VNRC, who ensure they are in accordance with the management plan.  The processes 
also reveal key differences in the direction of accountability within these projects and the 
structures within which they operate: once a village assembly has endorsed the initiation of 
the application procedure for a WMA, there is no formal requirement for the management 
                                                                                                                                                        
52 The Chairman of the Village Council writes to the District Executive Director and informs him of 
the intention to declare a VLFR. The District Executive Director and District Forest Officer may 
comment on the application. The plan must also be forwarded to the Director of Forestry for 
comments and consideration 
53 Copies of the bye-laws, management plan, minutes of meetings and members of the VNRC are sent 
to the District Council 
54 After 3 years, if the village has managed the reserve in accordance with the management plan, they 
may request formal gazettement by the central government, which provides a formal certificate signed 
by the Director of Forestry. Where villages have failed to manage the forest in accordance with the 
management plan the Director of Forestry can remove the rights of villagers to manage their own land 
(and hand over management to the District Council) 
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plans to be ratified by this level, approval is always required from levels above the AA.  In 
the CBFM application procedure, village assembly sanction of both the management plan and 
the by-laws are stipulated as a requirement.  The direction of accountability in the WMA 
governance system is consistently upwards, with few opportunities for downward 
accountability, whereas a mixture of accountability mechanisms is apparent in the forestry 
sector. 
Finally, the revenue sharing systems within the two policies are contrasting.  In WMAs, 
communities enter into investment agreements (with Wildlife Division and District Authority 
sanction) to gain income from non-consumptive uses of the WMA, for example photographic 
tourism55. Hunting activities within the WMA are controlled by the Wildlife Division, 
however, who allocate hunting blocks, sanction all hunting quotas, and share the revenues 
from these activities, although in an undisclosed and insecure manner, as no confirmation of 
revenue sharing proportions has been made in policy (see Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2005; see also 5.2.4).  In contrast, within CBFM consumptive and non-
consumptive uses of the forest can be undertaken by the community, or income gained 
through selling these rights to external companies (Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism, 2001a).  Management is overseen by the VNRC, as set out in the management plan, 
and all revenues are retained by the community, with 5% cess paid to the District (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2001a). 
The summaries above attempt to highlight some of the important differences between the two 
policies, and begin to indicate the origins of these distinctions and divergences.  To 
summarise, the differences in the development of the policies has resulted in twin policies of 
CBNRM within Tanzania, covering distinct resources but with almost identical objectives, 
and which have employed a different governance systems to achieve their aims.  The wildlife 
sector provides an opportunity to study a CBNRM policy which maintains tight national-
scale control over the power devolved to participating communities and retains power, 
influence and benefits for the regional and national scale.  In contrast, the forestry sector 
provides an opportunity to investigate the rapid devolution of power to local communities, 
and a lesser degree of regional and national scale influence and responsibility. 
                                                 
55 Although the negotiation and signing of these agreements is overseen by officials from the district and 




5.3 Community-Based Natural Resource Management Policy 
As discussed in 3.3, Tanzania has a very strong history of conservation based on Protected 
Areas (PAs), both in the wildlife sector where National Parks and Game Reserves formed the 
dominant strategy (Nelson et al., 2009), and similarly in the forestry sector which, until the 
1980s was very much focused upon production, not sustainable use or conservation (Ylhäisi, 
2003, Sunseri, 2005).  The emergence of a discourse of CBNRM, and the policy reform this 
resulted in, is part of a complex arrangement of factors and influences at the national, global 
and local levels.  In many ways, Tanzania exemplifies the discussion in section 1.1 
concerning fortress conservation and the shifts towards bottom-up development and an 
integration with conservation objectives in the new paradigm of sustainable development 
(Chambers, 1997; Adams et al., 2004; Hutton et al., 2005; Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 
2006; Adams and Hutton, 2007).  This shift is clear in the policy language used in the 
Wildlife Policy for Tanzania (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a) and 
the National Forest Policy (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998b) and 
Forest Act (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2002b), which highlight the role 
and rights of communities in conservation strategies: Policy statement 5 in the NFP states that 
“Village institutions will be granted appropriate user rights as incentives for sustainable forest 
management.” (1998: 19).  Similarly the Forest Act states the objectives of the act are to 
facilitate sustainable development and encourage the active participation of citizens through 
the development of community rights, and at the heart of this strategy is the objective to 
“delegate responsibility for management of forest resources to the lowest possible level of 
local management consistent with the furtherance of national policies” (Part II, Statement 3, 
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2002b).  The rights of the local level within 
the introduction of CBFM is clearly stated in the Forest Act, which declares that “A Village 
Council may by resolution..declare an area of land to be a village land forest reserve” (Part V 
Statement 33:1, Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2002b) and goes on to 
declare that villagers hold the rights to manage a VLFR, including rights to enter, occupy, use 
and harvest forest produce in accordance with the management plan for the VLFR, by-laws, 
rules agreements and customary practices (Part V Statement 39:12, Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2002b).  In the wildlife sector, the WPT (Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a, Statement 34 & Section 3.3.8: 19-20) also sets out the 
rights of local communities to “have full mandate of managing and benefitting from their 
conservation efforts” within the new WMA category of PA, and sets out a strategy for 
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facilitating CBNRM in the wildlife sector through “helping the rural communities to have 
secure ownership/long term use rights of their land and enabling them to use the wildlife and 
natural resources on that land”.  The discourse of CBNRM, with its foci upon the devolution 
of rights to the local community and the integration of community participation and benefits 
from conservation activities are very clearly integrated into the policies that were developed 
in the 1990s, therefore.  I discuss this integration below. 
5.3.1 External Influences in Agenda Setting 
This discursive shift towards CBNRM in Tanzania is described by Nelson et al., (2009) as 
developing on the ground prior to national policy, through the role of donor-funded projects 
operating in the country.  The reform of natural resource management policy in Tanzania is 
intrinsically linked to these influences through the agency of international organisations, 
particularly Transnational Conservation Organisations (TNCOs), the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, and the conditionalities placed upon bilateral aid.  These 
influences have been paramount in previous discussions of the emergence of CBNRM in the 
country (see Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993; Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007).  
Sunseri (2005) argues that this paradigm shift to CBNRM and the policy space surrounding 
TNCOs and bilateral funding agencies is tied into the emergence and eventual dominance of 
the biodiversity paradigm at the global level, the emergence of the hotspot discourse from 
1992, and the important role of the World Conservation Strategy 1980, which played a large 
part in the development of the sustainable use discourse.  Biodiversity narratives have also 
been heavily adopted in Tanzania, particularly by researchers at the University of Dar es 
Salaam, which led directly to the designation of the first National Park in Tanzania based 
upon biodiversity principles (Udzungwa National Park; Sunseri, 2005).  Brockington (2006) 
argued that whilst discourses of bottom-up community conservation projects and 
environmentalisms are widespread within Tanzanian society, their origins within elite 
scientific discourses and ideas from Western NGOs is clear.  A former ministerial staff 
member referred to the development of CBNRM in Tanzania’s wildlife sector as explicitly 
externally-driven, with TNCOs playing a key role in agenda-setting, alongside the hunting 
and poaching problems in Tanzania “which led the government to ask for help from the 
TNCOs...they agreed but on the condition that it would be community-based” (Interview 
P80).  Fieldwork at the village level also revealed a lack of bottom-up drivers of policy, with 
community members describing how instead of communities demanding CBFM projects, 
they were brought to the villages by District Officers (Interview P197). 
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The removal of the Director of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division in 1996, under 
international and national pressure from donors, due to his lack of support for the 
development of CBNRM policies is a concrete example of the agency of TNCOs and 
bilateral development funding in the adoption of a CBNRM agenda in Tanzania (Nelson and 
Blomley, 2010).  The policy space to achieve this influence was constructed through several 
channels.  Firstly, the extent of such influence stretches beyond the shift to CBNRM in 
Tanzania and throughout the country’s history of conservation, as is exemplified in the large 
areas of land set-aside for conservation purposes since the colonial era (Brockington, 2006).  
Lovett (2003) argues that the influence of international conservation organisations can be 
traced back to the colonial era in Tanzania and the establishment of the first PAs in the 
country under colonial rule.  Tanzania’s network of PAs in both the forestry and wildlife 
sectors was inherited by the newly independent government and retained and expanded over 
time, eventually forming the basis for CBNRM strategies, as discussed in chapter 3. The 
political commitment to conservation practices, often discussed with reference to the Arusha 
declaration of 1961 (in which President Julius Nyerere gave a speech confirming this 
commitment) was written on his behalf by Western TNCOs, providing a good example of 
this long history of international influence in Tanzanian policy (Neumann, 1998).  Igoe & 
Croucher (2007) describe this agency of TNCOs as being constructed through the provision 
of resources, expertise and technology, which continues to be represented today in the role 
prescribed in policy for NGO facilitators within the governance system of WMAs (see 5.2 
and 5.5).    Brockington (2006) also argues that the authority of such TNCOs is derived from 
the importance of nature-based tourism to the country’s economy, which is used by such 
organisations to discursively frame the necessity for a shift towards CBNRM and is 
legitimised by the privileged status afforded to the knowledge they present.  International 
support for CBNRM was presented primarily in narratives of the requisite, rights-based 
incorporation of local communities in conservation, for both moral and scientific reasons.  
CBNRM discourse drew upon both the morality of the inclusion of local communities in 
conservation activities, alongside rational, scientific justifications for such an approach based 
on efficiency (Andersson and Ostrom, 2004; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Brockington et al., 
2008).  The second of these narratives was clear in the rational, scientific, biodiversity-centric 
accounts of the need for policy reform towards CBNRM given by interview respondents 
across the national, district and village levels.  For example, a District officer described how 
“Participatory Forest Management was started in Tanzania because of a lack of government 
staff to run the forests, and high levels of destruction” (Interview P28).  This view was 
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elaborated upon by a former Forestry and Beekeeping Division Ministerial Staff Member, 
who argued that sustainable development was the main issue and that CBFM was the best 
option to achieve this because whilst “who manages it is not the big issue... the Forestry and 
Beekeeping Division had inadequate resources to enforce its laws and regulations” (Interview 
P2).  Members of both the wildlife and forestry research villages commonly explained that 
CBNRM had been implemented primarily for conservation reasons, because the previous 
systems were seen to not be working, and high levels of both wildlife poaching and forest 
harvesting were taking place, endangering the natural environment (Interview P42, Interview 
P97). 
5.3.2 The Rationality of Community-Based Conservation 
The emergence of CBNRM in Tanzania was also driven partly by the perceived inadequacies 
of fortress conservation practices and fences and fines approaches to conservation, which  
played an important role in the apparent necessity of a new approach to end what had become 
a ‘war for biodiversity’ (see Neumann, 2004a).  Militaristic anti-poaching operations such as 
Operation ‘Uhai’ (life/living) in 1989 were seen as ineffective and financially unsustainable 
(Hahn and Kaggi, 2001).  CBNRM offered a new approach in which hearts and minds could 
be won at considerably less cost to the central government.  Nelson et al., (2007) argue that in 
the wildlife sector, policy reform was a product of ongoing poaching problems, especially of 
rhino and elephants, alongside decreasing budgets faced by the Wildlife Division, which 
combined to heighten the perceived need to attract foreign donors through externally-funded 
projects.  Many of these donors were bilateral development agencies such as the Swedish 
International Development Agency and the Overseas Development Agency (UK), which both 
funded long-running programmes in the forestry and wildlife sectors respectively (Hartley, 
1997; Wily, 2000).  Their development focus, alongside the paradigm shift towards 
participatory development and bottom-up approaches, resulted in these donors playing a key 
role in championing the discursive shift towards CBNRM.   
The agency of external organisations was a product not only of the context of conservation in 
Tanzania and the power of such organisations to discursively frame the policy agenda, but 
also of the macro-policy context and economic situation in which Tanzania was situated at 
the time.  Igoe and Croucher (2007) describe the creation of WMAs in Tanzania as in-line 
with global discourses of governance and human rights, alongside the dominance of 
landscape-scale conservation in the global biodiversity discourse, but also as a result of the 
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influence of neoliberal models of development.  The influence of these models in Tanzania is 
closely tied to the transition from socialism to multi-party democracy, the economic situation 
in the 1980s and the adoption of structural adjustment that followed (see 3.2).  This wider 
context was identified as a factor in the move towards CBNRM by a former ministerial staff 
member, who described the change in forestry policy as necessary to keep in line with 
changing macro policy situation; Macro-economic changes were seeing the government 
devolving functions to the local government, and the Director of the Forestry and Beekeeping 
Division felt they should align with that (Interview P2).   
The neoliberal models of development that spread in the 1980s provided a mechanism for 
central government to decentralise, prioritise efficiency and re-regulate (Igoe and Croucher, 
2007).  They define this re-regulation as “the use of the state to commodify previously 
untradeable resources-those that were previously not owned, state-owned or community-
owned” (Igoe and Croucher, 2007: 537).  The opening up of natural resource sectors to 
markets through de-regulation, alongside decentralisation laid the foundation for the win-win 
scenarios predicted in CBNRM. In a clear link to the concept of governmentality and 
Agrawal’s (2005) idea of new environmentalities, Igoe & Croucher (2007) argue that the 
result was the creation of local communities as legal partners in business ventures and 
simultaneously “disciplining local people to exclude themselves from their land (Igoe and 
Croucher, 2007: 538).  CBNRM is often discussed in terms of win-win scenarios for 
conservation and development objectives, but this argument highlights the nature of 
neoliberal models in conservation policy premised upon the devolution of power to local 
levels as a political technology of the state (see 2.3.1).  This argument is supported by Sunseri 
(2005), who argues that the new forestry paradigm in Tanzanian is one where the language of 
CBNRM and participation is used to conceal the hegemonic discourse and interests of 
international conservation organisations.  This creates a system of CBFM that has two sides; 
the appearance of devolved power over resources; and the expansion of state control over 
unreserved lands.   
In the wildlife sector, Nelson et al., (2009) argue that the model for CBNRM adopted in the 
WPT (1998a) and subsequent legislation can be explained in terms of these concurrent vested 
interests of the state and external influences, especially TNCOs.  They compare the 
governance system operating in a pilot WMA with a competing CBNRM project focused on 
wildlife in Loliondo, Ngorongoro District, that had refused to follow the prescribed path to 
gazettment of a WMA.  They conclude that the official model, whilst highly flawed in 
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comparison regarding the income being generated for local communities at the time, became 
the preferred option for both the state and TNCOs operating in Tanzania as it incorporated 
controlled devolution of power to local communities alongside a maintained reliance upon 
international funding and aid (Nelson et al., 2009).  These studies suggest that devolution has 
taken place alongside recentralisation (Ribot et al., 2006) within CBNRM policy in Tanzania, 
and highlight the need to investigate the policy processes, and the discursive processes this 
entailed, which resulted in the publication of both the new wildlife and forestry policies and 
shaped the legal formal of WMAs and CBFM (see also 2.1). 
5.4 Policy Pathways 
In this section I consider the process of policy reform and examine further factors that helped 
shape these processes and the pathways adopted in policy.  The policy space created by 
external donors, specifically bilateral donors and TNCOs in Tanzania at this time has been 
discussed as a function of both the wider discursive shift towards CBNRM and the rational 
option that alignment with these new priorities provided for the Tanzanian state in a context 
of neoliberal change and conservation challenges.  The setting of the CBNRM agenda is the 
outcome of a combination of these factors, therefore.  However, the distinct differences 
between the CBNRM policies in the forestry and wildlife sectors require further examination.  
Nelson et al. (2007) argue that the role of external organisations, described above, is 
tempered by the interests of the policy community, where the political economy of different 
resources and the incentives these provide for bureaucrats, drive policy processes.  In the 
following section, I discuss these arguments with respect to the different policy pathways 
adopted in the forestry and wildlife sectors in Tanzania during the late 1990s. 
5.4.1 The Politics of Devolution: Political Economies of Natural Resources 
In their outline of policy networks, Marsh & Rhodes (1992) described the relationship 
between the wider policy network and the policy community as hierarchical.  The moderation 
of external influences in policy processes can thus take place according to the interests and 
beliefs of the policy community, and Nelson & Blomley (2010) state that in Tanzania these 
interests differ between the forest and wildlife sector according to the political economy of 
natural resources.  The politics of power devolution (see 2.1.1) with regards to Tanzanian 
CBNRM are distinct between these two sectors, based upon the perceived value of forest and 
wildlife resources and the systems of power and benefit that surround them.  Nelson & 
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Blomley (2010) discuss these roles in terms of ‘hidden economies’ (or informal systems of 
power and benefit; see 2.1.3) of these natural resources, which provides the context for these 
power struggles.   
Tanzania’s centralized tourist hunting concession system (see 3.3.2), in the hands of the 
Wildlife Division since 1998, has witnessed a ten-fold growth in value of animal resources, 
and the Wildlife Division is now responsible for the maintenance of Africa’s largest tourist 
hunting land area (Nelson and Blomley, 2010).  Wildlife is big business in Tanzania, 
therefore, and these resources have become highly politicised.  Within a system of power that 
privileges those who have access and control over these resources (see 2.1.3), wildlife 
resources were described by one District Officer as “hotcakes” because of the large amounts 
of money involved (Interview P28).  Whilst the objective of my research was not to carry out 
an in-depth analysis of the hunting system in Tanzania, as this has already been discussed by 
several researchers (see Siege, 2001; Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004; Leader-Williams et al., 
2009), I do believe that the hidden economy of wildlife hunting has played an important role 
in shaping the policy pathway and the prescribed governance system of WMAs.  The current 
hunting system is widely regarded as opaque and controlled by rent-seeking behaviour, which 
provides a clear disincentive for the devolution of power over these natural resources and 
authority to manage hunting investments within hunting blocks, as described in 5.2.4 (Nelson 
and Blomley, 2010).  The hidden economy of wildlife hunting is dominated by informal 
networks of exchange and power in which a centralised revenue system has kept prices 
artificially low through the lack of an auction or tendering system, which has resulted in 
administratively derived rents and facilitated rent-seeking, patronage, corruption and bribery 
amongst the influential bureaucrats in charge of the system (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008; 
Leader-Williams et al., 2009).  Baldus & Cauldwell (2004: 1) summarised the threat posed by 
the devolution of power over wildlife hunting in Tanzania for the Wildlife Division whose 
staff preside over “a [neopatrimonial] command system of control that favours a select group 
of hunting outfitters with reduced income generation and the exclusion of rural 
communities”.   
In direct contrast to the wildlife sector, the political economy of forestry resources in 
Tanzania incentivised the implementation of CBFM (Nelson and Blomley, 2010).  
Tanzania’s history of reserving forests, for high-value timber extraction and watershed 
conservation especially (see Lovett, 2003; Hurst, 2004),  encouraged the adoption of CBFM, 
which, through the creation of VLFRs would, at very little cost, bring large areas of land, 
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previously unreserved, under the PA status (Nelson and Blomley, 2010).  In contrast to the 
wildlife sector, the initiation of CBFM did not involve the devolution of power over PAs 
formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism56 (Wily, 
2000).  The low economic value of most of the miombo woodlands upon which CBFM has 
been implemented also served to limit the perceived loss of potential income for the Forestry 
and Beekeeping Division through the gazetting of VLFRs (Nelson and Blomley, 2010).   
These political economies of natural resources operating in Tanzania produced distinctly 
different ministerial-level divisions and policy communities in the wildlife and forestry 
sectors.  A former development agency staff member described these differences as “two 
different worlds, with the Forestry and Beekeeping Division being poor but open, and the 
Wildlife Division being rich but more closed and rigid” (Interview P1).  The respondent went 
on to discuss how the politicisation of wildlife resources entails much more serious and high 
consequences because of the large amounts of money involved and the close connections 
with rich hunting groups, whereas forest resources are perceived as important to wood and 
energy supplies, but not involving the large amounts of money and high value resources that 
the wildlife sector deals with (Interview P1).   
The differential politicisation of natural resources between the two sectors and the long 
history of sectoral policies has also produced little communication between the sectors.  Staff 
working on the MBOMIPA project described the difficulty in dealing with forestry issues 
when their affiliation was with the Wildlife Division, who “just did not deal with forestry 
issues” (Interview P74).  This highly separate nature of wildlife and forestry sectors at the 
national level creates separate bureaucratic systems to deal with forestry and wildlife issues, 
resulting in the same divisions being replicated at local levels, where members of the VNRC 
in Kiwere discussed their lack of opportunities to increase understanding of wildlife issues, 
due to their connection to the Forestry and Beekeeping Division, and the forestry-only focus 
of training they had received.  They also argued that legislation in the two sectors did not fit 
together (Interviews P34, P42).  
The result of these different political-economic and historical forces on the policy pathways 
adopted in the development of CBNRM in Tanzania is tangible.   In the following section I 
                                                 
56 Land under forestry reserves has usually been channelled into Joint Forest Management agreements 
instead of CBFM.  I have not discussed Joint Forest Management as its level of community authority 
and participation cannot be classified as CBNRM 
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discuss how the politicisation of natural resources is linked to the ways government officials 
have resisted the introduction of CBNRM and the power devolution that this entails. 
5.4.2 The Politics of Devolution: Resistance and Recentralisation 
A former ministerial staff member stated that support from Wildlife Division staff for 
CBNRM varied widely and that “some people using forests for illegal gains saw the transfer 
of forests to another organ as very threatening and destabilizing.  There was some resistance 
from forest officials” (Interview P28).  Such resistance on the part of ministerial staff was 
explained by one former donor-funded project staff member as directly due to the financial 
resources available to ministerial staff who, especially in the case of the Wildlife Division, 
were in receipt of lower wages compared to those working for the Tanzania National Parks 
Authority (TANAPA), which motivated corruption and illegal means of supplementing 
income (Interview P77).  Ministerial resistance was also found in scepticism of the CBNRM 
approach.  This was explained in terms of the shift in attitude and approach that it required, 
particularly the shift in role for ministerial staff from one of ‘enforcers controlling local 
populations’ to one ‘working with them as colleagues’.  A former ministerial staff member 
described serious doubts during the period of policy formulation and implementation 
regarding the impact upon wildlife and forestry resources, but also about the capacity of local 
communities to manage such resources, and the advisability of letting them try, particularly 
because of the large amounts of money involved (Interview P2).  The paradigm shift to 
CBNRM was uncomfortable for many of the Wildlife Division staff who, a former staff 
member explained, were generally “trained as biologists and ecologists and do not have the 
skills to deal with managing people in this way, only chasing and arresting them as 
poachers” (Interview P80).   
Instances of both ‘foot-dragging’ resistance to devolution (see Scott, 1985) and 
recentralisation were also highlighted by interview respondents with respect to both sectors.  
Respondents from within the Forestry and Beekeeping and Wildlife Divisions reported that 
whilst the ministry talked about and promoted a discourse of decentralisation and devolution, 
for many individuals, commitment to it was lacking (Interview P2) and “whilst they officially 
praised it, [they] tried to sabotage the whole operation.  They would continue to act as 
enforcers, arresting people and wielding their power in the villages” (Interview P80).  In the 
forestry sector, where devolution of power is rapid in comparison to the wildlife sector (see 
5.2.5), the political economy of natural resources was seen as a driving factor in the type and 
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speed of devolution processes by interviewees.  Under the umbrella of Participatory Forest 
Management, large variations in the time taken to complete the gazettement process both for 
CBFM and for Joint Forest Management are related to the value of timber resources within 
the proposed area, which acts as a disincentive to devolution, encouraging ministerial or 
district level resistance (Mustalahti, 2007; Mustalahti and Lund, 2009).  University 
researchers reported that in the forestry sector district authorities can be reluctant to 
relinquish control over forests, or in some cases, especially once revenue begins to 
accumulate from CBFM projects, can be keen to manipulate the projects to increase the role 
of the district (Interviews P2, P7; see also 6.3.2.1).  In such cases, they reported that the 
prescribed governance system for revenue collection and taxation may be avoided (see 7.2).  
This is supported by the review of Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania carried out 
by Blomley & Iddi (2009: 42), which found that “some District Councils have either 
deliberately or accidentally misinterpreted the Forestry and Beekeeping Division Forest 
Harvesting Guidelines and as a result were placing additional burdens, barriers or costs to 
villages regarding harvesting”.  One respondent went on to describe a particular example of 
the district authorities in Suledo orchestrating authority over the sale of forest products from 
the VLFR, despite having no legal right to do so, as legislation stipulates that this is 
controlled by the management plan for the VLFR and overseen by the VNRC at the village 
level (Interview P2).   
The economic value of natural resources is clearly an important factor in the political process 
of devolved environmental management.  Alongside the hidden economies surrounding 
wildlife resources, these indicate important political-economic forces that have shaped the 
devolution of power and the prescribed governance system set out for WMAs.  This is 
particularly clear in the retention of ministerial roles and authority, for example over the 
financial arrangements for hunting block concessions (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004), and the 
bureaucratic obstacles in the path of power devolution, for example through the 
implementation of a highly complex and lengthy application procedure for gazettement of a 
WMA (see also 5.2.5, Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Nelson, 2007).  In comparison, the different 
political-economic forces shaping the policy pathways and prescribed governance system in 
CBFM result in an application system that is simpler and shorter to complete and a form of 
power devolution that is less restricted by ministerial level involvement.  There are however 
similar forces operating in the forestry sector with regards to valuable timber resources, 
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which due to their value are often channelled into Joint Forest Management arrangements, or 
the process of VLFR gazettement slows down considerably (see also Mustalahti, 2007). 
The value of natural resources also plays a key role in their re-politicisation under CBNRM.  
The politics described above being played out at the national and district levels were quickly 
joined by similar conflicts at the local level where new perceptions of the value of natural 
resources initiated new struggles over the positions of power within the governance systems 
for both MBOMIPA WMA and Kiwere VLFR and the responsibility for managing revenues 
from the projects.  This was supported by an academic researcher, who described how 
“Conflicts are seen in projects where the resource is large and producing tangible revenues.  
Where the resource is insignificant, there is very little conflict” (Interview P7).  In section 6.3 
I discuss these conflicts, and their role in the creation of the performed governance system, as 
scalar struggles. 
Finally, the ongoing nature of these struggles and the continual re-politicisation of natural 
resources has been shown more recently in Tanzania in response to the emergence of 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) at both the policy 
scale and project level.  These new power struggles over the politicised environment (Bryant 
and Bailey, 1997) were discussed by an interview respondent as “a war going on inside the 
MNRT because all of the departments want control of the resources that will be under REDD 
and all want to have their say in its development”, resulting in the different divisions within 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism all vying for control and prominence within 
REDD policy processes and reform (Interview P3). 
5.5 Policy processes 
Thus far, this chapter has attempted to highlight the complexities of policy processes as 
representing multiple competing agendas and incentive structures.  Here I adopt a policy 
process and policy network perspective to explore the extent to which policy and CBNRM in 
Tanzania has been constructed through the work of diverse actors within a policy network, 
rather than a policy elite guided by scientific evidence in a rational manner (see 2.2).  I see 
the myriad advantages and disadvantages that different options or pathways present as a key 
aspect of both the policy processes actors are participating in and network formation.  I 
employ a conceptualisation of a policy network consisting of multiple, competing discourse 
coalitions (Bulkeley, 2000), and within which actors are engaged in discursive processes of 
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agenda setting, discourse institutionalisation and policy space construction (see 2.2.3; Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003).  I examine the policy networks involved in both the formation of the 
Wildlife Policy for Tanzania (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998a) and 
the National Forestry Policy (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1998b), and 
the shift towards CBNRM that these involved.  Whilst it has already been recognised that 
both TNCOs and bilateral donors, alongside political-economic factors, played a key role in 
agenda-setting and the policy pathways adopted, I argue that an additional layer of insight 
can be added through an analysis of the policy networks surrounding the development of 
CBNRM, particularly with respect to the ways in which policy is co-constructed by actors 
across levels of the network, including the local level (see Keeley and Scoones, 2003).   
In section 5.5.1 I analyse competing narratives and discourse coalitions (see 2.2.2.2) within 
policy networks associated with Tanzania’s wildlife sector.  Secondly, I discuss the role of 
policy entrepreneurs (see 2.2.2.4), highlighting the roles of key individuals at the ministerial 
levels (and within the policy community) in driving the policy pathways adopted in both 
sectors.  Finally, the role of key pilot projects in both forestry and wildlife CBNRM operating 
within the country at the time of policy formulation and implementation are discussed.   
5.5.1 Wildlife Policy Networks: Competing Narratives and Coalitions in Policy 
Processes 
The adoption of CBNRM into wildlife and forestry policy in Tanzania was part of the global 
shifts towards sustainable and participatory development, the twinning of conservation and 
development objectives and community conservation that is discussed in section 1.1.  This 
shift in policy practice came about through a change in the dominant conservation discourse 
operating within both sectors in Tanzania and a focus on the role of community in 
conservation (see also Barrow et al., 2001).  In this section, I discuss the role that external 
organisations and policy entrepreneurs played in facilitating this shift towards CBNRM, and 
the competing discourse coalitions that were active in the policy formulation process. 
The shift towards participatory development and community conservation by TNCOs and 
bilateral donors was part of the growing institutionalisation of these discourses at the global 
level, underpinned by both neo-malthusian and populist narratives of the need to reconcile 
environmental and development objectives through sustainable development (Adger,et al., 
2001; Adams, 2004). The ‘win-win’ discourse of community conservation drew on ideas of 
the efficiency and social equity of involving communities in conservation efforts and 
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narratives that argued for the necessity of incentivising sustainable natural resource 
management by channelling benefits to the local level in order to foster local support (see 1.2; 
Adger et al., 2001). Whilst these ideas were anchors around which the discourse of 
community conservation developed, Adams & Hulme (2001b) argue that variety in 
understandings of both community participation and economic welfare57 produced a number 
of policy narratives, discourses of community conservation and associated approaches.  
TNCOs and donor-funded projects that subscribed to this ‘win-win’ discourse, and were 
implementing the different approaches to CBNRM at the time, were important actors within 
the discourse coalitions that emerged (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010). 
The important roles of TNCOs and bilateral donors in the discourse coalitions that developed 
in Tanzania were the result of their policy space both to set the agenda for a shift towards 
community conservation in Tanzania and attempt to institutionalise their particular approach 
to community conservation through the use of policy narratives.  This policy space was a 
product of their long history of involvement in donor-funded projects across the nation in 
both the wildlife and forestry sectors, their close connections with the policy community as a 
result of this (see 5.5.3 for further discussion of this), and the large amount of financial 
resources they brought into these sectors (see 5.3.1).  The policy shift to community 
conservation in Tanzania was a combination of these external influences alongside 
ministerial advocation of the inclusion of local communities and decentralisation of natural 
resource management.  Including communities in conservation became an increasingly 
rational policy option for the Wildlife Division, particularly in the context of neoliberal 
reform and the perception of poor results from strict PAs (see 3.2.2 and 5.3.2) that were 
supported by with crisis narratives within Tanzania of biodiversity loss, deforestation, and the 
inability of wildlife populations to survive in pockets of PAs, even if strictly protected 
(Adams, 2004).  
The shaping of policy pathways according to the influences of TNCOs and bilateral donors is 
an important aspect of the processes of policy reform, but the role of such external 
organisations in the policy networks of forestry and wildlife CBNRM emergence is not a 
united or simple one.  The discursive shift from protectionist conservation to CBNRM took 
place within a context of competing narratives and discourses as to how this should be 
implemented.  CBNRM is part of a broader collection of approaches within community 
                                                 
57 Based on distinct values of nature and the ways local people can and should be involved in conservation 
(Adams & Hulme, 2001b). 
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conservation, and within Tanzania several different approaches were being implemented in 
different donor-funded projects prior to national policy formation (see 3.3).   
Whilst CBNRM emphasises devolution, community management and sustainable use of 
natural resources, the issue of wildlife utilisation divided the wildlife policy network, and the 
donor projects into distinct discourse coalitions.  A former REWMP staff member described 
how this divide not only split the projects in Tanzania, but these were part of a larger debate 
taking place across Southern and Eastern Africa and within conservation and development 
networks at the global level.  The respondent argued that “the position of the country in 
Africa was hugely important for the development of community conservation: South Africa 
was closely associated with CAMPFIRE and Zambia’s programmes, whilst Kenya had 
adopted a non-utilisation policy and was strongly influenced by the African Wildlife 
Foundation” (Interview P77).  In addition, within the policy network in Tanzania, TANAPA 
had initiated a different type of community conservation in its programme called the 
Community Conservation Service (see 3.3).  There were therefore three competing discourses 
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Table 5.3 shows that the three competing discourses of community conservation in Tanzania 
fell into two broad categories; one based on ‘park outreach’ and ‘benefit sharing’; and the 
other based on CBNRM, although split into two distinct coalitions according to views on the 
issue of wildlife utilisation.  Representatives of TANAPA, drawing on its experiences with its 
Community Conservation Service (CCS) put forward a discourse of park outreach and benefit 
sharing based on a policy narrative that local people’s destructive environmental practices 
could be reduced, alongside maintenance of strict protection of wildlife resources in PAs, by 
channelling funding for income generating projects to the local level and supporting 
livelihood alternatives that did not pose a threat to conservation objectives (Bergin & Dembe, 
1996).  The development of the park outreach approach within TANAPA was heavily 
influenced by its connection and funding provided by the African Wildlife Foundation, and 
particularly Patrick Bergin, who became a key member of the park outreach discourse 
coalition, and was instrumental to the African Wildlife Foundation’s anti-utilisation stance 
Table 5.3: Competing Discourse Coalitions in Tanzanian Community-Based Conservation Prior 
to National Policy Development (see also Bergin and Dembe, 1996; Walsh, 2000; Barrow and 




(Interview P77).  The leader of TANAPA at the time, who was personally very committed to 
initiating a form of park outreach and benefit-sharing and to building good relations between 
the National Parks and local people was also vital to the development of this particular 
discourse of community conservation in Tanzania (Bergin & Dembe, 1996, Interview P77). 
TANAPA had a long history of responsibility for managing the nation’s National Parks and 
anti-poaching duties and employed militaristic management strategies to achieve this (Bergin, 
2001).  Strict protection and enforcement by TANAPA staff was based on a narrative of 
ignorant and environmentally destructive local people, which identified those found within 
park boundaries as poachers.  Bergin (2001) described this as a ‘de-humanising’ narrative 
that was used to justify exceptional action, including violence, to combat the threat posed to 
natural resources, and particularly wild animals.  The relationship between TANAPA and 
communities living close to strict PAs was very tense, maintained also by local narratives of 
TANAPA staff that described them as savage, cruel, delighted to wield their power over 
normal people trying to earn a living and uninterested in understanding why people 
sometimes entered the park (Interview P73).  As TANAPA tried to find a way to deal with 
these antagonistic relations with local communities, whilst at the same time maintaining its 
remit to protect Tanzania’s National Parks, they created the CCS around a narrative of 
community conservation based on reciprocity, the value of nature and ‘ujirani mwema’58.   
TANAPA’s CCS was based on an argument that if only communities understood the value of 
wildlife, they would not exploit resources indiscriminately, and that community conservation 
should focus on sharing benefits with local communities as a means of making these values 
tangible to local people (Bergin, 2001).  Reciprocity was a key element to this narrative, 
based on the idea that villagers’ engagement in conservation-related activities would be 
rewarded through the provision of social services at the local level (Bergin, 2001)59.  The 
concept of ujirani mwema was vital to the development and success of TANAPA’s CCS as it 
worked to re-build relations with local communities through a form of community 
conservation that was acceptable to TANAPA, allowing National Parks to remain under strict 
protection, and TANAPA to remain in charge of protecting them.  The shift to community 
conservation threatened the status and responsibilities of TANAPA, but the concept of ujirani 
mwema and its application through the CCS created an identity for the organisation and its 
                                                 
58 Meaning ‘good neighbourliness’. 
59 This was later developed further into grants for income generating activities, operating as Support for 
Community Income Projects (see Bergin & Dembe, 1996) 
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National Parks not as “evil, colonial relics that should be turned back over to local 
communities, but rather that parks should have a good and mutually beneficial relationship 
with surrounding people” (Bergin, 2001: 98).   
Within the alternative CBNRM discourses, conservation is understood less as a concern over 
‘wild’ spaces and nature conservation, and more as the sustainable management of natural 
resources and ‘wise use’60.  A central theme within the two discourse coalitions that 
supported CBNRM in Tanzania, that set them apart from the park outreach discourse, was the 
devolution of power and management rights over natural resources at the local level.  These 
two discourse coalitions were agreed that benefit sharing and park outreach were insufficient 
as a form of community conservation, and that local people needed a much greater role in 
decision-making regarding natural resources.  Both of the CBNRM discourse coalitions 
argued that as wildlife resources occurred on village land, and that local people often bore the 
costs of conservation, they should be responsible for managing those resources, not simply 
compensated (see 2.1).  The two CBNRM coalitions were split however on the issue of 
wildlife utilisation through tourist hunting activities.  Whilst both discourse coalitions 
promoted the realisation of economic benefits from wildlife management to the local level, 
one set of actors argued that non-consumptive uses of wildlife resources was the only form 
compatible with conservation objectives, the other argued that the economic benefits that 
could be realised from tourist hunting were too large to remove, and formed the greatest 
opportunity for channelling significant funds to the local level. 
Several of the pilot projects operating in Tanzania at the time, including the Serengeti 
Regional Conservation Strategy (supported by the African Wildlife Foundation), argued that 
a sustainable system of conservation and generation of revenues could be achieved through 
non-consumptive uses only, particularly photographic tourism.  These members of the policy 
network drew on examples from Kenya to support their claims for a form of conservation that 
is based on intrinsic values of wildlife as a source of income to support local communities.  
The final competing discourse was represented by other donor-funded projects operating at 
the time, including MBOMIPA and the Selous Conservation Programme.  This discourse 
argued for the conservation of nature for utilitarian reasons, based on the ‘wise use’ of natural 
resources to meet human needs and uses (see Adams & Hulme, 2001b) and advocated the 
maintenance of wildlife hunting within CBNRM.  The members of this discourse coalition 
                                                 
60 The concept of ‘wise use’ was championed in the USA by Gifford Pinchot in the early twentieth century 
(Adams & Hulme, 2001) 
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drew on examples from Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme (see 1.2) and the history of 
wildlife hunting in Tanzania to support their argument.   
The competing discourses of CBNRM were played out by actors associated with these 
multiple organisations during the process of policy formulation as different actors and groups 
tried to influence the direction of community conservation.  The clearest example of this is 
the Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management project (PAWM).  PAWM began in 
1990 as a means to address the future of the wildlife sector, draw up national plans and 
promote sustainable economic development of the sector (Leader-Williams et al., 1996) and 
is seen as the first step towards the creation of the WPT (1998; Interview P76).  PAWM was 
funded by USAID but was jointly managed by AWF and the Tanzanian office of WWF 
(Leader-Williams et al., 1996).  This put the project at the centre of debates over utilisation as 
the two managing organisations were members of the distinct CBNRM discourse coalitions.  
Through connections with projects such as PAWM and links to the policy community, actors 
within both coalitions attempted to drive national policy recommendations according to their 
own convictions regarding wildlife utilisation within CBNRM (see also 5.5.3).  They 
employed the narratives discussed in this section to make their arguments and contextualised 
them by drawing on examples from across Southern and Eastern Africa and experiences 
within the Tanzanian community conservation projects.  Ultimately it was the pro-utilisation 
discourse coalition that was institutionalised as part of CBNRM in Tanzania’s wildlife sector 
(see 3.4.2, 5.2.4 & 5.5.3). 
Whilst the TNCOs and donor-funded projects played a key role in the discursive 
development of CBNRM in Tanzania (see also 5.5.3), a broader range of actors were 
associated with the different discourse coalitions; the British High Commissioner in Nairobi 
was very vocal in his support for a policy of non-utilisation, whereas members of the 
Overseas Development Agency/Department for International Development (who funded the 
REWMP/MBOMIPA project) were strongly in support of incorporating tourist hunting into 
CBNRM (Interview P77).  Such actors used their political connections to raise the issue in 
many media, including a discussion in parliament as to the appropriateness of the British 
Overseas Development Agency being involved with a pilot wildlife utilisation scheme in 
REWMP, which a former MBOMIPA project officer described as initiated by members of 
the discourse coalition opposed to utilisation in an attempt to convince more members of 
parliament to support non-utilisation (Interview P77).  The issue further divided staff working 
on the different pilot projects around the country.  An interview with a former REWMP staff 
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member indicated that the stagnation and lack of influence of the Serengeti Regional 
Conservation Strategy project in policy processes was due to conflict between its staff 
members, who could not agree on whether it was right to introduce tourist hunting within 
CBNRM (Interview P77).  Within the REWMP project, the eventual implementation of a 
utilisation component was also highly contested as the project manager was strongly against 
it, arguing that the focus of any form of community conservation should be to support the 
work of the national park around which it is based, and as any form of hunting is forbidden 
within a national park, it had no place within community conservation (Interview P73).  
Other REWMP staff members subscribed to a narrative that set out the wise use of wildlife 
resources, based on strict quotas for wildlife utilisation, as the best way of incentivising 
conservation amongst local communities because of the revenue that it could generate 
(Interview, P74).  The narrative in favour of utilisation posited that wise use would not 
endanger conservation objectives, but would greatly increase the revenue generated, and 
would thereby improve the prospects of CBNRM successfully linking conservation and 
development objectives, upon which successful conservation was seen to depend (Interview 
P73).   
As the debate over utilisation continued across the country, supporters of utilisation within 
Iringa faced stiff opposition from actors who worked closely with Ruaha National Park and 
advocated park outreach rather than CBNRM, particularly the influential expatriate families 
who own some of the lodges within and close to the park and the Friends of Ruaha Society (a 
regional NGO; Interview P73).  These actors argued that incentivising conservation should 
also be achieved through environmental education and awareness and an appreciation of the 
aesthetic and intrinsic values of wildlife, not purely by the generation of revenue. 
My Semi-structured interviews with former ministerial staff, development agency staff 
members, TNCO staff and academic researchers revealed that at the national and ministerial 
levels, the issue of wildlife utilisation became a critical juncture in the discursive 
development of CBNRM policy in Tanzania (Interviews P77, P77 & P80).  As shown in 
Table 5.3, the major governmental organisations (the Wildlife Division and TANAPA) 
involved in the wildlife sector adopted different discourses of community conservation.  Both 
organisations held strong interests in the development of community conservation, and 
especially the financial resources produced at the national level through wildlife-based 
tourism, but supported opposing official views regarding the incorporation of wildlife 
utilisation into community conservation projects.  Whilst TANAPA supported a model of 
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non-utilisation, the Wildlife Division firmly defended Tanzania’s history of tourist and 
resident hunting in Game Control Areas and Game Reserves (see 3.3).  As discussed in 5.4.3 
the political nature of power devolution combined with the political pressure exerted by 
funding agencies and TNCOs were important shaping forces in the policy pathways adopted 
in Tanzanian CBNRM.  The politicisation of wildlife resources, particularly as neoliberal 
models of conservation were influencing agenda setting and policy formulation in Tanzania 
led to what interview respondents reported as both the Wildlife Division and TANAPA vying 
for ministerial-level authority over WMAs as the process of policy formation was underway 
(Interview P77).  Ultimately it was the Wildlife Division that emerged as the organisation 
responsible for developing policy and implementing community conservation in Tanzania, 
which shaped the resulting policies into CBNRM, rather than park outreach and 
institutionalised tourist hunting as a component of CBNRM.   
I argue that the institutionalisation of a CBNRM discourse in the wildlife sector, including 
wildlife utilisation, was very heavily influenced by the revenue generated by hunting in 
Tanzania, but also by the power of the sustainable use discourse within conservation.  Whilst 
hunting has remained controversial throughout the history of conservation and in the 
development of community conservation discourses (Adams, 2004), the concept of 
sustainable use, underpinned by global environmental management narratives of the ability of 
the market to regulate utilisation and conserve resources through proper integration with the 
capitalist economy has become dominant (Adger et al., 2001; Adams, 2009; Buscher et al., 
201.  A former MBOMIPA staff member described how “hunting was at the core of the 
Wildlife Division” and, argued that particularly as the wages of its staff were lower than those 
of TANAPA staff, the creation of rent-seeking opportunities surrounding the hunting system 
in Tanzania had become important to the livelihoods of many of the Wildlife Division staff 
(Interview P73).  Therefore, the of incorporation of hunting into the governance systems for 
WMAs in Tanzania presented an opportunity for the Wildlife Division to retain an important 
source of revenue (and rent-seeking, see 5.4.1 and 7.4.4) whilst aligning the development of 
CBNRM in Tanzania with globally institutionalised ‘win-win’ discourses of sustainable 
development and policy narratives in favour of the expansion of the capitalist economy to 
achieve this.  The focus, therefore, was on finding ways for local people to benefit from the 
tourist hunting industry, opening up tourist hunting markets to CBNRM, rather than 
removing them (Nelson et al., 2007).   
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The large amounts of revenue that could be generated through wildlife utilisation were at the 
heart of the arguments for the maintenance and incorporation of tourist hunting into CBNRM 
in Tanzania (Interview P77).  The value of wildlife resources for non-consumptive uses, 
particularly photographic tourism, was realised early on and was a driving force behind the 
development of conservation more generally in Tanzania, as discussed by Julius Nyerere: 
“I personally am not very interested in animals. I do not want to spend my 
holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favour of their 
survival. I believe that after diamonds and sisal, wild animals will provide 
Tanganyika with its greatest source of income. Thousands of Americans and 
Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals” 
(Quoted in Nelson et al., 2007: 238) 
The value of the wildlife-based tourism industry was dwarfed by the per capita income from 
tourist hunting, however (see 3.3.2), and this formed a powerful argument for incorporating 
utilisation into the ‘win-win’ strategies for CBNRM (Nelson et al., 2007).  The utilisation 
discourse coalition also drew on a narrative that tourist hunting provided the means by which 
the largest number of local communities could benefit from CBNRM;  In areas that were 
poorly developed for photographic tourism and lacking in infrastructure to develop these 
services, tourist hunting could still provide economic benefits, whereas a policy on non-
utilisation would leave many rural areas without a mechanism to generate revenue from the 
management of wildlife resources (Nelson et al., 2007). 
Finally, the personal beliefs and experiences of important actors within the policy community 
were integral to shaping the policy pathways adopted and the CBNRM discourses that were 
institutionalised in Tanzania in the late 1990s.  It is important to note however that discursive 
institutionalisation of CBNRM does not equate to unwavering support by all individuals 
within the discourse coalition or policy community (see also 5.4.2).  The following section 
considers the role of key individuals in both the wildlife and forestry sectors to the 
institutionalisation of a CBNRM discourse in both the Forestry and Beekeeping Division and 
the Wildlife Division, and particularly the decision to incorporate utilisation in CBNRM in 
the wildlife sector.   
5.5.2 Policy Entrepreneurs 
In the study of policy processes, the roles of key individuals and chance are often not 
acknowledged.  Personal beliefs of these key individuals can be instrumental in pushing 
through policy reform that is facing resistance, hesitation or debate both within the policy 
156 
 
community or the wider policy network (Barrow et al., 2001).  For example, the development 
of the CCS in Tanzania was the direct result of the work of the Director of TANAPA 
between 1989 and 1992, despite the risks involved in implementing an untested and initially 
unpopular idea (Barrow et al., 2001).   
In the mid to late 1990s the Directors of both Forestry and Beekeeping and Wildlife were 
individuals who advocated policy reform and the introduction of community conservation, 
and especially CBNRM, in Tanzania (Ylhäisi, 2003; Interviews P2, P80).  In an interview, 
the former director of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division implied that promoting the 
discursive shift to CBNRM and making national policy reform were his first priorities on 
taking up the role (Interview P2).  He described facilitating policy reform through discursive 
processes to recruit members of the policy community to a populist narrative of ‘forests are 
wealth61’, shifting perceptions of forests from a national asset to a view that accepted that 
“these people surrounding the forest have legitimate needs from the forest...they are the ones 
who know who is conducting illegal harvesting…they are the best people to manage the 
resource” (Interview P2).  The rationality of this narrative builds on protectionist narratives 
of the need to safe-guard natural resources, which were familiar to the policy community, 
whilst at the same time shifting the argument to conceptualise local communities as best-
placed to achieve this.  The respondent’s description of these discursive processes clearly 
indicate the importance of policy entrepreneurs, particularly those in positions of authority, 
who are able to manipulate the policy network and discursively cultivate support for their 
own beliefs, priorities and policy agenda (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995).  His 
account also exemplifies the discursive nature of power through the use of policy narratives 
and story lines (Roe, 1991; Hajer, 1995; and see 2.2.2.2)  to socially construct environmental 
problems, control the issues on the policy table, reduce uncertainty or alternatives and 
organise actors into discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995).  Adger et al., (2001) describe the 
process of creating discursive homogeneity when a specific discourse comes to dominate 
thinking and is translated into institutional arrangements.  I argue that the Director of Forestry 
and Beekeeping was engaged in such a process of creating discursive hegemony in which he 
actively recruited other members of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division to support a shift 
to CBNRM using the social power associated with his title and discursive tactics to persuade 
people of the rationality and moral imperative of such a policy shift.   
                                                 
61 ‘Misitu ni mali’ is a well-known Kiswahili phrase 
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Similarly, in the Wildlife Division, the views and beliefs of the new Director, appointed in 
1995, were crucial to the discursive institutionalisation of CBNRM at the ministerial level, 
and particularly to the adoption of utilisation as a component of this policy shift.  The new 
Director of Wildlife’s beliefs concerning utilisation were shaped by his long history of 
employment with community conservation projects in Tanzania and across Southern Africa 
Former project staff who worked closely with him at the time reported that his support for 
utilisation came from experiences working on both the Serengeti Regional Conservation 
Strategy which, until 1998, employed a policy of non-utilisation, and later experience in 
Botswana (Interview P77).  WMA pilot project staff reported that these experiences in both 
utilisation and non-utilisation contexts were formative in the Director’s opinions and his 
employment of a narrative that utilisation represented “the only way forward for a successful 
community conservation strategy in Tanzania” (e.g. Interview P77).  The strong disincentives 
for the devolution of power over wildlife resources, as discussed in section 5.4, made the 
personal commitment of the Director to the approach a key driver in the development of a 
national policy and the adoption of the utilisation strategy within CBNRM in Tanzania.   
The key role that these entrepreneurs in strategic positions of the policy community played in 
the formation of policy, and the pathways adopted in this, is exemplified in the subsequent 
changes that took place in the wildlife sector.  In 1999 the director who had presided over the 
publication of the WPT (1998), and thereby developed the first legislation to incorporate 
CBNRM in the wildlife sector was described as being forced out of his position due to the 
politics surrounding the management of wildlife resources, and the controversy within the 
policy community over WMAs (Interview P77).  The new director had very different ideas 
about community involvement, and worked to implement changes in the policy framework 
that shifted the nature of WMAs.  Respondents from the ministerial, academic and NGO 
sectors explained that the changes he attempted to put in place were significant, although 
subtle (Interviews P77, P80).  Former Wildlife Division staff members reported that the new 
Director and his team “didn’t think that communities could achieve anything and they put 
obstacles to their achievements in the form of the WMA guidelines, by making them so 
complex that it stalled the process and made it very difficult for communities to go through 
and understand” (Interview P0).   
There is a strong link to these shifts within the dominant discourse of CBNRM in Tanzania, 
which altered with the change of director, and the politics of devolution described in 5.4.3.  
Whilst the official discourse of CBNRM could not be abandoned in Tanzania, the new policy 
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community held the next step of policy formulation (to produce the Regulations and 
Guidelines62 for the implementation of WMAs in Tanzania) within their power.  In effect 
these policy documents provide the detailed basis, rules and systems that are implemented in 
WMAs.  A former member of the Wildlife Division staff reported that the new Director was 
“very corrupt and very authoritarian” and viewed the implementation of WMAs through the 
WPT (1998) as highly threatening to the established channels of corruption and personal 
benefit within the wildlife sector, especially around hunting (Interview P80).  The change in 
Directorship within the Wildlife Division in 1999 not only signalled a shift in the dominant 
discourse coalition within the policy community, but is an excellent example of the control 
exerted by the policy community in processes of policy reform, and the manipulation of 
policy processes according to individuals’ private agendas.   
The examples from the Forestry and Beekeeping Division and the Wildlife Division have 
highlighted the important roles that such policy entrepreneurs within the policy community 
can play in shaping policy processes, and how the ways that they do this are determined by 
their own personal beliefs and private interests.  It is important to note that I do not argue that 
these influences demonstrate the elite control over decision-making that has often been 
conceptualised in linear models of policy reform (see Thomas and Grindle, 1990), but that 
they highlight the discursive nature of policy processes, and the central role of power over 
natural resources in shaping the discourses about their management.  The Tanzanian wildlife 
sector is an excellent example of the politics of power over wildlife resources (see Duffy, 
2000; Brockington et al., 2008; Nelson, 2010) and how the devolution of this power as 
envisaged in the WPT (1998) sparked a political struggle between different interest groups 
and discourse coalitions within the policy community. 
The way these struggles were played out discursively within the wildlife sector is shown in 
the development of the first WMA Regulations (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 
2000a) and WMA Guidelines (Wildlife Division, 2001).  The creation of the guidelines 
followed a participatory process in which representatives from pilot projects such as Selous 
Conservation Programme (SCP), Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS) and 
MBOMIPA were invited to discuss and contribute to their formulation.  During semi-
structured interviews, participants from these workshops described a change in atmosphere 
and relationships with the Wildlife Division at this transition of director.  After the 
                                                 
62 MNRT (2000a; 2001a)  
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appointment of the new Director of Wildlife in 1999, respondents described a clear feeling of 
unwillingness to relinquish control over wildlife resources from the Wildlife Division staff 
they dealt with, and the outcome of the participatory workshops as unsatisfactory, especially 
over issues of financial resources and the application procedure to create a WMA (Interview 
P74).  Respondents recalled feeling that these areas were beyond their control or influence, 
and they expressed the Wildlife Division staff’s lack of interest in their opinions and 
suggestions on these issues (Interview P1).  Within a discourse of participation and 
collaboration with the policy network, the policy community utilised the policy processes in 
creating these documents as a means to recentralise control and power over wildlife resources 
(Shauri, 1999; Nelson, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007).  A former REWMP staff member 
described how they felt that the shift towards CBNRM that was taking place at the time in 
Tanzania directly catalysed a “drawing back” by those who were unsure about it (Interview 
P77).  The restrictions placed on the devolution of power to local communities, particularly 
with reference to ownership of wildlife resources and the financial arrangements for WMAs 
(see 5.2.4) are a clear example of this recentralisation of power (Schafer and Bell, 2002; 
Goldman, 2003; Ribot et al., 2006).   
5.5.3 Pilot Projects in the Issue Network: Roles of Local Level in National 
Policy Development 
In this chapter I have shown that the policy reform processes that introduced CBNRM in 
Tanzania’s wildlife and forestry sectors involved a complex blend of actors and organisations 
and their interests, enacted through discursive processes.  Here I attempt to integrate a further 
level of actors in the policy network into these processes of policy reform; the role of the 
local level and specifically pilot projects operating in the country at the time of policy reform.  
Previous discussions of the emergence of CBNRM in Tanzania, particularly in the wildlife 
sector, have focused on the national and international actors and networks within this 
complex story (see Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007).  The research findings 
presented so far in this chapter have developed their findings in many respects to show that 
the role of key individuals at the centre of the policy community should be integrated with 
those discussed as important to agenda-setting in section 5.3 and the politicisation of 
resources discussed in section 5.4.  
Here I wish to address the failure of previous studies to encompass wider areas of the policy 
networks involved in the forestry and wildlife sectors.  Nelson et al (2007) claim that the 
local level has little political space in legislative procedures, and whilst they and Nelson & 
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Blomley (2010) emphasise how the development of Tanzania’s model for wildlife CBNRM 
was drawn from donor-funded pilot projects ongoing in the country, there is no account of the 
ways in which these projects were able to influence the formulation of this policy. In this 
section I argue that the study of the complexities of policy processes must expand to 
acknowledge that these intricacies are contributed to, and played out in, the local arena, 
which forms part of a multi-level network of coalitions which create, utilise and shape policy 
space.    
Reviews of the roles of external organisations and key pilot projects in the development of 
CBFM in Tanzania are well known (Wily and Haule, 1995; Wily, 1997; Wily, 2000; Wily 
and Dewees, 2001a; Wily, 2004; Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009), but, to 
date, the roles of such projects in the wildlife sector have not been discussed.  In the 
emergence of CBFM the role played by the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency funded pilot projects in Babati and Singida districts are often cited as drivers of 
policy reform (Wily, 1997; Wily, 2000; Wily and Dewees, 2001b). These projects were the 
first examples in Tanzania of villages declaring a forest reserve on village land and being 
granted the legal rights to manage that area according to district-approved by-laws written by 
the community (Wily, 2000).  Project staff working in Tanzania at the time attributed the key 
role played by these projects to the work of another policy entrepreneur working within the 
projects to promote the ideology of CBNRM at the national level and across Southern and 
Eastern Africa more widely (Interview P1).  However, there has been little discussion of the 
processes by which these projects and the actors involved influenced the formulation of 
national policy.  Such projects can be an important opportunity for ‘witnessing’ or grounding 
of experiences within policy reform (Charlton and May, 1995; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). 
Former Wildlife Division and Forestry and Beekeeping Division staff interview respondents 
described the role of such projects as key to policy reform through acting as  “laboratories 
and field experiments” (Interview P80), which raises interesting questions about the role of 
this witnessing in processes of policy development and implementation (see 5.5.3.2). 
It has been noted that donor-funded projects have agenda-setting influence (see 5.3.1) and 
that project staff played a role in the formulation of both CBFM and WMA guidelines during 
policy implementation (see 5.5.2).  Whilst the experience in the wildlife sector was described 
by participants in these processes as restricted and frustrating, respondents from the forestry 
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sector, including former staff of the MEMA63 projects in Iringa described having “real 
ownership and [a] real share” in the development of the guidelines for implementing CBFM 
(Interview P1).   
The process of formal or invited participation in policy formulation in these cases raises 
questions as to the limits of participation, and is connected with the discussion regarding the 
role of these projects in the formulation of the guidelines for implementing WMAs and 
CBFM projects and the changing policy community at this time (see section 5.5.2).  In the 
MBOMIPA case study, the issues they faced in their participation regarding the drafting of 
the WMA guidelines relate to the beliefs and motivations of the policy community, and the 
structured political-economic factors driving policy pathways within the shifting policy 
community (and institutionalised discourse).  The restricted nature of local level influence at 
this stage of the policy formulation and implementation reflects the tightening of the policy 
community’s boundaries and attempts to minimise the negative impacts of policy reform.  
Similarly in the forestry sector, whilst respondents from within the former project staff 
provided very positive feedback about the experience of participating in the development of 
the CBFM Guidelines, a former Forestry and Beekeeping Division staff member described 
their role in policy processes as “the path of policy was pre-determined.  What the projects 
did was to support this path and provide real experiences” (Interview P2).  This statement 
raises some important questions about policy processes and the role of the local level within 
these.  Firstly the comment that the policy pathway was pre-determined raises the questions 
of by whom and how?  In the context of the discussion within this chapter, the pre-
determination was partly due to the external influences of TNCOs and bilateral donors, and 
partly due to the beliefs and priorities of the individuals within the policy community, and 
how these shifted over time.  Secondly, the statement is interesting because it alludes to the 
roles of pilot projects and their participation in policy processes as potentially being strategic 
for the policy community.  In section 5.5.3.2 I will discuss further the concept of policy being 
co-constructed between the national and local levels. 
Below I investigate policy reform in the wildlife sector, and the role of the case study 
REWMP/MBOMIPA project to add further depth of insight to the complexities of the role of 
the local level in policy network and policy processes.  The discussion is organised into two 
sections, the first of which introduces concrete examples of aspects of the project that were 
                                                 
63 Matumizi Endelevu Maliasili meaning ‘sustainable use of natural resources’; see 3.3.3. 
162 
 
adopted into policy.  The second section discusses the importance discourse coalitions and 
policy networks to understanding the policy space that permitted the project to attain such 
influence in policy processes.   
5.5.3.1 REWMP’s Place in Policy 
Whilst not the first donor-funded CBNRM wildlife project in Tanzania, the REWMP project, 
which began in 1992, grew to become one of the most important examples of such projects in 
the country.  By 2001 REWMP’s successor, MBOMIPA, was described as one of the top two 
leading CBNRM projects in Tanzania, alongside the Ukutu WMA64 (which came out of the 
SCP), and the only one that provided extensive experience of the sale of wildlife quotas to 
resident hunters (Walsh, 2000; Elliott, 2001).  Its high profile meant that it was used by the 
Wildlife Division as an example of the development of CBNRM in Tanzania on a frequent 
basis, hosting visits from senior ministry staff, the Director of Wildlife, the UK Secretary of 
State for International Development, members of other community conservation projects 
around the country and students from the most prestigious college of wildlife management in 
Tanzania (Walsh, 1998; Walsh, 2003).  This high profile at the national level and good 
reputation, I will argue, was carefully constructed by actors working within and around the 
project who, according to their own beliefs, engaged in the discursive struggle of creating 
policy space and influence.  These actors positioned themselves and REWMP to provide 
significant contributions to the process of policy formulation and implementation.  Below I 
outline three concrete impacts upon policy that came from REWMP. 
Firstly REWMP led the way in the design of the structures of management authority for 
WMAs.  At a 1994 workshop of community conservation stakeholders and policy makers for 
the wildlife sector, a representative from REWMP raised the issue of a need to design WMAs 
to be managed across multiple villages, instead of individually managed sections of the 
WMA at the village scale (Leader-Williams et al., 1996).  The latter was the model being 
implemented at the time in the highly influential SCP (Hartley, 1996), but the REWMP 
representative argued that the project had identified concerns over this model based on the 
socio-ecological characteristics of the project area; highly uneven patterns of human 
population and land rights by village drove the representative to argue that a WMA must 
operate across participating villages or risk producing fragmented conservation areas and 
excluding many villages from participating and benefitting from such a project (Hartley, 
                                                 
64 Usually referred to by the name of the AA for this WMA: JUKUMU. 
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1996).  The inter-village model of WMA management is the one that has since been adopted 
into policy. 
Two further elements of the REWMP and subsequent MBOMIPA institutional structures 
have since been adopted into national model for wildlife CBNRM, as set out in policy.  The 
first is the incorporation of a District Natural Resources Advisory Board (DNRAB) into the 
institutional structure of WMAs, and the second is the right of the communities involved in 
the project to hold decision-making rights over the use of wildlife quotas on their land 
(Hartley, 1997; EPIQ, 2000; Walsh, 2003).  The formation of a DNRAB, then named the 
District Steering Committee, into REWMP came at the mid-project review in 1995 
(Mackenzie, 1995), and from a community conservation workshop held in Ruaha National 
Park in November 1994 (Hartley, 1997).  The justification for such an institution came from 
issues of forging links between the local, district and national levels, and because an 
institution for conflict arbitration was deemed necessary (Hartley, 1997).  The structure of the 
REWMP District Steering Committee (eventually settled at its third meeting in May 1996), 
and these two responsibilities were adopted into the WMA guidelines from their first and 
second drafts (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2000c; Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, 2000d) and the first draft of the WMA regulations (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2001b).  
The second aspect in which a direct influence from REWMP can be identified in the WMA 
policies resulted from decisions about the wildlife utilisation component in the project.  This 
was not initiated until April 1995 due to complex conflicts between stakeholders and the 
ideologies of the partners involved in the project (see 5.5.1, Hartley, 1997).  Through the 
transition strategy between REWMP and MBOMIPA (1995, see Walsh, 1996), the project 
initiated the right of the communities involved to decide on the use of the wildlife quotas 
allocated to them on village land (Hartley, 1997).  This gave them the right to decide whether 
to sell these quotas to resident hunters, or to hunt the animals themselves to provide meat for 
the community.  REWMP was, therefore, “the first community wildlife project in Tanzania to 
have established the right of the communities to make choices about the resources occurring 
on their land” (Hartley, 1997: iv).  This right is instilled in law in WMA regulation 51 
(Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2002a; Government of the United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2005) and in the WMA guidelines (Wildlife Division, 2001). 
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5.5.3.2 REWMP: Networks, Relationships and the Creation of a National Example 
In this section, I address the question of how REWMP was constructed and positioned as a 
major example of wildlife CBNRM within the policy network Tanzania and I investigate the 
processes by which influence was wielded through the creation of policy space.  Hartley 
(1997: 58) describes REWMP as “in the right place at the right time” because it was an 
emerging project just as the need for a coherent policy for CBNRM was becoming clear.  A 
REWMP staff member described the project’s influence as “REWMP made leaps 
forward...mov[ing] the storyline and Selous then had to catch up” (Interview P77).  This 
fortuitous timing that coincided with an established and growing agenda for wildlife CBNRM 
and calls for a national policy enabled REWMP to mould itself in line with policy and 
contribute to it on an ongoing basis.  This key strategy was possible for REWMP (which was 
UK-funded) due to the lack of the funding body’s engagement in wildlife conservation 
projects previously, which meant that project staff were not tied to a project model set out by 
its funding body (Interview P77).  The ability of the project’s staff to engage with this policy 
formulation process was forged through the connections it developed at the national level and 
within the policy community.   
Firstly, project staff had close relationships with the officers working on the PAWM project.  
Together PAWM and REWMP staff decided that REWMP would implement the models that 
were being developed for policy, rather than implement a donor-led model (Interview P77).  
REWMP was therefore able to create its own systems and develop alongside the national 
rather than a donor agenda (Interview P77).  These were important steps in the construction 
of the discourse coalition that went on to become institutionalised in policy.  
Through its close relationship with PAWM, this strategy allowed the project to sit 
strategically at the centre of policy debates, and secured an invitation to present at a PAWM 
workshop on community conservation in the wildlife sector, held in February 1994 (see 
Leader-Williams et al., 1996).  The conference not only reviewed the projects ongoing in the 
country at that time, but also debated the concept of a WMA and began the process of policy 
formation by creating a new draft of the Policy for Wildlife Conservation and Utilisation, 
introducing CBNRM in a formal policy capacity.  It is from this point on that we can see the 
rise of REWMP and the creation of a national example.   
The February 1994 workshop placed REWMP within the leading group of high profile 
CBNRM projects in Tanzania and highlighted the work of the project to the policy 
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community in attendance (Interview P77).  The Deputy Director of Wildlife became 
particularly interested in the work of REWMP and a close relationship developed between 
REWMP staff and the Wildlife Division as a result (Interview P74).  The close connections 
between the project staff and the Wildlife Division were increasingly important when the 
Deputy Director of Wildlife took over as Director in 1995.  The relationship proved to be 
decisive in the future of the project, as it stimulated discussions that resulted in support from 
the Wildlife Division, including the provision of a Game Officer, facilities,  advice and high 
profile support in times of conflict (Hartley, 1997; Interview P76).  As a consequence of this 
developing relationship, in November 1994 a second workshop was held at Ruaha National 
Park between the Wildlife Division, District officials and REWMP staff, with the purpose of 
discussing the future of the project (Hartley, 1997).   This workshop resulted in REWMP 
being designated as a pilot of the WMA concept by the Wildlife Division, which signalled 
that the project had become a major player within the policy network (Interviews P76, P74).  
The personal relationships created with the policy community are therefore key to the process 
by which REWMP became a high profile national example of CBNRM.  The personal 
connection to the Director of Wildlife was also an important opportunity for the construction 
of policy space, which providing a means for the project staff’s priorities, opinions and 
findings to be heard at policy making forums. 
As a nationally-recognised pilot of CBNRM in Tanzania, and particularly through the 
integration of REWMP staff into the dominant discourse coalition and the close connections 
with the policy community (the Director of Wildlife in particular) and other key actors and 
organisation within the coalition (especially PAWM), significant policy space was created 
around REWMP, enabling the influence upon policy that are described in 5.5.3.1.  This 
influence was not one-way however.  As mentioned in 5.5.3, the utility of such pilot projects 
to the policy community, their role in witnessing and their strategic use by the policy network 
needs to be considered.  I argue that the REWMP case indicates that whilst a pilot project 
may be the focus for construction of policy space, policy is co-constructed between the local 
and national levels, and pilot projects can act as the centre for such discursive practices.  Not 
only does a pilot project identity legitimise the position of its staff within the policy network, 
opening space for the inclusion of their particular views into policy processes, but the 
grounded identity of such projects is also beneficial to the policy community.  REWMP’s 
malleable nature, which helped project staff to position the project within the dominant 
discourse coalition and align the project with developing policy, left the project open to the 
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interests of those within the coalition and the policy community.  In the case of REWMP, the 
close personal connections between project staff and the Director of Wildlife was significant 
in the initiation of wildlife utilisation within the project, at the insistence of the Director of 
Wildlife, despite ongoing conflicts and recommendations to delay further (see 5.5.1).  The 
decision to implement the strategy was important for the status of REWMP, maintaining its 
position within the dominant discourse coalition and its close support from the Wildlife 
Division, but was also beneficial to the Director of Wildlife and the policy community at the 
time, who championed wildlife utilisation within CBNRM, and were able to use the REWMP 
project to discursively frame, ground and witness their own policy agendas. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter had attempted to show how the policies that developed to introduce CBNRM in 
Tanzania were the result of complex, inter-related factors that represent multiple and 
competing agendas of different actors over different levels and scales.  Whilst the objectives 
of CBNRM in both the wildlife and forestry sectors are clearly the same, the resulting 
policies and prescribed governance structures for WMAs and CBFM are a product of much 
more than these objectives.  Stark differences in power devolution and governance systems 
have been identified in this chapter and discussed as resulting from a combination of 
political-economic, personal interest and discursive processes.  The policy reform processes 
leading to the publication of the WPT (1998) and NFP (1998) incorporate the political-
economic situation in which Tanzania was situated at the time, alongside its close 
relationship with TNCOs and the growth of development aid in the country, which 
contributed to the setting of the agenda for community conservation in national policy.  As 
policy began to be formulated and discussed, political-economic factors relating to the 
politicisation of natural resources in both the forestry and wildlife sectors began to shape 
these policies, pulling them in different directions according to the interests of the actors 
within the policy community and wider policy network.  The policy pathways adopted in 
both the wildlife and forestry sectors were clearly a result of the combination of these driving 
forces, which were played out discursively between different actors and groups within the 
policy network.  The policy entrepreneur roles of the Directors of both the Wildlife Division 
and the Forestry and Beekeeping Division were crucial in the adoption of CBNRM strategies 
over competing discourses of community conservation within Tanzania.  The adoption of a 
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wildlife utilisation strategy within the WMA governance system is a clear example of the 
discursive struggles that were taking place within the process of policy reform.   
I have emphasised the role of policy entrepreneurs, arguing that the Directors of Wildlife and 
of Forestry and Beekeeping, who fully supported the introduction of CBNRM were 
fundamental in the processes of policy reform.  I also discussed the role of the local level, and 
particularly donor-funded pilot projects operating in the wildlife sector prior to policy 
formulation.  This unexplored area of the policy network shows that in the case of the 
REWMP project, significant policy space was both constructed by actors at the local level, 
who positioned the project to become one of the leading examples of CBNRM and the new 
concept of WMAs, and facilitated through connections with other levels within the policy 
network.  Through close personal relationships with the policy community and the PAWM 
project, the REWMP project and its policy space were legitimised through its integration into 
the dominant discourse coalition. The legacy of the REWMP/MBOMIPA project is tangible 
influences upon policy and the prescribed governance structure for WMAs.   
I contend, however, that the construction of policy space by such projects is not an entirely 
bottom-up process.  Firstly, the REWMP case supports the suggestion that relationships 
between the policy community and the wider policy network in policy processes are 
hierarchical and ‘subject to power relations’ nature of (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  The 
changing policy space experienced by the later MBOMIPA project with regards to 
participation in the formulation of WMA Guidelines clearly shows that the roles of the local 
level in policy processes are invited spaces that were be opened, closed and restricted by the 
policy community.  Secondly, strategic positions within the policy network are part of 
processes of co-construction of policy narratives in which such projects can be utilised by the 
policy community in the discursive projects of policy development and implementation.   
Pilot projects can play an important part in shaping policy processes, but the REWMP 
example highlights that such projects can be shaped by the connections that enable them to 
do this.  The role of the local level in policy processes should not be neglected, therefore, but 
its complexities are worthy of further consideration. 
The process of policy reform constitutes sub-processes of agenda-setting, policy construction 
and implementation (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  This chapter has dealt specifically with the 
first and second of these, and begun to outline the governance system prescribed in policy for 
both WMAs and CBFM in Tanzania.  This is continued in the following two empirical 
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chapters, which further outline the governance and power systems prescribed in these policies 







The Performance of Policy I: 











The previous chapter outlined the prescribed governance systems in place within 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects in both the wildlife 
and forestry sectors in Tanzania.  Through the processes of power devolution, the creation of 
formal institutional structures and their integration with informal institutions and local 
contexts of power (see 2.1.), configurations of power as set out in policy and as performed in 
reality are produced.  According to the differences in these processes between the two 
sectors, as described in the previous chapter, these configurations of power are distinct 
between the wildlife and forestry cases studies.  In the first section of this chapter, I outline 
these systems of power in both case study projects in further detail and discuss the scalar 
framings these involve.  In section 6.2, I look into inequalities in the impacts of both 
Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) 
for different groups, addressing the issue of elite capture and how it is related to the 
prescribed governance system and the topographies of power it legitimises.  In section 6.3, I 
use a scalar perspective to consider the framings that are utilised in both CBFM and WMA 
projects and I draw on the literature from politics of scales (see 2.4.2) to examine how the 
compartmentalisation of space around power relations produces scales within the projects 
(see Brenner, 2001).  I investigate how these scalar topographies of power are under constant 
negotiation, struggle and manipulation (Smith, 1990; Smith, 1992; Marston, 2000; Zulu, 
2009), and the discursive strategies used by actors in the struggle for empowerment and 
benefits from CBNRM (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003; see also 2.4.2.1 and 2.5.2; 
Campbell, 2007).  Finally, in 6.4 I combine these power structures and scalar struggles 
together to outline the power structures in reality within both case studies 
6.1.1 Devolution and Topographies of Power 
As discussed in chapter 5, the initiation of CBNRM in Tanzania is intrinsically connected to 
the idea of devolution of power away from the national, ministerial levels and towards the 
village level.  Between the WMA and CBFM systems, the principal governing institutions 
and fulcrum of power have been devolved in distinct ways, and the resulting prescribed 
governance structures to implement CBNRM policy demonstrate different strategies to 
achieve this.  The devolution of power within both sectors is signalled by the advisory role 
afforded to the ministerial levels in both forestry and wildlife and the daily management 
responsibilities in both CBFM and WMAs being placed in the hands of individuals elected 
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from within participating communities (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  Within the forestry sector, 
the prescribed governance structure for CBFM demonstrates a rapid devolution of power to 
the village level and is implemented through existing governance structures.  Contrastingly, 
the governance system in WMAs demonstrates a more cautious devolution of power, which 
is centred at a new institutional level created through WMAs, which sits between the local 
and district government levels (see 5.2.5).  As pointed out to me in an interview with a former 
employee of a conservation Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) in Tanzania (Interview 
P85), both systems represent a set of nested institutions, implemented not within traditional 
authority systems in Tanzania, which were gradually removed throughout the periods of 
colonialism and socialism in Tanzania (see Chapter 3), but within the bureaucratic national 
system of democratic government spanning the local, district, regional and national levels.   
This devolution of power from central to local is accompanied by further shifts in power 
resulting from the CBNRM policies.  These are witnessed in the changing powers, status and 
responsibilities of groups within the local and district levels.  Within CBFM, this is most 
clearly visible through the changing relationship between the Village Natural Resources 
Committee (VNRC) and the Village Council, whereby the implementation of CBFM 
empowers the VNRC and hands responsibilities for potentially large sums of revenue to this 
committee, which forms part of the village government and is overseen by the Village 
Council, although the Village Council holds supervisory powers only over revenue collection 
(see 5.5.1).  An academic researcher in Tanzania described how this concentration of power 
within the VNRC, and its nested relationship within the village government, has been a 
source of conflict in many communities implementing CBFM to date, particularly once 
revenue generation from CBFM becomes significant, increasing realisation of value and 
politicisation of resources within the community (see 5.4), and sometimes leading to power 
struggles between the Village Council and VNRC “as both want to have a say in resource 
use” (Interview P7).  This has led in some cases to “the Village Council take[ing] over 
control of the project because they want to collect the money themselves” (Interview P7).  
The interviewee also cited trust issues between the Village Council and the VNRC arising 
from a “lack of transparency and accountability.  Both believe the other is up to something 
and cannot be trusted” (Interview P7).    
Within WMAs, the devolution of power to AAs has not only altered the relationship between 
the ministry and the participating communities, but as one former project officer described: 
“The creation of MBOMIPA marked a significant shift in local government, as power was 
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transferred away from the hunting groups” (Interview P73).  These hunting groups, which 
formed part of the Hunting Association of Tanzania, and had previously used the Lunda-
Mkwambi Game Control Area for hunting activities through the purchase of permits at the 
district offices, objected very vocally to the initiation of the restriction of resident hunting 
freedoms and the devolution of management rights to the community level within the Ruaha 
Ecosystem Wildlife Management Project (REWMP) and MBOMIPA project areas 
(Interviews P1, P74; see also  Hartley, 1997).   
As discussed in 5.2, the devolution of power to the local level, and the shifts that this entails, 
are focused around distinct institutions between the wildlife and forestry policy sectors.  The 
institutional structure of CBFM reflects the devolution of power to an existing institution, the 
VNRC, nested within the Village Council structure.  The embedded nature of the VNRC is 
indicated in Fig. 6.1 and was described by village respondents in the CBFM research village, 
who emphasized that “the VNRC is beneath the village government, therefore there is nothing 
the committee does without the knowledge of the village government” (Interview P43).  
Committee members confirmed that the prescribed governance system meant they had to 
seek approval from the village government before using funds from the CBFM project, and if 
this permission was refused, they did not have the power to continue regardless (Interview 
P44).   
Conversely, the WMA governance system involves the injection of an entirely new 
institution into the management system, and simultaneously includes the creation of a new 
level, located across the participating villages.   The roles and responsibilities of the Village 
Council and district authorities with regards to the area gazetted as a WMA are significantly 
altered by the creation of this new institution (see Table 5.2), and a parallel governance 
system in created. Furthermore, the institutional structure within the prescribed governance 
system of WMAs is more cumbersome, more top-heavy and more intricate in terms of the 
relationships between different individuals and institutions.  The devolution of management 
responsibilities to the Authorised Association (AA) level is accompanied by a multifarious 
web of relationships between the AA and other organisations within the prescribed 
governance structure.   The power structure within the WMA governance system can be 
described as simultaneously more radial and more top-down.  The governance structure is 
clearly more top-down in terms of the retention of power and management responsibilities at 
the ministerial level, especially regarding hunting quotas and financial systems, and in the 
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advisory and supervisory powers invested in the District Natural Resources Advisory Board 
and the Board of Trustees (see 5.5).   
This could be described as an example of simultaneous decentralisation and recentralisation 
of power, a trend observed elsewhere in Africa (see Ribot et al., 2006), in which the 
devolution of power within such policies is limited wherever possible.  This is apparent 
through the multiple ‘safety nets’ that surround WMAs’ governance system; for example, the 
revenue sharing arrangements discussed in 5.5.4 include the retention of powers at the 
regional and ministerial levels.  Furthermore, the arrangements for signing of investment 
contracts between the AA and private investors include the selection of three favourable 
proposals by the AA, with advice provided by the Board of Trustees and potentially the NGO 
facilitator, which are then sent by the AA for inspection by both the District Natural 
Resources Advisory Board (DNRAB) and national levels (Wildlife Division), before 
contracts can be ratified (Interviews P86, P104, Focus Group P102).  This is in direct contrast 
to the system in CBFM, whereby the VNRC hold the powers to allocate permits for resource 
harvesting (Interview P34, Focus Group P41).  As discussed in section 1.1, recentralisation is 
an important part of the re-territorialisation of wildlife resources within a neoliberal form of 
statecraft (Igoe and Brockington, 2007).  This re-territorialisation within a discourse of 
devolution takes place through the use of policy and power devolution as political 
technologies.  As argued by Agrawal (2005), these technologies are a component of 
governmentality, producing new environmental localities and subjects within Tanzanian 
CBNRM, and represent the diffusion of state power over society (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005).  













Fig. 6.1: Power structure prescribed in policy in CBFM in Tanzania 
Legend for Figs. 6.1 & 6.2 
 
Village  Governance level 
AA   Authorised Association 
DNRAB   District Natural Resource Advisory Board 
Ministry  Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
PMO-RALG  Prime Minister’s Office of Regional and Local Government 
Regional Sec.  Regional Secretariat 
VC   Village Council 
VGS   Village Game Scouts 
VNRC   Village Natural Resources Committee 






A comparison of Figs. 6.1 & 6.2 clearly shows that the system in place within WMAs is 
institutionally much heavier, but it also shows that there are several important relationships 
that are prescribed in policy between the AA and national levels.  For example the AA holds 
direct relationships with the NGO facilitator and with investors (although this is balanced out 
as described above).  The introduction of the AA consortium at the national level is also a 
further key relationship (see 6.3.2.2).  This complex institutional structure within the 
prescribed governance system both demonstrates a lack of autonomy in decision-making and 
power, alongside the opening up of the new AA level to the district, regional and national 
levels.  In terms of the bundles of rights (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001) experienced by the 
village level within CBNRM, both WMAs and CBFM take place with clear village 
proprietorship of land and rights of withdrawal and exclusion, but the associated management 
rights are curtailed through the prescribed governance systems, and this takes place much 
Fig. 6.2: Power structure prescribed in policy in WMAs in Tanzania 
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more severely in the wildlife sector, where the rights of the AA to manage the WMA sit 
within a complex arrangement of safety nets and authorisations from government 
organisations. 
6.1.2 Scalar Framings in Wildlife Management Areas and Community-Based 
Forest Management 
The prescribed governance systems set out in chapter 5 and Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 serve to produce 
scales within WMAs and CBFM in Tanzania.  These scales are particular framings of reality 
that are discursively legitimised through policy processes of formulation and implementation 
(Marston, 2000).  A discursive process of scale production that integrates the national, 
regional, district and village levels, plus the AA level in the wildlife sector, is evident, 
therefore. These scalar landscapes not only reify the prescribed governance systems and 
topographies of power that these involve, but serve to de-legitimise alternative framings 
(Hajer, 1995; Keil and Debbané, 2005; Lebel et al., 2005), levels and scales of wildlife and 
forestry resources and the areas of land which the WMA and Village Land Forest Reserve 
(VLFR) now occupy.  These alternative and unrecognised scales and levels are distinct 
between the wildlife and forestry sectors and are described below with reference to the 
MBOMIPA case study. 
Within the participating villages of the MBOMIPA WMA, fieldwork revealed three 
additional levels within the scalar landscape.  Firstly, the long history of pastoral use of the 
area, particularly in the northern sections of the WMA, and especially the transitional nature 
of these uses, the seasonal movement of pastoral groups throughout the year and the identity 
of these groups as outside of a particular village cannot be accommodated within the 
governance system for WMAs.  In the current system, individual villages may set aside areas 
for pastoral uses, but grazing is forbidden within the designated WMA.  Maasai groups 
within the WMA declared that their access to grazing sources had been drastically altered by 
the designation of the WMA and that they had insufficient sources to stay out of the WMA 
area, forcing them to break the law or watch their cattle starve (Focus Group P134).  The 
marginalisation of pastoral groups within Tanzania is a long-recognised issue that extends 
beyond the issue of WMAs, having previously been highlighted with respect to National 
Parks, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Community-Based Conservation Projects and the 
Manyara Ranch (Goldman, 2003; Homewood et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2009; Goldman, 
2011).  Pastoral claims and uses of land within the WMA have effectively been scaled out of 
the prescribed governance system.  Secondly, within the governance system the AA sits 
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between district and village scales of governance, but does not recognise the division of the 
MBOMIPA villages into two administrative divisions (Idodi and Pawaga) which separate the 
villages administratively and geographically creating distinct spatial levels and scales.  
Finally the WMA governance scales mask divisions between the WMA villages between 
villages that have contributed village land to the area within the WMA, and those that act as 
boundary villages that have not contributed land (see Table 6.4).  These examples of 
additional socio-ecological scales represent both pre-existing framings of the landscape that 
have been removed or not integrated into the prescribed governance system, and the 
construction of new scales as a result of the implementation of the WMA.  These levels and 
scales are unrecognised within the governance system, but have become mobilising issues for 
scalar practices amongst the MBOMIPA villages (see 6.3.4; see Marston, 2000).   
6.2 Benefit Distribution and Scalar Configurations of Power 
One of the clearest outcomes from the power structures operating in both case study projects 
was the identification of elite capture within the projects.  This has been previously identified 
in other CBFM projects in Tanzania by Lund & Treue (2008), the MNRT (2008) and 
Vyamana (2009: 251), who described the inadequacies of CBFM in terms of creating 
opportunities for the poor to “build their own pathways out of poverty”.  Leaders of the 
project, referring to those holding positions on the committees, and especially those holding 
the top positions of Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer, both in the VNRC and the AA were 
consistently identified as those that benefitted most from the project.  This was described by 
local villagers within the CBFM village as resulting from several factors, including the ability 
of the leaders and the more wealthy groups within the community to afford to participate in 
the activities managed by the projects, whilst poorer groups were unable to raise the cash 
necessary to purchase permits (P57).  Secondly, these individuals were identified as 
benefitting significantly from their roles on the committees through the allowances for their 
work: “If we had good work like them (VNRC committee), we’d build a nice house, live in a 
nice environment, isn’t that true?” (Focus Group P58).  This situation was explained in focus 
groups with villagers using the saying “You can’t compare people who are in the kitchen 
with others who are waiting for food” (Focus Group P61) to indicate that those who are the 
“leaders must be at the centre of the activities, involved in everything, and will always take 
their share of the opportunities and benefits first” (Focus Group P59; see also 7.5).   
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The financial benefits available through representation on the committees are concentrated in 
the hands of the top leaders of the VNRC and the WMA Secretariat.  Within the VNRC, 
these leaders are entitled to receive an allowance equivalent to 20% of the revenue derived 
from the forest and its management, which is shared between the three (Interview P35), and 
the financial records of the VNRC confirmed this.  For the three assistant positions within the 
VNRC, financial allowances depend upon the work carried out, and usually only occur when 
one of the leaders is unable to complete a task (Interview P35, Participatory Technique P68).  
Within the revenue sharing system for MBOMIPA, the leaders and their assistants receive a 
set allowance per month, as detailed in Table 6.1.  In addition, all members of the Council are 
eligible to claim an allowance to cover meeting attendance, but do not receive a fixed 
monthly amount.  To put the amounts shown in Table 6.1 in context, an agricultural labourer 
receives a wage of around $2 per day, a full-time teacher’s annual salary is $828 and district 
government officers are paid around $4,956 annually.  The leaders of the VNRC and AA 
carry out their duties in addition to their own employment and additional sources of income. 
The patrol and protection system within MBOMIPA has changed within the past year so that 
whereas previously ten scouts from each participating village worked on a rotation system for 
MBOMIPA, two scouts from each village are now employed by the AA and carry out official 
MBOMIPA patrols within the WMA area65, whilst the remaining scouts usually patrol up to 
the border of the WMA, although in cooperation with the MBOMIPA scouts, they sometimes 
patrol beyond the village areas into the MBOMIPA zone (Focus Groups P164, P165).  The 
scouts are paid an allowance by the VNRC, as detailed in Table 6.1.  In addition to the patrol 
allowance paid in the CBFM village, focus group discussions with the scouts revealed that 
they are paid an additional TSh. 1000 ($0.69) each time they escort people to the forest to 
monitor activities, and the same amount was often used as a reward if scouts brought 






                                                 
65 Under this new system the MBOMIPA scouts work alternate months and receive an allowance of 
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Scouts’ Allowances ($ per patrol) 2 2 3.5 3.5 
 
In addition to the financial benefits for those working closely with the management of natural 
resources through the committee structures, additional benefits were identified by the wider 
community as originating from the project.  These included funds that were invested in 
community services, such as health clinics, improved housing for local teachers and investing 
in improving resources in local schools.  In Kiwere this money constituted up to 25% of the 
annual budget, as set out in the management plan ($554 in 2008-9 and $613 in 2009-10), 
whereas participating MBOMIPA villages hold the rights to utilize the funds provided by the 
AA to each village as they see fit ($1,448 in 2008-9 and $1,517 in 2009-10).  MBOMIPA 
also provides funding for two children from each participating village, who would otherwise 
not afford, it to complete secondary school education (P99, P101).   
Whilst the income received at the village level in MBOMIPA seems a much larger figure, the 
funds allocated to the villages as a proportion of the total income of the WMA in those years 
amounts to 34% and 29% respectively, and a significant proportion of those amounts was 
reported by the Village Council members, MBOMIPA Representatives and VNRC members 
as being used to pay the village scouts to carry out their patrols (Interviews P96, P106, Focus 
Group P164)66.   Furthermore, the income received by the Village Council for development 
activities is shared between the entire population of the village, which was recorded at the last 
population census (2010) as 2,183 in Kiwere and 1,642 in Makifu.  Revenue shared amongst 
the villages through development activities is comparatively little, and provides indirect 
benefits, whereas the leaders of the projects increase their personal financial income 
                                                 
66 VNRC accounts for this period were unfortunately incomplete and have not been included because 
of the large gaps in the data. 




substantially.  The disproportionate benefits of elected roles within the WMA and CBFM 
governance structures, and especially the leadership roles, are clear therefore. 
Lund & Treue’s (2008) study argued that these amounts were not inappropriate given the 
work that these individuals carry out.  My work shows, however, that there are significant 
individual benefits for those in leadership roles, but also that these benefits are highly 
disproportionate to the rest of the village population, who benefit from CBFM or the WMA 
through investments and development activities that accrue at the village, rather than 
individual, level, as previously discussed by  Blomley & Iddi (2009).   The costs associated 
with CBNRM through protecting farmland close to the WMA and shifts in livelihood 
activities as a result of the initiation of CBFM (especially charcoal makers; see 6.3.3.1) are 
borne at the individual level, and village development activities do not compensate for these 
costs (Meshack et al., 2006). 
6.2.1 Elite Capture through Prescribed Governance 
The capture of revenue and financial benefits by committee members described in the 
previous section is facilitated by the prescribed governance system, which sets out these 
allowances and also concentrates power and responsibility for the projects in the hands of 
these few, key individuals.  This section explores how whilst legitimately taking place within 
the prescribed governance system, elite capture is also facilitated and maintained by the 
protection of these opportunities.    
Discussions with villagers committee members across the villages participating in the WMA 
and CBFM projects commonly included complaints that formal training had only been 
provided for the leaders of the projects and whilst wider awareness of the projects was high, 
understanding and engagement with it are low (e.g. Focus Group P41).  Within the CBFM 
case study, the concentration of training within the leaders of the VNRC was corroborated by 
the leaders of the project who described the various training sessions they themselves had 
received from the Forestry and Beekeeping Division, district authorities and expert project 
advisors (Interviews P42, P46).  They also insisted that there was an informal system for 
training newly elected members of the VNRC and all committee members had received 
training (Interview P46).  The lack of ongoing formal training was explained as the result of 
lack of funds at the district level by both District and Village Officers (Interview P11, Local 
Assistant Report P20). The other members of the committee claimed not to have received 
adequate training however (Focus Group P41).  The lack of ongoing training and focus of 
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formal training and skills to within a small group of individuals is important in two ways: 
firstly the same group of individuals is habitually returned to office.  This was evident in both 
the WMA and CBFM case studies, and commonly explained by the leaders in question as due 
to their experience and expertise, which others in the community did not have (Interviews 
P35, P180); secondly this situation is advocated by both the district authorities and Village 
Council, who both do not wish, and claim to be unable, to bear the cost of providing extra 
training after each election (Local Assistant Report P20, Interview P88).  This stagnation of 
the project with respect to the elected management committees is clearly identified in the 
WMA case study where, for example, since the first elections held in 2002, the current 
chairman previously occupied the position of Assistant Chairman and was elected in 2007 to 
serve as Chairman, whilst both the Secretary and Treasurer have been in place since 2002 
(Interview P97).   
Within the CBFM research village the return of the same individuals to office within the 
VNRC is also facilitated by the prescribed governance system, which sets out that 
representatives on the VNRC are democratically elected at the sub-village level, and the 
positions within the committee are then settled at the first meeting of the elected 
representatives (Local Assistant Report P20).  Whilst this system ensures that representation 
on the VNRC includes all the sub-villages, it also leaves each voter with rights only over the 
two representatives from their particular sub-village, and not the entire committee.  
Complaints about individuals on the VNRC were therefore voiced in anger over their 
continual return to the committee and their specific leadership positions (partly because of the 
training situation), which those outside of the individuals’ sub-village were powerless to 
address (Local Assistant Report P20).  When asked to describe the process at the most recent 
election in May 2010, a VNRC member described how “about the Chairman and his 
Secretary: As usual, when the election took place, they came out as the representatives from 
their sub-villages, and when all the representatives met to select the leaders of the committee, 
they just got chosen again” (Interview P46).  A villager from the CBFM research village 
showed the anger surrounding this topic in his description of the explanation given as to why 
certain individuals have held office for long periods of time: “other villagers don’t get a 
chance and the opportunity stays with those of long ago, and we are told this is because it is 
those people who have the knowledge and expertise of the project.  The question to be asked 
is whether, when they first started, did they have this knowledge and experience? Didn’t they 
learn it through the project, and can’t new people also learn like them?” (Local Assistant 
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Report P22).  The same villager went on to explain that he/she thought it was just an excuse 
to allow people to protect their positions in the project and the benefits they get from it (see 
6.3.1). 
The distribution of benefits within the case study projects, and the identification of elite 
capture within both WMAs and CBFM are clearly linked to individuals’ positions within the 
governance structure, and elite capture is compounded by the concentration of power, 
knowledge and training with these same individuals, and further sustained through the 
electoral systems and lack of ongoing training.  I argue that knowledge about the project is 
itself a form of benefit resulting from the project, a means by which to secure material 
benefits and exclude others from these, and also a form of power within the project.  The 
power of knowledge enables certain individuals to inflict a form of institutional violence over 
others through the control of information and empowerment (see 6.3.1; Brockington, 2008).  
These processes produce a form of stagnation within the projects, which are also closely 
linked to cultural and hidden aspects of the governance system, as discussed in chapter 7.  
6.3 Politics of scales 
So far in this chapter I have discussed the topographies of power that result from the 
prescribed governance structures in place within WMAs and CBFM in Tanzania.  I have 
started to develop arguments that power, training and knowledge are concentrated within 
both types of CBNRM within the hands of a small group of individuals in each case.  In this 
section, I want to expand upon these arguments to discuss how scalar configurations of power 
are both being reinforced by those in power and those benefiting from the projects (often the 
same individuals, as discussed in 6.2.1), and being contested by multiple actors and groups 
throughout the governance systems.  These mechanisms of scalar construction and 
transformation are driven by the scalar configurations of power within the governance 
system, and can be seen as strategic attempts to gain control over both the resources managed 
by the projects and the projects themselves (Smith, 1992).   
6.3.1 Discursive Construction and Reinforcement of Scales: The Protection of 
Power 
In their study of the river basin management in the Mekong region, Lebel et al., (2005) 
describe a process of discursive construction of scale through the control and manipulation of 
information, creating patterns of empowerment and disempowerment (see 2.4.2).  Within 
both case study projects the concentration of training, experience and power within the hands 
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of a small number of individuals is a good example of this.  Lebel et al., (2005) argue that 
this is a strategic action by those in power to control the frames of reality presented in scales 
through the discourses and narratives that surround them (Lebel et al., 2005; Lebel et al., 
2008).  I argue that the case study projects show such processes in action and add to such 
debates. 
Taking an example from the CBFM project, the communication systems in place between the 
VNRC and the village assembly consist of the public declaration of quarterly figures for 
income and expenditure related to the forest, and the display of these data in written form at 
the village natural resources office (Interview P34).  A similar system is used in the WMA 
governance structure to report back to the village assembly about the income derived from 
the WMA within the village budget and its uses, and the activities of the AA (Interview P95).  
Such meetings are also used as an opportunity for villagers to make suggestions, voice 
concerns and ask questions relating to the projects (Interviews P34, P94).  Discussions with 
villagers revealed several problems with these governance arrangements.  Firstly, villagers 
argued that reading out information at three-monthly intervals was not frequent enough for 
them to really understand or keep track of the project activities, and that meetings were often 
postponed, did not take place at regular intervals and information was sometimes not read out 
(Focus Group P57, Local Assistant Report P22).  There were also concerns about the level of 
detail included in the information, the opportunities for discrepancies to be hidden within the 
information read out, and a lack of awareness of the state of the natural resources within the 
forest and whether they are being used wisely: “We used to know that we had [for example] 
50 trees ready to be harvested and this would be advertised...but now we don’t know how 
many trees we have and even if they are available, the leaders give them to each other” 
(Local Assistant Report P22).   
Villagers in the CBFM research village described their understanding and participation in the 
project as “trifling” as a result, and the contribution of the project to the development of the 
village as “insignificant” (Local Assistant Report P27).  In discussion with village 
government officials and MBOMIPA representatives, some acknowledged that developing a 
good understanding of the projects and activities was difficult for ordinary villagers and 
justified the level of detail divulged to the village assembly as appropriate so as to not take up 
large amounts of their time: “we take the important and meaningful information to explain to 
people” (Interview P93).  Furthermore, this process was additionally evident within the 
WMA case study, scaled to the level of the AA, where representatives complained that the 
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leaders of the project acted without the knowledge of the whole Secretariat (Interviews P172, 
P174), and in a focus group with officials from one participating village they complained that 
the Chairman in particular “believes he is the only one authorised to speak about the project” 
(Focus Group P133).   
In both case study projects information was shared on a ‘need to know’ basis and to the 
minimum acceptable level. The retention of knowledge and restriction of information by the 
officials of the project serves to reinforce the power structure in place through maintaining a 
clear margin between those working within the project and responsible for it, and the rest of 
the village community.  The discursive construction and reinforcement of scalar topographies 
of power in both case study projects involves distinct patterns of empowerment and 
disempowerment.  This was recognised by villagers in both research villages who commonly 
voiced their discontent and lack of understanding, blaming the project leaders for not 
educating them about the project or involving them in it: “The important people know about 
it, not the rest” (Interview P49); “I don’t have anything or way to participate.  If they build a 
school, my children go, if they build a clinic, I can be treated, but that’s all” (Interview 
P152).  Villagers in both the wildlife and forestry research villages described how this lack of 
understanding and information led to them not feeling able to make suggestions at the village 
assembly meetings, and the wishes of the leaders of the project nearly always being accepted 
as the best course of action, because they were the only people who really understood the 
project (Local Assistant Report P21, Interview P142).  If we take knowledge to be 
inescapably linked to power (Barnes, 1988), the sharing of information and empowerment of 
the wider community threatens to destabilise the existing scalar topography of power 
(Haugaard, 1997), and controlling this information is a mechanism to protect those who hold 
power, office and rights to benefit from the CBFM and WMA systems. 
The control of information is a form of institutional violence that is part of a process of 
power, as described in 6.2.1.  It is a clear example of power as a political technology in the 
social construction of subjects; that villagers felt the leaders of the project were the proper 
authorities possessing the appropriate knowledge signifies the process of internalisation of 
the socio-political order taking place within the research villages with regard to management 
of the forest and wildlife resources (see Lukes, 2005).  Both natural resources and their 
management were being discursively produced and rendered governable through the 
construction of environmental objects that require ‘proper’ management, and environmental 
subjects who are equipped to do so.  The control of information serves to reinforce the power 
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system in place and has also been internalised by the wider community, making it a key 
aspect in the reinforcement and construction of power (Feindt and Oels, 2005). 
These findings demonstrate the third, fourth, and fifth types of power described by Haugaard 
(1997; see 2.3.1): the internalisation of values that accepts the system described above is 
supported and maintained by systems of thought (3) that reify power structures, preventing 
destabilisation through the lack of perception of the work of power within the system (5).  
Importantly in this example, this takes place through the prevention of the fourth form of 
power (tacit knowledge) through the control of information that remains in the form of 
practical rather than discursive consciousness.  There is also a clear link to the discussion of 
corruption and neopatrimonialism in chapter 7:  Information has become a resource within 
the performed governance systems of CBFM and WMAs, and its exchange is subject to the 
relations of patronage operating within the projects (Moss, 1995).  This is supported by 
Chabal & Daloz (1999) who discussed the control of information as a key component of the 
political instrumentalisation of disorder and the expansion of patron-client relations (see 7.4 
and 7.5). 
The control of information and restriction of opportunities for the wider community to 
engage with the governance system surrounding CBFM and the WMA serves to reinforce the 
existing scalar organisations of power.  This is achieved principally through the fifth form of 
power described by Haugaard (1997) in which these scales are discursively constructed as 
appropriate and legitimate, for example through paternalistic arguments that justify the 
simplification and selection of appropriate information to share with the village assembly, as 
described above.  The restriction of training and experience to the leaders of the project and 
the stagnation of election processes which results from this (see 6.2.1), further serves to 
discursively create identities for a small group of individuals as trained, experienced and 
knowledgeable, controlling the frame of reality for the wider community to facilitate their 
return to office at elections, justifying the perceived pooling of benefits with this group, and 
explaining and sustaining the lack of wider participation and engagement with the 
management of the resources as apposite.  Thus a system is in place whereby the leaders of 
the project legitimately benefit from their work to manage the natural resources under their 
jurisdiction and they are disproportionately empowered through CBFM and the WMA.  The 
control of information-sharing is a political technology employed by the leaders to reinforce 
the power hegemony, and is legitimised by a discourse of knowledge and experience.  
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6.3.2 Scalar Transformations: The Struggle for Power 
The performance of policy and the power structures it sets out indicates that alongside the 
reinforcement of power systems and the protection of power that is described in 6.3.1, there 
are processes of scalar struggle and transformation taking place continuously within the case 
study projects.  These conflicts are driven by socio-political desire to capture power and 
control over the projects, the benefits derived from them and the natural resources they 
manage.  In this section, I outline the mechanisms by which power struggles are taking place 
in both the case study WMA and CBFM, and how individuals and groups both take 
advantage of existing and create new opportunities to manipulate the projects and scalar 
topographies of power.  These pathways to scalar transformations draw on the ideas set out 
by Smith (1992: 74) that “the scale of struggle and the struggles over scale are two sides of 
the same coin”.  I include examples of both scale jumping and scale bending (see 2.4.1) and   
characterise the scalar transformations as being either upward or downward.  This direction 
follows the system of administrative levels operating within Tanzania, and is not intended to 
suggest that the scales within CBFM and WMAs follow a ladder analogy (see 2.4.1; 
Bulkeley, 2005).  My focus is therefore on the verticality and politics of relations between 
scales and how they are being transformed by actors (Bulkeley, 2005; Leitner and Miller, 
2007; Rangan and Kull, 2009). 
Scalar transformations were witnessed in the ways in which actors and groups positioned 
themselves around the existing scalar landscape to both access and alter scales.  This can take 
place through both scale jumping and scale bending (see 2.4.2), but is clearly distinguished in 
the comparison of the case study projects by the different directions of scaling this involves 
around the distinct topographies of power in place.  A comparison of the politics of scales in 
Tanzanian CBFM and WMA governance indicates that the politics driving such conflicts are 
essentially the same, although the prescribed governance structures, and resulting power 
topographies these create, shape the dominant drivers and opportunities for scalar 
transformations, producing contrasting scales of struggle and directions of transformations 
(see 6.3.3). 
6.3.2.1  CBFM: Scaling Down 
Investigation of the governance system within CBFM revealed that the dominant 
transformations taking place were examples of scaling down to lower levels.  Interviews with 
international conservation practitioners and university researchers revealed that the 
concentration of power and management responsibilities in the VNRC (village level) has 
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stimulated several attempts by district officials to re-scale their role to within this level, and 
to take advantage of opportunities to maximize district-level benefits from the projects.  The 
case study of CBFM in Kiwere village revealed the scaling down of election processes with 
respect to the district’s role, alongside scaling down of accountability mechanisms by the 
Village Council.  Previous studies of CBFM in Tanzania (e.g. Mustalahti, 2007; Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009) have identified similar processes at work, particularly 
with reference to the ways in which the prescribed governance system, and especially 
revenue systems, are altered in practice (see also 7.1).  I adopt a scalar perspective to these 
issues, and address the struggle for power that lies at the heart of these transformations and 
deviations from policy. 
The first of these transformations involves the process of scale bending, whereby district 
level actors have created a role for themselves in the election processes for the VNRC at the 
village level.  This is closely linked to the discursive construction of scale and protection of 
power within the hands of a few individuals already on the committee, and the obstacles to 
new officials being elected (see 6.2.1).  Both VNRC officials and local villagers described the 
encroachment of district officials into electoral processes and decisions around the VNRC; 
they described how the limited number of trained and experienced individuals within the 
village led to advice from the district to ensure that these people remained in their positions 
within the VNRC (Interview P43).  The scaling of district-level influence into VNRC 
electoral processes moved beyond this advice in some instances however, and was described 
by community members as preventing free elections from taking place because the district 
officials insisted that at least one quarter of the experienced committee members must remain 
on the committee, and when previous election results included an entirely new committee, the 
district refused to allow this (Interview P43, Focus Groups P61, P62).  This scalar 
transformation is discursively legitimized by the district officials and those within the VNRC 
on the basis of existing committee members, and especially the leaders of the project, 
possessing the required training, knowledge and expertise to manage the project successfully, 
which, as discussed in section 6.3.1, partly results from the reinforcement of this situation by 
these same individuals.   
Thus a closed circle is created whereby the leaders of the project possess the official training 
and approval by the district to take up leadership positions within the CBFM project, which is 
then protected through discursive construction of the VNRC as the appropriate level and 
institution for successful management of the project, and reinforced through the concentration 
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of power within the level of the VNRC and limitations placed on the empowerment of the 
wider community.  The interference of the district officials into the VNRC election processes 
benefits both the district, by reducing the need for ongoing training and the existing VNRC 
members, who remain in post, empowered and able to benefit from the project more easily.  
Community members also suggested that the interference of the District Officials, the 
creation of this closed circle and the close relationships between the project leaders and the 
District Officials potentially reflected the scaling down of corruption networks (see 7.4; 
Véron et al., 2006).  In a focus group discussion, one community member suggested that the 
VNRC and district officials might be working together for mutual benefit from pre-existing 
arrangements for private benefits from the exploitation of forest resources (Focus Group 
P61). 
A second process of scalar transformation is taking place within the CBFM project with 
respect to governance arrangements and the roles and responsibilities of the VNRC and the 
Village Council.  In an attempt to foster accountability and transparency, the Village Council 
in Kiwere has created a supervisory role for itself within the activities of the VNRC.  This is 
a good example of scale jumping by which the Village Council has secured an invitation for 
one of its members from the social services committee of the Village Council to participate in 
all formal VNRC meetings and report back to the Village Council (P43).  The Village 
Council has also carried out patrols within the VLFR to verify the findings of the forest 
scouts and reports and activities of the VNRC (Local Assistant Report P17). 
6.3.2.2  WMA: Scaling Up 
The scalar transformations taking place within the WMA case study were predominantly 
examples of upward scaling.  These were evident in instances of village governments re-
scaling investment opportunities through jumping up to regional and national levels by 
entering into agreements with tourist operators, and scale bending through the creation of a 
national consortium of AAs to build an increasing voice for these institutions at the national 
level.  There were also examples of conservation NGOs enacting scale bending to increase 
their role in WMA processes. 
Within the WMA governance system non-consumptive investment contracts are drawn up 
between the AA and the private investor, although as discussed in 5.2.4 and 6.1.1, this is a 
more complex process that involves checks by several other institutions at the district and 
national levels before final contracts are signed and top-down revenue-sharing arrangements.  
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Whilst the problems with this in terms of the restriction placed upon power devolution has 
been discussed earlier (see 6.1.1), another result of the prescribed governance arrangements 
over this issue is the marginalisation of Village Councils from participating villages, who sit 
in an uneasy position with regards to authority and hierarchy with the AA.  There is no 
official role or space for Village Council officials to participate in decision-making processes 
regarding investment contracts (see 5.5.3), and the benefits they receive from MBOMIPA are 
handed down to the village level from the AA (whilst at the same time the Village Officers 
clearly saw themselves as above the AA, which is made up of elected representatives from 
each village; Focus Group P129, Interview P178).  This shift in power relations had clearly 
caused tension between the AA and the Village Officers, with one village chairman 
describing how the village must have the final say, not MBOMIPA, and if they disagree with 
the decisions taken by the AA they would “first change the MBOMIPA representatives from 
the village, then break the AA committees, then go after the chairman.  We would not wait for 
the elections, we would chase them away” (Focus Group P129). 
In an attempt to re-scale power and benefits from tourist investments around the WMA to the 
village level, rather than that of the AA, several villages have begun to set up investment 
agreements with tourist operators to provide accommodation facilities and game viewing 
opportunities outside the WMA, on village land. This is taking place within the villages that 
are located in areas of potential development for tourist activities nearby the WMA, 
particularly the villages of Tungamalenga, Mahuninga and Makifu, which directly border the 
WMA lands and are in close proximity to Ruaha National Park and the infrastructure 
surrounding it.  The village of Tungamalenga has developed sites for tourist investment over 
a long period, hosting hotels and campsites on village land (numbering 12 at the time of 
fieldwork) and tourist attractions, including a snake park.  Other villages, including the 
research village have since begun to identify the potential for tourism investments, which in 
Makifu amounted to negotiations between the Village Council leaders and five investors (all 
operating at the regional level), although contracts were still being drawn up at the time of 
fieldwork (Village Meeting P186, Interview P108).  Such camps would be located along the 
boundary of the WMA area within Makifu village, on an area of land that has been 
designated a conservation area by the village.  This area comprises a strip of land beyond the 
mountains that separate the domestic and agricultural areas of the village from the WMA 
(Focus group P160).  Discussions with Village Council members from several villages 
indicated that they were strategically re-scaling investments in order to by-pass the prescribed 
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procedures and systems for tourism investment within the WMA, and to exploit the 
opportunity to increase village revenues directly, rather than receiving a share of new 
investments through the WMA revenue sharing arrangements (Interviews P176, P180).  One 
MBOMIPA representative discussed this scalar transformation as the cause of conflicts 
within the AA and between the villages: “People are trying to benefit privately by setting up 
tourist enterprises, but village investors cause much conflict because people disagree over 
whether the money should go to the village or to MBOMIPA” (Interview P180). 
Within the village of Makifu, discussions about these potential investments revealed that they 
were actually examples of scale jumping in both directions, as members of the Village 
Council explained that they had both been working to develop these opportunities, copying 
the model already set out in the neighbouring village of Tungamalenga (scaling up) but in 
some cases had been initiated by the investors themselves (scaling down), searching for 
potential sites outside of the WMA to develop their activities at lower costs (Interview P108).  
Both processes reflect the re-organisation of activities around the existing power structure in 
attempts to access and re-configure flows of power and revenue around the project and the 
resources that it manages. 
The discursive construction of scale is taking place within the wildlife sector through the 
initiation of a new institution called the National Consortium of Authorised Associations, 
which began in 2010.  The role of this institution, which is formed from representatives of the 
AAs around the country is to act as a forum for the unification of processes and systems in 
WMAs across the country, but also to provide the platform for AAs to increase their voice at 
the national level and their role in governance processes scaled to this level (Interview P80).  
The consortium was described by the chairman of one WMA as “the equivalent of the 
National Park Authority for WMAs in Tanzania…which has the power to speak to 
government and the ministry” (Interview P100).  The officially-stated objectives of the 
consortium include “to liaison (sic) with government, non-governmental organization and/or 
private sectors in all matter that affect the consortium positively or negatively.  These include 
development policies, legislations, guidelines, community development and distribution of 
land and natural resources” (Government  of the United Republic of Tanzania et al., 2011).   
This re-organisation of WMA governance scales is potentially also driven by the desire to 
access and influence the decision-making processes concerning wildlife hunting quotas 
within hunting blocks inside WMAs and investment contracts for tourist hunting.  This is 
indicated in the expected benefits of the consortium, which include “secured markets for 
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different tourism products in the WMAs…representing AA members in decision making 
during wildlife quota allocation…having favourable environment (sic) for investment in 
WMAs” (Government  of the United Republic of Tanzania et al., 2011)  
The consortium has very strong links with external conservation organizations, particularly 
with funding from USAID and facilitation provided by Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF; 
Government  of the United Republic of Tanzania et al., 2011).  This indicates another process 
of re-scaling by which WWF, in particular, is enacting scale bending by positioning itself as a 
key actor within WMA governance.  An academic researcher described WWF’s rising status 
within the WMA governance system through its current role as the external facilitator for at 
least four of the largest, most successful and high profile WMAs in Tanzania (MBOMIPA, 
JUKUMU, Wami-Mbiki and Burunge), and stating that he believed WWF were attempting to 
expand their role as much as possible (Interview P80).   
6.3.3 Politics of Scales: Same Politics, Different Scales 
The examples of scalar reconfiguration ongoing within both case study projects indicate that 
these manipulations of the prescribed governance structure are centred around power.  
Drawing on debates in the scale literature about the non-hierarchical nature of scales 
(Marston et al., 2005; Leitner and Miller, 2007), these examples clearly show that scalar 
struggle is not simply a case of individuals and groups consistently attempting to scale up or 
jump or bend scales in an upward direction.  Rather, re-scaling takes place around the 
existing power structures as different individuals and groups attempt to access these scales 
and construct new scales around them.  In the case of the CBFM case study, where power 
devolution to the lowest level of village government is prescribed, re-scaling is taking place 
around the VNRC with the district officials attempting to bend CBFM scales to create a 
larger role for themselves within the governance system, and maintain opportunities to 
benefit from the management of forest resources, and village government officials attempting 
to jump down into the VNRC scale.  Conversely in the WMA case study, where power is 
devolved principally to the AA, operating at the inter-village level, but issues of the retention 
of power at the national level remain (see 5.5), re-scaling is taking place both around the 
inter-village and the ministerial levels.  This is evident in attempts to both allow Village 
Councils and investors to circumvent the prescribed systems through creating a new scale of 
investments at the village level, and in attempts to contest the power of the national level 
through the creation of a National Consortium for AAs. 
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The politics of scales taking place within the Kiwere CBFM and MBOMIPA WMA case 
studies support the arguments of Purcell & Brown (2005) and Smith’s (1990) definition of 
politics of scales, which both emphasise the socio-spatial strategies employed by actors for 
their own political, and in this case environmental agendas.  The idea that power is at the 
heart of these processes is shown in the scalar transformations and constructions taking place 
around the existing topographies of power within both sectors, producing the same 
underlying political processes but scaled to different levels within the governance systems of 
CBFM and WMAs. 
I argue that a process-based view of scale (Swyngedouw, 1997; Swyngedouw and Heynen, 
2003), as utilised in this discussion, is necessary to capture the characteristics of scalar 
dynamics taking place within the case study CBFM and WMA, which include both 
transformation and construction.  Swyngedouw & Heynen (2003) also argue that conflict and 
political struggle are at the heart of these scalar processes, which is the focus of the next 
section.  These conflicts also indicate that whilst they are taking place at different scales, the 
politics driving them is essentially the same: a struggle for power over CBFM or the WMA, 
the funds they generate and the natural resources they govern. 
6.3.4 Scalar Transformations: Conflicts and Power Struggles 
 
“Politics is about the formal and informal contests and negotiations of power in, 
or over, various circumstances and how and what power and decisions might be 
shared or not”  
(Brunckhorst, 2010: 17). 
 
Alongside the scalar transformations taking place as described in section 6.3.2, there are 
several conflicts ongoing within the case study projects that reflect struggles for power over 
the projects and the resources they control.  As discussed throughout section 6.3, these 
struggles take place around the prescribed governance structure and the power systems 
produced from this.  An important feature of these conflicts is the level at which they are 
focused, therefore; following the concentration of power within the governance system of the 
WMA in the AA, a major set of conflicts is correspondingly scaled to this level; in the CBFM 
project, principal conflicts are taking place between different groups within the village, scaled 
to the same level as the concentration of power in the hands of the VNRC members.  These 
conflicts, which indicate the processes of discursive construction of scale ongoing within the 
case study projects, are discussed separately because, whilst the processes are comparable, 
the nature of the conflicts is distinct. 
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6.3.4.1  CBFM Conflicts: Resource User Groups  
One of the main conflicts taking place in the CBFM research village involved the different 
resource user groups that utilize the forest to harvest different products.  The main uses of the 
forest are for harvesting timber, firewood for charcoal production and tobacco curing, poles 
and stones for building uses, alongside numerous non-timber forest product uses of the forest, 
particularly grazing of livestock, beekeeping and medicinal plant and mushroom collection 
(Interview P4).  Within these uses, revenue is generated from the sale of permits, and 
collected by the VNRC (Participatory Activity P66).  The collection of firewood within the 
forest for domestic uses67 is permitted under the CBFM management plan, but interviews 
with villagers, and especially women who usually carry out this task, generally takes place in 
an area outside of the CBFM project known as the ‘open area68’, which is located closer to 
village residences (Interview P47).  The permits allocated for different uses within the CBFM 








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Dry wood 63 72 100 98 127 48 145 137 155 101 127 66 1239 
Fresh wood    221  17  83 47 43   411 
Charcoal    2 3 10 1 17 62 28 3 3 129 
Visitors   24 10  14 14      62 
Fodder         143    143 
Building 
poles 
         5   5 
Timber            190 190 
 
Total 63 72 124 331 130 89 160 237 407 177 130 259 2179 
 
                                                 
67 Differentiated from collection of firewood for commercial purposes through the prohibition of 
cutting tools (machete or axe) and restriction of amounts collected to that which can be carried on foot 
(P4, P38, P58). 
68 ‘Mahitaji wazi’. 





The issuing of permits for harvesting of firewood for both tobacco curing and for the 
production of charcoal purposes puts two resource user groups in direct competition for 
resources within the village.  This conflict has escalated in recent years and, in 2010, resulted 
in the decision to cease allocation of permits for the purposes of charcoal production within 
the forest (Interview P43).  Interviews with tobacco farmers, charcoal producers, the Village 
Council and the VNRC all confirmed this decision, and the topic generated lively debate, 
indicating the unresolved tension surrounding this conflict.  The decision to cease approval of 
permits for charcoal production was explained in several different ways by different groups, 
indicating the discursive construction of scale around this issue.  Charcoal producers 
explained the decision as one typical of the project which “harm[s] the charcoal producers” 
by forcing them to stop harvesting in the forest, firstly because they struggled to raise the 
cash to purchase the necessary permits, and then by removing their rights to use the forest for 
Fig. 6.3: Graph showing Kiwere CBFM Income Derived From Permits Issued in 2010 ($US) 
194 
 
this purpose altogether (Local Assistant Report P13).  A focus group discussion with charcoal 
producers from the research village also showed that they feel unable to participate in the 
project following the decision, and they described the project as “negligent” (Focus Group 
P59).  The Village Council members explained the exclusion of charcoal producers as a 
business-driven decision, because their permit requests put them in direct competition with 
those that could be allocated for firewood collection for the purpose of tobacco curing 
(Interview P43): “we had already set aside a large area for the tobacco farmers and if we 
issue permits for the charcoal producers, this would mean the forest would be over-used”.  
On the contrary, the VNRC members justified the decision to stop charcoal production in the 
forest and the collection of firewood for this purpose on the basis that the charcoal producers 
were constantly breaking the rules of the project and they could not be trusted (Interview 
P43).  They invoked a narrative of environmental destruction and the degradation caused by 
charcoal production in particular, citing it as one of the main reasons why the project was 
started in the village and then describing the previous degradation and indiscriminate 
harvesting carried out prior to the project: “the charcoal makers used to empty a whole area 
of forest” (Focus Group P60, also Interviews P44, P50).  The use of the narrative by the 
VNRC in particular demonstrates the discursive construction of scale with respect to the 
legitimization of the project as environmentally necessary, the restriction of charcoal 
production in the forest as a legitimate rule with corresponding sanctions within the project 
and the VNRC as the appropriate management institution to implement these rules. 
This discursive scalar struggle is also played out within a particular socio-economic context 
that had allowed the tobacco farmers to exclude their charcoal-making competitors from the 
project.  There are two elements to this context: the business interests of the members of the 
VNRC; and the socio-economic hierarchy associated with different livelihood options in rural 
Tanzania.  The first of these elements refers to the fact that the majority of those elected to 
serve on the VNRC are closely connected and personally involved with tobacco farming in 
the village, whilst none of them proclaimed to be involved in charcoal production.  Of the ten 
members of the VNRC in Kiwere, six described themselves as tobacco farmers, including the 
three leaders of the project (Interviews P39, P34, P35, Focus Group P195), which suggests a 
very strong incentive for the VNRC to prioritise harvesting for tobacco-farming activities, 
over those of charcoal-making.  Tobacco farmers within the community described their 
fortune at having a tobacco-farmer as the chairman of the project and the benefits they 
received from the project as including a good and secure source of firewood for curing 
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tobacco, which is organized for them through the chairman of the project and delivered to 
them as requested (Focus Group P60).  Secondly, the discursive construction of charcoal 
production as environmentally destructive and the producers as untrustworthy and habitual 
rule-breakers was facilitated by the high socio-economic and social status disparities between 
the two groups; tobacco farming is generally a livelihood activity of the richer members of a 
community as it requires large areas of land to cultivate the tobacco plants, special structures 
for curing the tobacco, and sufficient income to invest in an agricultural system that involves 
a lengthy growing season (usually 6 months, depending upon rainfall), plus additional 
processing time (Focus Groups P60, P61, Participatory Activity P70).   
In contrast charcoal production is an activity associated with less educated and poorer groups 
within the community: “villagers who have lower incomes occupy themselves with making 
charcoal to get money to meet their daily needs” (Local Assistant Report P13).  It is 
described as feasible for poorer groups in the community because of the low costs associated 
with the necessary equipment and the relatively short periods of time required to build and 
prepare a kiln, cut the firewood and produce the charcoal (minimum of five days, increasing 
with kiln size; Participatory Activity P69, Local Assistant Report P13).  Charcoal producers 
within the research village described it as a ‘hand to mouth’ livelihood strategy adopted by 
those struggling to meet the needs of their family, and described themselves as victims of the 
project and its leaders’ decisions: “the leaders have been refusing to let villagers produce 
charcoal while at the same time they are using the area to improve their own lives” (Local 
Assistant Reports P13, P21).   
The conflict between these two groups involved the discursive construction of identities of 
charcoal makers as both unethical destructors of the environment and simple, poor people 
trying to feed their families.  The different discursive tactics employed by the two sides of the 
conflict demonstrate the political nature of this conflict and the tactical use of discourse.  The 
discourse of victimisation, impoverishment and necessity to support their families employed 
by the charcoal producers indicates an attempt to justify the continuation of charcoal 
production within the forest, and villagers reported that it is commonly used as a defence by 
charcoal producers when challenged (Interview P57).  The VNRC and tobacco farmers on the 
other hand employed a discourse of environmental protection and rule-breaking by charcoal 
producers to legitimise their marginalization within the project, gain support from the wider 
community for these actions, whilst simultaneously securing resources for their own uses: 
“the charcoal makers could not be trusted, illegal use was rife” (Interview P34).  I argue that 
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the current outcome of the conflict to prohibit charcoal production since 2010 reflects the 
private interests of the decision-makers, alongside the different socio-economic status of the 
two groups, which facilitates the prevalence of the negative narratives surrounding charcoal 
production.  The strong hierarchy within Tanzanian society and the emphasis of respect for 
well-educated and wealthy groups within society, alongside the social norms surrounding the 
contestation of power (see 7.5) all contribute to the reinforcement of this situation and the 
dominance of the tobacco-favouring committee over the needs and wishes of charcoal-
making groups within the community. 
6.3.4.2  WMA Conflicts: Inter-Village Politics and Struggles for Revenue 
The conflicts taking place within MBOMIPA indicate the same underlying drivers of power 
and control over the WMA, its funds and its resources.  The conflicts are scaled to the level 
of the AA however, following the concentration of power at this level in the prescribed 
governance system.  The conflicts dominating the project at the time of fieldwork involved 
two inter-linked themes: the relationship between the two administrative divisions the 
participating villages are located in; and the distribution of benefits and problems from the 
MBOMIPA project. 
Of the 21 villages participating in MBOMIPA, all are located within the district of Iringa 
Rural, although the district is sub-divided into divisions, which splits the villages involved  
wherein 12 of the MBOMIPA villages are located in Pawaga division, whilst the remaining 
nine are located in Idodi division (see Fig. 6.4).  This split has some interesting impacts on 
the relations between the villages and between the MBOMIPA representatives within the AA.  
Interviews carried out with the MBOMIPA representatives from both villages in Pawaga and 
Idodi revealed tensions and “problems of not understanding one another” (Interview P107) 
between the two sets of villages, which were described as each group of MBOMIPA 
representatives trying to dominate the power and decision-making rights of the AA 
(Interview P107, Focus Group P127).  A focus group with village authorities and MBOMIPA 
representatives within Idodi revealed a fear of the Pawaga villages dominating the AA and 
decision-making because “they have more villages involved, which means more 
representatives, more voice in the project and more power to make decisions” (Focus Group 
P127).  Village authorities and MBOMIPA representatives from some villages in Pawaga 
corroborated these ideas and argued that Pawaga was more influential within the project 
(Focus Group P133). Conversely, focus groups in other villages in Pawaga revealed conflict 
because they perceived that “the villages of Idodi see themselves as above those of Pawaga.  
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This is because they have contributed land, which means they have invested more in the 
association [WMA] than the Pawaga villages.  Those that think themselves above are Kitisi, 
Mahuninga and Tungamalenga” (Interview P171).  A respondent in the focus group also 
described how power was being concentrated in Idodi because all of the top leadership 
positions within the AA were all held by representatives from Idodi, whilst all of their 
assistants came from Pawaga villages (Interview P171; see Table 6.3).  Thus a complex set of 
power relations has developed between the two groups of villages, and is exacerbated by the 
poor infrastructure between the two divisions, the remoteness of Pawaga compared to Idodi 
and the perception of Pawaga as poorer and less-developed than Idodi, where the villages 
benefit greatly from higher rainfall and income from Ruaha National Park (which is accessed 










The conflict between the administrative divisions is clearly a struggle over power and 
position within the project, but is also related to a recent conflict that developed within the 
project concerning the distribution of benefits and problems from MBOMIPA between the 
participating villages.  This conflict centres on the contribution of village land to the area that 
is managed as a WMA.  Table 6.4 compares the area of land contributed by each village (and 
division) to the MBOMIPA WMA, and highlights that whilst six of the Pawaga villages 
(notably Mboliboli) have contributed areas of village land to the WMA, six have not.  
Conversely, within Idodi, eight out of nine of the villages have contributed land, and five out 
of the six largest areas of land contributed to the WMA come from villages within Idodi.  
Within the current governance system of the WMA, all villages receive an equal share of the 
distributed revenue from the AA, as set out in the MBOMIPA constitution (MBOMIPA, 
2002).  Severe conflict has been created around this issue with a very vocal group of 











































































Table 6.3: MBOMIPA Authorised Association Committee Structure and Representatives’ 




MBOMIPA representatives and associated village authorities arguing that it is unfair that 
benefits are divided equally when some villages have contributed no land at all to the WMA.  
This produces arguments that such villages are “eating for free” (Interview P93).  These 
groups, comprising most, but not all, of the village authorities and MBOMIPA 
representatives from the ‘landed villages’ also invoke a discourse of human-wildlife conflict 
to justify their arguments for altering the distribution of benefits.  They claim that crop-
damage impacts from wild animals that move beyond the boundaries of the park are 
concentrated in the villages that are located closest to the park, and these villages also form 
the group of landed villages.  
 
 


























The geographical location of landed villages versus ‘landless villages’ is closely linked with 
their proximity to the national park, which arose from the design of the WMA, whereby the 
land within the WMA (gazetted from the previous Lunda-Mkwambi South Game Control 
Area) was selected to form a buffer around the national park (see Fig. 6.4).  This is used by 
MBOMIPA representatives and village authorities within the landed villages to argue that 
“here [landed villages] we are hurt by conservation, but they [landless villages] only know 
the importance of conservation, but we are all paid the same” (Interview P100).  A District 
Official also described how this situation produced a large discrepancy between the 
participating villages in the benefits received from MBOMIPA (Interview P88).  Those who 
Table 6.4: Axes of Power within MBOMIPA WMA.  Amounts shown correspond to the area of 
land contributed (km2). 
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oppose any alteration to the distribution of benefits within the WMA villages utilised a 
discourse of biodiversity conservation to challenge these arguments.  A Village Officer from 
a landless village within the WMA described how “[the village’s] participation is valid 
because animals do not have borders…it needs to be seen from a conservation point of view” 
(Focus Group P123).  Such political use of environmental discourses in the context of 
rivalries and competition has previously been noted in Tanzania by Brockington (2006).  
Other landless villages’ MBOMIPA representatives defended their inclusion in the 
MBOMIPA project on protection grounds, arguing that the villages further away were 
included so that they could form a cohesive force against hunting within the national park, 
which justified their inclusion and the equal share of revenue they receive (Interview P178).  
This group of MBOMIPA representatives and Village Authorities also attempted to discredit 
the arguments in favour of changing the revenue system, accusing the actors from those 
villages as “only being interested in money, not conservation” and attempting to “throw out 
other villages so that their income increases” (Interview P123, Focus Group P178). 
These two conflicts are inter-related as they feed into one another, escalating tensions and 
bad-feeling between the representatives.  The consequences of these two conflicts became 
apparent during the period of fieldwork when seven villages wrote officially to the leaders of 
the AA to complain that the situation was unfair and threatening to remove themselves from 
the association if the revenue system was not altered in favour of the landed villages 
(Interview P100).  One MBOMIPA representative from Pawaga described how this situation 
had reached a point where he thought that “MBOMIPA appears to be closer to the villages of 
Idodi than those of Pawaga” and the effects of this relate not just to the debates about 
revenue sharing but also “the representatives from Pawaga think that the Chairman is 
preferential to the Idodi villages and he also gives them priority for many giving [donor-
funded] projects” (Interview P171).   
The complex conflicts taking place within the MBOMIPA villages have produced several 
axes of power that broadly divide the villages according to administrative division and land 
contribution, as shown in Table 6.4.  It is important to note that not all Village Authorities 
and MBOMIPA representatives from landed villages within Idodi support the proposal to 
alter the revenue distribution system, or vice versa.  Indeed within the research village there 
was high differentiation between the members of the Village Council and the MBOMIPA 
representatives with regards to this issue.  One individual complained that villages with little 
or no land had been included to help prevent poaching and hunting from taking place within 
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the WMA “but now we see that they are eating for free.  Their crops are not destroyed, they 
get no problems from the wild animals, yet they get the same proportion of the funds” (P108).  
Another individual from the research village was completely against changing the revenue 
distribution system in favour of the landed villages.  The interviewee argued that “those who 
have little [land] are doing their work just as those that have lots of land, will you withold 
from them so that they are given little?..We share together because we all have one job to 
protect our land so that it can be sustainable, and even those who don’t have [land] protect  
it.  It’s something that all of us should receive equally therefore,  because the work we do is 
the same” and demonstrated her point using the following story (Interview P109): 
 
“It might be that in your house you have five children, and you are the father.  
There’s one child who grows up to do eveything that you ask of him.  There’s 
another who just wants to sleep and he doesn’t even want to work.  Another from 
the time they wake in the morning is occupied with cleaning, another is at school 
and the other works to bring home the things you need at home.  Now with the 
one who doesn’t want to work, now when it comes time to eat do you deprive him 
of food whilst they are all still your children?  He must eat.69”  
 
Table 6.4 clearly indicates not only that the majority of landed villages are located within 
Idodi division, but also that these have contributed the overwhelming majority of the land 
area inside the WMA.  These villages have become more powerful within the AA, assisted by 
the fact that these villages hold over a third of the committee positions within the AA (8/22), 
including the top three leadership positions (see Table 6.3).     
Both the conflicts between the divisions of Idodi and Pawaga with regards to representation 
on the AA committees, and the debates over revenue distribution between the MBOMIPA 
villages, are good examples of what Fraser (2010) terms ‘scalecraft’ (2.4.2.1).  The example 
described from MBOMIPA indicates several facets of Fraser’s concept: firstly that the 
discursive construction of scale around the issue of land contribution is a purposeful attempt 
to “diminish the influence of actors at other geographical scales” (Fraser, 2010: 336), built 
                                                 
69 “Unaweza ukawa ndani ya nyumba una watoto watano na wewe ndio baba, yupo mtoto anayelima 
anafanya kazi kila unapomtuma anafanya, yupo mwingine yeye ni kulala tu kabisa yeye hataki hata 
kazi, yupo ambaye yeye akiamka asubuhi ni kushughulika na usafi, yupo mwingine anaenda shuleni, 
yupo mwingine kazi yake ni kutafuta vitu vya muhimu vya kuleta pale nyumbani. Sasa katika yule 
mwingine hataki kazi kabisa sasa je, ukifika muda wa chakula huyo asiyefanya kazi utamnyima 




upon narratives of human-wildlife impact and justifications of ‘fair share of the work’ that 
strategically empower one set of actors over another and has material consequences for both.  
Secondly, the MBOMIPA example of inter-village conflict is an excellent example of what 
Fraser (2010) terms ‘active destruction’, in which the disassembling of scales and 
reconfiguration around a conflict could be seen as an important form of scalar ‘craft’.  This is 
supported not only by the scalar struggles taking place around this conflict, but by the 
recognition that specific individuals were largely responsible for starting such a conflict and 
for deliberately dividing the villages within the WMA around such issues for their own 
benefit.  Respondents from Village Authorities and other MBOMIPA representatives argued 
that the chairman of the AA was to blame for starting this conflict, as he wanted to gain as 
much for his village and himself as possible (Focus Group P133).  As Fraser (2010) points 
out, the true aim of many such scalecraft practices may remain hidden beneath neutral 
justifications, as seen in the reasoning provided to support an altered revenue system.  
Occasionally, however, as Scott (1990) argues, such hidden agendas, thoughts or ‘transcripts’ 
may be voiced.  For example, a member of the village authorities from one MBOMIPA 
village explained the tension between the villages of Idodi and Pawaga as “due to business: 
every person wants to appear to be the big man, so that he may have the power for himself” 
(Interview P107).   
6.4 The Performance of Policy: Power in Reality 
The scalar transformations taking place within both the case study CBFM and WMA indicate 
a combination of both reorganisation of existing scales, including instances of both scale 
jumping and bending, and scalar construction.  In line with the discussions in section 6.3, 
Figs 6.5 and 6.6 indicate these transformations through the relationships and levels that have 
been created and modified within the power structures for both CBFM and WMAs. 
Fig. 6.5 shows the re-scaled relationship between the VNRC and the District Council and the 
construction of a new scale of tobacco investment at the village level.  Importantly, the newly 
constructed scale is not entirely separate but, as discussed in section 6.3.3.1, overlaps with the 
VNRC and with other investor groups at the village level.  This group of investors has 













Fig. 6.5:  Re-scaled Power Structure as Performed in CBFM.  Modified relationships 
and levels within the structure are highlighted in red. 
Legend for Figs. 6.5 & 6.6 
 
Village  Governance level 
AA   Authorised Association 
DNRAB   District Natural Resource Advisory Board 
Ministry  Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
PMO-RALG Prime Minister’s Office of Regional and Local Government 
Regional Sec.  Regional Secretariat 
VC   Village Council 
VGS   Village Game Scouts 
VNRC   Village Natural Resources Committee 
WMA   Wildlife Management Area 
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The re-scaled power structure within the MBOMIPA WMA demonstrates several additional 
relationships, notably the re-scaled relationship between investors and the Village Council 
discussed in section 6.3.3.2.  The National Consortium of Authorised Associations is 
highlighted as important in two ways in Fig. 6.6: Firstly, the discursive construction of scale 
is evident in this new organisation; and secondly, this scale has been strengthened by the 
development of close links with both the AA and with the NGO sector (WWF).  Finally, Fig. 
6.6 incorporates the scalar conflicts that are taking place within the AA and the axes of power 
that have been identified in section 6.3.3.2 between administrative division and land 
contributions to the WMA area. 
 
 
 Fig. 6.6: Re-scaled Power Structure as Performed in WMA.  Modified relationships and levels 





In this chapter I have investigated the performance of policy in Tanzanian CBNRM.  I have 
adopted a scalar perspective to achieve this, arguing that the separate policy pathways 
adopted in both the forestry and wildlife sectors in Tanzania have produced different 
governance systems, and I have identified distinct scalar configurations of power that result 
from this.  This is clearly seen in the implementation of a parallel governance system in the 
wildlife sector, where a new inter-village level sits at the centre of governance processes.  It 
is clear that the governance systems prescribed in policy and performed in practice entail 
shifts in the relationships between different actors and institutions within the governance 
system, as seen in the changing power relationship between the Village Council and the 
newly empowered VNRC within CBFM.   
This chapter has investigated the characteristics of the scalar configurations of power that 
were being performed in both case studies, and I argue that one of the clearest features is their 
shifting nature.  There are clear examples from both sectors of the protection and 
strengthening of the power system prescribed in policy and the benefits that it brings to those 
elected to serve as leaders on the VNRC and the AA, but also multiple examples of the ways 
in which different actors were invoking scalar strategies in politics of scales as they attempted 
to manipulate the scalar topography to their own ends.  I argue that discursive practices are 
central to these processes of transformation and reification and indicate the processes of 
subjectification which were ongoing within both the WMA and the CBFM case studies.  This 
is most clearly evident in the control of information that was shared with those outside of the 
principal governance institutions.  Struggles over power are at the heart of the politics of 
scales that are witnessed in the case studies, and this is further indicated in the scales of 
transformation and conflict, which mirror the scalar configurations of power in each sector.  I 
refer to the politics of scales in both case studies as taking place at different scales but 
involving the same politics.  In the forestry sector scalar re-organisations are focused around 
the VNRC and conflicts revolve around the dominance of different resource user groups 
within the village level.  In the wildlife sector, re-organisations are taking place to both 
circumvent the AA and re-scale investments to the village level, but are also evident in the 
scale bending that is taking place through the National Consortium of AAs and its developing 
voice at the national level.  Conflicts within the WMA governance structure are dominated by 
those within the AA however, and divide the participating villages along two clear axes of 
power relating to both geographical locations within the political-administrative system of 
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Tanzania and land contributions to the WMA area.  Closely linked to the discussion of the 
roles of discourse coalitions in policy processes in chapter 5, the utilisation of competing 
narratives and discourses by actors and groups within scalar practices is seen to be crucial 
(see Bulkeley, 2000).  The conflicts taking place within the MBOMIPA WMA and Kiwere 
CBFM case studies are indicative of what Hajer & Versteeg (2005) refer to as ‘dislocations’ 
in which conflicts are used as moments of resistance and challenge to the dominant power 
structure, producing moments of routine-breaking.  The discursive practices used within these 
conflicts reveal not only the power of discourse within the performance of policy and the 
politics of scales that it has produced but, I argue, also reveals conflict to be a strategic arena 
for such practices.  This links clearly to the practice of ‘active destruction’ described by 
Fraser (2010) in which scalar configurations are deliberately dismantled in attempts to re-
configure power systems for private gain. 
The political ecology of scales presented here is closely linked to the discussion in chapter 5 
in the ways power devolution is a political project subject to multiple driving forces across a 
complex network of actors.  This chapter adds to this perspective by investigating the non-
containerised nature of scales and the ways in which actors are involved in re-shaping the 
scalar landscape, producing new scales of governance and forging new links between levels, 
creating what Neumann (2009: 404) refers to as “new relational socioenvironmental 
spatialities”. 
The scalar configurations of power prescribed in policy and being performed in reality, 
including the struggles that are taking place and scalar re-shuffling that is outlined in this 
chapter, place power as a central theme in the socio-political complexities at work within the 
case studies.  As in chapter 5, where the political and power-driven nature of policy reform 
and the different policy pathways and distinct governance systems in place in Tanzanian 
CBFM and WMAs have been discussed, the politics of scales discussed in this chapter 
indicate that access to, control over and benefit from natural resources are at the core of these 
issues.  This is further highlighted in this chapter as similar processes taking place in both the 
forestry and wildlife sectors, but as different scalar practices in accordance with the scalar 
topographies of power prescribed in each sector.   
In the next chapter I continue the theme of the implementation of the prescribed governance 
system and its performance within the case studies. Whilst in this chapter I have looked 
further into the issue of power within the prescribed system and the ways it is being 
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manipulated in reality, in the next chapter I continue this theme by considering the socio-
cultural landscape into which CBNRM has been implemented in Tanzania and the ways in 







The Performance of Policy II 







This chapter continues to explore the enactment of governance within the case studies of 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), exploring this performance 
through non-prescribed and often unseen aspects.  I seek to develop the idea of this 
performed governance system as one that is produced both around and through the system set 
out in policy (the prescribed governance system).  I follow the approach used in institutional 
theory and discussed by Robbins (2000: 427) that a governance system in performance 
consists of de jure laws and de facto rules and social norms in combination and is “adapted 
and curved around the contours of local power” (see 2.1.2).  Recognising the political nature 
of implementing CBNRM in such a context, and the key role that the amalgamation of both 
prescribed and performed governance systems has upon the outcomes, successes and failures 
of such endeavours is critical to adding insight to the disenchantment with CBNRM 
discussed in 1.3, and the socio-political processes shaping such outcomes. 
Using the terminology of institutional analysis, I consider the ‘rules of the game’ that are in 
play within the governance system, drawing on cultural factors that have influenced these.  
The performed governance system is articulated through an informal economy and cultural 
aspects of participation.  These processes and mechanisms are a blend of existing systems 
and relationships and newly created ones around the prescribed governance system.  I also 
consider the ‘tricks of the game’ within this chapter, and I use this term to include the 
processes uncovered through fieldwork which indicate the importance of informal economies 
operating around these CBNRM systems.  These tricks of the game constitute the 
mechanisms and processes by which actors have both adapted and circumvented the 
prescribed governance system, producing a hidden, but equally important aspect within the 
performed system. It is widely observed that the structures of the state are altered in 
performance, used by people and re-shaped by them to their own advantage (Brockington, 
2008).  In chapter 6 I looked at how this was taking place in politics of scales, scalar 
transformations, conflicts and power struggles within the case studies.  I now extend this and 
look at how the rules of the game, in both the prescribed and performed governance systems, 
facilitate procedures of rule-breaking that go unremarked, unchallenged or unsanctioned.  I 
also begin to explore issues of neopatrimonialism, bribery and clientelism as mechanisms of 
corruption in this chapter, investigating the context of power that such systems draw on, and 
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how they contribute to the inequalities in benefits described in 6.2 in both legitimate and 
illegal ways. 
In this chapter my focus is principally on the informal realm and the connections between 
formal and informal types of power, rules of the game and the relationship between the 
prescribed and performed governance systems.  I consider power in two principal ways: 
firstly through the power structures into which CBNRM has been amalgamated, discussing 
types of power already present within the research villages and how these have merged with 
and transformed the governance system put in place; secondly through the power of different 
discourses enacted by groups within the governance system and how these have an effect 
upon decision-making and governance arrangements.   
The initiation of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and Community-Based Forest 
Management (CBFM) policy within the research villages marked important shifts in the 
power structures, the politicisation of natural resources, and the processes by which different 
groups benefitted from them (see 5.2, 6.1 & 6.2).  A former MBOMIPA project staff member 
described how significant informal economies were present around the project both before 
and during the REWMP phase and through to the MBOMIPA phase (Interview P73).  The 
emergence of national policy implementing WMAs in Tanzania shifted the systems in place 
and “ushered in the transferral of control away from the informal economy” (Interview P73), 
which had complex results for the different groups involved.  The politics of devolution 
described in section 5.4 must also acknowledge these hidden systems of power operating 
around natural resources, therefore.  Some villagers had been part of hunting networks 
controlled by resident hunters and involving district and regional officials, tied together in 
processes of private benefit through bribery, clientelism70 and neo-patrimonialism.  The 
initiation of WMAs heralded the transfer of control over managing wildlife resources to a 
new set of actors, removing hunting rights and shifting sources of funds away from such 
groups.  These shifts in the power system, an academic researcher argued, had significant 
impacts in the forestry sector also, where actors and groups began searching for ways to 
benefit from the new systems and sources of revenue (Interview P2).  The performed 
governance system is a continually changing arrangement of previous relationships and 
systems, the implementation of the prescribed governance system and the integration of new 
                                                 
70 Whilst neopatrimonialism and clientelism both consider ties of dependence and processes of patron-
client distribution, clientelism, in modern day Africa, is closely associated with practices of 
favouritism in decision-making Olivier de Sardan (2008). 
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processes as actors attempt to position themselves and the scalar configurations of power for 
private benefits.  The outcomes of such attempts is a mixture of ways in which people have 
utilised the prescribed governance system, shifting and manipulating it to their interests (see 
6.3), and ways in which people have found ways to circumvent it, diverge from policy and 
evade sanctions.  In the next section I outline examples of the rules not being followed within 
both the CBFM and WMA governance systems, and I attempt to highlight some of the 
differences between the prescribed and performed governance systems within the case 
studies.  As with villagers’ perceptions of those who benefit the most from CBNRM, the 
leaders of both the VNRC and the AA were frequently highlighted as persistent rule-breakers 
who employed several tricks of the game (but see also 7.4.1).  Further instances of rule-
breaking were identified as impracticalities with the prescribed governance system, rather 
than tactical efforts to avoid the rules (see 7.2.1). 
7.2 Deviations from Policy: Rule Breaking in the Performance of Policy 
The devolution of power and authority over revenue collection and natural resource 
management to the local level in both CBFM and WMAs has been a contentious and not 
universally-supported shift in natural resource management policy in Tanzania (see 5.4.2).  
Deviations from policy have been recorded, therefore, in cases of revenue policy simply not 
being followed, as described by an academic researcher concerning CBFM revenue systems, 
where some districts have ignored the 5% district cess collection rule, choosing instead to 
collect 100% cess (Interview P2).  Other cases of non-acceptance of the changes brought in 
by the initiation of WMAs and CBFM have also been noted, especially within the WMA case 
study where claims were commonly made that resident hunting groups simply ignored the 
changes in rules governing their rights to hunt (Interview P86).   
A lack of adherence to the rules put in place within the WMA and CBFM management plans 
runs alongside problems with enforcement of these rules within both the WMA and the 
CBFM case studies.  One owner of a tourist lodge described a key aspect of this problem 
when he depicted illegal hunting as “common at night and uncontrollable because of lack of 
funding for patrolling, and technology such as mobile phones, which mean hunting groups 
can be tipped off about raids” (Interview P79).  Whilst the assertion that there are significant 
issues with enforcement of rules concerning hunting within WMA was strongly supported by 
the research carried out, it was difficult to judge the extent to which hunting was taking place 
within the WMA and harvesting was occurring within the CBFM forest outside of the official 
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systems as this was obviously a sensitive issue to discuss with respondents.  Respondents’ 
estimations of how much of an issue these presented ranged from insignificant to the 
dominant problem that threatened the sustainability of the entire system within the forest or 
the WMA.  Quantification of the problem has not been attempted.  However, it was clear 
from the research carried out that illegal harvesting from the forest and illegal hunting within 
the WMA were both facilitated by enforcement issues, notably the effectiveness of patrols, 
and the systems in place to sanction offenders.   
In both the research villages, the inability of scouts to patrol the areas effectively was 
discussed by the scouts and the wider community as a product of the size of the area they 
need to patrol and the lack of resources available to enable scouts to achieve this (including 
shelter, shoes, clothing and monetary allowances; Focus Group P65, Local Assistant Report 
P25).  In the CBFM village the result is that a small group of scouts were responsible for 
protecting a large area of forest and often did not patrol some areas at all (Interview P4), 
patrols were not always carried out as frequently as set out in the management plan (four 
times per month for CBFM), and the frequency of patrols varied according to the weather and 
season and the responsibilities faced by the scouts with regards to their farming activities at 
different times of the year (Interview P4, P94, P108, Local Assistant Report P25).  In both the 
research villages, respondents described how the long rainy season particularly between 
March and May is often associated with less frequent patrols (Local Assistant Report P25; 
Focus Groups P65, P164 and P162, Interview P99).   In the CBFM village, respondents 
described this as well known by the villagers, who could cause a lot of damage in the forest 
during this period, with little likelihood of being apprehended (Local Assistant Report P25).  
These respondents raised questions about the feasibility of carrying out patrols to the extent 
set out in policy under the current system due to the size of the forest,  the long-distances 
involved in patrols and the opportunity costs associated with patrolling rather than working 
on their own farming activities (Focus Groups P164, P162; Interview P192).  A further issue 
was the low allowances paid to the scouts, which is discussed further in 7.2.1.   
Within this context of problematic enforcement, instances of rule-breaking by different 
groups within both the CBFM forest and the WMA were widely perceived.  Rule-breaking 
was also a sensitive issue and it was inherently difficult to gauge the level of rule-breaking 
taking place within either case study.  Instead, I focused on identifying the mechanisms and 
ways in which rules could be broken in both case studies.  A lack of fear or perceived 
likelihood of being caught and punished for rule-breaking was a key factor revealed through 
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fieldwork, and closely associated with the size of the forest and the WMA and the patrolling 
issues described above.  The likelihood of being caught by the forest scouts in the CBFM 
research village was generally described as low, due to the size of the forest, alongside 
knowledge of when the scouts were going to carry out their patrols and the areas they usually 
covered (Interview P4).  Likewise villagers within the WMA research village described how 
certain areas were popular with illegal users as they were infrequently patrolled by the village 
scouts (Interview P192).  Types of rule-breaking include exceeding quotas for harvesting 
activities (Interview P86), for example permits for charcoal production are given according to 
the number of bags that will be produced, but this amount is often exceeded and extra bags 
may be paid for retrospectively, may be excused through a bribe (see 7.4 & 7.5), or may be 
hidden from authorities and transported out of the forest for sale in Iringa town (Interview P5, 
Local Assistant Reports P13, P20).   
Further tricks of the game were identified by villagers and local assistants in the 
transportation of illegal goods from the forest.  Permit holders should both be escorted to the 
forest by a forest scout and should then pass through the village or the boundary gate at the 
end of their activities, where vehicles are inspected by members of the Village Natural 
Resource Committee (VNRC) or forest scouts to verify the goods harvested match those 
allocated in the permit (Local Assistant Reports P13, P22, Focus Group P59, Participatory 
Activity P67).  Village respondents reported that “they have several tricks” (P59) to avoid 
these checks.  In conjunction with issues of bribery opportunities (see 7.4.2), it was reported 
that concealment of goods was used to transport illegally harvested products.  This was 
identified as taking place particularly for illegally harvested timber, which was concealed at 
the bottom of the truck and covered by the firewood for which a permit had been purchased 
(Local Assistant Report P25).  Secondly, illegally harvested goods were thought to be 
transported at night to avoid being stopped by the forest scouts or the VNRC (who were also 
implicated in these activities), and this trick was used by many villagers as hard evidence that 
illegal harvesting was taking place because they reasoned that “if they have purchased a 
permit, why is it that they transport at night and not in the afternoon?” (Local Assistant 
Report P22). 
7.2.1 Disincentives within the Prescribed Governance System 
The difficulties met by scouts with regards to the demanding nature of their patrols, the poor 
equipment available to them and the threats they faced from armed groups within the forest 
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and WMA areas all acted as disincentives to carrying out the patrol system as prescribed in 
policy.  This is compounded by the low wages paid to forest and wildlife scouts within the 
villages which has created a system that encourages illegal and informal economy processes, 
resulting in a perception by research academics that a significant proportion of transactions 
continually take place outside of the prescribed governance structure: “accountability in 
accounting is not so much a case of where the money goes to from the accounts, but what 
doesn’t make it into the official receipt book” (P5).   
Whilst greed is often blamed for the processes taking place in the informal economy and 
instances of bribery and corruption (e.g. Leader-Williams et al., 2009; see also 5.4.1), the 
research findings point to the facilitation of such processes by the prescribed governance 
system itself.  Using the CBFM case study as an example, the role set out for forest scouts 
positions them as the protectors and enforcers of the rules of the management plan for the 
forest (see 5.2.1).  They are responsible for carrying out patrols, apprehending offenders and 
taking them back to the natural resources office within the village to face the appropriate 
sanction, which is the responsibility of the members of the VNRC.  The distribution of 
benefits and problems surrounding the low allowances paid to forest scouts has created a 
relationship whereby these sanctioning processes were de-incentivised: “The scouts are often 
angry with the authorities because they feel they work hard and receive little benefit” 
(Interview P7); “Their allowance for patrols is very small, their work is hard, especially 
when it rains, and the fines [given to offenders] can be quite big, so they should get more for 
an allowance” (Focus Group P65).  The performance of policy in this respect involves the 
financial incentivisation of bribery, as described by a local assistant, who said “A villager 
who is caught making charcoal will offer a bribe to the person who has caught him in order 
to finish the problem.  For the villagers who don’t have the money, they are able to promise 
to give them an amount from the sale of the goods” (Local Assistant Report P20).   
The WMA system has attempted to move away from such processes through the decision 
taken to employ MBOMIPA scouts, rather than utilising the village scouts.  There are 37 
scouts now employed by MBOMIPA, which means a smaller number of scouts are carrying 
out patrols over a vast area.  However, MBOMIPA is able to pay them an allowance that is 
very substantial compared to that of the forest scouts ($558 annually compared to between 
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$50.4 and $8471 annually).  The differential politicisation of resources and the high value of 
wildlife resources within the hunting sector (see 5.4.1) has driven this move on the basis that 
adequate allowances for the MBOMIPA scouts will enhance the perceived value of 
employment in such roles, encourage abidance with the rules of the WMA, promote effective 
patrolling and encourage reporting of report rule-breaking, rather than acceptance of bribes.  
Whether this rational-economic shift in policy will deliver a reduced incentive to benefit from 
bribery could be called in to question however by the informal rules of the game discussed in 
7.3. 
7.2.2 Discourses of Rule-Breaking 
In both research villages, local respondents argued that beyond the ‘insider’ rule-breaking 
associated with the leaders of the Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC) and 
Authorised Association (AA), cases of rule- breaking were dominated by outsiders (non 
village residents).  This probably reflected an unwillingness to admit to rule-breaking or to 
incriminate others within the village.  Where rule-breaking by the villagers was admitted, it 
was usually explained as inevitable given the harsh conditions in which people live, levels of 
poverty and necessity of providing for one’s family (Local Assistant Report P25, Interview 
P92): “the conditions we live in sometimes cause people to break the rules of the 
forest...many people cut firewood in the forest without being scared of being caught and they 
are of one heart that if you are caught, it is just bad luck” (Local Assistant Report P25).  
Villagers invoked a discourse of necessity and poverty therefore to justify rule-breaking as 
necessary to live.  Contrastingly, rule-breaking by outsiders was described as unacceptable, 
and surrounded by a discourse of others not respecting their rules and not understanding the 
importance of managing resources properly.   
As mentioned earlier, the range in perceived levels of rule-breaking and the impacts it had 
upon the WMA and CBFM forest was very large.  Whilst many village respondents portrayed 
illegal activities as largely a small-scale nuisance within a generally very successful example 
of CBNRM in Kiwere, local assistants’ reports included testimonies of villagers who 
perceived the condition of the forest to be deteriorating and management of the forest to be 
very poor, with high levels of illegal harvesting, particularly of firewood and charcoal 
making, taking place by villagers, outsiders and the committee themselves (Local Assistant 
                                                 
71 This is calculated from the number of patrols supposed to be carried out each month and the 
average number of scouts that carry out each patrol (three to five).  
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Reports P13, P14, P15).  These respondents argued that persistent rule-breaking was 
encouraged by the rules themselves, which were not strong and fines that were not high 
enough to deter people from using the forest which, alongside people’s perception of the low 
likelihood of being caught, encouraged people to carry on harvesting as they wished (Local 
Assistant Report P13).  A similar discourse of forceful protection was invoked by a group of 
tourist lodge owners operating in the WMA area and Ruaha National Park, who described the 
ability of the AA to successfully handle hunting pressures as inadequate and blamed both 
resident hunters and local communities for persistent illegal hunting taking place within the 
WMA (Interviews P79, P81, P85, P103).   
7.3 Enforcement, Moral Economy & Reciprocity 
The issues described in 7.2 with respect to the enforcement of rules and deviations from 
policy regarding patrolling and sanctioning of offenders are closely linked to de facto rules 
and social norms within the research villages.  Not only is enforcement tempered by the 
difficulty in apprehending offenders and the disincentives described above that facilitate 
extra-legal harvesting and bribery to accommodate this, but research revealed several aspects 
of a moral economy, or what Neumann (1998) terms ‘local justice’ resulting from the 
tensions between state policy and local subsistence requirements and customary use (see 
2.1.3). 
Local management of natural resources, as seen in both CBFM and WMAs in Tanzania 
involve local enforcement of the rules governing such resources.  This creates an intrinsic 
tension between enforcers (in this case forest and wildlife scouts) and villagers using the 
resources.  In both research villages scouts within the villages described how their job was 
made more difficult because of the close personal connections they often had with people 
they were supposed to apprehend and send to the office to be sanctioned for breaking the 
rules of the forest or WMA.  An academic researcher summarised these issues as “It is 
difficult to exercise the law when relations are involved...When you catch a culprit who is the 
son of your aunt, and you decide to prosecute, you should expect problems from family 
members.  These are big problems for scouts and committee members” (Interview P7).  
Leaders of the CBFM project also described how they faced severe pressure from villagers 
for imposing rules and fines for breaking those rules, especially in the early stages of CBFM 
(Interview P35).  Within MBOMIPA this issue was reduced by the patrol system of the 
scouts, who did not carry out patrols within their own or neighbouring villages, but would 
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travel to the other administrative division (Idodi or Pawaga) to carry out their work 
(Interview P89)72.  The social costs of being a forest scout in Kiwere were revealed by 
VNRC members’ descriptions that “after they catch somebody, he [the offender] begins to 
blame the forest scout and to build hatred towards them, even though it was he [the offender] 
who committed the error” (Interview P44).  The scouts also reported that enforcing the rules 
of the forest caused them to damage their good relations with the village community (see also 
7.5), leading to threats against themselves, their families and their livelihoods.  Scouts argued 
that when such threats were made, they reported it to the VNRC, so that one of the leaders 
would speak to the offender and warn them against doing anything to harm or cause problems 
for the scouts.  However, local assistants reported that threats of curses and superstitions still 
often prevented the scouts and the VNRC from carrying out the jobs as they were supposed to 
because they feared for their lives (Local Assistant Report P14).   
Research also indicated that there is a significant reciprocity element to enforcement and the 
level of sanctions given to offenders within the CBFM project.  Local assistants reported 
from villagers that the level of fine faced by someone caught breaking the rules was related to 
the socio-economic status of the offender “for example a rich person who destroys the forest 
for timber, they [VNRC] often fail to follow the steps properly because that person has lots of 
money” (Local Assistant Report P22); “punishments that are given out by the leaders show 
favouritism for those who are rich over those that are poor...poor people are held to the 
rules” (Local Assistant Report P25).  Local assistants also reported that lower fines or no 
punishment may be given, or fines may not be followed up when the offender is seen to be 
potentially useful to the scout or the offender and they could ask for the favour to be returned 
at a later date (Local Assistant Report P25).  Villagers also reported through a local assistant 
report that leaders feared heavy fines would encourage some offenders to reveal the leaders’ 
own illegal activities in the forests, leading to significant bias in the sanctions imposed (Local 
Assistant Report P20). 
The performed governance system in both WMAs and CBFM is one where the moral 
economy of local communities partly governs the processes of enforcement and sanctioning.  
It is important to note that these informal institutions not only govern the actions of scouts, 
the VNRC and the offenders, but are also a vehicle for the development of patron-client 
relations and the emergence of multiple forms of corrupt practice (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  
                                                 




In the next section I discuss three processes of corrupt practice ongoing within Tanzanian 
CBNRM: neopatrimonlialism, bribery and clientelism.  These practices exist in tandem with 
the prescribed governance system in a balance of political and moral-economic factors 
making up the processes of ‘real governance’ (see Olivier de Sardan, 2008).  They are 
therefore, further core features of the performed governance system. 
7.4 The Corruption Complex  
In this section, I begin to consider the hidden aspects of governance that constitute different 
types of corruption.  There are many different classifications within this area, and I follow 
Olivier De Sardan’s (1999: 26-7) terminology of the ‘corruption complex’ as an umbrella 
term for “a number of illicit practices...[which] offer the possibility of illegal enrichment, and 
the use and abuse to this end of positions of authority”.  Such a definition could encompass 
many techniques including classic corruption, nepotism, clientelism, embezzlement, abuse of 
power, misappropriation, influence pedalling, prevarication, insider trading and abuse of 
public funds (Olivier De Sardan, 1999).   
It is important to note that the processes of corruption identified within the Kiwere Village 
Land Forest Reserve (VLFR) and MBOMIPA WMA are closely linked to the power 
struggles described in 6.3: Neopatrimonialism, bribery and clientelism all take place within a 
formal context of established rules and governance processes (see Kelsall, 2011).  
Uncertainty and a lack of transparency are vital to the continuation of these informal 
processes, upon which political legitimacy rests (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  The protection of 
power and discursive construction of scale described through the control of information and 
empowerment in 6.3.1 are vital to the maintenance of these corrupt practices (Moss, 1995; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999), and constitute important tricks of the game therefore.   
7.4.1 The Corruption Complex: Neopatrimonialism 
Neopatrimonialism involves the distribution of public goods for private benefit (see 2.1.3), 
and within African societies is widely regarded as a ‘perk of the job’ to which those in 
positions of responsibility are entitled (Bayart, 1993; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  The perks of 
the job available to different actors within CBFM and the WMA are clearly closely related to 
the issue of elite capture of benefits discussed in section 6.2.  The capture of benefits within 
CBFM and WMAs, particularly by those working as leaders on the VNRC and AA takes 
place partly through legitimate means within the prescribed governance system (see 6.2.1), 
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but is joined by myriad accusations of neopatrimonlialism through money being ‘creamed 
off’ from public funds, creative accounting that covers private use of funds (Interview P9), 
alongside the issues of bribery discussed in this chapter.   Within the CBFM research village 
such claims were extremely widespread, whereas within the WMA research village, most of 
the interviewed village residents claimed not to know enough about the WMA to understand 
the sources of revenue, how these were distributed and how they were used for good or ill 
(see 6.3.1).  Amongst the AA Representatives however, accusations if improper use of funds 
became common again (Interviews P168, P175).   
Discussions with NGO staff and research assistants described a widespread culture within 
Tanzania of perks of the job.  They described this as especially related to NGO and 
development funding where supplementing pay with benefits such as expensive cars, travel 
expenses, invitation to training sessions and conferences and the ubiquitous per diem were 
standard practice expected by those working on such projects (Interviews P1, P4).  Olivier De 
Sardan (2011: 26) describes this as a characteristic of ‘project modes’ of local governance, 
which create an “oasis of prosperity, which is the envy of all public servants, whose ambition 
is to be hired by a project, or failing that, to be financed by it”.  Whilst this distribution of 
funds and perks may operate within the governance system, and be justified by a discourse of 
project maintenance and administrative duties, it exacerbates the capture of benefits by those 
already legitimately benefitting from their involvement in the VNRC and the AA.  The 
MBOMIPA case study provides an excellent example of such processes and techniques at 
work.  The AA recently purchased a new project vehicle, which was partly funded by the 
USAID totalling $22 500, alongside additional funding sources to cover the remaining costs 
of purchasing and paying the necessary duties on the vehicle (Interview P101).  This large 
expense was justified as enabling effective patrols and facilitating management of the project, 
but is likely to bring large benefits to the leaders of the AA, who will gain access to the 
vehicle both to travel to meetings and for personal use when they feel able to justify or 
conceal such use.   
The AA also exemplifies neopatrimonialism through its expenses system.  Large amounts of 
money can be accrued through expenses claims: MBOMIPA representatives were eligible to 
claim up to TSh 45 00073 ($31) for each meeting they attended (Interview P109).  Recent 
conflict because some representatives claim more expenses than others resulted in each 
                                                 




representative being given a flat rate of TSh 51 000 ($35) plus the cost of their travel 
expenses (Interview P109).  Respondents involved with the Board of Trustees for 
MBOMIPA reported that some representatives were very keen to hold as many meetings as 
possible in order to be eligible to claim such expenses as frequently as possible (Interview 
P103).  They described this as a type of corruption within the AA, whereby the committees 
“swallow up huge amounts of the budget, leaving just a small amount for the villages” 
(Interview P103).  The major categories of expenditures in the MBOMIPA accounts are 
shown in Table 7.1.  This corroborates the argument that management costs are a legitimate 
but high proportion of the expenditure of the AA.  Whilst this category is the smallest 
proportion of the total, the accounts detail that it was spent exclusively on allowances, travel 
and accommodation expenses related to meetings, training and visits to other WMAs and 
mobile phone credit for representatives (totalling 44 individuals).  These claims are not 
against the rules, but do represent clear examples of the abuse of office and the maximisation 





Expenditure (US$) 2007-8 
 
Proportion of total 
(%) 
 












22,910 52 45,553 50 
 
 
There were also a number is discrepancies within the accounts, however, which complicated 
assessment of how funds were spent.  For example, a driver’s allowance is recorded twice for 
the year 2008-9 with different amounts for each, and adjustments to the constitution of the 
AA are recorded under ‘development activities’.  Whilst the development activities budget is 
the largest category in the expenditure, these funds are split between 21 participating villages 
(and a total population of over 30,000 people).  Each village received just $828 for the year 
2007-8 and $1,448 for the year 2008-9.  Likewise the expenditure for protection is large, but 
conceals the fact that the expenditure that ended up in the pockets of scouts and drivers for 
each year was a total of $7,634 (2007-8) and $14,883 (2008-9), making up just 59% and 58% 
Table 7.1: MBOMIPA Authorised Association Expenditure by Category 2007-9.  These data 
were provided in the official accounts of the AA. 
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of the total protection costs respectively.  It is unclear from the accounts what the remaining, 
fairly large protection expenditures were.   
It becomes very difficult to assess the ways in which funds, as recorded in the official 
accounts, are actually being used.  Many of the transactions taking place are hidden 
(deliberately or due to poor accounting skills) within the official figures, and a large number 
of transactions reportedly took place outside of the formal economy of the VNRC and AA.  
For example, at a village meeting requests for made for the committee members not to “hide 
yourselves in the information” (Interview P148), relating to the perception that figures 
provided to the wider community concealed many private uses and benefits under official 
categories.  Such processes and techniques take place within the “realm of rumours and 
suspicion” (Olivier De Sardan, 1999: 30) and, considering the sensitivity of such topics 
within interviews and discussion groups, it was very difficult to verify such accusations.   
Although extensive triangulation was attempted to gain as much depth of insight into the 
validity of such claims, caution must be advised in accepting such accusations as truth.  For 
example, within the CBFM research village, accusations that the leaders of the project “use 
the opportunities of being leaders to harvest timber and to make charcoal” (Local Assistant 
Report P13) were common, but it was not clear how much of this use is legitimate and how 
much is illegal.  It is clear from the research I carried out in Kiwere, and in other studies 
carried out (e.g. Lund and Treue, 2008) that leaders of the VNRC are able to benefit from 
CBFM through the purchase of permits, partly because they usually come from richer socio-
economic groups and have the funds available to participate in the project, and also partly 
because, as leaders of the VNRC, their applications for permits are unlikely to be refused.  
The latter of these processes indicates a ‘perks of the job’ component of such 
neopatrimonlialism, which was commonly thought to be accompanied by more sinister 
components of deliberate embezzlement and illegal harvesting: “the leaders make charcoal 
and steal timber without permits for their own activities” (Local Assistant Report P13); “the 
question to ask is whether they follow the procedure of obtaining a permit, and if they do, 
how is it that they can produce large amounts of charcoal whilst the activity for the rest of the 
community is forbidden?” (Local Assistant Report P22).  The boundaries between 
unfortunate (but legitimate) capture of participation and benefits, perks of the job and the 
abuse of power and funds within neopatrimonialism remain very unclear.    
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The accusations and widely-held beliefs that those working on the VNRC and the AA were 
closely involved with illegal activities could support the argument made by Brockington 
(2008: 118) that in Tanzania he witnessed a lack of faith in official figures and those holding 
positions of public office, claiming that, generally, “the expectation was that money will be 
misspent and positions abused for personal profit”.  Chabal & Daloz (1999) similarly outlined 
this situation as one of resigned fatalism and the expectation of the abuse of power.  Such 
expectations and a level of acceptance of the benefits enjoyed by those holding positions of 
power was expressed in a report by a local assistant in the CBFM village: “every leader does 
his work considering his own interests first, before he considers those of the community.  
Even if others are elected, they can have the same customs as the first leaders who are 
involved in bad uses of the money and leadership positions” (Local Assistant Report P20).  
Such discourses of acceptance and inevitability could be seen to represent the internalisation 
of such values and the subjectification of the corruption complex (Gaventa, 1982; Lukes, 
2005).  This is indicative of the first form of power outlined by Haugaard (2003).  He termed 
this type of power construction ‘causal predictability’ created through structuration and 
confirm structuration whereby social meaning is reproduced and recognised by actors (see 
Table 2.1).  This example indicates that the social power entitling certain actors to perks of 
the job and to employ tricks of the game have been internalised.  In this situation the 
members of the community may recognise the practice of neopatrimonialism and perks of the 
job but do not attempt to overthrow the system which supports these processes, but seek to 
position themselves to benefit in these ways.  The politics of scales and conflicts described in 
6.3 were described as a struggle for power over natural resources and the benefits from them.  
Neopatrimonial forms of exchange and the perks of the job form an important element of 
these (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Robbins, 2000). 
Olivier De Sardan (1999) argues that African forms of corruption are simultaneously 
despised, generalised and banalised, usually going uncontested and supporting Brockington’s 
(2008) thesis that people have become both accustomed to and expectant of such practices.  
Such a discourse of corruption expressing both expectation and inevitability of perks for 
those in power was exemplified by one villager in the CBFM village who said that he “had 
no suggestions about improving the management of the forest because even if they changed 
the leaders, the new people would do exactly the same as the last ones” (Interview P53).  
Stories of the embezzlement of funds by specific members of the VNRC and accusations that 
the MBOMIPA leaders had utilised the funding available for educating two orphans from 
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each village for their own children, or those of their friends and relatives, were good 
examples of this (Interviews P4, P109, Local Assistant Reports P13, P17).  
Chabal & Daloz (1999) argued that the informality of African politics and the disorder on 
which it rests provides opportunities for those that know how to play the game and get the 
most from it.  This is similar to an argument put forward by Olivier De Sardan  (1999), who 
claimed that a ‘logic of predatory authority’ in African political systems creates a belief by 
those in power, and often more widely, that such a position entitles one to certain benefits, 
creating a discourse of entitlement and serving oneself.  He states that “illegal enrichment and 
nepotism are definitely supported by positive social values, namely the necessity to seize all 
opportunities” (Olivier De Sardan, 1999: 43).  In Tanzania these arguments can be closely 
linked to a discourse of self-help, which has played an important role during the socialist and 
multi-party democracy periods in Tanzania (see 3.2).  Such arguments are important to the 
issues surrounding patrols discussed in 7.2.1, within which it is commonly argued that 
increasing scouts’ wages for carrying out patrols will provide the incentive required to reduce 
instances of bribery and deviations from policy.  According to Olivier De Sardan’s view 
(1999), taking such measures will not necessarily lead to any such changes on behalf of the 
scouts, who will be driven to utilise opportunities for bribery regardless of the wages they 
receive. 
7.4.2 The Corruption Complex: Bribery 
As discussed above, there were extensive rumours and beliefs of the widespread acceptance 
of bribes by the scouts, the VNRC and leaders of the AA.  Bribes were believed to be offered 
and accepted for allowing illegal goods to leave the forest, for allowing hunting to take place 
in the WMA in excess of the quota or without proper permits to hunt (Local Assistant Report 
P25, Focus Group P59, Interviews P103, P168), which one villager from Kiwere discussed as 
a process of “they [users, scouts and the VNRC]join hands and the goods pass through” 
(Focus Group P59), whilst a local assistant recorded in his report that people believed that 
“the fines that are given out by the leaders, for the most part are for their own advantage but 
to help the community is just a small percentage” (Local Assistant Report P25).  Similarly a 
tourist operator discussed how in MBOMIPA “the project has got worse as its got bigger 
because corruption has grown along with it” (Interview P103).  My study confirms the 
arguments made by Brockington (2008) and Olivier De Sardan (1999) that such corrupt 
practices invoke criticism but little retribution or social action.  In the previous section I 
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discussed the internalisation of values that emphasise the maximisation of private benefits to 
explain this, yet here I offer an additional explanation that works alongside this.   
Investigation into the suspicions, rumours and accusations of bribery and other techniques 
suggested that these could also be influenced by the lack of understanding and engagement 
by the wider community with CBFM and the WMA.  For example, suspicions of bribery 
within the CBFM research village were very prevalent, and closely related to people’s 
perceived lack of understanding of how the system works and inability to hold the VNRC and 
forest scouts to account.  One villager described widespread bribery and pocketing of bribes 
and confiscated goods but, when asked about this in further detail, the respondent explained 
that he/she presumed this was going on because, if it wasn’t being pocketed by the scouts and 
the VNRC, he did not know where these goods or the money was going (Local Assistant 
Report P14).  A local assistant corroborated such processes by reporting that the lack of 
information shared with villagers led many to believe the something was being hidden (Local 
Assistant Report P15).   
The accusations made against the leaders of the committees in both of the case studies 
suggest that, whilst the power structure is reified by the control of information and prevention 
of the construction of discursive consciousness within the wider community (see Table 2.1), 
this does not go entirely unchallenged. The internalisation of values that facilitate corruption 
does not prevent it from being widely decried in Tanzania (see Fig. 7.1), and featuring 
prominently in political scandals.  It was very difficult to gauge to what extent the 
accusations of bribery and other forms of corruption were accurate within both the WMA and 
CBFM case studies.  I argue that claims of corruption may be a political weapon employed 
by the wider population as a form of resistance to the power system in place.  Actors may 
attempt to position themselves to benefit from the mechanisms of corruption and tricks of the 
game discussed in this chapter by facilitating the removal of the leaders of the AA or VNRC 
through accusations of corrupt practice.  Scott (1990) describes how this kind of resistance, 
presented as a hidden transcript, does not necessarily reflect the truth of the situation, but it is 
an important mechanism by which the dominant power system can be destabilised.  Here, I 
argue, there is a link to the discussion of politics of scales and the role of conflicts within 
such power struggles, as described in 6.3.  The accusations of bribery and other forms of 
corruption may be a political strategy employed as part of politics of scales and scalecraft.  
Actors use such tactics to destabilise the scalar topography in the process of attempting to 
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negotiate the system of power and position themselves to benefit from it (Fraser, 2010; see 










































Fig. 7.1: Government Anti-Corruption Poster (Institute for the Cessation and 
Contestation of Corruption, Government of Tanzania).  The poster, displayed in the 
Village Council Offices in Kiwere, shows a political campaign in which the speaker is making 
promises of food and money to the local community, whilst his assistant is anticipating the 
bribes they will receive from these people.  A member of the crowd is protesting that the 
people are hungry, whilst one man is walking away saying that this type of corruption only 
brings bad leaders and he refuses to be a part of it. The bottom of the poster reads: “If you 
involve yourself with electoral corruption, you inhibit the growth of democracy and good 
governance.  Stop corruption.” 
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7.4.3 The Corruption Complex: Clientelism 
There are several ways in which the boundaries between ‘good neighbourliness’, bribery and 
clientelism are blurred within the case studies, especially in MBOMIPA, where such issues 
were a dominant complaint of the MBOMIPA representatives.  Whilst the processes that are 
described in this section could be classified in several different ways according to the type 
and characteristics of tricks of the game they represent, I discuss them together as they all 
display impacts upon the decision-making processes taking place within the case studies, and 
relationships of patronage can be identified.  Some elements of the processes discussed here 
are open, whilst others are hidden, although all operate outside of the prescribed governance 
system. 
Within MBOMIPA a clear set of close relationships has developed between the Board of 
Trustees, the leaders of the AA, current WMA investors, and potential future investors.  In 
one sense these relationships are cultivated by the investors themselves, who declare the 
importance of building good working relationships with the leaders of the AA, following the 
concept of ‘good neighbourliness’ that is very prevalent in Tanzania since its socialist era 
(see 3.2.2).  The importance of gift-giving and the moral duty this involves within African 
cultures (see Olivier De Sardan, 1999) contributes to such processes and has resulted in 
investors providing gifts of food, drinks, trips to visit the investors and cash (Interview P102).  
The importance of such gifts to smooth the process of applications was demonstrated within 
the research village where a potential investor in the village (not the WMA) had, prior to the 
signing of investment contracts, provided TSh 400 000 ($276) to the Village Council, which 
was explained as a gift to the village to help with development activities (Village Meeting 
P186).  Whilst members of the Board of Trustees claimed that for the WMA they always 
discouraged such activities (Interview P102), researchers working in the area and MBOMIPA 
representatives claimed that the trustees were complicit in such activities, had close 
relationships with investors and that their advice to the AA was often influenced by these 
clientelist relationships (Interviews P86, P175):  “it has appeared over the past few years that 
the advice they give is not in the best interests of the project or villages, but involves personal 
gain for them, or support for their friends’ bids” (Interview P86).  The Board of Trustees is 
made up of prominent local businessmen, the majority of whom run tourist-related 
enterprises, including safari companies and hotels.  The nature of their work was described as 
a benefit by district officials who claimed that it gave them a real interest and often valuable 
experience in this sector, which MBOMIPA must work within (Interview P88).  One 
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MBOMIPA representative described how the nature of the business interests of those serving 
on the Board of Trustees made them too closely connected to MBOMIPA.  One of the 
members of the board had been the owner of an existing tourist lodge within the MBOMIPA 
area and is now one of the official investors in the WMA, whilst others were setting up 
investment contracts on village land around the WMA (Interview P175).  The respondent 
argued that they could not provide good advice when they were so closely related and 
financially involved with the WMA and its activities.   
The manipulation of decision-making for private interests is closely linked to the discussion 
of manipulation as part of the re-scaling of both forest harvesting within CBFM and 
MBOMIPA revenue systems in section 6.3.3.  MBOMIPA representatives and village 
authorities from one village who participated in a group discussion described how they would 
prefer the Chairman and Secretary of MBOMIPA to be employed from outside the 
participating villages because “these are very influential positions and important decisions 
are made by them and, at the moment, these people still represent their own villages’ 
interests, not solely the interests of the WMA” (Interview P137).  The leaders of the AA were 
also accused of biased opinions regarding the conflict within the WMA (concerning the 
distribution of revenues between the participating villages; see 6.3.4.2), and these 
respondents argued that as the leaders came from villages in Idodi that have all contributed 
land, their handling of the conflict would be severely compromised by the additional benefits 
these villages would receive if the revenue system were altered (Interview P137). 
Clearly, mechanisms of clientelism hold potentially significant financial benefits for the 
agents within the relationship, who respondents described as benefitting from large sums of 
money from investors wishing to hold favour with the leaders of the AA (Interview P86).  
The impacts of such relationships extend beyond these financial transactions however, into 
the decision-making processes within the AA, where reports of those thought to be 
benefitting from such arrangements are described as pushing the other representatives to 
make decisions according to the wishes of the investors they are closely related to, and even 
to attempt to circumvent the prescribed governance system and the constitution of the WMA 
in favour of these investors.  MBOMIPA Representatives claimed that “at the last budget 
meeting, the leaders tried to use the WMA regulations of 2005 instead of those issued in 
2010.  This brought an argument and caused many of the representatives to believe that they 
wanted to benefit some of the investors with whom they have close relationships” (Interview 
P172).  Interviews with MBOMIPA representatives revealed that a decision had been made to 
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allow one of the investors to hunt within a zone of the WMA that, according to the 
management plan, is reserved for non-consumptive tourist activities only.  The respondents 
described how the leaders of the AA had persuaded the others to allow this for the year 2009 
on the basis that the investor could not collect any revenue from the planned lodge until 
construction is complete.  The leaders of the AA suggested that they should support his 
proposal of hunting as a way to allow the investor to collect revenue in the meantime “but the 
shocking thing is that nobody knows how many animals he hunted” (Interview P172).  The 
representatives decided that this was unacceptable and refused to allow the leaders to let this 
continue, causing much conflict within the AA and between the AA and the investor, who 
“after he was refused his request for the year 2010 refused to pay the money owed to the AA 
as part of his investment contract” (Interview P175).  This refusal to pay his investment 
contract fee to the AA is one of the primary reasons why the development budget for the year 
2009-10 decreased dramatically, and each village received just $552.  The impacts of such 
relationships can be very tangible for the communities participating in MBOMIPA, therefore. 
The close relationships between the leaders of the AA and investors were explained by others 
as due to demands from the leaders for rewards, gifts and money, amounting to extortion 
rather than clientelist offerings from the investors: “the chairman called the investor on the 
phone and demanded 15 million shillings [$10 344] so that he could rent a tractor, and when 
the investor refused, he [chairman] phoned the wife of the investor and told her that her 
husband had denied him the money and the chairman would see if the investor would 
continue hunting in the WMA” (Interview P175).  The same MBOMIPA representative went 
on to explain that the investor had been pressured into putting payments into private 
accounts, rather than the MBOMIPA account and had often been asked to provide extra 
money for MBOMIPA resources, such as the purchase of a spare wheel for the vehicle 
(Interview P175).  Cash transactions were also reported to take place between the leaders of 
the AA and local villagers applying for work when available within the WMA “so that they 
get preferential treatment...the work available is down to the leaders who look after their 
friends and family and those that can provide an incentive” (Interview P191).  It is not clear 
whether these techniques of clientelism and nepotism are initiated by those applying for work 
and wishing to enhance their application, or by the leaders themselves.  Once again, the 




Such relationships of clientelism were also apparent in the CBFM research village, although I 
sensed to a smaller extent.  The domination of forest harvesting by village tobacco farmers 
using firewood for curing of their crops, as discussed in 6.3.4.1, also represents a relationship 
of patronage.  The chairman of the VNRC in the research village is a tobacco farmer, and is 
also heavily involved with a tobacco cooperative between the villages of Kiwere and 
neighbouring Mgera.  The chairman organises the permits for collection of the firewood and 
transport from the forest, which as mentioned before puts the tobacco farmers within the 
cooperative at an advantage over the other uses of the forest, particularly the charcoal 
producers who have been excluded from the project (see 6.3.4.1), creating a clientelist 
relationship.  This relationship, however, extends beyond the tobacco farmers of Kiwere; a 
recent controversy had erupted at the time of fieldwork because the chairman of the VNRC 
had purchased a single permit for the farmers from Kiwere and those members of the 
cooperative who come from Mgera.  As external users of the forest they should pay a higher 
price for access to these resources according to the management plan, but they had been 
charged the same rate as the Kiwere members of the cooperative (Interview P36). 
7.4.4 Scales of Corruption 
In this thesis, I have focused on gaining depth of insight into the everyday, petty forms of 
corruption that contribute to the disappointing and unexpected outcomes from both WMAs 
and CBFM.  Whilst the financial value of these mechanisms of corruption is far less than the 
rent-seeking behaviour and neopatrimonial systems apparent at the national and international 
levels between ministerial staff, wildlife hunting companies and timber companies (see also 
5.4.1), in this section I discuss how local forms of corruption may be linked to further scales 
of corruption and important as a component within a broader system. 
In the wildlife sector, several studies have pointed out the opacity of the hunting block 
allocation system and the opportunities for rent-seeking this provides (Nshala 1999; 
Sachedina, 2008; Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012).  Leader-Williams et al. (2009) describe 
how the liberalisation and neoliberal reform that began in the 1990s in Tanzania, alongside 
low public servant salaries, has produced a system of corruption around wildlife hunting that 
is endemic and systemic.  They argue that rent-seeking surrounding hunting block allocation, 
the issuing of presidential licences for hunting to personal friends of high level officials and 
the allocation of hunting blocks based on the private financial interests of high level officials 
(many of whom own smaller hunting companies) pose serious constraints on the transparency 
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and revenue generation of the wildlife hunting industry in Tanzania.  The roles of 
neopatrimonial forms of exchange and clientelist relations is clearly equally important at the 
national level as at the local, as discussed in this chapter.  Similarly, in the forest sector, the 
hidden aspects of timber markets at the national level have been discussed by Milledge et al. 
(2007), who argue that there are huge degrees of revenue loss (up to 96%) related to 
undervaluation and illegal forms of exchange that line the pockets of individuals involved in 
networks of forestry-related corruption spanning the international to district levels.  Milledge 
et al. (2007) argue that the expansion and globalisation of timber markets from Tanzania, 
alongside the opening up of new areas to timber trade through infrastructure developments 
(particularly through the Mkapa bridge in Southwest Tanzania) has been accompanied by the 
expansion of markets for collusion and concealed transactions.  As in the wildlife sector, they 
cite neopatrimonial networks and personal and institutional relationships between timber 
exporters and senior officials74, mechanisms of bribery and rent-seeking behaviour as critical 
to national level forestry-related corruption.  They also argue that fraudulent documentation 
and certification (particularly with respect to the authentication and certification of timber by 
‘hammer’ marking of timer products by District Authorities) is an important component 
within these networks. 
There may be important links between these national scales of corruption and the politics of 
scales described in section 6.3.  In the wildlife sector, the emergence of the AA consortium at 
the national level, and its specific interest in gaining political voice regarding hunting and 
block allocation decision-making (see 6.3.2.2) could indicate either an important challenge by 
members of the AAs across Tanzania to challenge the corruption complex surrounding 
hunting at the national level, or could represent the integration of these scales of corruption 
and the assimilation of local level actors into networks of corruption.  The discussion in 7.4.3 
of clientelist relationships and their impacts on decision-making regarding the MBOMIPA 
WMA indicate that this integration may be well underway, with increasing links between 
investors, the Board of Trustees and the leaders of the AA shaping investment agreements 
and neopatrimonial relationships, with real and material consequences on the WMA, the 
villages, and villagers that participate in it.  In the forestry sector, the indication of 
widespread corruption relating to forest products, and particularly the involvement of District 
Officials in these networks, indicates a potential link with the politics of scales discussed in 
                                                 
74 Over half of the 28 timber companies they investigated had institutional linkages with senior Tanzanian 
officials (Milledge et al., 2007). 
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section 6.3.2.1.  The interference of the District Authorities in local level electoral processes 
and their vested interest in keeping the same individuals in office within the VNRC was 
described by one respondent as due to the facilitation of corruption (see 6.3.2.1), indicating 
the incorporation of CBFM, and specifically project leaders at the local level into these 
networks.  This is supported by Sachedina’s discussion of corrupt practice, in which he cites 
a district officer offering to teach a member of the village government the “tricks of fraud” 
(2008: 170).  In both sectors, the scaling down of national level corruption networks and 
mechanisms, and the incorporation of project leaders into these networks provides further 
incentive for the control of information and reinforcement of power through discursive scalar 
construction described in 6.3.1, which serves not only to hide from view the local processes 
of the corruption complex, but also the links to wider networks and scales of corruption 
ongoing within the natural resources sector.  In the next section, I discuss how the integration 
and maintenance of these networks of corruption need to be considered in the context of the 
socially-embedded mechanisms that support them. 
7.5 Cultural Aspects of Power and Corruption 
“In a face-to-face society, the price of open conflicts is too high” 
Olivier De Sardan (1999: 30) 
This section discusses the performance of policy by considering the cultural context into 
which CBNRM has been implemented in the research villages.  In exploring corruption as a 
part of a moral economy of production (see 2.1.3; Chabal and Daloz, 1999), the social 
mechanisms of corruption and “the value systems and cultural codes, which permit a 
justification of corruption by those who practice it (and do not necessarily consider it to be 
such – quite the contrary), and to anchor corruption in ordinary everyday practice” (Olivier 
De Sardan, 1999: 26-27) must be a research focus.  In this section I address such social 
norms, considering them as a component of the tricks of the game that, to borrow the word 
from Olivier De Sardan, ‘communicate’ with corruption. Such factors are also important for 
adding depth of insight to the power struggles discussed in chapter 6 and to the aspects of 
power that could be involved with the issues explored in this chapter. 
Power systems within Tanzanian communities are clearly not limited to the politics 
surrounding the management of natural resources under CBNRM.  Such politics are instead 
mapped onto existing systems, hierarchies and inequalities within the village context and 
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wider institutions (Hyden, 2005; 2008).  Pre-colonial systems are mixed with colonial 
regimes and post-colonial developments to produce complex governance systems that make 
up the performed governance system that has been the focus of this chapter (Hyden, 2008).  
In this section, I attempt to highlight the key features of Tanzanian culture that I witnessed 
influencing and shaping the management of natural resources by communities. 
Participant observation in village meetings and time spent with villagers in both research 
villages supported a common observation of the prevalence of hierarchy and respect, both for 
elders (see Pepinsky, 1992) and for those with an official title, and the significance placed 
upon bureaucratic procedures and following protocol.  This was also particularly apparent 
when dealing with administrative tasks related to conducting fieldwork in Tanzania.  
Discussions with other researchers and international NGO staff working in the study area also 
highlighted the important role of ‘accepting one’s place’ within the hierarchy and following 
the social norms surrounding dealing with official matters (Interviews P6, P7).  Such 
procedures were very apparent at village meetings, where a strict protocol was followed 
regarding the agenda and management of meetings, and where demonstrating appropriate 
respect for Village Council officials was of paramount importance.  Such demonstrations 
usually included addressing the person by their title, and using a discourse of deference with 
respect to those in power.  Raised eyebrows from those holding office and uncomfortable 
shuffling and floor gazing from the wider community were noted when an individual failed to 
follow these rules.  In the rare cases where I witnessed outright defiance from an individual 
towards those in power, this was quickly addressed by a high-ranking official within the 
village who would berate the outspoken individual for their poor manners and exert their 
authority over the meeting, insisting that all contributions were invited by the Village 
Officers.   
Whilst an important feature of the participatory processes within CBNRM, hierarchy and 
respect for those in power was not dictatorial in the research villages, and whilst speaking out 
of turn was severely frowned upon, the strict rules governing how and when a person may 
address a meeting also created space to ensure that all participants were given an opportunity 
to speak.  The importance of hierarchy and respect for those who sit at the top of it was 
discussed by an academic researcher as contributing to problems within CBNRM because “It 
is difficult to challenge up the hierarchy, and this is exacerbated by the current set up of the 
institutions... Who has the power to remove the Chairman?  Someone has to just come up.  
This requires courage” (Interview P7).  The same respondent went on to describe how this 
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created problems when an individual working on the committees was deemed to be doing a 
poor job, because it can be very difficult to remove such a person (Interview P7).  
Disagreement with the leaders of the VNRC or WMA was usually voiced using specific 
responses that thanked the official for their contribution and then requested permission to 
contribute to their ideas, in an attempt to make suggestions rather than appear confrontational 
(Interview P7).  Brockington (2006) previously identified a similar process taking place in 
Tanzania whereby the ‘weak speak to the strong’ through official discourses, for example in 
requests for increased accountability rather than direct accusations of corruption, and thereby 
employ tactics of manipulation and subversion, rather than conflict and open resistance.  
Avoiding conflict was seen as an important social skill, underlying which is a consideration 
of long-term relationships over immediate issues combined with expected reverence for those 
in power.     
Social norms can also play an important role when family members work together on a 
committee, making it inappropriate to disagree with a relation in such a setting (Interview 
P7).  Customary rules regarding the participation of women in such meetings and their 
subordination to men also played a role in the meetings that I observed, where even when 
invited to speak, women were uneasy doing so.  When discussed with groups of women in 
the village, one explained to me that she and her friends didn’t like to speak at the meetings 
in case they said something stupid.  As we discussed this topic whilst cooking outside her 
house following a meeting earlier that day she said “for women it’s different.  Here we can 
speak, but not there” (Interview P138).  The gender aspects of participation are well-known 
(e.g. Guijt and Shah, 1998; Cornwall, 2003; Cornwall, 2004), and the policies for CBNRM in 
Tanzania include regulations to ensure a proportion of women are elected to serve on the 
VNRC and as WMA Representatives.  The comments of women within the research villages 
highlight the fact that ensuring presence does not necessarily lead to meaningful 
participation, and that participation is still subject to multiple types of power relations within 
and around committees 
Aspects of power were clear in relation to the norms of participation and reverence for those 
in office.  The protocols surrounding speaking publicly and in challenging the leaders of the 
VNRC and the AA could be seen as exemplifying the structuration and confirming-
structuration of power, as described by Haugaard (2003), whereby the symbolic act of 
attaching meaning through following these rules confirms and strengthens the power 
structures they represent.  I also observed that many villagers were unwilling to appear to be 
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complaining about individuals that hold office or the management of the forest and the 
WMA.  One group of respondents explained that they could not discuss the problems they 
saw with the project “because it would be like saying we don’t want MBOMIPA” (Village 
Preliminary Survey P132).   Taken together, these embodiments of power in the way people 
speak and act reflect the subjectification of villagers and the internalisation of values and 
norms that legitimise the power systems in place and the appropriate behaviour with respect 
to those in power.  They form an example of governmentality (see Foucault, 1980).  The 
research findings also support the argument that there is a strong spatial element to both 
participation and power, with the women I spoke to happier to discuss CBNRM, the 
committees and the problems they perceived with the management of natural resources away 
from men, but also away from spaces they perceived as the domain of men (see Kesby, 2005; 
Kesby, 2007).  In this respect they demonstrated the internalisation of values regarding the 
subordination of women to men, reinforced these power systems through their behaviour at 
meetings.  In the next section I bring together the discussions of rule-breaking and local 
systems of power, including neopatrimonialism and respect for officials to consider the 
emergence of big men within the performed governance systems of Tanzanian CBNRM.  
7.5.1 Cultural Aspects of Corruption: The Tanzanian Big Man 
In combination with the clustering of power in the hands of a small number of individuals 
working on the VNRC and AA, both the CBFM and WMA case studies indicated a 
phenomenon similar to that of ‘big man’ politics (see 2.1.3; Sahlins, 1963).  The concept of 
the big man has been applied outside of Melanesia, with parallels drawn in Africa, for a 
person who has achieved leadership status through wealth and personality and has created a 
large group of supporters (Brown, 1990).  Here I argue that the personal power of such 
individuals, elected to positions of power within the VNRC and the AA, are combined with 
the authority of public office in Tanzania, and the culture of respect and reverence discussed 
above.  A key aspect of the ‘big man’ concept is loyalty, which has also been noted in 
Tanzania in the dangers of speaking out against village authorities and the tensions between 
Village Officers, whereby “the council was not a balance to the chairman’s powers” 
(Brockington, 2008: 118).  The demands placed upon myself and my research assistants 
when dealing with the leaders of MBOMIPA supported the concept of them acting as big 
men, and I argue that this is more pronounced in the WMA than in the CBFM case study 
because of the scalar topographies of power associated with each.  In the WMA, the scaling 
of governance processes to the level of the AA (and the uncomfortable relationship with the 
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Village Government this produces), alongside the large sums of money that are managed by 
the AA, and the direct links formed between the leaders of the AA, national level investors 
and influential businessmen that make up the Board of Trustees have contributed to this.  The 
concept of big man politics is present not only in the respect that must be shown to the 
leaders of the projects, particularly in the WMA, but also in the decision-making processes 
ongoing within the VNRC and the AA.  As discussed in section 6.2.1, there is a clear 
concentration of power, knowledge, training, and to a certain extent benefits with those who 
are elected on to the VNRC and to serve as MBOMIPA Representatives.  Furthermore, 
within the committees such benefits are gathered at the level of the leaders in particular, and 
the pattern of decision-making often follows this.  Powerful individuals holding the most 
prestigious and powerful roles within the committee often take on the responsibility of 
making management decisions, without necessarily following participatory mechanisms with 
the wider committee (Interview P7).  The status of such individuals makes it difficult for such 
a situation to be challenged, regardless of the written management agreement for the forest or 
WMA. 
Further to the instances of rule-breaking and deviations from policy described in 7.2, the 
performed governance systems indicated that participatory processes of decision-making in 
both the AA and the VNRC (see 5.2.1 and 5.2.3) were often not followed, and decision-
making power was commonly described as concentrated in the hands of the leaders of the 
VNRC and the AA, resulting in decisions being made by these same few individuals without 
consultation or with retrospective consultation with other members of the AA, VNRC or the 
wider communities (e.g. Interview P7).  One MBOMIPA representative voiced his frustration 
that “an investor can send a letter of application and then you hear that the leaders have sat 
to discuss and have decided that the investor is suitable without consulting with other 
representatives” (Interview P171). Other MBOMIPA representatives complained that “there 
are times when the leaders of MBOMIPA do not implement decisions that have been agreed 
by the Chairmen of the villages” (Interview P170), and explained that “it’s possible that 
[decisions are taken by the leaders alone] because of the geography of the area and the 
difficulty of meeting with the other representatives if such a situation is shown to be an 
emergency.  Other times you discover that one of the leaders makes a decision for himself, 
not according to the rules of the association” (Interview P174).  Narratives and explanations 
for individuals acting on their own commonly drew on ideas of necessity and the large 
distances between the WMA villages making it infeasible to bring MBOMIPA 
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Representatives together for all decisions.  These politically-neutral explanations also served 
to reify the power structures within the AA, positioning the leaders of the AA as legitimately 
able to make decisions on behalf of the WMA in its entirety.  Here there is clearly a link to 
the protection of power, the discursive construction of scale and the control of information 
(see 6.3.1) which, together with the social norms protecting the social standing of individuals 
in office, served to promote and maintain the big man status of the leaders of the VNRC and 
the AA. 
7.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed the hidden aspects of the performed governance systems in 
Tanzanian CBNRM.  These hidden aspects are made up of ‘rules of the game’, which do not 
necessarily follow the governance systems prescribed in policy, but are seen to incorporate 
ideas of moral economy, reciprocity and social norms, alongside ‘tricks of the game’ which 
are processes and mechanisms by which actors can get around the rules of CBFM and the 
WMA and the sanctions that they might face.  It is clear that deviations from the prescribed 
governance system are plentiful, especially in instances of rule-breaking by numerous groups 
both within and outside of the research villages.  There are also significant issues with 
enforcement of the rules which both facilitates rule-breaking and is caused by deficiencies 
within the prescribed governance system.  The patrol systems in place within the CBFM case 
study highlight these issues and currently represents a system in which patrolling, as outlined 
in the management plan for the forest, is unrealistic for the scouts, thereby promoting rule-
breaking within the forest, as people do not expect to be apprehended, but also facilitates 
systems of bribery when they are. 
Power is critical to understanding the hidden aspects of the governance systems being 
performed in the case studies.  The common belief that leaders of  both the VNRC and the 
AA benefit from illegal use of the forest and wildlife resources they are elected to manage, 
and the funds generated from their management, generally goes unchallenged within the case 
studies, and in many cases has been accepted as inevitable.  This highlights the ways in which 
such individuals hold protected positions of power within the research villages, shielded from 
investigation by the control of information and social norms that demand respect from the 
wider community, although still subject to accusations.  I have argued that the leaders of the 
VNRC and the MBOMIPA representatives generally hold important social positions within 
their own villages, characterised by wealthy individuals who employ many other villagers 
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and are large personalities within the community, or so called ‘big men’.  Such status may be 
a contributing factor to their election to the VNRC and the AA, which consolidates their 
power and status within the governance systems of CBFM and the WMA. 
The case studies also highlight the ways in which such social norms communicate with 
corruption, normalising the seizing of opportunities and expectation of ‘perks of the job’ for 
those elected to serve on the VNRC and the AA.  The examples of clientelism discussed in 
this chapter also highlight how such relationships are facilitated by the communal, rather than 
individual culture in Tanzania, and the importance of good neighbourliness, fostering  good 
inter-personal relations within working relationships and the practice of gift-giving.  These 
are crucial aspects of the socio-political processes within the performance of policy, which 
are hidden and unrecognised by the prescribed governance system, but which have important 
impacts upon the governance systems in place and the distribution of benefits resulting from 
the WMA and CBFM.  
I argue that the status of the leaders of the VNRC and the AA and their ability to benefit from 
these positions is both a product of their protected social positions, but also a process of 
governmentality in which villagers have internalised and automatically confirm-structure the 
legitimacy of their authority and the normality of the processes through which they benefit 
from these positions (see also 6.3.1).  This does not mean that these processes are blindly 
supported, however: instances of the corruption complex at work within both case studies are 
a common source of complaints within the village, and serve as a focal point for resistance to 
the power regime, but, like the form of power they involve, these forms of resistance are 
subtle.  Villagers often speak privately of the injustices they see within the governance 
system, but in public they call upon official discourses of accountability, rather than conflict-
inducing accusations.  This suggests support for the ‘public and hidden transcripts’ described 
by Scott (1990).  In the case studies the public transcript was used not only to appear 
acquiescent with the regime, but also as a vehicle to address the issues within the hidden 
transcript, where this was too politically sensitive to be voiced directly.  Officials and the 
wider community are caught in a delicate discursive game therefore, in which the politics of 
natural resource management go undisclosed, and non-confrontational discourses are invoked 
by both the leaders of the project, who hide aspects of the performed governance system 
within them, and also by those seeking to challenge the power system in place, who utilise 
the official discourse to confront (without ever appearing to do so) the prescribed governance 
system, the power system it involves and the ways in which it is being performed.    
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The nature of power in the case study projects of CBNRM involves both the prescribed and 
performed governance systems, and the intricacies these entail.  As described in chapter 6, 
these power systems are not static, but involve constant manoeuvres by actors as part of the 
politics of natural resource management.  The hidden aspects of governance and especially 
the tricks of the game discussed in this chapter highlight some of the mechanisms and 
processes by which such manoeuvrings take place and the ways in which the prescribed 
governance system is mapped onto and melded around pre-existing power systems and social 
practices. 
Power is at work in the subjectification of people in both the case studies in several ways.  As 
described in 6.3.1, the protection of power and strengthening of the power exercised 
particularly by the leaders of the VNRC and the AA is evident in the control of information 
shared with the wider community within each of the case studies.  I argue that this situation, 
whether strategic or not, serves to legitimise the power of those elected to serve and 
reinforces the hierarchical nature of power and respect for official status described in this 
chapter.  Both processes drive the subjectification of the wider community, instilling values 
of acceptance, legitimacy and necessity of those individuals (who possess the appropriate 
knowledge, training and experience), to govern the Village Land Forest Reserve and the 
WMA on their behalf.  Concurrently the process of subjectification whereby the corruption 
complex described in this chapter has become socially normalised, especially with reference 
to the ‘perks of the job’ expected for leadership positions, legitimises and removes obstacles 
to the capture of benefits and misappropriation of funds apparent in both case studies.  
Members of the community are automatically confirm-structuring these systems of power, 
having internalised such systems as in their best interest and the inevitability of some 
‘leakage’ within the system. 
Ordinary villages are not blind to these processes however, which raises interesting questions 
about the nature of power and resistance within these performed governance systems.  It is 
clear from the findings in both this chapter and in chapter 6 that power and resistance are 
complex systems within the case studies.  Resistance could be characterised as the ways in 
which actors attempt to reconfigure power for their own benefit, particularly in the struggles 
and conflicts described in 6.3.4, and in the destabilisation of power systems through political 
accusations of bribery as described in this chapter.  I find that resistance is not always present 
or, at least, not always presented by everyone.  Instead, the performed governance systems in 
Tanzanian CBNRM indicate a delicate balance of the protection of power, subjectification to 
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that power, alongside processes of resistance to it.  The processes of resistance described 
within the politics of scales and the accusations made against elected officials within the 
project do not necessarily represent attempts to dismantle the power system completely, but 
instead are often attempts to re-shape the configuration of power in order to access and 














Previous studies of CBNRM in Tanzania have highlighted many issues, both with policy and 
with the outcomes witnessed.  The large discrepancies in the outcomes from CBNRM across 
the country (Lund, 2004), the presence of elite capture (Lund and Treue, 2008; Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009; Nelson et al., 2009), negative impacts of CBNRM 
(Meshack et al., 2006; Igoe and Croucher, 2007), concern over revenue systems in both 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM; 
Walsh, 2000; Meshack et al., 2006; Mustalahti, 2007) and poor implementation that has 
diverged from policy (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009; Mustalahti and 
Lund, 2009) have all been previously noted, although little explored.  In the wildlife sector, 
concerns over the ways in which power has been devolved to local communities for 
managing natural resources, and especially hunting systems, within Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs) has been a popular topic of debate and concern (Leader-Williams, 2000; 
Nelson, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007; Leader-Williams et al., 2009; Nelson and Blomley, 2010).  
Many of these issues are acknowledged in the recent ministerial reviews of both WMAs and 
CBFM around the country (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007; Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, 2008; Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2009; Health and 
Development International Consultants (HDIC), 2010).  This thesis has been designed to 
meet the challenge previously set by such studies to consider these issues in more depth and 
to investigate the socio-political processes underneath these phenomena (see Igoe and 
Croucher, 2007; Blomley et al., 2008b; Blomley et al., 2008a). 
In this thesis I set out to take a specifically socio-political lens to the study of Community-
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Tanzania.  In the preceding empirical 
chapters I have done this through an investigation of three over-lapping areas: the processes 
of policy reform and the prescription of policy; the performance of policy as seen through 
power structures and the struggles that take place around them; and the performance of policy 
as including hidden aspects of power and governance.  These three areas bring together the 
context in which CBNRM has developed and is being implemented in Tanzania, and 
theorises CBNRM as an integration of socio-political processes of politics, power and 
governance that take place across levels ranging from international and national level policy 
formulation through to the micro-politics of natural resource management at the local level.  I 
argue that an understanding of the outcomes from CBNRM and the issues described by other 
researchers as discussed above cannot ignore the role of such micro-politics, but also cannot 
consider them in isolation from the political-economic-social context in which CBNRM 
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developed as a national policy, and the socio-political forces that shaped it.  For example, as 
discussed in chapter 7, the problems with enforcement and the processes of rule-breaking 
within both the case studies were the result of the influences of both the prescribed 
governance system, which created disincentives for patrolling and enforcement, and were 
also partly facilitated by the moral economy of local communities in Tanzania, where cultural 
aspects of power and corruption also shaped enforcment and mechanisms of rule-breaking 
within the performed governance system.  In investigating how the reality of CBNRM in 
Tanzania is different from that prescribed in policy, my first conclusion is that the two exist 
in tandem, sometimes in conflict and always under processes of change and struggle.  The 
performed governance system is an amalgamation, and occasionally conflict, between the 
power systems prescribed in policy and local contexts of power.  The socio-political 
processes that take place around these contexts of power are partly outside of the prescribed 
governance system and operate within an informal realm, often hidden from view and not 
discussed openly, but they are present in reality and cannot be explained simply as poor 
implementation.   
Closely linked to this, my second conclusion is that the ‘how’ of governance processes is 
inescapably socio-political and represents a tangled mix of power-driven processes.  Power is 
a central driver in the process of policy reform and the prescribed governance system that 
results from the politics of natural resource management, power devolution and the authority 
to manage natural resources and revenues that can be generated from them.  Power is also at 
the heart of the performed governance system and the struggles taking place as actors try to 
benefit from the governance and power systems, and shape them according to their private 
interests.  
In this concluding chapter, I draw on the insights from the three empirical chapters to address 
some of the over-arching questions set out in chapter 1 through an examination of three 
socio-political processes cutting across these issues and my empirical chapters: politics, 
power and governance. 
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8.1 Politics, Power and Governance: Empirical and Theoretical Research 
Contributions 
8.1.1 A Comparative Perspective of CBNRM in the Wildlife and Forestry 
Sectors 
In this thesis, I have attempted to broaden the discussion of CBNRM in Tanzania by bringing 
together the concerns over power devolution, elite capture and the unequal and unexpected 
outcomes from CBNRM in a comparative study of WMA and CBFM policy prescription and 
performance.  There are important similarities between the developments of these policies, 
particularly relating to their objectives, the timescale of their development and the role of 
external organisations in agenda setting and policy formulation. These twin policies of 
CBNRM in Tanzania have followed distinct but parallel trajectories in both agenda setting, 
policy development and the assessment of predicted ‘win-win’ outcomes.  In this section, I 
bring together the findings concerned with the distinctions between the two sectors and the 
underlying processes that have led to these distinctions and the differences in outcomes that 
are witnessed. It is clear that this process of political reform is a complex context of 
competing agendas and discourses and differential politicisation of natural resources in the 
forestry and wildlife sectors.   
In chapter 5, I examined the process of policy reform that introduced CBNRM as a national 
policy in Tanzania in both the forestry and wildlife sectors.  One of the three original foci of 
my research was to explain the distinctions between the prescribed governance systems in 
place in CBFM and WMAs.  Three of these differences are key: Firstly, the ways in which 
power is devolved to the local level within WMAs and CBFM, and the different 
configurations of power that result; secondly the application procedure to gazette a WMA 
and a VLFR; and thirdly in the revenue arrangements and mechanisms of distributing funds 
between the national and district levels, and amongst the individuals participating in CBNRM 
in their villages.   
The divergences between the policy pathways in the wildlife and forestry sectors manifest in 
the prescribed governance structures, which devolve power in distinct ways.  The wildlife 
sector and the introduction of WMAs represents a much more cautious devolution of power 
and involves a much larger role for the district and national levels within the governance 
system for a WMA.  Furthermore, WMAs demonstrate the recentralisation of power through 
restrictions and bureaucratic obstacles within power devolution within the original policies 
that introduced WMAs and subsequent amendments to policy that set out further constraints 
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on the autonomy of the local level with regards to the generation and collection of revenues 
from WMAs.  However, the example from the forestry sector in Tanzania indicates that state 
devolution of power to local communities is not inevitably restricted wherever possible.  The 
introduction of CBFM aligned with the interests of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division and 
presented an opportunity to increase the area of land under a category of Protected Area 
without threatening the material interests of the policy community.  There is clearly a 
territorial component to the devolution of power over natural resources.  In the forestry 
sector, where this does not threaten the interests of the state and its officials, and offers an 
opportunity to expand the area under a category of PA (over which the state has some 
advisory capacity at least), it is more broadly accepted and implemented.  Where such 
devolution effectively removes territory from under the control of a state organisation, as 
with WMAs in Tanzania, and threatens officials’ networks and systems of personal gain, 
devolution is much less forthcoming, highly restricted and politically contested.  The case 
studies indicate that the politics of power devolution do not always represent attempts by the 
state to restrict devolution wherever possible, but are a complex interaction between different 
forces shaping natural resource use and their management across different levels.  
The power to control areas of land, make decisions about and benefit from natural resources 
drove the politics at work in both sectors throughout the processes of policy reform and 
creation of the prescribed governance system, and continues to drive the politics of their 
performance.  The differential politicisation of natural resources in the wildlife and forestry 
sectors is key to understanding the different policy pathways adopted, the distinctions in 
power devolution, alongside the attempts at recentralisation that have emerged, and the 
patterns of winners and losers witnessed in both WMAs and CBFM, therefore. 
The economic value of wildlife resources, particularly through the hunting system in 
Tanzania and the opportunities for rent-seeking by national level officials and ministerial 
authorities within an opaque block allocation system was a driving force behind the processes 
of controlled devolution and recentralisation that have been witnessed in WMAs.  In contrast, 
the comparatively low value of forest resources in CBFM projects has facilitated the more 
rapid and full devolution of power in the prescribed VLFR governance system.  Through the 
high value of wildlife resources, they have become increasingly politicised and a focus of 
power struggles as the national level continues to seek opportunities to re-capture control and 
revenue associated with both hunting activities and other forms of revenue generation within 
WMAs.  The key role of natural resource politicisation is also highlighted by the emergence 
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of conflict and resistance to power devolution in CBFM when high value forest resources are 
involved (as discussed in 5.4.2), and also at the local level once the economic potential of 
forest resources becomes clear, sparking conflicts and power struggles within the community 
(see 6.3.4.1). 
The importance of the differential politicisation relating to wildlife and forestry resources 
been crucial in shaping the governance structures prescribed in policy and generating the 
distinctions between WMAs and CBFM described above.  These determining factors also 
have ongoing effects in shaping the patterns of winners and losers within Tanzanian CBNRM 
and the ways in which the governance structures are being performed and contested. 
8.1.2 Winners and Losers in Tanzanian CBNRM 
The politics of power devolution surrounding wildlife resources have created a governance 
system in reality where the authority of the local level and financial benefits of CBNRM are 
restricted.  This has clear implications on the patterns of winners and losers from WMAs, 
whereby a significant proportion of revenue is being retained at national and district levels, 
and local level empowerment is strictly controlled.  My research has highlighted that the 
patterns of winners and losers in both WMAs and CBFM are a product of these prescribed 
governance systems and the scalar configuration of power that they produce, alongside the 
political struggles over natural resource management taking place within and between the 
different levels of administration.   
As discussed in chapter 6, the scalar configuration of power set out in policy for both WMAs 
and CBFM concentrates power devolution at the local level into the Village Natural 
Resources Committee (VNRC) for CBFM and the Authorised Association (AA) for WMAs.  
The concentration of benefits is correspondingly scaled to the level of these institutions, 
taking place within the village level for CBFM and at the inter-village level for WMAs.  In 
both case studies the concentration of power within these organisations was associated with a 
lack of empowerment and low levels of knowledge concerning the WMA or the VLFR, but 
this was especially pronounced in the WMA, where village residents were excluded through 
the scaling of power and governance processes to the inter-village level. 
Furthermore, within these organisations, the capture of benefits by a small number of 
individuals elected to serve in leadership positions was consistently identified.  These 
individuals benefit from the allowances that they are entitled to from carrying out their duties, 
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but also benefit from the training provided to carry out these duties.  The elite capture of 
benefits was further maintained through the restriction of information sharing and the lack of 
ongoing training, by which these individuals were successfully protecting their positions 
within the governance systems, and the benefits they enjoy from this.  The fundamental 
relationship between power and knowledge and the concept of power as a political 
technology is very clear in both the case studies, therefore.  The use of this political 
technology is intrinsically tied to the social construction of subjects and the internalisation of 
values that legitimises and protects the system of power in place, and the elite capture that 
results from it.  Elite capture and its acceptance by the wider community as both inevitable 
and acceptable (to an extent) is also closely tied to local contexts of power within the case 
studies.  The role of neopatrimonial systems of power which surround the leaders of the 
VNRC and the AA, and the internalisation of one’s rights to ‘perks of the job’ when in 
positions of power are vital to the maintenance of these processes of elite capture. Actors 
continually try to re-position themselves to benefit from the management of natural 
resources, employing power as a political technology, tricks of the game and politics of scales 
to do so.  Such tactics are generally accepted and internalised as both legitimate and 
inevitable.   
8.1.3 The Reality of Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
Power is not only exercised and constructed in the prescription of policy and the formal 
governance structure set out, but is adapted around existing systems of power (within the 
local community and between these communities and other levels operating within the 
WMA/VLFR), and is re-configured by the actors involved across these levels.  These 
processes of integration with previous arrangements and the re-configuration of power 
systems that is constantly taking place are largely responsible for the differences seen 
between the prescribed and performed governance systems.  This is not a case of poor 
implementation, but one of the unrecognised or unanticipated socio-politics surrounding 
implementation. 
The devolution of power to manage natural resources to the local level within CBNRM 
necessarily involves changing relationships of power between the state and the local level, 
although subject to the politics of this change as described above.  CBNRM also introduced 
changing power relationships at the local level however; the introduction of the Authorised 
Association (AA) to manage a WMA has created new scalar configurations of power with 
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respect to natural resources and altered the roles of the Village Council dramatically; 
similarly in the forestry sector the introduction of CBFM has shifted relationships of power 
between the Village Council and the Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC).  
CBNRM is introduced at the local level within an existing context of power, and the 
performed governance system emerges as an integration and struggle between these two 
systems of power and the shifts described above.  The evidence from both case studies clearly 
shows that the performed governance system and the power systems within them are under 
constant struggle and re-negotiation as actors try to position themselves and manipulate the 
projects for their own interests.  These struggles are a key feature of the politics of scales 
taking place within Tanzanian CBNRM and an important shaping force underlying the 
patterns of winners and losers within both the WMA and CBFM case studies.  These 
processes of scalar transformation shaped people’s participation within the projects, the 
election processes within CBFM and the revenue opportunities available to the village.  I 
argue that a scalar perspective makes it evident that power is at the centre of these conflicts.  
Whilst the nature of conflicts is specific to the case studies and the natural resources sector in 
which they operate, the identified struggles all converge around the locus of power at the 
local levels and the distinct features of the topographies of power in each case.  I have 
referred to this as indicating the same politics at different scales within the politics of scales 
and processes of contestation of power.   
I have employed a definition of governance in my research that acknowledges the roles of 
both formal and informal means to creating a management system (see 1.4).  It is clear that 
the implementation and reality of CBNRM in Tanzania as seen in the performed governance 
systems, and their divergence from that prescribed in policy, is constantly being shaped by 
informal processes and de facto rules of the game.  CBNRM is initiated within a context of 
existing local contours of power and socially accepted norms and rules.  Neopatrimonial 
systems of power remain hugely influential and are re-shaping the governance systems, their 
performance and the outcomes of CBNRM.  The unequal distribution of benefits and 
presence of elite capture are widely lamented within Tanzanian CBNRM, and both the case 
studies demonstrated these processes in action with little challenge or resistance from the 
wider community.  Those that benefit most from CBNRM at the local level are consistently 
identified as those that hold positions on the committees charged with decision-making and 
natural resource management on behalf of the community.  These individuals hold positions 
of status within the communities and enjoy many ‘perks of the job’.  I have likened them to 
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the ‘big man’ in politics (Sahlins, 1963), whereby individuals construct power through the 
creation of a network of supporters and the ability to redistribute resources to these 
supporters.  
 I have argued that the deviations from policy and the unequal distribution of benefits from 
CBNRM witnessed in the case studies were largely unchallenged due partly to these 
neopatrimonial networks in place around the leaders of the VNRC and AA (see 7.4).  The 
privileged and protected position of these big men is also due partly to the social norms and 
culture of respect surrounding such positions.  Furthermore cultural factors are important to 
understanding the differences between the prescribed and performed governance systems, 
especially in terms of the acceptance of unequal distribution of benefits from CBNRM.  
Tanzanian culture respects and rewards the individuals who play the game successfully.  
These values are internalised by members of the community, who accept the right of those 
that are able to benefit in whatever way that they can, and simultaneously their own right to 
benefit in such ways if they can position themselves to access such benefits.  The power 
systems and social norms shaping the performed governance system are continually 
undergoing processes of structuration and confirm structuration, serving to legitimise the 
status of the leaders of the VNRC and the AA, and justifying the processes and maintenance 
of elite capture.   
In my research I have focused on the devolution of power within CBNRM and the struggles 
this invokes.  My research also highlights features of resistance however.  The research 
findings with respect to resistance are complex; whilst the politics of scales discussed clearly 
indicate that power is clearly being contested and re-configured in both WMAs and CBFM, 
the discussion above indicates that power, and the inequalities it supports, often go 
unchallenged.  Power and resistance are neither uniform nor universal, but are woven 
throughout the socio-political fabric of everyday life.  It is not a case of power either being 
totalitarian and imperceptible, or always subject to resistance (however subtle it may be).  
Instead, power is at times invisible and internalised and in other contexts it is resisted, and 
this resistance is itself bound by the system of power.  For example, I have argued that the 
case studies indicate that power is rarely questioned or resisted in an outright fashion.  The 
conflicts taking place within both case studies represent a form of defiance and resistance, but 
they do so within the confines of the performed governance system, and in ways that reduce 
the confrontational manner of these conflicts, as dictated by socio-cultural aspects of power 
within Tanzania.  In place of outright challenges, the politics of scales perspective used in 
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this thesis shows that processes of active destruction were used to destabilise scalar 
configurations of power (Fraser, 2010).  As discussed in 2.4.2, these processes of scalecraft 
indicate the inter-relatedness of structure and agency as actors organise themselves and their 
agency around the structures in place.   
8.1.4 The Discursive Process of Policy Reform 
A final theoretical and empirical contribution made in this thesis concerns the discursive 
process of policy reform, and particularly the role of the local level in these negotiations.  The 
prescribed governance systems that set up the differences between WMAs and CBFM 
described in this research were formed from influences across levels, including Transnational 
Conservation Organisations (TNCOs), the state, key individuals within the policy community 
and actors at the local level.  The different policy pathways adopted in the forestry and 
wildlife sectors, and that underpin WMAs and CBFM in Tanzania result from the 
preferences, values and beliefs of these actors and groups, alongside multiple political-
economic factors that drove policy processes.  My research supports and contributes to the 
body of work that has begun to highlight the political economic process of policy reform in 
Tanzania, therefore (e.g. Nelson and Blomley, 2010), and has expanded this discussion to 
consider the discursive processes that took place within agenda setting and policy 
formulation.  Furthermore, the research presented in this thesis has highlighted the role of the 
local level in these policy processes, particularly the influence of the REWMP/MBOMIPA 
projects in the wildlife sector.  Such roles of the local level and the influence of donor-funded 
pilot projects are often left un-discussed, but here I have emphasised their potential roles in 
the co-construction of policy with the national level, and especially the policy community.  It 
is also apparent that the role of the local level in policy processes is an invited one, and their 
position within an institutionalised discourse coalition does not guarantee influence in policy 
formulation,  and that this is subject to power relations between the policy network, the 
discourse coalition and the policy community.  Policy space is both constructed by 
individuals and restricted by them according to these power relations and the discursive 
processes that surround them, therefore.  The discursive nature of policy reform is also clear: 
Policies are, after all, created by people, all of whom approach the process of policy reform 
with their own understandings, priorities and motivations.  The resulting policy pathway and 
prescribed governance structures is an embodiment of those actors’ success at discursively 
negotiating policy processes within the context of driving forces that surround natural 
resource management (or any policy issue).  Pilot projects are not only capable of influencing 
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policy reform processes however; they can also be shaped by them.  In 5.5 I argued that 
strategic positions within a policy network make pilot projects useful to the policy 
community, and the discursive processes of policy formulation they are engaged in, by 
providing an opportunity to witness policy options in practice.  The REWMP/MBOMIPA 
example highlights that pilot projects can play a role in shaping policy processes, but also the 
substantial impact they may have on pilot projects. 
8.2 Practical Research Contributions, Implications and Future Directions 
In this thesis, I have focused specifically on the complexities and struggles taking place 
within case study CBFM and WMA projects.  I have argued that it is vital to understand the 
ways in which such policies and projects are performing differently to what is expected, and I 
have attempted to delve into the messiness, highlight the loopholes, inequalities and 
undesirable mechanisms and processes that are shaping the case studies.  What emerges is a 
picture of CBNRM in Tanzania that is fraught with struggle and tactical manipulation, and 
where actors across levels are engaged in a ceaseless game to benefit from natural resources, 
often at the expense of others.  I believe this to be true, and I argue that such processes are 
inherent to CBNRM, but I also argue that they should be taken in context.  The two case 
studies discussed in this thesis are both well-regarded examples of WMAs and CBFM within 
Tanzania.  They are successful in many ways: they both have a long history of generating 
revenue at the local level; they have both been in operation for over a decade and have 
successfully transitioned from donor-funded projects to implementing national policy; they 
are both fully authorised and functioning examples of WMAs and CBFM that have operated 
under community authority for at least five years and do not appear to be in danger of 
collapsing in the near future.  The longevity of these projects and their continuing presence 
should be recognised as an achievement.  My research has been at pains to point out their 
imperfections and inadequacies, but they function, in unexpected and unequal ways, but 
function nonetheless.   
I have not focused on the biophysical elements of these CBNRM projects, and I have not 
attempted to investigate the conservation outcomes witnessed in these projects.  This is an 
area for rewarding future research and collaboration with other research projects in the area75.  
However, the findings of this research with regards to rule-breaking and corruption, and 
                                                 
75 See the Ruaha Carnivore Project (www.ruahacarnivoreproject.com) and The Wildlife Connection 
(www.thewildlifeconnection.org), accessed 07/04/13 
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particularly the potential integration of local level actors involved in CBNRM into regional 
and national networks of illegal resource exploitation and personal gain, do raise important 
questions for conservation outcomes.  Local villagers argue that wildlife and the forest are 
benefitting from CBNRM, hunting is reduced, illegal activities are curbed and the impacts of 
this are seen.  However, my research has highlighted the unequal distribution of costs and 
benefits being experienced by local residents, which may lead to disillusionment and 
destructive environmental practices as people abandon the project and its rules, as previously 
discussed by Gillingham (1998) and Songorwa (1999).  The discourse of CBNRM argues that 
conservation outcomes from both WMAs and CBFM are twinned with the development 
outcomes that are achieved.  I have highlighted the inequalities and often disappointing 
results for development in both case studies, which suggests that conservation objectives are 
jeopardised by the complexities discussed in my research.  I am hesitant to suggest that the 
socio-political complexities of CBNRM discussed here should be taken to show that such 
policies and projects are failing.  I have maintained that these projects indicate that CBNRM 
in Tanzania is working in unique and evolving ways, and I argue that the patterns of both 
development and conservation outcomes can be expected to follow similarly intricate and 
dynamic paths.  Future research that could link the socio-political complexities discussed in 
this thesis with analysis of the conservation status of the MBOMIPA WMA and Kiwere 
VLFR would be highly beneficial. 
The intrinsically political and power-driven nature of natural resource management, policy 
reform and CBNRM are not new themes within political ecology (see Forsyth, 2003; 
Robbins, 2004; Adams and Hutton, 2007; Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2007).  The 
objective of my research in this thesis was to carry out an in-depth investigation into the 
socio-political processes at work within CBNRM in Tanzania, and to provide insight into the 
outcomes and inequalities that are witnessed in WMAs and CBFM.  In doing this, I have 
brought together several different bodies of literature, connected through the theme of power, 
to provide a holistic perspective of the prescribed and performed governance systems in place 
within a WMA and a VLFR.  I have used political ecology as an approach, placing power at 
the core of these socio-political issues and drawing on these further areas of study to gain 
depth of insight into the processes at work.  I argue that a political ecology approach, and 
particularly the freedom this provides to integrate further areas of research, offers the 
opportunity and highlights the necessity of serious consideration of the complexities of such 
socio-political processes.   
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There is ongoing debate within and around political ecology as to how it can, or whether it 
should be useful (see Vayda and Walters, 1999; Walker, 2005; Walker, 2006; Forsyth, 2008; 
Blaikie, 2011).  Below I argue that the political ecology approach implemented within this 
thesis has highlighted several ways in which recommendations can be made to improve the 
problems associated with both WMAs and CBFM in Tanzania.  However, I also argue that 
the biggest contribution made by this kind of research is not the adjustments to policy that 
may come out of such research, but the recognition and attempts at mainstreaming the 
importance of investigating the political nature of such issues.  As I stated in chapter 1, 
understanding the outcomes, successes and failures of CBNRM is simply incomplete without 
attempting to understand the ‘how’ of governance processes (Büscher and Dressler, 2007).  
Whilst it is perhaps easier to create new forms of devolved environmental management, new 
markets for environmental commodities (fictitious or not) and new revenue generation 
schemes, such technocratic fixes will always be subject to similar power struggles, political 
processes and shaping forces that have been witnessed with CBNRM.  We must learn to 
accept the messiness, not as poor implementation, but as characteristic and a permanent 
feature. 
There are always adjustments that could improve the outcomes of CBNRM in Tanzania.  My 
research has highlighted the concentration of power, opportunities for training and benefits in 
the hands of a small group of individuals elected to serve as leaders of the AA and the 
VNRC.  Creating a rule that the same individual cannot serve in these positions indefinitely, 
and that training must be provided so that newly elected members can carry out their duties 
effectively might alleviate this issue and spread the benefits of such roles to a wider group of 
people.  It is important to note, however, that such ‘tweaks’ to policy and the rules of the 
game would only spread these benefits so far within the participating communities, and are 
not a silver bullet to the problem.  Secondly, the prescription of a new rule does not guarantee 
its performance as envisaged.  As is clearly indicated by the MBOMIPA example, stipulation 
of the proportion of revenue that should be distributed to participating villages does not 
prevent divergence from this figure, and constitutional decree of the equal sharing of revenue 
between all participating villages does not prevent attempts to change this (see 6.3.4.2).  
Similarly, prescription of the rules for sanctioning offenders within CBFM does not mean 
that different rules which adhere to a moral economy or which facilitate bribery will cease to 
have influence (see 7.2 and 7.3).  Attempts to increase the remuneration available to forest 
scouts is often advocated as a solution to bribery and enforcement problems within CBFM, 
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but as discussed in 7.4.1, these problems rest not simply on the poor wages and harsh 
conditions experienced by forest scouts, but also upon complex cultural factors that uphold 
practices of accepting a bribe for turning a blind eye and encourage the seizure of 
opportunities to improve one’s own situation, and that of those who depend upon you, 
wherever possible.  I argue that an ongoing process of ‘tweaking’ is advisable to continually 
monitor the devolved governance of natural resources.  The performed governance system is 
not static, but is constantly shifting as actors adapt to the de jure and de facto rules.  There is 
no optimal configuration of CBNRM governance systems, or end point to aim for.  CBNRM 
requires constant attention to the power struggles and manoeuvrings within the performed 
governance system to understand and address the imbalances that emerge. 
Similarly I would argue that the issues and inequalities within Tanzanian CBNRM cannot be 
resolved by expurgating all forms of local level corruption from within the governance 
systems being performed in WMAs and CBFM.  This research has highlighted the complex 
cultural foundations of practices that others may classify as morally corrupt, but which can be 
alternatively viewed as adherence to a different set of rules, accepted and upheld by actors.  
My research is closely aligned with efforts to investigate the ways in which development 
efforts can work alongside and through local contexts of power and political systems, such as 
neopatrimonialism (Kelsall et al., 2010).  The further depth of understanding demonstrated in 
this thesis as to how these systems of power relate to the management of natural resources 
within CBNRM in a Tanzanian context opens up a potentially fruitful area for further 
research that draws together my own research area with questions about how to work with, 
and get the most for development objectives, from such systems of power. 
A final core finding of my research is the constantly shifting nature of political struggles 
within devolved natural resource management.  In 6.3 I discussed the politics of scales 
ongoing within the case studies of CBFM and a WMA.  These struggles take place as actors 
try to position themselves to benefit from CBNRM in Tanzania, and it is important to note 
that they have emerged in response to, and around the configurations of power within CBFM 
and WMAs (see also Smith, 1992).  What these scalar transformations and conflicts highlight 
is that governance systems and the power systems within them are not static, and that actors 
are engaged in constant struggle.  Whatever changes are made to the prescribed and 
performed governance systems, these processes of struggle will remain, and new forms of 
conflict and scalar re-configurations will emerge.  As discussed in 2.2.3, policy reform does 
not begin with agenda setting, move through processes of policy formulation and end with 
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implementation, but is an ongoing process of negotiation and development (Keeley and 
Scoones, 2003).  Further research into the case studies discussed in this thesis might trace the 
shifting politics that continue to feature in both Kiwere and MBOMIPA as the AA and 
VNRC go through subsequent elections, new AA investment contracts are signed  and the 
policy environment begins to concentrate seriously on the opportunities presented by REDD 
in Tanzania (see Burgess et al., 2010).  The adoption of REDD in Tanzania may also present 
an interesting opportunity to investigate further comparisons between the different types of 
market-based mechanisms for local development within Tanzania. 
Finally, future research might expand the discussion in 5.5 regarding the role of different 
non-state actors in policy processes and the politics of scales discussed in 6.3.  The role of the 
Hunting Association of Tanzania in policy processes, for example, is yet to be explored with 
respect to the development of the 1998 Wildlife Policy for Tanzania.  Future policy changes 
and amendments to the prescribed governance structures within WMAs may also emerge 
through the ongoing roles of TNCOs (and particularly WWF; see 6.3.2.2), and their roles in 
the initiation and shaping of the National Consortium for AAs is a potentially interesting field 
of research.  The politics of scales and conflicts that might emerge in Tanzania through such 
an organisation at the national level may have profound impacts on the devolution of power 
within WMAs, particularly with respect to the hunting revenues distributed by the Wildlife 
Division, which has been an ongoing debate for several years (as discussed in 5.2.4; see also 
Shauri, 1999; Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001; Nelson et al., 2007).   
All of these topics might produce interesting future research that continues the contribution of 
this thesis to dedicating research efforts to deepen understanding of the complexities of 
CBNRM, both in a Tanzanian empirical context, and in a theoretical context by outlining 
further aspects of the role of power in shaping policy processes and its continual 
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Appendix 1: Bundles of rights in natural resource management (adapted from Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001) 
 
Drawing on the common-pool resources literature, the table below outlines the continuum of different bundles of rights, made up of operational-
use rights and property rights, which may be devolved to a community under CBNRM or other forms of community conservation.  These 
bundles of rights are critical to the autonomy of the community in decision-making and are a representation of the devolution of power. 







The right to enter and 
obtain resource units or 
products from the resource 






The Parks and People Programme in Nepal’s Terai is a buffer zone 
project that permits local communities limited rights of access and 
withdrawal.  Management decisions are retained at the level of the 
park authorities 
Management 
The right to regulate 
patterns of use and to make 
decisions to transform the 






Joint Forest Management in India grants communities access and 
user rights.  Management rights are in place but highly 
controversial.  Little security of tenure limits property rights to that 
of authorized claimants 
 
Exclusion 
The right to determine who 
has access to withdrawal 
rights and prevent those 
without rights from 




Community Forestry in Nepal is associated with proprietorship 
status for local communities.  Communities make day to day 
management decisions governing the rules of use within their 
forests and also enforce sanctions upon those who break these rules 
Alienation The right to sell or lease the rights described above 
Owner 
 
Community-based forestry management projects in Tanzania are 
located on land owned by the communities and they have the right 
to lease withdrawal rights (see Blomley et al., 2008). 
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Appendix 2: Schedule of Interviews, Focus Groups and Qualitative 




SSI Semi-Structured Interview 
QS Qualitative Survey 
FG Focus Group 
PO Participant Observation 
LA Local Assistant Report 
 
Code Category Respondent Date 
P1 SSI Former MEMA Project Officer 11/2010 
P2 SSI Academic Researcher 15/2/2011 
P3 SSI Academic Researcher 15/2/2011 
P4 SSI Academic Researcher 11/2/2011 
P5 SSI Academic Researcher 3/7/2010 
P6 SSI Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (1) 17/6/2010 
P7 SSI Academic Researcher 17/2/2011 
P8 SSI Regional Wetlands Officer 6/2010 
P9 SSI Regional Participatory Forest Management Officer 17/6/2010 
P10 SSI District Catchment Forest Officer and Former MEMA Project Officer 24/6/2010 
P11 SSI District Natural Resources Officer 02/2011 
P12 Transcript District Catchment Forest Officer and Former MEMA Project Officer N/A 
 



















Local Assistant Reports: 
Benefits and Problems 





Scouts and Patrols 
Rules of the Forest 











P28 SSI District Natural Resources Officer 15/6/2010 
P29 – P33 QS 5 CBFM villages 08/10 
P34 SSI Kiwere VNRC Secretary 03/11 
P35 SSI Kiwere VNRC Chairman 03/11 
P36 SSI Kiwere Village Chairman 03/11 
P37 SSI Kiwere VNRC Assistant Secretary 03/11 
P38 SSI Kiwere Village Treasurer 03/11 
P39 SSI Kiwere VNRC Treasurer 03/11 
P40 SSI Kiwere Village Executive Officer 03/11 
P41 FG Kiwere VNRC Representatives 04/11 
P42 Transcript Kiwere VNRC Secretary 03/11 
P43 Transcript Kiwere Village Chairman N/A 
P44 Transcript Kiwere VNRC Assistant Secretary N/A 
P45 Transcript Kiwere Village Treasurer N/A 
P46 Transcript Kiwere VNRC Treasurer N/A 
P47 – P56 SSI Kiwere Village Residents 03/11 
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P65 FG Kiwere Village Scouts 04/11 
P66 PA Kiwere VNRC Responsibilities 03/11 
P67 PA Kiwere Forest Patrol Systems 04/11 
P68 PA Kiwere VLFR Income Systems 04/11 
P69 PA Kiwere Charcoal Systems 03/11 
P70 PA Kiwere Tobacco Systems 03/11 
P71 PA Kiwere Beekeeping Systems 03/11 
P72 PA Kiwere Wealth Ranking 03/11 
P73 SSI Former MBOMIPA Project Officer  6/2/2010 P74 20/10/2010 
P75 SSI Consultant (CBNRM) 08/2008 10/4/2010 
P76 SSI Former PAWM Staff Member 12/2010 
P77 SSI Former REWMP Project Officer 12/2010 
P78 SSI Academic Researcher 17/7/2010 
P79 SSI Tourist Lodge Owner 1/5/2010 
P80 SSI Former Wildlife Division staff member 17/2/2011 
P81 SSI Tourist Lodge Owner 02/2011 
P82 




P86 SSI Wildlife Conservation Society Staff Member (2) 21/3/2010 12/5/2011 
P87 SSI District Game Officer 24/6/2010 P88 31/1/2011 
P89, P90 SSI Makifu Village Chairman 8/4/11 
P91, P92 SSI Makifu Village Executive Officer 13/4/11 
P93, P94 SSI Makifu MBOMIPA Representative (1) 19/4/11 
P95, P96 SSI Makifu Village Treasurer 21/4/11 
P97, P99 SSI Makifu MBOMIPA Representative (2) 22/4/11 
P100, P101 SSI Chairman of the MBOMIPA Authorised Association 26/4/2011 
P102 SSI Chairman of the MBOMIPA Board of Trustees 3/2/2011 
P103 SSI MBOMIPA Investor 07/2010 
P104 SSI Secretary to the MBOMIPA Authorised Association 17/7/2010 
P105 SSI Former Chairman to the MBOMIPA Board of Trustees 07/2010 
P106 Transcript Makifu Village Chairman N/A 
P107 Transcript Makifu Village Executive Officer N/A 
P108 Transcript Makifu MBOMIPA Representative (1) N/A 
P109 Transcript Makifu MBOMIPA Representative (2) N/A 
P110 – P117 SSI Makifu Village residents (Makanisoka) 04/11 
P118-P137 QS 21 MBOMIPA villages 07/2010 
P138 - P145 SSI Makifu Village residents (Makifu) 4/11 
P146 - P153 SSI Makifu Village residents (Makambalala B) 4/11 
P154 - P159 SSI Makifu Village residents (Makambalala A) 5/11 
P160, P161 FG Makifu VNRC 8/4/11 
P162, P163 FG Makifu Village residents (Mahove) 05/11 
P164, P165 FG Makifu Village Scouts 05/11 
P166, P167 FG Makifu Village residents (Isanga) 05/11 
P168 SSI Luganga Village Chairman 06/11 
P169 SSI Luganga MBOMIPA Representatives 06/11 













P171, P172 SSI Mbuyuni MBOMIPA Representatives 06/11 
P173 SSI Itunundu Village Chairman 06/11 
P174, P175 SSI Itunundu MBOMIPA Representatives 06/11 
P178, P179 SSI Nyamahana Village Chairman 30/4/11 
P180, P181 SSI Nyamahana MBOMIPA Representatives 30/4/11 
P182 - P186 PO Makifu Village Meeting 4/11 
P187 PO Makifu Village Meeting 03/11 
P188 Transcript Nyamahana Village Chairman N/A 
P189 Transcript Nyamahana MBOMIPA Representatives N/A 
P190 PO Kiwere Village Meetings 04/11 
P191 SSI Village Key informant 5/11 
P192 SSI Village Key informant 5/11 
P193 PA Makifu  Farming Calendar 05/11 
P194 PA Makifu Wealth Ranking 05/11 
P195 SSI Kiwere Assistant Chairman 03/11 
P196 FG Kiwere VNRC Leaders 04/11 
P197 Transcript Kiwere Village Chairman N/A 
P198 SSI Government Advisor 09/2008 
P199 SSI Government Advisor 09/2008 
P200 SSI Academic Researcher 11/2010 
P201 SSI Academic Researcher 07/2010 
P202 SSI Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2) 09/2008 




Appendix 3: List of Documents Collected and Analysed 
The documents are arranged according to their source. 
Government of Tanzania: 
 
• Wildlife Conservation Act (1974) 
• National Forest Policy of Tanzania (1998)  
• Wildlife Policy for Tanzania (1998) 
• Local Government Act (Act 6; 1999) 
• Land Act (1999) 
• Village Land Act (1999) 
• Forest Act (2002) 
• The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations (2002) 
• Population and Housing Census: Iringa Region profile (2002) 
• Agricultural census: Smallholder household characteristics and access to services and 
natural resources (2002-3) 
• The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations (2005) 
• Iringa Region: Socio-economic profile (2007) 
• Wildlife Policy for Tanzania (2007) 
• Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulations, 2007 
(Amended) 
• Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) 
• Muungano wa Jumuiya Zilizoidhinishwa za Hifadhi ya Maeneo ya Wanyamapori 
Tanzania(Authorised Associations Consortium; 2011) 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism: 
• Draft national policy for wildlife conservation and utilisation (1994) 
• Draft Wildlife Management Area Guidelines (2000) 
• Second Draft Wildlife Management Area Guidelines (2000) 
• Wildlife Conservation (tourist hunting) Regulations (2000) 
• Draft Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations 
• Wildlife Management Areas Regulations (2001) 
• Community-Based Forest Management Guidelines (2001) 
• Guidelines for the designation and management of wildlife management areas (2001) 
• Wildlife Conservation (tourist hunting) Regulations (2002) 
• Procedures for communities to enter into joint ventures in WMAs (2002) 
• Reference Manual for implementing guidelines for the designation and management 
of wildlife management area (WMAs) in Tanzania (2003) 
• A report on baseline information of pilot wildlife management areas in Tanzania: First 
draft of the Southern working group (2003) 
• Baseline Survey of the Eastern Pilot Wildlife Management Areas, Volume 2: Idodi-
Pawaga (2003) 





• MBOMIPA project induction (1998) 
• MBOMIPA project notes (1998) 
• MBOMIPA Quarterly Reports (1-6; Oct 97-Jun 99) 
• Roles of Village Natural Resource Committee (Sep 98) 
• Seminar on the Roles and Relationships between Village Governments, Village 
Natural Resource Committees and government  departments (Nov 98) 
• Summary of activities to December 1998 
• Report on seminars for village leaders (Feb 99) 
• Feasibility Report: beekeeping and honey (May 99) 
• Report on the workshop on participatory techniques and planning for Village Land 
Use Plan (May 99) 
• Report on the workshop on initiating Income Generating Activities (Sep, 99) 
• Report: Game Scout Training (Sep, 99) 
• Training for Game Scouts, Village Natural Resources Committees and the 
implementation of participation (Nov, 99) 
• MBOMIPA Participatory planning reports (all villages; 1999)Proposed revision of 
logical framework (Jan 2000) 
• Follow up training for Village Government and Village Natural Resource Committees 
(Jun 2000) 
• MBOMIPA review (2000) 
• Key issues for the MBOMIPA project (2000) 
• Participatory monitoring of wildlife resources (Mar 2001) 
• MBOMIPA constitution of registered trustees (2002) 
• MBOMIPA project key issues (2003) 
• MBOMIPA final report (2003) 
• Pawaga-Idodi proposed wildlife management area: Draft resource management zone 
plan (2006) 
MEMA: 
• Progressive report MEMA Projects 1999-2003 
• MEMA Progress Report (2001) 
• MEMA Semi-Annual Progress Report no. 1: September 1999 – May 2000 
• MEMA Semi-Annual Progress Report no. 2: May 2000 – December 2000 
• Socio-Economic Baselines (Kiwere, Mfyome, Kitapilimwa, Itagutwa, Kinyang’anga; 
2000) 
• Training Needs Assessment and Human Resource Development Plan (March 2001) 
• Non-wood Forest Product Baseline Survey (April 2000) 
• MEMA Semi-Annual Progress Report no. 3: January – June 2001 
• MEMA Semi-Annual Progress Report no. 4: July – December 2001 
• Review of MEMA Phase I and Formulation/Pre-appraisal of a Second Phase 
(September, 2001) 
• Assessment of Gender Issues in Participatory Forest Management (November, 2001) 
• MEMA Semi-Annual Progress Report no. 5: January – June 2002. 
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• MEMA Semi-Annual Progress Report no. 6: July – December 2002 
• MEMA Kitapilimwa Forest Reserve. Agreement, Bylaw & Management Plan (2002) 
• MEMA. North Nyang’oro Woodlands Village Land Forest. Agreement, Bylaw & 
• Management Plan (June 2002) 
• MEMA South Nyang’oro Woodlands Village Land Forest. Agreement, Bylaw 
&Management Plan (June 2002). 
• MEMA: Initial learning experiences (2003) 
Kiwere Village Council: 
• Agreement: Forest of Kidundakiyave 
Wildlife Conservation Society Tanzania: 
• Community-Based Wildlife Management: MBOMIPA 
• Ruaha Landscape Programme Strategic Plan 
• Ruaha Landscape Programme Report 2008/09 
Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam: 
• Assessment and Evaluation of the Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania (2007) 
Health and Development International Consultants (HDIC): 
• Socio-Economic Baseline Studies in Selected Wildlife Management Areas under the 
Financial Crisis Initiative/Cash-for-Work Program (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
